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THE GREAT SHIVERING AROUND THE MILLENNIUM
L. CSONTOS —J. KIRÁLY— G. LASZLO
Recently several stud ies and  essays have been published in H ungary which are devoted to  
th e  “d isto rted" developm ent of the  financial system , and th e  excessive influence of “m oney and  
finance” . T he purpose of th is s tudy  is to de tect th e  com ponents of th e  everyday fears an d  to 
confront them  with some insights of m onetary economics. T he s tu d y  is divided in to  th ree  pa rts . 
In th e  first one, we analyse th e  theoretical, m ethodological problem s of the  “m oney dom inance 
proposition” , particu larly  the  strong  version thereof, and its norm ative background. T he second 
p a r t  reac ts to  sta tem en ts which stress the  detachm ent of financial interm ediaries from  th e  “rea l” 
world, the  q u an tita tive  explosion of financial interm ediaries and  m onetary  aggregates, and their 
existence as “an  independent v irtua l reality” . T his section describes the  factors th a t  affect fi­
nancial innovation m ost strongly, an d  the  functions of techniques an d  transactions th a t  are often 
depicted  as having a  diabolical na ture . Explicitly or implicitly, critiques of th e  financial system  
often  call for s tric te r regulation or s ta te  intervention. Therefore, in the  th ird  p a r t  we a tte m p t 
to outline th e  po ten tial reasons for, and likely consequences of financial regulation— no t only the 
supposedly positive side-effects b u t also the  negative ones.*
A recurrent topic of essays and studies on the international economy has been 
the shivering vision of m ankind’s destruction and m ental degeneration. In the sec­
ond half of the 20th century, such an apocalyptic vision was presented in a report 
of the Club of Rome. This projected slower economic growth, faster population 
growth, and thus the tragic over-reproduction of humanity. I t was followed by de­
nials, then denials of the denials and so forth. Recently, the greatest shiver has 
probably been triggered by the “virtual financial world” which is organised in a 
“global phantom  structu re” . According to Korien (1996) financial institu tions, as 
economic entities having been originally created to channel resources in to  produc­
tive investments, have turned into a global financial system  which is dedicated to 
robbing taxpayers and the productive economy, and is ruled by exploitation, risk 
induction and speculation.
It is not a t all difficult to  find similar quotations, since the topic is among the 
m ost popular ones in contem porary essay-writing. Laymen and economists, promi-
'T h re e  of us began to write th is p ap er—however, by th e  tim e we finished, László Csontos had  
left us forever. He could no t read  the  final version, therefore all responsibility falls on th e  two of 
us. A shorter version of the  study  was published in the  July  issue of th e  Beszélő under the  title  
“Has the  financial system  degenerated?”
The au th o rs  would like to  th an k  László Antal,  Iván Csaba, E rzsébet Gém,  László Harmati,  
A ndrás Huszár , Ferenc Karvalits,  György Lengyel,  A ndrás Mikolasek , P é te r  Pete,  Z oltán  Szántó  
and  Balázs Vedres for their valuable com m ents and assistance.
1 0001—6373/95/S5.00 ©  1997-98 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
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nent au thors1 and journalists from countries expelled from the world’s financial 
centres, resigned philosophers and enthusiastic activists cover the dead-end devel­
opm ent of the financial system. In Hungary, critical voices concerning the financial 
system ’s development, the new financial instrum ents and the excessive influence of 
the financial world have become especially loud in the past two years. This can 
be partly  explained by the recent and lasting crisis in H ungarian banking, the suc­
cessive bank scandals and the consolidation. However, the often rather passionate 
wording is possibly linked to the disappointm ent they feel over the process and the 
perspectives of the “G reat Transition” . Personal grievances, excessive em otions and 
a belief in the moral finality of criticism often reduce the objectivity of the debate. 
This approach has entered popular magazines and Sunday supplem ents, thus it 
should not be long when m ost “m en-in-the-street” will also blam e the money and 
finance, the bankers and the stock exchange for any worsening in their situation.
Fears and suspicion about the social institu tion of money are not novel: in the 
first book of Politics, A ristotle discussed when money use turned dangerous for the 
public. The debates about usury and unrestricted money-money transactions in the 
Middle Ages, and the writings of m odern philosophers about money and freedom, 
money and equality are all predecessors of the recent “great shivering” . Yet, debates 
about money have always had more than  one layer: worries and criticisms of certain 
financial techniques such as the use of paper money or the term ination  of the role of 
gold in in ternational finance often hide a critique of contem porary society, in fact 
the refusal of m odernisation (see, for example, Franket 1977; Schumpeter 1955; 
Lowry 1979).
This study attem pts to  detect the components of the fears, and to  confront 
these with a sort of academic approach. It is divided into three sections. In the 
first section, we will deal with the “financial dom inance” proposition. The “ weak” 
version of it  claims th a t the actors of the finanacial superstructure are m ostly able 
to  assert their interests over those in the real economy, whereas the strong version 
sta tes th a t the players in the “real” economy make decisions and act subject to 
money m arkets, obeying “the wills and commands of finance” . This p a rt will 
focus on the methodological problems of such explanations and their norm ative 
background.
The second section will examine one of the pillars of the dominance proposi­
tion, notably the sta tem ent which claims th a t the financial system  has broken free 
and become self-ruling. Here, we will generally react to  statem ents which stress 
the detachm ent of financial interm ediaries from the “real” world, the quantitative 
explosion of financial processes, and its existence as “a virtual reality living an in­
dependent life” . We will describe the factors th a t affect financial innovation most
1 Galbraith (1995) (See Tamas Bacskai’s book review (1996)). Keynes, the  m ost influential 
econom ist of the  century, also had  grave reservations towards some, th en  new developm ents of 
m oney and  th e  cap ita l m arkets. (Keynes  1965, pp. 180-181.)
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strongly, and the functions of techniques, and transactions th a t are often depicted 
as having a diabolical nature. The presentation of the economic background of these 
processes is im portan t because, though the debate is long-standing, the analytical 
tools available have greatly increased in number over the past decades.
Explicitly or implicitly, critiques of the financial system  often call for stricter 
regulation or sta te  intervention. Therefore, we will a ttem pt to  outline the potential 
consequences of regulation—not only the supposedly positive side-effects bu t also 
the negative ones. Barriers raised by regulation have made a significant— and often 
forgotten— contribution to  the development of the financial m arkets, so one m ust 
briefly examine these before lifting new barriers. The third section will a ttem p t to 
do this.
We believe th a t a sorting and a thorough analysis of statem ents on which 
debates about the weight and role of the financial system  are based should help us 
to  acquire a deeper understanding of the topic. The stable and effective operation  of 
financial interm ediaries is crucial for economic development and equilibrium . This 
fact, as well as the rapid emergence of new financial instrum ents, do indeed impose 
regulatory tasks on the government, yet the s ta te ’s role and the solution itself are 
far from being unambiguous. However, it has very rarely been so—consequently, 
these issues require explanation rather than  mystical treatm ent.
The “dominance” propositions
T he critics of the financial system largely agree th a t money and the finan­
cial interm ediation system  have lost their original function, and turned  in to  a 
“self-ruling” , “v irtua l” world. Some would even add th a t “economic activities— 
preserving humanity, and its natu ral and cultural environm ents— obey financial 
power.” ( Lányi 1996)
The proponents of this view insist on asserting th a t money and finance rule 
over the real sector or the “real” world in the m arket economies at the end of the 
20th century.2 Such statem ents will usually be messy: they do not identify “who” 
or “w hat” rules over “who” or “w hat” ; therefore, w hat we call the dominance 
proposition has a num ber of potential interpretations. Here, we will examine one 
in terpretation  of the above quotations, notably th a t the rule of the “financial world” 
over the “real world” involves the sub/superordination of particu lar actors or groups 
of actors. The weak version of the theory is seen in the sta tem ent th a t on account 
of their position, actors in the financial world are generally able to assert their 
interests against those in the “real economy” , even if the la tte r try  to resist such
2 “In our world, it is the  in ternational m oney m arket th a t orders w hat should happen in a 
p a rticu la r industry, country  or household.” (Almasi  1995). Sim ilar thoughts a p p ea r in Spitz  
(1996) an d  Salins and Villcroy de Galhau (1996).
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interests. On the other hand, the strong version of the theory claims th a t agents in 
the “real” world are subject to money markets; therefore their decisions and acts 
reflect the “wills and orders” of the financial superstructure.
We think th a t the strong version can be neither verified nor refused with 
empirical or theoretical argum ents. There are no such observations, nor can they 
possibly be produced, which would prove th a t consumers, farmers, m anagers of 
m anufacturing companies, civil servants or government members— who should all 
belong to  the  “real world”—would always act upon the orders of money and fi­
nance. Ju s t like th a t of the “real world” , the composition of the financial world 
is also ra ther heterogeneous: even the narrowest definition would include com­
mercial and investm ent banks, brokerage houses, stock and commodity exchanges, 
foreign exchange m arkets, insurance companies, treasury departm ents of domestic 
and international firms, institu tional investors like pension funds, tru st funds, and 
in ternational m ultilateral financial institu tions (World Bank, IM F, EBRD, e tc .).3 
Obviously, tem porary relationships do exist between members of these two groups— 
some im portan t, some less im portan t—but their number and intensity do no t verify 
the “strong” theory. Neither does it follow from theoretical economic considerations 
th a t the strong version of the dominance proposition m ust or should be valid; the 
advocates of this theory would, in fact, blame m ainstream  economists th a t their 
models do not explain the basic issues arising from the dom ination of the financial 
“phantom  struc tu re” .
The theory of collective decisions offers a possible and coherent theoretical 
m ethodology for studying the relationships between financial institu tions and po­
litical institu tions, and between bankers and politicians. This theory, inter alia, 
argues th a t the conspiracy hypothesis is not really supportable for large latent 
groups— and the international financial community is certainly one. Such groups 
are either not able to realise their common interests, or are lucky beneficiaries 
of changes which have been brought about by other groups ( Olson 1997). Thus, 
when attem pting  to examine cui bono? type situations on a solid methodological 
basis, theoretical reasons m ust also warn scholars to  be extremely careful w ith the 
conspiracy theory, which assumes intentional jo in t action.
If we intend to  give rational treatm en t to  views which cannot be criticised with 
empirical or theoretical argum ents, we have to explore the norm ative background 
and the methodological roots of the given opinion in order to  create the possibility 
of understanding and rational discussion.
The norm ative evidence for the dominance proposition employs an a ttem pt 
to  modify the consequences of com petition and free market mechanisms by using 
ethnic, religious, moral, political or other value criteria. This involves the need 
to  adjust the form al-calculative rationality of these m arkets according to value
3 A broader definition would also include millions of small investors, who hold deposits , bonds 
and shares, and are frequently  very active p a rtic ipan ts in the  process.
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rationality. The ideological roots of the a ttitu d e  which is suspicious and hostile 
towards m arkets and money range from utopian, socialist theories based on value 
principles through various versions of rom antic anti-capitalism , and to  the large 
world religions, particularly  to  systems which include their economic ethical rules.
Briefly, the formal structure  of the problems looks like this: under an im por­
ta n t bu t mostly covert presupposition of economic theory, the preferences of market 
players satisfy the so-called Archimedes axiom.4 However, there are preference re­
lations which are different—for example, the so-called lexicographic ordering.5 Ac­
tions based upon value-rational principles mean actions according to  lexicographic 
preferences. In our opinion, the norm ative support and the rational core in the 
views of essayists and social scientists who are horrified by the expansion of the “fi­
nancial world conquering the real world” or a t m arket conditions in general are, in 
m ost cases, th a t they direct a tten tion  to the dangerous consequences which result 
from  the apparently  unstoppable advance of one-dimension utility  calculation, and 
the corresponding reduction in the possibilities of value-rational action.
T his “classic” thought is expressed perhaps m ost eloquently by a now less 
frequently quoted author, the young Karl Marx: “Finally, tim e came when ev­
erything th a t people had previously considered inalienable became an object of 
exchange and haggling, thus turning alienable. This was the tim e when even the 
things which had been shared but never exchanged, given bu t never sold, acquired 
b u t never bought— virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc.-—went into 
trading. This is the tim e of general corruption, universal venality, or— to  use the 
term s of political economics—the tim e when everything, w hether intellectual or 
m aterial, bearing a commercial value, is taken to  the m arket so th a t their exact 
value can be assessed.” ( Marx 1959)
T he same idea is reflected András Bródy’s criticism of m onetarism : “There­
fore, my basic and m ost incisive objection against m onetarism  is th a t it wants to 
measure everything with money through the m ediation of prices. By doing so, it 
too often ignores the very central issues of m ankind.” ( Bródy 1996)6
4 If the  relation  “b e tte r  th an ” is m arked with R,  and  in te rp reted  as the  goods baskets which 
con tain  various quantities of goods x  an d  y, th en  the  expression (x i, y i)R (* 2 , w )  m eans th a t  
the  individual exam ined prefers goods basket ( i i . y i )  to  goods basket ( x 2 11/2 )■ T he Archimedes 
axiom  s ta te s  th a t y has such a  y* (y* >  y2 ) value for which (x 2 y  * )R (x i, y i ) applies. In o th er 
words, th e  direction of the  original preference relation can be reversed by m anipu lating  th e  value 
of y.
5T his is defined as follows: we say th a t  vector ( x i , 1 2 , •••.* n ) ' s preferred  to  vector
( v i , V2 , ..., yn) lexicographically if there is an  t for which x t R y,  holds true , an d  for every j  <  t, 
Xj is a t  least as good as y3. We can see th a t  in th is case there  is no conversion betw een types of 
goods w ith in  the  given goods basket; there is no “currency” (money, power, influence, ...) which 
can be used to  com pensate the  actor for a  reduction in the  qu an tity  o r value of th e  o th e r good.
f  T he lectures delivered a t the  conference “M onetarism : P ast and  Present, Deviance or N orm al­
ity ” , which was jo in tly  organised by the  Debrecen Branch of the H ungarian  Academy of Sciences 
and  the  Friedridh E b ert Foundation  in Debrecen 31 M ay to  2 June  1996, ind icate  th a t  m ost
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If the above reconstruction of the norm ative background of the “dom inance 
proposition” is valid, then the following question can be formulated: how can one 
create institu tional guarantees which ensure th a t the presence of economic ra tio ­
nality in the world of law, religion, politics, science and the arts, or even business 
does not go together w ith the unlim ited predominance of the Archimedes axiom; 
in o ther words, where and how can one save some scope for individual action th a t 
is based on value-rational preferences? However, we think th a t this question must 
be clearly separated from the problem of a general restriction, regulation, or term i­
nation of the m arkets in the name of value-rational principles. The la tte r problem 
has a num ber of different “solutions” , ranging from Islamic fundam entalism  through 
“national socialist” ideas to  the ideology of a “social market economy” , which have, 
of course, a varying degree of attractiveness for us.
Now, turning from the norm ative support of the strong version of the  domi­
nance proposition to  its methodological background, our greatest objection is th a t 
the proponents of the view seem to ignore the basic methodological requirem ents of 
economic analysis. Economic theory is actually based on methodological individu­
alism, which means a proper economic analysis does not contain—or only as a sort 
of conceptual shorthand—statem ents like “money markets don’t like, in fact, often 
don’t tolerate th a t governments exercise their former ... rights” , “money m arkets 
do not like inflation” , or “the money market expects to have certain privileges” . (cf. 
Lányi 1996, p. 6) Personalising entities like m arkets, bank capital or the interna­
tional financial world, and empowering them  with the ability to act and assert their 
interests, and w ith the am bition to seize power frequently rest on a false conclusion. 
T he conclusion claims th a t any change which is useful or beneficial for a particu lar 
group is brought about by members of th a t group through some concerted action.
Thus, the logical structure  of this false conclusion looks like this:
1. y  has happened  as a  resu lt of behaviour, etc. x,  which is typical of m em bers of G roup A,
2. y  is beneficial for m em bers of G roup A ' , which is different from  G roup A;
3. so, people belonging to  A  have been persuaded by  m em bers of A '—individually  or 
jo in tly — to  bring ab o u t y
Consequently, if the deterioration of the market position of a H ungarian bank 
is good for com petitors, certain political groups or the in ternational “hawk cap ita l” , 
then, according to the above pattern  of thinking, one m ust see the bank run as the 
result of cooperation or conspiracy of the rival banks, the political opposition and 
the international hawk capital, no m atter w hat the real reasons for the collapse are.
presenters—sim ilarly to  A ndrás B rody— interpreted  the  concept of m onetarism  as th e  “dom ina­
tion  of th e  m oney-w orld” , which is in sta rk  con trast w ith the  te rm ’s content an d  its  conventional 
usage in in te rn atio n al economics.
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The greatest methodological shortcoming of the dominance proposition is— as we 
see i t—exactly this process of thinking— notably the uncritical acceptance of the 
conspiracy theory of social action.
K orten’s study (1996), quoted above, attem pts to  lay down the foundation of 
the strong version of the dominance proposition. He claims th a t one m ust be aware 
of the way with which the issue of economic globalisation7 has been pu t— or ra ther 
m anoeuvred—on the political agenda, almost completely bypassing social dialogue. 
According to  Korten one should not think of a secret meeting of a narrow élite, 
who contrived a plan to  conquer the world, It is more like a process of establishing 
a network or a common culture, where we can observe the emergence of alliances 
between individuals and groups. T h a t is, Korten asserts, th a t there is no conspiracy 
at all, though the consequences seem to point towards the existence of one.
Korten attem pts to provide his statem ents with a more precise theoretical 
basis. However, the text eventually concludes th a t the foundations of the rule of 
the “cloud-walkers” and “hawk capital” are to be found not in concrete interactions 
or bargains— as methodological individualism would require— but merely in the 
existence of a common culture and common interests. However, as long as K orten’s 
statem ents cannot be deduced as voluntary or involuntary consequences of hum an 
actions, the categories he uses cannot be interpreted logically or empirically. Since 
the institu tions or the agents of jo in t action and jo int interest assertion cannot 
be identified precisely, the only and methodologically wrong solution is backward 
deduction from presumed common interests and benefits.8
T he proponents of the weak version of the dom inance proposition form ulate 
their conclusions in a less general form. Examples for this version may be found 
in several economic sociological studies, which usually examine the rule of banks 
or bankers. Some of these satisfy our methodological requirem ents, and may well 
com plem ent economic analyses, yet we have not come across any writing th a t would 
have reasonably verified the weak version of the theory— notably, th a t the actors
7 "Economic globalisation is the  basis on which the  new cap italis t colonial em pires are bu ilt. 
T he proponents of cap italist libertarian ism  argue th a t  economic globalisation is going ahead  as 
driven by unchangeable historical forces, and  we have no option b u t to ad ju s t to  th e  situ a tio n  
an d  to  lea rn  to  com pete with our fellow hum an beings. T his is a  bold lie, which brazenly denies 
th e  well-organised, generously funded and  am bitious efforts of cloud-walkers (K orten 's  m etaphor 
to  deno te  th e  arch itects an d  the  beneficiaries of the  new economic world o rder— The authors)  a t 
dem olishing national economies, an d  erecting the  in stitu tio n s of a  global m arket. (...) we will 
exam ine how they  im agine th is  process and  how they  have taken to  its  im plem entation .” (K orten  
1996, p. 143)
8K am illa  Lányi writes: “(the m oney m arket) expects to  have certain  privileges, (...) wants or 
is able to  impose its  in terests on others (even by m aking others find ou t its  desires), and (...) it 
cannot be  held responsible.” (Lányi 1996, p. 6) It is no t far th en  to in te rp ret news ab o u t corrup t 
bank m anagers or th e  renewed bank consolidation as proofs of th e  overall rule of th e  m oney-world.
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of the “money-world” can mostly assert their interests against other actors, even if 
the la tte r try  to  resist.9
The branch of economic sociology which deals with relationship networks 
examines the allegedly central position of banks w ithin economic institu tions. The 
hypothetical central position exercised through ownership or delegation of officers 
was proved in some countries but not in others. Using figures available about 
to d ay ’s Hungarian economy, the existence of such a central role cannot be clearly 
supported as H ungarian banks prim arily tend to delegate officers to each o ther.10 
Neither does any evidence of central network position mean control or regularly 
imposed bank intentions but only a large num ber of concentrated relationships.
Research into social structure, more specifically into the economic élite, also 
provides interesting d a ta  for the verification of the dominance proposition. The 
analysis of the position of H ungarian bankers indicates th a t while there is no deny­
ing of the privileged position of bankers, there is no evidence which would also 
confirm the dom inant power position of the group. ( Lengyel and Bartha 1997) 
These economic sociological research works do not support the validity of the dom­
inance proposition, even though they a ttem p t—several times applying appropriate 
m ethodology— to identify the networks and the cultural elements in which the au­
thors who we have quoted earlier seem to discover the overall rule of money and 
finance.
The selection of top m anagers of banks in sta te  ownership or under s ta te  con­
trol is strongly subject to  politics. In some countries such as A ustria, an implicit bu t 
acknowledged trad ition  divides control over banks between various political parties. 
This s tructure , which has plenty of disadvantages, may simplify the observation of 
how parties com pete for funds and influence. Yet this is exactly the reverse of the 
dominance proposition, w ith political power gaining economic influence.
A divided, or scattered  ownership structure  may improve the m anoeuvring 
opportunities and the interest assertion ability of bank managers. Here, owners 
have difficulties in coping with the already mentioned failures and traps of collec­
tive action. If the m anagem ent successfully stands up for its interests, stalem ate
9 M in tz  and Schwartz  1985; Swedbcrg 1989. A frequent m isrepresen tation  in sociology and 
lite ra tu re  is th e  descrip tion  of the  borrower as the  defenceless m an-in -the-street an d  the  lender 
as th e  dom inant p a rtn e r. However, m any of those who are exposed to th e  ban k  are depositors 
them selves— th a t is, lenders to the  bank. One m ust also m ention the  dislike th a t  well-known 
novels an d  films teach us from  childhood onwards which, in th e ir description of th e  privileged and  
dom inant position  of bankers, usually stress th e ir unavoidable m enta l d isto rtions or some blem ish 
in th e ir previous lives. Take, for exam ple, Shylock from  Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, 
o r B aron D anglars in  D um as’ Count of Monte Christo. This is w hat explains th e  ex trao rd inary  
success of Ogger's Bankers  (1995) b o th  in H ungary and  Germ any. Typical chap ter titles are: 
A ccount R obbers, M oney A bductors, Fleecers.
10See Vedres (1997). Incorporating  lending conditions should improve the  explanatory  power 
of these em pirical studies.
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situations may emerge—th a t is, politics and the managers of the particu lar bank 
may end up grasping each o ther’s th ro a ts .11
The actual interest-asserting, influence-seeking and rent-seeking activities of 
individual banks can be empirically verified w ith case studies and anecdotal evi­
dence. Several H ungarian and foreign examples indicate th a t the concrete expla­
nation for the sizeable influence of particular banks and bankers usually lies in 
the practice of unjustified advances, or the dispensing of funds—which m ay target 
political parties, the media, etc.,—or, in a broader sense, in the bank’s ownership 
structu re  or its decisive share in the money and capital m arkets ( “too big to  fail” ). 
Reciting the dangers of a “global phantom  structu re” may well serve to  distract 
a tten tion  from things th a t are happening right in front of our eyes.
The myth of the unrestrained monetary world
A typical description of money and finance becoming virtual and unrestrained 
argues th a t “the flow of money has become entirely detached from the flow of goods: 
it has an independent life, a circulation separate from the world of goods, which 
is much larger than  the value of goods volume” ; where the money m arket “is a 
superstructure  above the economy and the society: it has broken loose from  the 
world of goods, the production of goods and services satisfying hum an necessities.” 
(Almâsi 1995, p. 39)12 These ideas show th a t explanations of autonomy or self-rule 
usually raise hazards associated with dimensions, the dem aterialisation of money 
and the inoperativeness of the real economy.
The increased autonom y of the financial sector is a fact of life which, in our 
opinion, can be explained by the increased im portance of the basic functions of 
the financial interm ediation system, and the inevitable failure of certain regulatory 
a ttem pts. The process follows from structu ral changes th a t have taken place in 
m odern economies over the past few decades. Therefore, this chapter will deal with 
the evolution of money and the financial interm ediation system , the hypothesis 
about the changed nature of money, and its background. Our exam ination will 
focus on interm ediation and transactions—-that is, whether the interm ediation of 
goods, resources, services, or information is som ething th a t we consider crucial for 
understanding the financial world. In our opinion, the basic function of the financial 
system  is, on one hand, to  facilitate the allocation of resources, and, on the other,
11 Várhegyi (1996). See Laffont and. Tirolé (1994) C hap ter 17 an d  Dewatriponl and Tirolé 
(1993) on th e  role of ownership types, an d  the  games betw een m anagers and  owners.
12 M ária  Augusztinovics expresses a  sim ilar thought: “An oversize parasite  financial s tru c tu re  
rules over th e  economy. T he production  of goods and  services has becom e of secondary im portance , 
where cap ita l can move across borders quietly b u t fast, seeking cheap labour.” ( Augusztinovics  
1996)
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to  allow the flow of inform ation over space and time. It alleviates conflicts w ithin 
the economic system , reduces social deadweight losses, and creates social value by 
increasing efficiency. The m ain elements of the financial system are: money itself, 
the paym ent system , money m arkets and capital m arkets. ( Tobin 1992a, Merton 
1990). We will deal w ith these components in the following paragraphs.
Evolution of money: the standardisation of money functions and the demateriali- 
sation of money
In the earlier stages of social development, money functions were often ful­
filled by separate tools and activities. The evolution of money from goods money 
through money substitu tes up to m odern money has actually been the history of the 
s tandard isation  of money functions— th a t is, the emergence of a single tool ( László 
1997, Kohn 1997). Numerous writings on economic history, economic sociology and 
anthropology have studied archaic economies which use money not in its to d ay ’s 
form  and only to  a limited extent. Although such studies aimed at the analytical 
presentation of cases where unusual bu t operative “hum an” integration forms, be­
havioural rules and norms existed; these studies m ostly focused their a tten tion  on 
sta tic  societies and economic systems which had a limited capacity to  develop.
Identifying money functions posed a great challenge for “m odern” economic 
theories.13 It is easy to see th a t money is not needed in a completely friction- 
free society. In W alras’ equilibrium  theory, money did not have any significance 
or value: the models only incorporated it as a unit of account. T he theory of 
liquidity preference— based on Keynes and Hicks—treated money as an asset with 
zero nom inal interest rate risk. In this sense, other functions of money have lost 
im portance, and the price of money solely depended on the dem and and the supply 
of the given asset
Since the 1960s both conventional approaches have been under fierce attack , 
w ith critics arguing th a t the concept of money will become em pty if its basic
13 T he sto ry  of the  “two Robinsons" is one of the  best-known fables for dem onstra ting  th e  essence 
of money. Living on th e  sam e island, th e  two Robinsons agree to  take tu rn s in cooking dinner. 
As they  are absent-m inded, they  often forget who is cooking nex t. Finally  th ey  find a nice opal 
stone, and  agree th a t  the  guest will always leave the  stone w ith the host, who can use it th e  nex t 
day to  prove th a t  he is th e  guest. T he sto ry  contains an  im perfect inform ation  situ a tio n  (there is 
no  reliable inform ation ab o u t who the nex t cook is), a  tem poral transac tion  friction (you can only 
pay for to d ay ’s d inner w ith tom orrow ’s d inner), and, as a  solution, som ething th a t m ight even be 
called  money, which sim ultaneously acts as a  u n it of account (1 d inner =  1 stone), a  m edium  of 
exchange and  a m eans of paym ent (given in exchange for dinner) and store of value (up  to  the  
following n igh t). Its  in troduction  into the  m odel economy has reduced tran sac tio n  costs (tim e 
used  for quarrelling is saved), an d  everybody a ttr ib u te d  a  positive value to  it. (Ostroy and Starr  
1990). T he s tu d y  provides an  alm ost full p icture  ab o u t the  developm ent stages of m oney theory, 
detailing  th e  conflicting features of m oney theory models.
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functions— particularly as a medium of exchange and means of paym ent: th a t 
is, transaction costs— are ignored (Tobin 1992b; Weber 1986; Kohn 1988). Dif­
ferent approaches w ith respect to the theory of money usually assume different 
constrain ts and frictions in an a ttem pt to  prove the necessity of money with posi­
tive value. The arb itrary  assum ptions of earlier approaches could be best corrected 
by modifying the inform ation structure  of the basic model: it can be proved th a t 
im perfect and asym m etric information distribution are necessary and sufficient as­
sum ptions for the existence of money with positive value. The next stage in the 
development of the theories was the incorporation of “non-standard” explanations 
such as adaptiveness and animal spirit. Thus, the development of the theory of 
money is nothing bu t an increasingly precise and sophisticated answer to — using 
Armen A lchian’s words—the question of “why money?” , and this process is unfin­
ished insofar as there is no final agreement on the exact nature of money functions 
and their interrelationships.
In the above approach, it does not a t all m atter w hether money is an opal 
stone, a piece of paper or a com puter record. We can completely agree w ith Miklos 
Almasi: “Money has turned into a token. Token money is only a m etaphor; as 
a m atter of fact, money has become an electronic sign, which appears at various 
points of the screen as a num ber.” (Almasi 1995) However, while Almasi sees this 
transform ation as the “death” of “real” money,14 we would ra ther agree w ith the 
American future researcher Toffier, who thinks th a t the essence of 21st century 
money is th a t it is becoming w hat it really is, namely information: “The money of 
the T hird  Wave is a physically non-existing thing created by electronic impulses. It 
allows im m ediate registration, ongoing control and undelayed reaction, and it exists 
alm ost exclusively on com puter screens. Yes, .. the money of the T hird  Wave is 
the Inform ation itself—the basis of knowledge” . ( Toffier 1993)
Economists are also concerned with issues related to  the technical develop­
m ent of paym ents and the dem aterialisation of money. Still, the hypothesis of the 
separation of “real” and “fictitious” money refers to  a relevant m onetary theory 
problem th a t has been created by the historical evolution of money— notably, th a t 
the value of money was separated from th a t of the m oney’s m aterial. We all know 
th a t medieval m onarchs tried to channel the wealth of their subjects towards them ­
selves not only by m inting bu t also by curbing money. The transform ation of money 
into a money sign has been a natural consequence of the more effective operation of 
money functions, and the reduction of the transaction costs. One of the oldest and 
most fundam ental questions of the theory of money does, in fact, arise from this 
problem: if the value of money is separated from the value of its m aterial, w hat 
guarantees th a t anyone who accepts it can exchange it later? One possible answer
14 "... b u t it has already lost all of its  original qualities ... This m etam orphosis, or herm aphrod ite  
fictitious real m oney is th e  m ost im p o rtan t and the  m ost dangerous invention of new cap italism .” 
(Alm asi 1995, p. 41)
Acta Oeconomica 49, 1997-98
12 L. CSONTOS -J. KIRÁLY-G. LÁSZLÓ: THE GREAT SHIVERING
points to the power of the state: the sta te  may order th a t a medium m ust be used 
as a means of paym ent. The other possible answer builds on the tru st of the soci­
ety, the individual decision-makers: “I will accept the money because I tru st th a t 
others will also accept it” . Today, money is issued by government through central 
banks, yet we cannot neglect the second criterion. Paper money issued to  finance 
wars in the 19th century, for example, generally ended up causing hyperinflation 
and devaluation. In these cases, governments, in the absence of proper guarantees, 
were not able to continuously enforce the use of the given legal tender because eco­
nomic actors did not accept or use it for economic or other considerations. These 
situations also showed th a t economic actors themselves will solve their problems of 
paym ent, exchange, or settlem ent— at higher welfare costs though— if governments 
fail to  effectively m anage “money” .15
The transform ation of money into a m onetary signal and the development of 
financial institu tions have also raised the problem of whether the different money 
functions need to  be united in one object in the future; thus the un it of m easurem ent 
or account and the general medium of exchange may be linked, or these functions 
may break away from each other (W hite 1996). In the 1970s, Fischer Black and 
R obert Hall outlined a fu ture financial system  in which the financial interm ediaries 
com peted with their services, including the issuance of means of transactions. In 
their system  there is no “outside money” whose exchangeability is guaranteed by 
the central bank or the government, only the numeraire is fixed centrally. Here, 
money in the trad itional sense disappears completely, some of its functions cease to  
exist, and others are taken over by other means, ju s t like in the visions presented 
by the critics quoted above.16
This idea may be doubted from various aspects. One may show the higher 
inform ation and transaction  costs of such a system. If somebody tries to  sell their 
bond in this system , w hat will be the qualities or functions the m edia accepts 
in exchange or as paym ent? Further on, analysts may arrive at the conclusion 
th a t since this theoretical system is based on m arket conditions, the m arket, mov­
ing towards increased efficiency, will eventually reintegrate money functions into 
“m oney” . A nother argum ent may focus on the evolution of money, showing th a t
15 T his issue is linked to ano ther very old debate, which questions the  ju stification  of the  m oney- 
issuing m onopoly of th e  s ta te . ( Goodhart 1985, White  1984).
16 In his study  published in 1970, Fischer Black exam ined w hat would happen  to  paym ents 
an d  money use if s ta te  regulation  over the  banking system  were abolished. In his hypothetical 
exchange economy, the  u n it of account is the  dollar, bu t th is dollar has been fixed w ith a  goods 
basket. Later, the  m eans of paym ent can also be determ ined in th is u n it, b u t no t necessarily. 
Following in th e  footsteps of Black, R obert Hall analysed the price changes of earlier decades so 
th a t  he could identify the  goods basket of the  m ost stab le  value to fix the  numeraire.  (W hite  
1996).
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outside money is unlikely to die out in the foreseeable future as decision-makers 
cannot be realistically expected to  make such a decision. (W hite 1996)17
The numerous functional and empirical differences between to d ay ’s money 
and money, say, fifty years ago are indeed remarkable, and it seems reasonable to 
analyse changes in money functions along these lines. A t the same tim e, we th ink 
th a t the distinction “virtual-real” is misleading. The prim ary distinction between 
to d ay ’s money and th a t of earlier times is not its m aterial or “realness” bu t, for 
example, the rich variety of media and mechanisms fulfilling money functions.
Not only average people but also financial statisticians find this abundance 
difficult to manage. This is the reason why another argum ent is closely intertw ined 
into m onetary theory debates, which questions the “realness” of to d ay ’s money 
on the basis of its insufficient statistical consideration. The theoretical debate 
about which instrum ents m ust be considered as money has been going on since the 
1950s. The debate is based on the assum ption th a t if we cannot exactly measure 
w hat people use as money, the regulatory authorities will not be able to  operate 
its regulatory function, therefore its m onetary policy will be inefficient. However, 
this debate has little to  do with functions of money and the nature  of financial 
in term ediation.18
Financial intermediaiion and the evolution of financial markets
The authors who enlist the dangers of the the “financial superstructu re” 
do not generally focus on money bu t on other im portan t structures of the financial 
system, such as the financial markets, the financial intermediaries and the derivative 
m arkets.
The trad itional functions of money and capital m arkets include the pooling 
and distribution of resources, the transform ation of m aturities and risks, and the 
reduction of the transactional and inform ational costs of economy. The efficient 
operation of money and capital m arkets is not only a precondition for stable, long­
term  economic growth but, in a modern m arket economy, it is inseparable from the 
giving of answers to  the most basic problems of the most average people. There 
are three fundam ental problems in human life:
17T he theory  of collective action  has, of course, been able to  show num erous subop tim al s itu ­
ations; however, in th is s ituation  it is probably the  inertia  inherent in  the actions of large la ten t 
groups th a t  ensures the  survival of the  more efficient s ta te . As long as no d rastic  in tervention  
is m ade in the  operation  of the  m arket system —and th is would contradict the  purposes of these 
au th o rs—attach m en t to external m oney continues to exist, as do the  benefits th a t arise from  the  
fact th a t  m oney sim ultaneously fulfils the  functions of a  m edium  of exchange an d  th e  u n it of 
acco u n t.
18 As long as the  m onetary  policy begins to ac t a fte r “getting  familiar" with figures.
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1. old-age security, which is impossible w ithout long-term  savings and au­
tonom ous pension funds;
2. housing, which requires long-term loans—th a t is, m ortgage lending;
3. education, which requires the incorporation of long-term  loans into financ­
ing higher education.
Economic theory has long been debating w hat performs these tasks better: 
the m arket (which is perpetually  reallocating resources), or the s ta te ’s control 
(which is based on some “social contract” ) .19
The allocation mechanism of financial m arkets usually produces efficient dis­
tributions. The deeper and “more fragm ented” the m arkets are, in other words, the 
m ore m edia there are available between the two end-points of the same m ediation 
chain, the lower social costs, and the smaller deadweight loss these solutions entail. 
A good exam ple is the recent changes in the structure  of m ortgage m arkets. In 
an economy w ithout capital m arkets, people build or buy houses using their own 
personal savings. In the initial phase of the development of the capital m arket, such 
resources were provided by m ortgage loans, financed from the savings of families in 
the given community. Following the development of the m ortgage m arkets, today, 
loans for buying houses in some developed m arket economies are m ade available 
by financial interm ediaries outside the banking system, and these interm ediaries 
are financed by investors whose activities focus on the mortgage-backed security 
m arket. This process—which leads to a reduction of social operating  costs through 
the grooving of the m arket and the m ultitude of available paths— does, indeed, 
appear as an increase in the autonomy of the financial world, where events on the 
secondary m ortgage m arket are apparently not linked to  the people who wish to 
solve their housing problems.
M aria Augusztinovics is certainly right in arguing th a t "... you have the im­
pression th a t the economy consists of Dow Jones and other indices jum ping  up and 
down, and running electronically around international stock exchanges from New 
York to Frankfurt, from London to Tokyo. Production, technology, construction, 
consum ption and similar negligible m atters are hardly mentioned. I t is shattered  
currencies or large scandals on the money m arkets th a t become news.” (A uguszti­
novics 1996) The explanation of this phenomenon is th a t the operation of these— 
seemingly oversize and self-contained—m arkets generally reduces the social costs 
of production, technology, construction and consum ption. Anyone who wishes to 
restrain  the emerging institutions or their operating mechanisms m ust remember
19Sum m aries of th is theoretical debate are provided by Augusztinovics (1987) an d  K irály (1989). 
However, even the  criteria  of qualification (w hat is “b e tte r”?) are subject to  discussion: the 
problem  which was shown by a  con trast of value-rational criteria  and  the  Archimedes axiom  in 
th e  previous section resurfaces. Here, th e  ac tu a l dividing line runs betw een th e  acceptance of 
P a re to  optim ality , a  basic criterion  in economics, and  efficiency, and  its  rejection. T he au th o rs— 
as it m ight by now have been noticed—see P are to  optim ality  and the  corresponding efficiency as 
p racticab le  criteria .
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th a t, ap art from the expected favourable consequences, the damage done to these 
functions results in higher social costs and a larger deadweight loss.
The emergence of ever newer segments in the financial m arkets is not an end 
in itself bu t a development intended to  increase the efficiency of the real economy. 
Due to large-scale deregulation, financial innovations, the explosive development 
of inform ation technology, and the appearance of new products and new actors 
in recent years, similar processes can be observed in all segments of the financial 
world. A common feature of these developments is the removal of national borders 
and barriers between financial “industries” such as insurance and banking, and 
commercial and investm ent banks. Functions which used to  be fulfilled by banks 
only are partly  being taken over by other business organisations; regional finan­
cial m arkets are being replaced by virtual markets existing on com puter networks; 
moreover, with gradually expanding possibilities of arbitrage and speculation, and 
increasingly sophisticated risk m anagem ent techniques, essentially inform ation and 
contingent claims are traded on the global financial m arkets.
Economics has provided four main explanations for the financial innovation 
process:
1. the dem and for the completion of the m arket, which is aimed a t the elim­
ination of barriers and gaps in the spreading and consolidating of risks, the re­
grouping of resources over tim e and space, and the introduction of new, stop-gap 
institutions;
2. the possibility of reducing direct transaction costs;
3. increasing the liquidity of certain instrum ents and the position of their 
holders;
4. the possibility of reducing “principal-agent”-type information costs and 
frictions; these are costs which arise from the asym m etrical inform ation situation, 
and the observation, supervision of the other party  involved in the transaction  
(M erton 1990; Allen and Gale 1994; Diamond 1996; Fama 1996).
W hile the instrum ents of financial m arkets reduce transactional and inform a­
tion costs and alleviate the frictions of the economic system, they inevitably bring 
about new types of friction, arising from the imperfect and asym m etric inform ation 
situation of m arket players. While the interm ediary organisations on the financial 
m arkets such as banks, m utual funds, investm ent banks, etc. seem to increase in­
term ediation costs w ith their interests, fees and faults, they actually reduce these 
inform ation inequalities, and the social deadweight loss resulting from non-optim al 
observation. This manifests itself for the individual decision-makers—for example, 
small investors who face lower risks with respect to  decision-making.
To understand the essence of derivatives or futures m arkets (which are so 
often blamed by the critics of the financial system), we m ust return  to  im per­
fect information provision: the point of the futures m arkets is th a t they efficiently 
transm it fu ture prices to  today ’s decision-makers, thereby reducing the risks in­
volved with decision-making. These instrum ents were not invented by theoretical
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economists or m athem aticians as, contrary to  popular belief, derivatives are not 
a t all new: option contracts, sim ilar to  the present ones, were widely used a t the 
A m sterdam  stock exchange back in the 17th century.20
T he instrum ents of the derivative m arket also allow the individual decision­
maker to  reduce the risks of a certain decision-making situation. Again, we should 
th ink  about solving the most everyday problems of the m ost average people. During 
their lives, people are continuously accum ulating wealth which imposes lim its on 
their possible decisions. If the value of this accum ulated wealth is fluctuating 
because of m arket price movements, the lack of full inform ation about the future 
makes the decisions suboptim al. Essentially, derivatives allow decision-makers to 
reduce fluctuations in the value of their accum ulated wealth and to  “cover their 
positions” . Thus, the derivative m arkets perform the same function as financial 
interm ediaries: they increase the grooving of the m arket, thereby reducing the 
risks of individual decisions. While in the new situations new, different risks will 
inevitably emerge for individuals, institu tions and communities, the question is: 
w hat is the relationship between benefits and costs?21
The financial evolution cannot obviously be considered a m onotonous process 
since, from tim e to  time, it has been in terrupted by institu tional changes which 
have brought about deep changes in the operation of the financial system . Each 
of these changes, such as the appearance of money substitu tes, the end of the gold 
standard  system , and the removal of the dollar’s convertibility into gold, caused 
much concern. Today, it is mostly the expansion or the dom inance of derivative 
transactions th a t gives rise to  concern and towards which criticism is aimed. Earlier, 
we have said th a t the basic function of money and financial interm ediation was to 
reduce the inform ation and transaction costs of transactions at different points of 
tim e, production and the selling processes. I t is this function in which derivative 
transactions complement traditional money use.22
20 See Allen and  Gale 1994, p. 13. T his stock exchange operation  gave b ir th  to  th e  generalisation 
of the  general equilibrium  theory  m odel, and  its tem poral extention: if a  friction-proof situ a tio n  
is supposed bo th  in  space and  tim e, all spo t an d  futures m arkets of all p ro ducts will operate  
efficiently, an d  can  perfectly  tran sm it inform ation on th e  basis of which economic actors can 
c rea te  a  P are to  op tim al d istribu tion  s ta te  by m aking optim al decisions. By giving up th e  friction- 
proof sta te , the  tem porally  single world falls into sequential partia l economies, which already 
necessitates th e  in troduction  of “m oney” to  reduce tem poral inform ation im perfectness. (Hahn  
1971)
21 For exam ple, imposing the  requirem ent of deposit insurance (which is m ostly justified) may 
cause depositors to  devote less energy to  observing their bank (which can  lead to  m anagem ent 
abuse). (Harmati, László and Zsámboki  1997)
22 T he in stitu tiona l economic revision of fu tures transactions, m oney-m oncy transac tions and  
m oney functions in general, is an  im portan t task . W ith  regard to th is issue, readers are advised 
to  consult Allen an d  Gale (1994) and  Richter  (1989).
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Quantity of money and the size of financial transactions
T he authors who have called attention to the dominance of the financial world 
do not think th a t the emergence of the institu tions is the most dangerous factor, 
bu t ra ther its size. In their opinion, it exceeds the optim al level. As K am illa Lányi 
writes: “It is true th a t contem porary economies would not be able to  operate 
w ithout financing, savings, financial interm ediation, bu t we have already shown 
th a t the dimension of money m arkets is far larger than  the economy would need.” 
(Lányi 1996)
The expansion of the fianncial and m onetary world is a fact, though not 
only a fact of these days. Based on figures from 1900 to 1949, Gurley and Shaw, 
who researched the financing capacity of the economy and the nature of money 
in the 1960s, pointed out th a t the to ta l value of financial assets had grown one 
and a half times faster than  the national income, and the value of financial assets 
owned by financial intermediaries also rose by one and a half times w ithin to tal 
financial assets. A fast expansion of banks, and an even faster development of 
non-banking interm ediaries are evidenced by the fact th a t “the banks were growing 
faster than  the national wealth and the national income, bu t lagged behind the 
general development of the financial sector” . ( Gurley and Shaw 1955, 1960)
In 1984 R. W . Goldsmith, the best-known statistician  of American wealth 
accounts, found th a t the economy’s real wealth was $ 13,500 billion, while finan­
cial wealth—including the actually real capital and shares not representing debt— 
am ounted to $ 14,800 billion. ( Goldsmith 1985). Considering these figures, we 
may conclude th a t it was not the size of the m arket created by the appearance 
of derivative markets th a t is remarkable bu t the rate of expansion was high: the 
notional value of the stock exchange derivative market rose from $ 620 billion in 
1986— roughly a t the time of G oldsm ith’s research—to $ 9,200 billion in 1995. 
Thus, while in 1995 the to tal stock was still below U.S. real wealth of 1986, the 
average growth rate was 35 percent—higher than any earlier growth rate  of the 
stock. However, growth potential expressed in the growth rate is deceptive. Today, 
we already know th a t after the initial soar, which was a natu ral consequence of the 
small quantity, growth slowed down to merely 3 percent in 1995. ( Table 1).
The figures quoted in the previous paragraphs are often compared by the 
critics to  the G D P 23 of the country, or even th a t of the world, pointing out how 
many times larger is the m onetary turnover of the “useless” m onetary economy 
than  production actually requires. Two optical illusions may be discerned in these 
comparisons.
One remarkable fact is th a t G DP only measures the value added created in 
the economy in the given period. The annual to tal ou tpu t of the economy—i.e. 
the to ta l value of the economic transactions in one year—is a multiple of the GDP.
23 We could use G N P instead  of GDP, however, this d istinction  is irrelevant here.
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Table 1
Selected derivative financial markets (notional value, in billions of USD)
1986 1990 1994 1995
In terest ra te  futures 370.0 1,454.5 5,757.4 5,863.3
In terest ra te  option 146.5 599.5 2,623.5 2,741.6
Foreign exchange futures 10.2 17.0 40.1 37.9
Foreign exchange option 39.2 56.5 55.5 43.2
S tock index futures 14.5 69.1 127.3 172.2
S tock index option 37.8 93.7 238.3 326.9
Total 618.3 2,290.4 8,862.5 9,185.3
Source: Szalai 1996
If we compare trading figures to G D P (which are closer to  to ta l transactions— 
for example, the  annual number of contracts in the derivative m arkets), we will 
naturally  find th a t they are multiples of GDP. In the case of stock exchanges, the 
problem is even aggravated by the fact th a t the num ber of transactions involves 
cum ulation: trading and positions are recorded for each of the participants in the 
transactions.
The second optical illusion, which influences public opinion much more, arises 
from the comparison of flow and stock variables. It does make a difference w hether 
one measures the size of the banking system as the share of to ta l banking assets 
to  G D P (it is roughly 200 percent in developed countries), or as the share of GDP 
generated by the banking system  to to ta l G DP (which is below 20 percent). If, then, 
we conclude from the first ratio th a t the banking system  was too large compared 
to  G DP and consequently must be restricted, we make a ra ther serious mistake. 
Probably due to their imprecise wording, this is exactly the m istake th a t critics of 
the money-world have made: according to their argum entation, a flow variable— 
G D P produced in one year—should  constitute a kind of ceiling to the excessive 
growth of a stock variable (market size). M arket size is an asset-like variable and, 
if seen from this perspective, only a portion of to tal assets is embodied in assets 
produced by the money-world. Due to  the growth of assets, this does indeed account 
for an ever larger share of annual GDP.
We assume th a t the real problem of the critics is the in ternal restructuring 
of wealth: indeed, an ever larger share is represented by financial, ra ther than  real 
wealth, and the weight of wealth embodied in derivative products w ithin to ta l fi­
nancial wealth is rising. However, comparing a term  deposit or a share position 
and a derivative position is not w ithout problems either. If we are to  measure 
precisely, wealth should include not the notional value for derivatives bu t only the 
value of the capital at risk. Following on from the m arket’s net settlem ent principle,
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it is the m arket value, or the reproduction value of the position, which is estim ated 
a t 5-15 percent of the notional value.24
Based on w hat we have said in the previous section, we consider the shift of 
wealth towards financial wealth to  be a positive phenomenon, rather than  negative— 
th a t is, negative for those who see dangers in the process. It is a positive phe­
nomenon because it means the increased efficiency of m arket interm ediation and a 
reduction in to tal social costs. Furtherm ore, the main argum ent of critics is th a t 
the money-world is “too large” . They seem to think th a t there is an “optim al” size 
which has already been exceeded by the burgeoning money-world, thus becoming 
self-contained and siphoning off power from the real economy. We should adm it 
th a t we cannot ascertain optim al dimensions. We do not know w hat size an opti­
mal banking system is. We do not know w hat size an optim al derivative m arket 
is. We believe th a t these m agnitudes are more like signs: they do not tell whether 
som ething is “much” or “little” , th a t it is functional or dysfunctional.
The problem of the quantity  of money and the size of financial interm ediation 
is not new in the history of economics. The best example is the debate about the 
determ ination of “optim al quantity  money” . Early economic studies often dealt 
w ith the level or quantity  of money accum ulated in a country. The authors, labelled 
m ercantilist, liked to stress th a t increasing the money supply in a country m ust be 
a key political objective, while Smith and his followers saw this as a narrow-minded 
approach.
Later, the issue of optim al quantity  of money was connected to the question of 
inflation. The theory which links the value of money not to  its production and sell­
ing costs bu t to its quantity—called the quantity  theory of money—has existed for 
centuries. A ttem pts at regulating the optim al money supply are frequently found 
in 20th century theoretical writings as well, bu t every constructive rule has gener­
ated problem s.25 The development of the theory has finally produced a negative 
result: no constructive rule can be provided for determ ining the necessary quantity  
of money, and there is no such controllable mechanism which would guarantee the 
regular release of the necessary money supply.
Later, m onetarist economics gave up trying to determ ine the optim al quantity  
of money, and rather it attem pted  to identify the supposedly optim al equilibrium  
level by forecasting money demand and money supply. A part from m onetary ag­
gregates, m onetarist economics tried to  forecast m onetary processes through prices 
and liquidity, and their ever finer m easurement.
The critics of the financial world usually employ direct indicators, and their 
writings suggest th a t there is “useful” money and “useless” money. By continuing
24 For exam ple, according to a  BIS survey, the nom inal value of con tracts on the O TC  m arkets 
was $ 40,700 billion in  M arch 1995, while the  gross m arket value am ounted  to $ 1,700 billion only.
25One of th e  m ost recent was F riedm an’s ra te  X  rule.
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in this direction, one may well arrive at the basic question arising from the m ethod­
ology of socialist political economics, namely “Do or do not tills contribute to  the 
increase of the national income?” We do not think th a t this approach will lead to 
positive answers.
Lower interm ediation costs, m argins and fees will only appear in liquid, suf­
ficiently deep m arkets; these, in tu rn , require growth in m arket size. If the depth 
of a market is measured by the number of offers or bids below or above current 
m arket price, then new inform ation which shifts the price from the curren t level 
will result in large price swings in “shallow” markets. This is because there are 
few offers or bids near the current m arket price. Price changes are hardly notice­
able on in ternational foreign exchange m arkets, which suggests th a t the m arket has 
dep th .26
The global foreign exchange market is probably one of the world’s most 
liquid27 and thus m ost efficient m arkets, where information flow is free and transac­
tion costs are low. A change in the price of futures products on this m arket reflects 
inform ation about the future, and is independent of present price changes (unless 
they carry inform ation about the future as well). Inform ation which will be new 
tom orrow, and which will determ ine prices tomorrow cannot be forecast w ith great 
certainty in a scientific way; as a consequence, an efficiently working m arket cannot 
possibly be influenced.28
One or more speculators would stand a good chance of influencing future 
prices if they could move around such a purchasing power on the given deep m ar­
ket which guarantees them  a dom inant position. On account of the dimensions of 
the foreign exchange m arket, rarely has a single business group had the chance to 
do th a t. The other possibility to influence prices is if several actors have identical 
expectations, and they make transactions accordingly. As a consequence of diffi­
culties in coordination and cooperation, this has mostly happened in the recent 
decades when governments have tried to  stabilise the value of the target foreign 
exchange detached from its real value a t a higher level, and the action finally put 
an end to  this artificial situation. This indicates th a t the m arkets of such financial
26T he global foreign exchange m arket is the  world's m ost liquid m arket, which m eans th a t 
positions can  be opened or closed a t the  fastest ra te  w ithou t affecting th e  curren t m arket price. 
A nybody can in itia te  transactions 24 hours a  day in all m ajo r currencies. A lthough m ulti-m illion 
do lla r transactions are quite  frequent on th e  global foreign exchange m arket, th e  m arket is so 
large th a t  these transac tions do no t exert a  significant influence on curren t exchange ra te s  either.
27K am illa Lányi writes: “In  1995 the  daily  trad ing  volume stood a t USD 1,300—1,500 billion.” 
(Lányi 1996) Essentially, th is m arket only includes foreign exchanges whose conversion is free, 
and  which are relatively unrestric ted  and cheap to move.
28The logical im possibility of such a forecast was indicated  by a fam ous jazz m usician who, 
answ ering th e  question “W here do you th ink  jazz will be in twenty years", said  “No idea. For if 
I knew, I would already be there .”
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liabilities cannot be fundam entally and perm anently separated from the operation 
of sectors whose products or assets these liabilities directly or indirectly refer to .29
T he expansion of the m arket size is generally accompanied by an increase 
in efficiency, and market liquidity reduces the volatility and distortions of m arket 
prices. Price volatility is a reliable signal of m arket size: large volatility is likely 
to  signal a shallow m arket, and insufficient liquidity. However, there are certain 
barriers to  the increase of the depth and efficiency of the m arket parallel to  m arket 
growth.
One problem is “if market actors do not recognise the positive benefit of 
increased liquidity th a t their m arket entry would induce, they will possibly not 
enter the market in fear of illiquidity. Thus, a “shallow” m arket cannot become 
a “deep” m arket even though the market entry of actors would improve Pareto  
efficiency” (Hahn 1990). So, actors are caught in a trap , and only intervention or 
learning can lead to  increased efficiency.
A nother problem  results from the method of gaining information. Keynes 
ironically remarked th a t Americans active on the stock exchange were trying to 
acquire information not about the object of investm ent bu t about w hat the others 
would like to  see, ju s t like judges at a beauty contest (Keynes 1965, p. 181). How­
ever, the direct acquisition of information on the securities market does not pay off 
for some actors, so they like to resort to prices, and obtain a free ride from those 
who invest in information. Thus, prices not only contribute to  m arket cleansing, 
and the coordination of dem and and supply, but also provide inform ation ( Gross­
man and Stiglitz 1976). The new actors can be either inform ation investors or ones 
who do not want to  spend on this, so their entry does not necessarily deepen the 
m arket.
Problems may arise when the growth of the market size makes it profitable for 
some actors to apply product differentiation—thus the m arket becomes segmented, 
with exclusive positions emerging. Moreover, on m arkets w ith inform ation inequal­
ities, where the ability of actors to process and evaluate inform ation is lim ited, any 
growth in the number of actors may worsen communication, leading to  fragm en­
ta tion  and increased price volatility. On a smaller market with similar conditions, 
actors would have fuller information, their relationships would entangle the m arket 
be tter, and thus price volatility would be reduced. ( Baker 1984)
In term s of liquidity growth, it is im portant th a t such actors should enter 
the m arket who refuse risks less, are willing to take on extra risks in the hope of 
high returns— in other words, speculators appear on the market. The emergence 
and the expansion of speculation increase m arket liquidity (and thus its efficiency)
29T his balancing function of speculation is m entioned by Miklós Almási (Almási 1995, pp . 34- 
35). Obviously, appropria te  tools, in te rnational regulation  an d  intervention agreem ents m ust and  
can be used to  fight speculation which points in a reverse, unhealthy  direction. We also have to 
add , however, th a t  over-regulation m ight prevent the occurrence of the  balancing itself.
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and reduce social costs; while, on the other hand, due to the greater propensity of 
speculators to  take risks,30 the m arket becomes more fragile, w ith a greater prob­
ability of speculation bubbles emerging (LeRoy and Gilles 1990). The speculation 
bubble is the appearance of a factor in the m arket price which cannot be explained 
by fundam ental factors such as expectations concerning the present value of future 
returns. The size of the price bubble is “justified” by its future value— in other 
words, prices are high because the actors expect them  to be even higher.31 Thus, 
the bubble is swelling in a self-induction process.32 Today, the “bubble theory” 
can determ ine certain special conditions as to when arbitrage abolishes bubbles, or 
when a bubble converges to  an equilibrium  state; however, these results are not suf­
ficiently robust. Our current knowledge about the birth  and survival of bubbles is 
ra ther little , even though a survey of these would also be required for the economic 
analysis of financial instrum ents. We know of price bubbles, bu t we cannot even 
show them  precisely (because the m easurem ent tools are wrong). We know th a t 
bubbles will “burst” under certain conditions, bu t we cannot precisely determ ine 
the necessary and sufficient conditions.
W ith  m arket fragility the probability of price bubbles may increase parallel to 
the growth of the m arket size. Such bubbles may cause problems in an increasingly 
autonom ous and self-ruling financial system. The question is: how serious are these 
problem s and w hat social costs do they entail? Then there is another big question: 
w hat regulation tools are necessary to  avoid them ? However, before dealing w ith the 
dilemmas of regulation, consideration m ust be given to the im pacts th a t financial 
processes have on the real economy.
The impact of the operation of the financial system on other economic sectors
“The real economy suffers from a capital shortage, while the financial sector 
has excess capital” , writes Miklós Almási. This means th a t the financial world 
has not only lost its original function of transferring capital from economic areas
30Fear from  speculation  is no t new either: in the  General theory , Keynes expressed sim ilar 
thoughts: “As long as businesses are progressing favourably, speculators will pe rh ap s no t cause 
larger dam age th a n  the  bubbles. T he situation  tu rn s serious if the  business becom es a bubble  in 
the  vortex of speculation. If the  developm ent of a  country 's capital becom es the  by -product of 
the  operation  of a  gam bling casino, speculation would no t really do a  good jo b .” (K eynes 1965, 
p . 181).
31 Expressed form ally (simplified): pt = N P V [ E ( d t + j ) +  bt i )], where N P V [ E ( d t+})] is the  net 
present value of fu ture  re tu rn  (dividend) expectations, bt is the  price bubble w hich is described 
by th e  following stochastic  difference equation: bt =  E(bt+i ) / ( l  +  r).
32T he bubble is no t a  p roduct of m odern m arkets. For the  description of the  w orld’s m ost 
significant bubbles—such as the  infam ous D utch tu lip  bulb bubble or th e  South Sea Com pany 
bubble—used as a  s tan d ard  tex tbook  exam ple, see Kindleberger (1978).
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w ith excess capital to those w ith a capital shortage, bu t it is actually functioning 
in a contrasting way: it hinders economic financing by spending the funds, which 
are sources of this financing, on m aintaining its own self-ruling operation. As a 
consequence, actual, real economic needs are left unsatisfied due to the absence of 
financing. It is an illusion to  think th a t resources appearing in the financial sys­
tem  can be converted to other places because they are prim arily m arket products, 
created by the m arket itself. Channelling may be possible in com m and economies 
(though in a fragm ented way only) but not in m arket economies. The resources 
used for this purpose are likely to  be lost by way of an adm inistrative restriction, 
to  say nothing of the welfare costs arising from the absence of unfulfilled functions.
Following the development described in the previous sections, the theoretical 
description of the relationship between the financial sector and the real economy, 
the so-called “transm ission mechanism” , was also in constant transition.
In the Keynesian theory, money affects the real economy indirectly through 
the interest ra tes.33 In the m onetarist description of the transm ission m echanism — 
since institu tional factors make the velocity of money foreseeable in the long run, 
and since the real economy’s performance is basically determined by technological 
factors— changes in money supply will principally result in price changes. Ih e  
m onetarists stress th a t factors which determine the long-term  growth rate  of the 
real income are independent of the long-term growth rate of the money supply as 
long as the economy is following the normal routine. A close link between a change 
in money supply and a change in other economic variables does not tell anything 
about their origins or the direction of influences. M onetary variables may dance to 
the tune of independent changes in other economic variables, but changes in the 
income and the prices may equally well dance to the tune played by independent 
m onetary changes; the two may be interactive, while both (...) dancing to  a tune 
whistled by a th ird  group of effects.” ( Schwartz and Friedman 1963, p. 48) If 
several tim e series move together, the question of which enjoys relative freedom is 
a reasonable question for the purposes of the forecast and the analysis of rational 
economic action. The m onetarist and the new classical schools have m ade the m ost 
significant contributions to the analysis of this relative independence. As a result of 
the economic political consequences, the proponents of the dominance proposition 
see “the a ttack  of the money-world” as an “a ttack  of the m onetarists” , even though 
the theoretical economists wanted to say something completely different.34
33 As his perhaps g reatest critic p u t it: “Keynesians th in k  th a t  th e  in terest ra te  is th e  only link 
betw een m onetary  an d  real income changes. The more inflexible the  investm ent expense and the  
savings are in re la tion  to  th e  in terest ra te , the  less a  change in th e  in terest ra te  will affect y." 
(Friedm an 1986, p. 125) See also Keynes (1965).
34 Friedm an’s argum ent suggests a  sort of “dancing will be done to the  piping provided” dom i­
nance, yet it sim ply tries to  provide a visual expression of w hat is called exogenity in  tim e series 
analysis. To p u t it very generally: m oney’s weak exogenity is accepted in m odels belonging to 
the  m o n eta ris t school of thought, bu t there  is no strong  exogenity, i.e. no good o pportun ity  in
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C ontem porary research increasingly stresses the significance of certain chan­
nels of finance, the new financial instrum ents and interm ediaries.35 Financial crises 
may directly influence real economic processes through changes in the  liquid finan­
cial assets available, the obstruction of financial channels, and the in terest rates. 
An increasing num ber of analysts emphasise the endogenity of the financial sector, 
and the im portance of internal substitu tion  processes which, in developed and di­
versified financial systems, allow the satisfaction of the economy’s need for financial 
assets. Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960), or more recently Bernanke (1983), Stiglitz 
(1993) and Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) criticise the division of financial assets into 
two extremes (which was very popular among both Keynesian and neo-classicist 
economists), since, in reality, bonds as well as money have plenty of b e tter or worse 
substitu tes, and the shares of these are rising every year. However, if the m onetary 
policy tries to  narrow liquid assets in the economy, or influence the interest rates, 
and if it does so by heeding only bank liabilities defined as money, it seems to  for­
get th a t economic actors will—even by incurring higher transaction costs— create 
money substitu tion  means and mechanisms, and will activate the credit channel in 
addition to  the money channel (László and Zsámboki 1995).
The critics of the increasing autonomy of the financial system  essentially 
stress the uncertain ty  appearing at the national economic level and the higher so­
cial costs which result from rational micro level decisions. However, increasing au­
tonomy may also be evaluated from a radically different perspective. Accordingly, 
increasing autonom y allows the financial sector to  become more or less independent 
from real economic cycles. In critical situations, financial interm ediaries can offset 
contractions w ithin the banking sector; thus, for example, a bank crisis triggered 
by a real economic crisis will not necessarily turn  into a factor which s tren g th ­
ens or expands the real economic crisis. A t the same time, transition  economies 
have provided plenty of examples for the high social costs of such substitu tion  
processes. Both financial queuing or pilot games are unusual financial institu tions 
whose uncertainty-raising effects and social costs probably exceed their individual 
benefits. As a consequence, any one-sided general evaluation is misleading.
On the degree of uncertainty and the need for restriction
Due to financial innovation and the removal of certain regulatory barriers, the 
independence of the financial m arkets has indeed grown in recent years. We have so
economic policy to  be  seized by th e  government. Causality does no t follow from  weak exogenity. 
The em pirical research findings in the early  1980s d id  no t confirm th e  hypothesis th a t  a  change 
in m oney supply  essentially determ ines the  developm ent of real economic o u tp u t. T hus, if “the 
money-w orld is a tta ck in g ”, the  m onetarists are attack ing  the  least.
35 T he tools available to m anage inform ation problem s have also grown in num ber, which has 
facilitated  m odel-m aking w ith the new approach.
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far tried to prove th a t increasing autonomy is, in m ost cases, not an end itself but 
increases efficiency and thus welfare. A t the same tim e, increasing autonomy also 
enhances risks since the s ta te ’s intervention power is per defimotionem shrinking.36 
Several analysts believe th a t regulation is not a risk-reducing and crisis-preventing 
factor bu t it can actually propagate the crisis. Milton Friedman and A nna Schwartz 
argued th a t the financial crises during the G reat Depression were, for the m ost part, 
caused by the Fed (when it exploited the opportunities available badly), and it did 
not try  to  offset the liquidity crunch arising from the real economic crisis, and the 
change in expectations.37
An outline of reasons for banking regulation
A popular topic of theoretical and empirical research is the analysis of bank 
runs and bank crises, and the definition of the governments consequential regula­
tory role. From a theoretical point of view, the banking system  has two equilibrium  
states: one is when, based on client trust, banks can finance their illiquid assets 
from liquid liabilities because the depositors will not rush to  w ithdraw their money 
and there are no bank runs or banking panics; the other is when people s opin­
ions about the bank change and they want to have their money immediately; this 
triggers bank runs, or even a series of bank failures. Unfortunately, the favourable 
equilibrium  is fragile, with the inherent possibility of a shift.
Bank runs may be caused by some public information about the bank, the 
banking system or even the whole economy which shatters people s confidence, this 
is called an “inform ation-based” panic. In an information-based panic situation , 
banks are run in the wake of some concrete public information: a worrying indicator 
in the annual report, the spectacular intervention of the banking supervision or 
sta te  authorities into the bank’s activities, information published about a significant 
w ithdraw al, or a piece of news about the economy suggesting future failures, which 
suddenly make a bank or the banks look more risky. This is the point when the 
analysis of bank crises is linked to  the analysis of macroeconomic cycles.
A popular approach holds th a t financial crises will break out as a consequence 
of the decision of rational depositors in an a ttem pt to m aintain their consum ption 
level. Therefore booms lead to excess savings which are used up in tim es of eco­
nomic decline. Bank failures due to  deposit withdrawal are m ost probably a t the 
bottom  of the crisis ( Gorton 1988). A large-scale bank crisis with a series of bank 
runs may quickly ripple through the whole banking system , ruffle the  economy s
36 T he au tho rs quo ted  consider these risks too big, b u t they  do so w ithout considering th e ir  
benefits.
37 We especially recom m end th is though t to those who perforce see m onetarism  as restric tion  
(Schwartz and  Friedm an 1986; László and  Zsámboki 1995).
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financing system  and deepen the recession. The proponents of this approach a t­
tem pt to  present the simple nature of the indicators with the help of which clients 
used to  observe the operation of the financial institu tion (G orton 1988; Park 1991, 
pp. 271-286; Williamson 1988, pp. 25-44). However, if the crisis is the result of the 
observation by clients, regulations can also prepare for the situation and, if need 
be, intervene. The question is whether they can and want to  take this step.
Another group of economists argue th a t the fragile equilibrium  may also 
be shattered  by an incident, a seemingly insignificant event, a sort of “sunspot 
activ ity” ; this is where the term  “sunspot panic” comes from .38 In such a panic, 
there is no concrete, direct cause, no public inform ation th a t would shape public 
opinion, and depositors run on banks as a result of practically incidental influences, 
m ostly as victims of a mass hysteria. The panic occurs because depositors expect it 
to  happen, so depositors run on banks not because, for example, the b ank’s assets do 
not provide sufficient cover but because their individual expectations have suddenly 
changed. If this is true, regulations are mostly powerless, or they should in itia te  
institu tional changes—for example imposing deposit insurance—which will pu t a 
brake on expectations turning in the wrong direction (Kindleberger 1978; Diamond 
and Dybvig 1994; 1986).
The critics of the development of the financial system— openly or covertly— 
see stronger sta te  intervention and regulation as a means of lessening risks. How­
ever, the financial system  is already well-regulated in comparison w ith other areas, 
and few would doubt the necessity of the regulation of this area.
In the case of a particular financial regulation issue or a concrete sta te  action, 
economic policy-makers will generally enlist the following injuries done to public 
good:
—  risks increasing as a result of financial innovation and expansion of the 
financial system,
—  general disorders occurring in the efficient allocation of financial liabilities 
and in the interm ediation of savings,
—  the effects of a potential impossibility of the paym ent system  on the real 
economy and the society,
—- the violation of the small depositors’ interests,
—  the possible loss of wealth for the sta te  as an owner,
—  the efficiency improving effects of regulatory measures.
Yet, an analysis of social costs is very often missing. This is because sta te  
intervention and economic regulation in the financial sector have produced a large 
number of unwanted side-effects and increased transaction costs. Several financial
38 “Sunspot” is o ften  called a “bubble" as well—indeed, bubbles an d  sunspo ts were long con­
sidered to  be identical. We can  see th a t, despite the  sim ilarity, the  two phenom ena occur for 
different reasons, and  are different in n a tu re  (e.g. sunspot implies “incident” , while bubbles can 
also be determ inistic. (LeRoy and  Gilles 1990, pp. 74-76)
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innovations have actually been prom pted by regulation or taxation .39 The other 
typical problem  is th a t individual factors will get enlarged in such a list even though 
their weight is much smaller than  earlier. Today, the operation of the paym ent 
system  is more independent of a particular bank’s success or failure. The collapse 
of the giro system  would require such a general banking crisis which would probably 
be caused by a large-scale external shock; this— as in other areas—would require 
sta te  intervention.
T he theory of banking regulation lists other factors as well to  justify  regu­
lation. One category contains factors related to the special nature of banks, such 
as the high ratio  of loans to equity, the link with the paym ents system, or the 
transform ation function of the banks. The factors in the other group are related 
to  regulation—for example, the need to ensure liquidity, or the deposit insurance. 
Still, we should conclude th a t most of the factors are not so special as we think, 
and the system  works well in other industries w ithout any sta te  regulation. When 
a company finances a long-term  investment w ith short- or m edium -term  bonds, it 
actually performs transform ation similar to  a bank. In most countries, insurance 
companies and brokerage firms are as active players in the giro system  as the banks 
but even so, their regulation is different (Dew atripont and Tirolé 1993).
Of the reasons for a special banking regulation listed above, the m ost sig­
nificant is the need to offer risk-free savings opportunities to small depositors. In 
the same way as small investors in most financial businesses, depositors may suffer 
significant losses due to adverse selection and moral hazard. This is due to the fact 
th a t small depositors are not able to monitor the banks’ activities, thus the m an­
agement can assert their own interests a t the depositors’ expense. An im portan t 
dilem m a concerns the areas which require governments to  regulate, and the place 
where participants can operate under rules determ ined by themselves.40
A credible policy not only can contribute to the continued stability  of indi­
vidual banks but also lead to financial panics, where sound financial institu tions 
also fall victim  to the crisis (H arm ati, László and Zsámboki, 1996). It is also crucial 
to  detect the border between micro and macro level risks as their mixing may lead 
to excessive intervention.
Fears concerning the expansion of the crisis to other segments of the financial 
system  are also often exaggerated. In countries with a developed financial system, 
the unregulated nature of derivative transactions is seen as a much greater danger 
(D ew atripont and Tirolé 1993; Szalai 1996). The m arket and the regulation of these 
financial procedures are rather chaotic, and a standardised and balanced regulation
T he capping of the  in terest ra tes of sight deposits resu lted  in a  sea of non-banking in term e­
diaries: for exam ple, open-ended m utual funds; this practically offered a  sim ilar opp o rtu n ity  a t 
b e tte r  in te rest conditions.
For a  detailed analysis o f the  question, see Várhegyi (1997). For a  case of deposit insurance, 
see H arm ati, László and  Zsámboki (1996).
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does, in fact, seem necessary. However, we m ust point out th a t while abuses with 
these instrum ents may have led to  serious bankruptcies, such crises were invariably 
contained w ithin the given financial institutions, and they did not influence m arket 
prices, or only for a short time and to a small extent.
T he individual members of the financial system are undoubtedly in contact 
w ith each other: banks trade with banks on the interbank m arket, banks give credits 
to  brokerage firms, insurance companies deposit a part of their funds w ith banks, 
etc. However, before erecting high protection walls around the institu tions, we must 
examine each element of this chain according to  whether m arket mechanisms create 
n a tu ra l risk m anagem ent mechanisms, and whether sta te  regulation is necessary.
It is obviously im portan t th a t banks should provide a possibility for safe de­
positing, but there are other financial intermediaries which were established ju st 
because investors did not need the level of sta te  intervention th a t banks norm ally 
offer. Regulating open-ended m utual funds—on the grounds of even larger risks, 
ju s t like banks— would in fact abolish its very reason for existence since they are 
institu tions where investors wish to  get free from the shackles of the banking reg­
ulation.
The effects of globalisation
T he globalising financial m arket institu tions and actors, enjoying a rising 
degree of autonom y and crossing national borders, curb the economic power of the 
governments, and narrow the scope of “national” economic policies. The s ta te ’s 
economic power is essentially built on four pillars which are, a t the same tim e, 
legal guarantees. The first is the s ta te ’s exclusive tax-raising power, the second is 
the governm ent’s currency issuing monopoly, to which is related the s ta te ’s right 
to  elim inate the budget deficit by borrowing, and finally the s ta te ’s regulatory 
m onopoly—specifically the monopoly of regulating the financial m arkets.
Free capital movement and the development of the financial m arkets present 
a great danger to these sta te  monopolies. W hile, a t the time of the isolation of 
national m arkets, both individual and institu tional taxpayers and investors were 
prisoners of these s ta te  monopolies and could only protest if they were unsatisfied, 
today they have the option to  exit: voting with their feet and wallets, they can 
choose from alternative financial institutions, taxation  systems and different cur­
rencies. The increased decision-making freedom of citizens and companies can have 
not only an inherent danger bu t also a large disciplinary power: it forces govern­
m ent to  pursue more sensible fiscal and m onetary policies, and to show more care 
in safeguarding the value of the currency.
The com petition for funds also restrains the potential indebtedness of na­
tional states since it opens up new alternatives for potential borrowers who used to
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be squeezed between the barriers of a narrow, undeveloped financial institu tional 
system  and the national markets. This, of course, does not mean th a t governments 
cannot do certain  things unpunished: the economic tools41 often applied in times 
of missing or seriously restricted convertibility of the national currency, the regula­
tion of capital transfer and the ban on international banking trigger opposite effects 
in the new economic environm ent, and undermine the governm ent’s domestic and 
foreign credibility.
Since governments and civil servants involved in the preparation  and imple­
m entation of government decisions still feel a political responsibility for the macroe­
conomic indicators, they are reluctant to accept a narrower playground for economic 
policy. Moreover, decision-makers who advocate the continuity, or national targets 
for economic policy, and fear th a t the global commodity and foreign exchange m ar­
kets curb the s ta te ’s sovereignty often receive substantial political support from 
groups of producers and employees who—since they only possess products, skills 
and knowledge with a limited m arketability—are interested in m aintaining sta te  
regulation; this creates opportunities for rent by restricting com petition.42 The 
rent seeking—e.g. income and wealth transfers, monopolistic rights, government 
allowances and privileges— belongs to the category of non-price com petition where 
social benefits are smaller than costs. Sizeable empirical and theoretical evidence 
proves th a t the advance of the rent-seeking groups and the d istribution coalitions 
underm ine the conditions for long-term  economic growth since it reduces the abil­
ity to  adopt the new technology, and deteriorates the conditions of any necessary 
change in redistribution of funds.43
Thus, any restriction of the governm ent’s tax-raising, m oney-creating, bor­
rowing and regulating power—ju st like the disciplinary power of the creation and 
enforcement of fiscal and m onetary constitutionalism — ties the hands of the po­
litical decision-makers bu t it will, with a high degree of probability, improve the 
efficiency of resource allocation.
We do not deny th a t the development of the financial markets creates nu­
merous new sources of danger at the level of particular states or national regula­
tory authorities. Governments may react to these dangers—from the emergence
4'F ix in g  the  exchange ra te  of the  dom estic currency, unbridled governm ent spending, inflation- 
ary  m oney creation , using th e  s ta te ’s regulatory  m onopoly for raising  revenues, etc.
42 Readers are recom m ended to  consult Stigler (1989) and  M ueller (1989) on th e  political eco­
nom ics of regulation.
43See Olson (1987; 1997). T he validity of th is conlusion, which originally comes from  Olson, is 
fairly broad, so it is no t by accident th a t several em pirical counter-exam ples can be listed  alongside 
the  facts which su p p o rt the  theory. See M ueller 1989, p. 319. We th in k  th a t  in  tran s itio n  economies 
rent-seeking induced by indirect s ta te  economic regulation, and rent-seeking efforts re la ted  to 
the d istrib u tio n  of ownership are enormously im portan t. U nfortunately, very few studies have 
been w ritten  on th is topic in Hungary, and social scientists still have to  p resent th e  analysis 
° f  the  d istribu tion  of privileges concerning financial interm ediaries, an d  th e  b ank  an d  deb tor
consolidation.
Acta Occonomica 49, 1997-98
30 L. CSONTOS -J. KIRÁLY-G. LÁSZLÓ: THE GREAT SHIVERING
of speculative bubbles to  the collapse of large banks—in two ways. They will ei­
ther jo in tly  create globally valid rules for economic actors—sim ilar to  m inim um  
capital requirem ents imposed on banks—or, also by way of a jo in t effort, establish 
a global economic environm ent which encourages actors to  behave in a prudent 
way and to  regulate themselves. International action will, of course, have to face 
the well-known traps of collective action, coordination problems and the typical 
phenomenon of free riding.
Conclusion
Although the authors we have quoted repeatedly do not constitu te a homo­
geneous group, or belong to  one “school” , the logic and the norm ative background 
of their argum entation seem very much alike. We have presented this “philosophy” 
alongside three statem ents which we consider fundam ental: (a) the dom inance 
proposition points out the dominance of the financial world over the real economy,
(b) the second proposition expresses the excessive development of financial transac­
tions and institu tions, their detachm ent from natu ral boundaries, and (c) the third 
proposition argues for the need for new adm inistrative restriction.
We were not m otivated to  write this study by a simple refusal of the is­
sue. We believe th a t such critiques of the financial system  have been triggered by 
phenom ena which do indeed require an explanation. The significant influence of 
financial institu tions or their managers on certain political or economic decisions 
is a hypothesis th a t can and should be examined. The dem aterialisation of money, 
the emergence of new segments in the money m arkets, the recent fast expansion 
of the derivative m arkets and the appearance of certain, formerly unknown or in­
significant risks are all facts of life. However, as opposed to the m ajority  of critics 
quoted, we do not think th a t these phenom ena are underpinned by some conspir­
acy of am bitious élite groups, and probably it is not these phenom ena th a t direct 
m ankind’s development into a deadlock (if it is going there anyway).
The prim ary purpose of this study has been to explore the m ethodological and 
norm ative background of writings th a t uncover the “m oney-world’s dom inance” , 
and to  present some theoretical explanations and em pirical research findings about 
the operation  of the institu tions in question which we find m ethodologically accept­
able. The phenom ena under a ttack  are not obvious facts for us either, and although 
we have form ulated the questions in a different way and included new aspects, we 
have essentially tried to move the debate on from the current impasse.
In addition to methodological foundations and em pirical validity, we have 
identified another weakness in the strong and weak versions of the dom inance 
proposition, notably th a t in the m ist of “great ideas” analysts and politicians may 
overlook significant issues such as deadlocked institu tions, rent-seeking, free riding
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and the potential shortcom ings of regulation. The study has presented the develop­
m ent of money and the financial m arkets as a usually efficient solution to the m ost 
basic hum an problems. We have focused on the determ ination of inform ation and 
transaction  costs, friction arising from economic transactions, and the description 
of actions, institu tions aimed a t alleviating this friction. We have tried to  define 
the basic functions of these institu tions and instrum ents as well as explain their 
operation, because this is necessary for the exam ination of their operating disorders 
and social costs.
The critics of the financial system often see the side-effects of th is development 
as a more serious danger. Therefore—explicitly or im plicitly— they call for the 
raising of barriers. They will stress the dangers of the rising trading volume and 
globalisation, even though it  results in not only the realisation of increasing risks 
bu t also, as a by-product of com petition and larger liquidity, lower in terest rates 
and improved conditions. In the financial system, com petition is not linked to  a 
single product but a series of products which—figuratively speaking—plot a risk 
and yield function. However, although the development of money m arkets may 
bring about m arked product differentiation and m arket segm entation, this would 
im pact the quality, the risk and the price of other products and services as well. 
The high num ber of transactions will make it easier for investors and depositors to 
fine-tune prices and risks.
Regulation m ust, of course, be developed in certain cases, such as the futures 
m arket, bu t it m ust not jeopardise the development of the financial system. This 
is not only because it is unreasonable but also because the financial interm ediation 
processes will invariably duck adm inistrative barriers. We agree th a t the role of 
governm ents in stabilising crises originating from or reinforced by the financial 
system  has diminished, bu t thereby their ability to destabilise is also contained. 
However, if we incorporate unjustified adm inistrative barriers in the system  again, 
the stab ility  of the  financial system  and the economy will not increase noticeably, 
only the inform ation and transaction costs. Consequently the system  will operate 
less efficiently, and incur larger social costs.
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FOREIGN TRADE DEFICIT OF COUNTRIES OF 
EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE* 
Causes and Consequences in the Light of Preparations for Accession 
to the European Union
A. INOTAI
In  the  last years, m ost associated C entra l and  E aste rn  E uropean countries have been faced 
w ith  rapid ly  growing tra d e  deficit w ith th e  E uropean Union. Due to  quick economic m odern­
ization and  fu rth er im port liberalization , stipu la ted  in the  A ssociation Agreem ents, still ahead, 
the  w idening of th e  already su b stan tia l trad e  deficit can be predic ted . Since th e  A ssociation 
Agreem ent did no t create  a  linkage betw een rising trad e  deficit resulting from  free trad e  in less 
developed countries and  sim ultaneous financial transfers, the  trad e  and  curren t account deficit 
rnay becom e a  constrain t in  th e  transform ation  and  m odernization process of C entra l an d  E aste rn  
E urope. More im portantly , i t  m ay jeopardize o r even tem porary  bloc official negotia tions to  be 
s ta r te d  in th e  first ha lf of 1998. T he study  identifies the  m ain factors of rising trade  deficit and  
looks a t  the  different sources and  economic policy instrum ents th a t m ay be able to  finance it in 
th e  n ex t and  crucial years of p reparing  for full m em bership in the  E uropean  Union.
In recent m onths, and especially after figures about the foreign trade balances 
of 1996 were made public, analysts both in Hungary and abroad noticed th a t the 
respective foreign trade balances of the transition countries of East-C entral Europe, 
which are associated countries of the European Union, had undergone a dram atic 
deterioration. The process started  as early as 1991-1992, yet in the initial years of 
transition  the deficit was kept under control, and the massive am ounts of capital 
invested (either in the form of foreign direct investm ent, portfolio investm ent or 
as com pensation for services) comfortably compensated for the trade deficit. In 
1996, however, fundam ental changes upset what used to be sustainable imbalances 
( Tabl e  1 ) .
Between 1995 and 1996 the deficit in Poland increased from USD 6.2 billion 
to  USD 11.9 billion, and from USD 3.8 billion to USD 5.9 billion in the Czech 
Republic. In 1995, there was a minor trade surplus in Slovakia, which had turned 
into a deficit of USD 2.1 billion by 1996. The deficit in Slovenia was as high as 
USD 1.2 billion already in 1995, and levelled off at US 1.1 billion a year later. 
Even in Hungary, which introduced a radical stabilisation program m e, the deficit 
of USD 2.6 billion in 1995 climbed to USD 3.1 billion because, by the second half
‘ The author acknowledges the contribution of Gergely Kacsoh , research fellow at the Institute 
° f  World Economics of the Hungarian Academy o f Sciences, who supplied key figures about the 
foreign trade of the countries concerned.
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Table 1
Comparison of foreign trade flows of peripheral EU and CEFTA countries
C ountry D estination
(origin)
Year E xports
USD
Im ports
m n
B alance
Ireland world 1970-1972 3,869 5,533 -1 ,6 6 4
1973-1975 7,935 10,371 -7 ,9 3 5
EC 1970-1972 480 928 -4 4 8
1973-1975 6,109 7,209 -1 ,1 0 0
Greece world 1978-1980 12,365 24,930 -1 2 ,5 6 5
1981-1983 12,958 28,294 -1 5 ,3 3 5
EC 1978-1980 6,202 11,800 -5 ,5 9 8
1981-1983 6,146 13,594 -7 ,7 4 8
Spain world 1983-1985 67,262 87,550 -2 0 ,2 8 8
1986-1988 101,696 144,357 -4 2 ,6 6 1
EK 1983-1985 34,288 30,398 3,890
1986-1988 64,633 78,866 -1 4 ,2 3 3
P o rtugal world 1983-1985 11,353 23,882 -1 2 ,5 2 8
1986-1988 27,513 41,304 -1 3 ,7 9 2
EC 1983-1985 9,662 10,642 -9 7 9
1986-1988 19,445 26,464 -7 ,0 1 9
H ungary world 1989-1991 29,380 28,848 532
1992-1994 30,313 38,163 -7 ,8 5 0
1995 12,867 15,466 -2 ,5 9 9
1996 13,145 16,209 -3 ,0 6 4
EU 1989-1991 10,132 9,922 210
1992-1994 14,923 16,358 -1 ,4 3 5
1995 8,080 9,515 -1 ,4 3 5
1996 8,250 9,684 -1 ,4 3 4
Poland world 1989-1991 42,691 35,709 6,982
1992-1994 44,570 56,316 -1 1 ,7 4 6
1995 22,896 29,050 -6 ,1 5 5
1996 24,750 36,640 -1 1 ,8 9 0
EU 1989-1991 19,060 15,505 3,555
1992-1994 27,393 31,632 -4 ,2 3 9
1995 16,028 18,781 -2 ,7 5 3
1996 16,203 23,647 -7 ,4 4 4
Czechoslovakia world 1989-1991 37,200 37,397 - 1 9 7
1992 11,656 12,530 -8 7 4
EU 1989-1991 10,138 8,585 1,553
1992 6,180 6,285 -1 0 5
Czech R epublic world 1993-1994 27,499 27,587 - 8 8
1995 17,086 20,886 -3 ,8 0 0
1996 21,918 27,824 -5 ,9 0 6
EU 1993-1994 12,103 12,241 -1 3 8
1995 9,426 11,774 -2 ,3 4 9
1996 12,746 17,349 -4 ,6 0 3
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C ountry D estination
(origin)
Year E xports
USD
Im ports
m n
Balance
Slovakia world 1993-1994 12,138 12,945 -8 0 7
1995 8,545 8,485 60
1996 8,828 10,934 -2 ,1 0 6
EU 1993-1994 3,235 3,034 201
1995 3,195 2,947 249
1996 3,643 4,029 -3 8 6
Slovenia world 1990-1991 7,992 8,858 -8 8 6
1992-1994 19,570 19,889 -3 1 9
1995 8,286 9,451 -1 ,1 6 5
1996 8,306 9,397 -1 ,0 9 1
EU 1990-1991 4,853 5,245 -3 9 2
1992-1994 11,197 10,837 360
1995 5,569 6,512 -9 4 3
1996 5,362 6,352 -9 9 0
Source: OECD Foreign T rade by Com m odities, Series C (for d a ta  on Greece, Ireland, 
P o rtu g a l and  Spain); W IIW  (figures on C EFTA , 1989-1995); C entra l S ta tistica l Office (H ungary ) - 
E x te rn a l trad e  (figures for 1996); Em bassy of th e  R epublic  of Po land  (Polish d a ta  for 1996); 
E m bassy  of Hungary, B ratislava (Czech and  Slovak d a ta  for 1996); Em bassy of Slovenia (Slovene 
d a ta  for 1996)
of 1996, the stabilisation-oriented economic policy was unable to  keep on reducing 
the foreign trade deficit.
S tatistics about the early m onths of 1997 indicate th a t the above tendency 
has persisted and even occasionally strengthened. In Poland, where earlier the 
deficit was planned to  reach USD 12 billion, observers cannot rule out th a t the 
figure may even reach USD 16 billion—which would am ount to 11 percent of the 
G DP. A lthough in the Czech Republic the ra te  of the increase of the G D P slowed 
down in March 1997, the deficit in the first quarter of the year was more than  40 
percent higher than  the all-time high deficit of 1996. For the whole of 1997, it 
can be forecast th a t the deficit may even reach between USD 7 and 8 billion in 
the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, in the first m onths of 1997, a deficit of USD 200 
million was generated; projected onto the whole year, this figure may come to a 
level of around USD 3 billion. In comparison, Hungary may be considered as a 
refreshing exception: even the m ost pessimistic estim ates indicate th a t the deficit 
will not be higher than  USD 3 billion. Knowledgeable predictions pu t the deficit 
lower— th a t is, it could be a figure sim ilar to  th a t of 1996.
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There are three key issues th a t need to  be considered in connection w ith the 
deficit:
a) are the deficits generated by an increase in economic grow th—th a t is, 
whether it is a consequence of the so-called “m odernisation deficit”—or by other 
factor(s)?
b) to w hat extent has the Association Agreement contributed to  the increase 
in the deficits, given the fact th a t the European Union is by far the m ost im portan t 
trad ing  partner for the countries of this region and the Association Agreement 
provides for the creation of free trade in m anufactured goods by 2001?
c) w hat types of instrum ent are available for reducing deficits?
On the causes of the increase in the deficit
Com pared to the whole of the East-C entral European region, the Polish, 
Czech and Slovak economies have recorded considerable grow th in recent years. 
Hence it follows th a t some analysts suppose th a t there is a direct connection be­
tween the faster pace of growth and the increasing reliance on the im ports of grow­
ing economies. Because it takes some tim e before the im ports may be converted 
in to  an increase in exports— as it is sta ted  by these analysts— the exports of these 
countries are bound to  lag behind their im ports. The conclusion drawn from this 
tra in  of though t is th a t the increase in the trade deficit is chiefly due to  the im port 
of capital goods and is therefore of a transitional character. More im portantly , it 
is not only possible to  find funds for the financing of this deficit, it is also the duty 
of these countries to  find sufficient funds for the purpose.
At first sight, this argum ent seems to be corroborated by the national s ta tis­
tics. In those countries, ju s t as in Hungary in the early 1990s, the im port of capital 
goods grew faster than  average. C apital goods have dom inated im ports and these 
belong to product category 7 in the S tandard In ternational Trade Classification. It 
m ust be borne in m ind th a t this ra ther heterogeneous group of products includes 
both  machinery and installations. These exclusively serve investm ent purposes and 
products th a t at best can be described as serving double purposes. In other words, 
they include m otor vehicles (including used ones), and personal com puters and their 
components. I t is difficult to tell w hether the im port of such products has served 
investm ent or consum ption purposes. The case of Hungary, however, suggests th a t 
the la tte r option is more likely. This theory is apparently  confirmed by the fact th a t 
in 1996, in the northern countries of the C entral European Free Trade Association 
(C EFTA ), there was a massive increase in the incomes of the population calculated 
in real prices. This increase— with the exception of Poland—was in excess of the 
rise in productivity.
There has been another development th a t justifies caution on the p a rt of the 
analyst: the dynam ic increase in exports th a t had been experienced in previous
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years seemed to  have lost steam  by 1996. While in the first half of the 1990s, the 
increase in imports (which was occasionally steeper than that of exports) coincided 
with the dynamic expansion o f exports, in 1996, and especially in the early months 
of 1997, imports continued to grow, while exports stagnated. (Developments in 
Hungary followed a diiferent course.) The causes behind this tendency are related 
to  com petitiveness and the rate of exchange of the national currencies. In Poland, 
the devaluation of the zloty, which was announced in advance, proved to  be in­
sufficient to  com pensate for the difference between inflation in Poland and th a t in 
the rest of the world. A lthough in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the ra te  of 
exchange—which was practically fixed—lent considerable im petus to  exports (fol­
lowing a drastic devaluation of nearly 100 percent in 1991) over a period of several 
years, the difference in the rate  of inflation in these two countries versus the rest 
of the world eroded the initial advantage in price com petition w ithin a few years. 
By 1996, the price competitiveness of the Czech and Slovak products were clearly 
proving to  be insufficient.
The roots of the growing problems related to foreign trade balances are to be 
found in the economic policy pursued by these countries in previous years. Each of 
the transition  countries of East-C entral Europe made a m ajor stride tow ards liber­
alising their trade when their traditional Comecon m arkets collapsed; the  domestic 
m arkets shrank due to  the fall in these countries’ respective GDPs; and the sec­
ondary instrum ents of m arket protection were not applied. Com pared to  economic 
policies pursued by other countries in the past, this practice is unparalleled. Af­
ter all, common sense would dictate, even for countries much more advanced than  
those of East-C entral Europe, the immediate introduction of protectionist measures 
when even a minor share in domestic and foreign m arkets are lost. Such common 
sense was not heeded by the countries of East-C entral Europe— in fact, an opposite 
tendency prevailed. The adverse consequences will be felt, albeit w ith some delay 
in the second half of the 1990s.
It goes w ithout saying th a t the liberal champions of the fast dism antling of 
the barriers to  trade (Poland and Czechoslovakia of the tim e, both of which followed 
a course different from H ungary’s) have so far failed to  include in their “success 
story” the fact th a t their radical liberalisation efforts coincided with an even more 
radical devaluation of their national currencies. In other words, w hat they achieved 
in the field of liberalisation by reducing customs tariffs, they com pensated for by 
protectionist measures in the field of exchange rate policy. In their case, a drastic 
devaluation of the national currency proved to  be the principal protectionist in stru ­
m ent. (No such measure had to  be taken in Hungary. Besides, it would have been 
difficult to  do so here because, already in the early 1990s, the difference between 
the respective official and m arket rates of exchange of the forint was negligible.)
In countries where the devaluation of the currency was radical, the position 
of the domestic companies improved in foreign m arkets overnight because— with 
some exaggeration— nearly all of their products became attrac tive  in the in terna­
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tional price com petition. A t the same tim e, for these countries im ports became 
much more expensive and, as a consequence the im port of foreign goods rem ained 
lim ited. However, this development had its unfavourable effects as well. Due to  the 
fact th a t the devaluation im parted a m om entary advantage in price com petition, 
the m anufacturing companies had no incentive to upgrade their equipm ent and 
technology. Moreover, few companies had the funds to  buy im ported goods, given 
th a t the price of the la tte r had gone up. As the exports of these countries became 
more saleable than  before, there was no real m otivation to  proceed w ith techno­
logical improvements. More im portantly, the struc tu ra l changes were delayed both  
by the privatisation policy pursued by these countries and the low level of foreign 
direct investm ent (which was related to  th a t privatisation policy).
To sum  up the situation  in other words: the transformation of the microstruc­
ture of the economy—which is essential to any sustainable export-oriented growth — 
did not take place. This issue became a serious cause for concern when it was found 
ou t th a t  the  trad itional export mix had become less and less com petitive and im­
ported  goods had become more and more com petitive as the national currencies of 
countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia were gradually revalued. It was a t th is 
junctu re , som etim e during 1995, th a t a partial m odernisation of the m icrostructure 
(firm-level struc tu re) began. Even so, obstacles th a t have since arisen in privatisa­
tion are still blocking the course of m odernisation in several fields.
For the above reason it is justified to  suppose th a t one of the causes of 
the present trade deficit is the transform ation th a t has sta rted  in the m icrostruc­
ture. This transform ation has had a considerable influence on m odernisation; in 
fact, it generates “m odernisation-related im ports” . In Hungary, however, such 
m odernisation-related im ports have been experienced ever since the middle of the 
1970s. Along with some gross blunders com m itted in investm ent policy, such im ­
ports  represent one of the causes of H ungary’s heavy foreign indebtedness. However, 
this was not a phenom enon th a t was characteristic of Hungary alone. Such a con­
flict is encountered by all countries where m odernisation takes place at a fast speed. 
Exceptions to  this rule are countries th a t have revenues from gold, diam onds or oil 
to  finance the surplus in im ports. It is justified to  suppose th a t in countries of 
E ast-C entral Europe— which are suffering from massive trade deficits— the m od­
ernisation of the m icrostructure has ju s t begun, even though with a considerable 
delay. The rapid economic growth, the im port requirem ents of macro-level m oderni­
sation and consum ption by the population, which in these countries is increasing 
faster than  productivity, has been further exacerbating these countries’ respective 
trade  imbalances. Hence it follows th a t the question o f deficit is too complex just to 
be explained as a consequence of over-heated economic growth or the redistribution 
of incomes to the benefit of consumption. As a m atter of fact, it would be relatively 
easy to rectify the two la tte r “dysfunctions” (albeit not, of course, w ithout public 
discontent or even open conflicts). The question remains: how to trea t the im port 
requirem ent of the micro-level transform ation? It is especially difficult to  answer
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this question if we bear in m ind th a t this process was initially ham pered by a sta te  
socialist economic policy which had for a number of decades been based on central 
planning and regional isolation. Moreover, the privatisation which had sta rted  in 
1989-1990 did not reckon with the forces of the m arket, an exchange rate policy 
th a t resorted to devaluation heavy-handedly, and the behaviour of foreign capital 
based on selected priorities.
The interplay between the Association Agreement with the EU and trade deficits 
in East-Central Europe
As the European Union (EU) is a m ajor trading partner of each of the coun­
tries of East-C entral Europe, and as W estern European integration is a m oderni­
sation anchor for this transition  region, the question arises: to  w hat extent should 
the steeply increasing deficit be ascribed to trade w ith the EU?
The comprehensive, com parative statistics compiled by the EU and covering 
all the countries of the region show th a t since 1992 the EU has realised a growing 
surplus in its trade with countries of the region. In 1992, trade between the EU 
and five CEFTA countries showed an EU surplus of ECU 2.3 billion. In 1993 the 
figure was as high as ECU 6.3 billion, in 1994 ECU 6.4 billion, and in 1995 ECU 
7.6 billion. Between 1993 and 1995, the aggregate trade surplus of the EU with 
the countries concerned was in excess of ECU 20 billion, which roughly equalled 
the EU ’s to ta l trade surplus in its trade w ith the outside world. To pu t it more 
precisely, it is the countries of East-C entral Europe which account for the EU ’s 
trade  surplus, at exactly the same tim e as they are struggling with all the pains of 
transition . Throughout their existence they have always been undercapitalised and 
they still need massive external sources of capital to  finance their m odernisation. 
Yet these were also the countries which—at least on paper-—in these very years were 
supposed to benefit from the asym m etrical advantages th a t it was supposed would 
derive from their Association Agreement with the EU. Let us mention yet another, 
even more convincing figure referring to  1995: the five CEFTA countries accounted 
for 6.7 percent of the EU ’s to ta l im ports, while these five countries accounted for 
32.5 percent (ECU 7.6 billion) of the EU ’s surplus in its trade  with the rest of the 
world.
It is common knowledge th a t free trade transacted between countries of dif­
ferent levels of development usually produces greater benefit to  the more advanced 
and more com petitive countries; this, among other areas, can be seen in the bal­
ance of bilateral trade. This study shows a comparison of trade between the above 
five countries of East-C entral Europe and the EU with th a t between the EU and 
countries th a t acceded to the EU during the 1970s and 1980s and are less developed 
than  the average EU Member States. As shown in Table 2, the basis of com parison
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Table 2
Some indicators with regard to total and EU-trade of selected countries
C ountry Year Share of EU (in 
exports im ports
percent)
balance
Im port coverage 
to ta l EU
Ireland 1970-1972 12,4 16,8 -2 6 ,9 69,9 51,7
1973-1975 77,0 69,5 -1 3 ,9 76,5 84,7
Greece 1978-1980 50,2 47,3 -4 4 ,6 49,6 52,6
1981-1983 47,4 48,0 -5 0 ,5 45,8 45,2
Spain 1983-1985 51,0 34,7 * 76,8 112,8
1986-1988 63,6 54,6 -3 3 ,4 70,4 82,0
P o rtugal 1983-1985 85,1 44,6 - 7 ,8 47,5 90,8
1986-1988 70,7 64,1 -5 0 ,9 66,6 73,5
H ungary 1989-1991 34,5 34,4 + 39,5 101,8 102,1
1992-1994 49,2 42,4 -1 8 ,3 78,5 91,2
1995 62,8 61,5 -5 5 ,2 83,2 84,9
1996 62,8 59,7 -4 6 ,8 81,1 85,2
Poland 1989-1991 44,6 43,4 + 50,9 119,6 122,9
1992-1994 61,5 56,2 -3 6 ,1 79,1 86,6
1995 70,0 64,7 -4 4 ,7 78,8 85,3
1996 65,5 64,5 -6 2 ,6 67,5 68,5
Czechoslovakia 1989-1991 27,3 23,0 * 99,5 118,1
1992 53,0 50,2 -1 2 ,0 93,0 98,3
Czech Republic 1993-1994 44,0 44,4 -1 5 6 ,8 99,7 98,9
1995 55,2 56,4 -6 1 ,8 81,8 80,1
1996 58,2 62,4 -7 7 ,9 78,8 73,5
Slovakia 1993-1994 26,7 23,4 * 93,8 106,6
1995 37,4 34,7 +415,0 100,7 108,4
1996 41,3 36,8 -1 8 ,3 80,7 90,4
Slovenia 1990-1991 60,7 59,2 -4 4 ,2 90,2 92,5
1992-1994 57,2 54,5 * 98,4 103,3
1995 67,2 68,9 -8 6 ,4 87,7 85,5
1996 64,6 67,6 -9 0 ,7 88,4 84,4
*The balance of to ta l and EU trade  shows opposite signs (in all cases, deficit in to ta l trad e  
co n tra sted  w ith surp lus in trad e  w ith the  EU).
Source : own calculations based on Table 1.
was a period th a t preceded these countries’ accession and the period th a t followed 
accession after two or three years. The following hypothesis is suggested: accession 
to  the EU significantly weakens the new en tran ts’ trade balance (which, of course, 
may be largely com pensated for by access to  various EU funds). The exam ples of 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal clearly show th a t following accession, these 
countries’ respective trade deficits with the EU were higher than  they had been 
before accession. This was especially so in the case of Spain and Portugal, where 
the deterioration in the balance am ounted to  ECU 17 billion and ECU 6 billion,
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respectively, over a period of three years. (Broken down, in the case of Spain, a 
surplus of ECU 3.9 billion achieved three years before accession changed over to  a 
deficit of ECU 14.2 billion w ithin three years of accession.)
It cannot be ruled out, however, th a t in term s of trend and m agnitude, a 
trade deficit w ith the EU is not necessarily different from a trade deficit w ith other 
areas of the world outside the EU. Indeed, Ireland’s trade deficit w ith the world 
outside the EU increased to a much higher degree than  th a t vis a vis the  EU (in 
this case, it was chiefly due to  the im pact of the first oil price explosion, which 
coincided with Ireland’s accession). A lthough, in the case of the o ther countries, 
the deterioration of the trade deficit w ith the EU largely exceeded th a t of trade 
w ith the rest of the world—with the exception of Greece— the EU ’s share in the 
resu ltan t deficit rem ained smaller than on the export and im port side of the bilateral 
trade of the countries concerned. It has to  be added th a t, with the exception of 
Ireland, the import coverage indices of trade with the EU deteriorated for all the 
countries concerned, and yet they were still more advantageous over the average of 
the three years following accession than corresponding indices of trade with non-EU  
countries. (This m ay have been due to the fact th a t all the EU M ember S tates 
of the M editerranean region obtain a considerable part of their energy and raw 
m aterials im ports from outside the EU, while most of their exports are directed 
towards the EU, and in m arkets outside the EU they are not com petitive enough 
to  be able to  counterbalance m ajor im port purchases.)
T he above criteria in our exam ination of the countries of East-C entral Europe 
could only be applied by separating the period th a t preceded the entering into force 
of the Association Agreement and th a t coming after it. In the la tte r period, the 
figures covering 1995 were dealt w ith separately from those referring to  1996. Our 
findings show a fairly mixed picture. In 1996, the im port coverage index of trade 
with the EU in the case of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia was more favourable than  
th a t of trade w ith the rest of the world. By contrast, the opposite was true in the 
respective cases of the Czech Republic and Slovenia. On the whole, however, the 
coverage indices of trade w ith the entire outside world and th a t w ith the EU did 
not show significant differences— they were between 1 and 5 percentage points, and 
th is index only reached 10 percentage points in the case of Slovakia.
The trends experienced between 1989 and 1996 are more telling. In the case 
of each of the associated countries under survey import coverage indices o f trade 
with the EU deteriorated. In fact, trade balances registered deficits following initial 
surplus positions. I t has to  be borne in mind th a t a similar process took place in 
trade w ith the entire world. (The EU now accounts for a growing share in th a t 
trade. Therefore, trade with the EU has played—and continues to  play— a dom i­
nan t role in the overall processes which follow the same line as th a t of trade  w ith 
the EU.) Note th a t, following 1992, the trade deficit with the EU grew much faster 
within the deficit o f trade in general than the way the EU increased its share in the 
total exports and imports o f the several associated countries. In the case of Poland,
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between 1992 and 1996, the share of trade with the EU increased by 6 percentage 
points while the share of the EU in Poland’s foreign trade deficit increased by more 
than  26 percentage points. In the case of Hungary, the corresponding figures were 
16 and 26 percentage points. In the cases of Slovenia and Slovakia, it was in this 
period th a t the surplus of trade w ith the EU turned into a considerable deficit. 
Special m ention should be m ade of the change which occurred in 1995-1996, given 
th a t predictions indicate the continuation of th a t process for 1997. In the trade of 
the Czech Republic with the EU, the share increased by some 5 percentage points 
from  1995 to  1996, while the deficit registered an increase of 18 percentage points. 
In Slovakia’s trade, the EU ’s share went up by about 3 percentage points, while 
the trade  balance for 1996 ran into deficit as opposed to  the considerable surplus of 
previous years. In the overall foreign trade of Poland and Slovenia, the E U ’s share 
declined by approxim ately 2 percentage points each, while the EU ’s share grew by 
18 and 4 percentage points, respectively, in the two countries’ trade deficit. The 
only country where the situation did not follow suit was Hungary: in the overall 
foreign trade of the country, the EU ’s share went down by 1 percentage point, while 
the EU ’s share declined by more than  8 percent in the deficit.
All in all, it is impossible to  deduct a clear-cut tendency from the above fig­
ures, it cannot be sta ted  th a t proof has been found th a t the increase in the  trade 
deficit is the effect of trade w ith the EU or th a t conducted w ith other regions of 
the world. (To render the picture even more complex, there may be m ultifarious 
inpu t-ou tpu t interrelations between these two spheres of trade, which the prim ary 
s ta tistical figures are unable to reflect.) It can be safely sta ted  th a t— as a p art 
of the overall process of increase in the trade deficit—in the given tim e fram e the 
deficit in trade  with the EU has shown a considerable increase. Occasionally th a t 
tendency may cause serious disequilibria, which in tu rn  m ay bring about tem porary  
or even persistent disruptions in the relations of the associated countries w ith the 
EU. Such disruptions may even be a drawback for the pre-accession process. In this 
context it is worth rem inding the reader th a t, following a brief transitional period 
of asym m etrical trading conditions, the Association Agreement provides for sym ­
m etrical free trade in industrial goods between countries th a t are on different levels 
of development, competitiveness and economic capacity. Moreover, the Association 
Agreement cannot handle the apparent disequilibria that follow from free trade. The 
situation was different for the three Mediterranean countries that acceded to the EU 
earlier. Their respective trade deficits with the EU Member States increased also 
in their case yet that could be considerably compensated for  by immediate access 
to various EU funds. Tools th a t would cushion such adverse consequences for the 
countries of East-C entral Europe are missing both  from the Association Agreement 
and the whole of the relationship w ith the EU.
There are two considerations th a t lend topicality to  this issue. F irst: in view 
of certain com m itm ents which have been assumed recently, it can be safely pre­
dicted that import competition will further increase in the East-C entral European
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countries. This in tu rn  will push trade deficits further up. Three factors can be 
m entioned which are likely to expand imports: (1) the com m itm ents m ade in the 
World Trade O rganisation to  reduce customs tariffs, (2) the elim ination of tem po­
rary asym m etry in trade conditions between 1997 and 2001—such conditions being 
p a rt of the Association Agreement, (3) and the elim ination of the tem porary  im ­
port surcharge (and of other measures th a t render im ports more expensive). Added 
to  these factors will be the classic “m odernisation deficit” , which originates from 
the acceleration of economic development and the emphasis on exports. There are 
m arked differences in selected countries in term s of microeconomic developm ent— 
which in tu rn  can also generate increases in im ports in numerous countries. Foreign 
direct investm ent— which is currently flowing into countries of the region— is also 
likely to  dem and massive im ports. (It will take several years before sufficient ex­
port capacities will be available to  counterbalance those im ports.) W hat is more, 
it has to be borne in m ind th a t foreign direct investm ent, which was absorbed in 
an earlier period by the strategic industries, will in forthcom ing years also require 
growing im ports for its new projects. The key question therefore is whether or not 
the countries concerned, can tolerate such a huge pressure for imports, and if they 
can, what economic policy measures should be employed?
T he second consideration is the present level of preparation for EU acces­
sion on the part of the candidate countries, with special reference to  the accession 
negotiations; the la tte r are to  open in early 1998. I t is beyond doubt th a t the  ne­
gotiations will cover several conditions of full membership, and occasionally it will 
be possible to  acquire im portan t derogations. However, it will be an indispensable 
precondition of accession for the candidate countries to  fulfil the requirem ents of 
the A ssociation Agreement and, within tha t, to  ensure the free trade of industrial 
goods already in the pre-accession period. (The transposition of the dom inant m a­
jority  of the acquis communautaire will be another precondition.) I t  would be very 
em barrassing if, in the course of the negotiations for accession (or shortly before 
their conclusion), any of the East-C entral European candidate countries “threw 
in the towel” because it thought its trade deficit could only be handled by apply­
ing tough protectionist measures. Whichever country of this region does so, the 
chances are th a t it would have serious consequences also for the other countries in 
the negotiation process. After all, eastward enlargem ent is not solely based on the 
“m erits” of the several countries involved. Inevitably, it takes into consideration 
certain geostrategic and geopolitical factors.
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Economic policy dilemmas and options
T hree basic instrum ents can be applied to reduce the foreign trade deficit in 
an effective way. They can be used separately or in various com binations. They 
are as follows:
(a) to  reduce the deficit by increasing exports and substitu ting  im ports by 
dom estically produced goods;
(b) to  finance the deficit by using surplus th a t has been generated under other 
headings of the  current account of payments;
(c) to  apply drastic austerity  measures.
T he reason why option (c) will not be discussed here is not th a t we regard it as 
inconceivable bu t because it would deal a serious blow to the region’s aspirations to 
accede to  the EU. Such an option would both ruin preparatory  efforts and postpone 
accession for an inestim able period of time. In contrast, it cannot be ruled out 
th a t certain restrictions will be applied—tem porarily and as a response to  certain 
circum stances th a t may emerge as a consequence of the Association Agreement. 
Let us emphasise th a t such a development would negatively affect the image of the 
country concerned (which may be in the process of accession negotiations a t the 
given m om ent) and would further weaken its bargaining position.
Increasing the capacity to export
(a) This option is undoubtedly the m ost reassuring. I t depends, how ever,' 
on numerous internal and external conditions. There are basically three ways of 
increasing export capacity:
(aa) The im porting countries, in this case, the Member States of the EU, 
could assure greater access to  their markets;
(ab) The appeal of exports could be heightened by devaluation;
(ac) Exports are rendered more com petitive in the long run by employing 
various export-oriented instrum ents.
(aa) T he EU is planning to  liberalise all its im port quotas for m anufactured 
goods by the beginning of 1998. The rem aining restrictions have already been can­
celled for the  last group of sensitive goods (i.e. iron and steel and textile clothing). 
Only one group of products will be unaffected by free trade—i.e. agricultural pro­
duce and foodstuffs. As far as these categories of goods are concerned— according 
to  the agreem ents currently in force—there will be no free trade even beyond 2001. 
Such a situation  may have the following consequence: a negative asym m etry may 
emerge in the trade between the EU and the associated countries, to the  detrim ent 
of the la tte r. The explanation for this is th a t, in the case of exports to  the EU 
from the countries of E ast-C entral Europe, the ratio  of agricultural produce th a t
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falls under restrictions is higher than th a t of their im ports from the EU, and the 
ratio  of goods affected by free trade will be lower for the countries of E ast-C entral 
Europe than  for the EU. (It is full membership, which is scheduled for 2002, which 
could help resolve this problem .) It is difficult to predict today w hat m agnitude of 
export potential will be “frozen” by the EU restrictions on agricultural produce. 
A t present, the EU keeps claiming th a t the associated countries are unable to  fully 
utilise several EU quotas due either to quantitative or qualitative problem s. In 
contrast, the East-C entral European countries stress th a t there are certain  goods 
th a t could be offered for export but their sale is prevented by barriers in the m ar­
ket. A gricultural exports could, in part, bypass the barriers th a t can be found in 
EU m arkets by selling these products in other m arkets. It should not be forgotten 
th a t the conditions under which these la tte r sales are realised are not necessarily 
b e tter than  those th a t could be reached in the EU m arket if the la tte r was open. 
It seems to  be unjust to pu t the blame for all capacity-related problem s on the 
internal situation of the countries th a t act as producers. After all, no country is 
prepared to  expand its production unless it is convinced th a t its ou tp u t can be 
safely sold. Therefore, if the EU were to  open its agricultural m arkets, th is would 
help to  create considerable new production and export capacities. As long as the 
EU restrictions are in force, the above production capacities are kept in reserve and 
therefore cannot create additional exports. Consequently, they are unsuitable for 
reducing the widening trade deficit.
(ab) After the systemic change, the countries of E ast-C entral Europe did 
not follow a uniform exchange rate  policy. The individual exchange ra te  policies 
were and have remained due to the different conditions of the countries concerned 
before and after 1989. As the export structure of the associated countries of this 
region is dom inated by products which lack sophistication, it is probable th a t the 
volume in which they can be sold abroad depends heavily on their price level. Price 
com petitiveness can be improved with two techniques: through a shock therapy 
and in a step-by-step m anner. The shock therapy approach opens w ith a one- 
off drastic  devaluation and then fixes the exchange rate  where it stood a t the 
m om ent of devalution. The second approach realises a gradual nom inal devalution, 
however, in th a t the difference between the real and the nominal devaluation is 
entirely com pensated for by the increase in productivity between the exporting 
and im porting countries (as well as an accompanying stru c tu ra l upgrading).
The one-off radical devalution has the effect of rendering every product com­
petitive overnight. This is especially true if the country concerned possesses a 
relatively broad assortm ent of goods. (Classic examples include Czechoslovakia 
and, after 1993, especially the Czech Republic). Yet such a devaluation weakens 
the compulsion to carry out s truc tu ra l adjustm ents both on the export side (as 
every product becomes saleable), and on the im port side (because the devaluation 
increases the costs of im port com petition, which in tu rn  cannot make itself felt in 
the domestic m arket). As tim e goes by, the difference in the rate of inflation in the
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principal export m arkets, as compared with the domestic m arket, is bound to  eat 
away the tem porary  com petitive edge th a t was created by the drastic devaluation. 
In fact, the  fixed exchange rate becomes the m ost im portan t obstacle in the way of 
progress. This is exactly the situation today in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. 
W hen a coun try ’s foreign trade balance is running into the red, there is no doubt 
th a t devaluation is the cure. However, this may encourage speculative cap ita l— 
which for the tim e being is available to  cover the balance of trade deficit— to flee 
the country. More im portantly, a confidence crisis would evolve in the  long run 
between the foreign investors and a country which, until th a t tim e, had welcomed 
them . In previous years, W estern investors found the Czech (and, to  a lesser ex­
ten t, the Slovak) economy a ttractive, especially because they expected a higher 
th an  average interest m argin due to a fixed exchange rate. These same W estern 
investors were, however, unable and reluctant to  finance capital projects directly, 
partly  in view of the privatisation techniques employed by the countries concerned, 
and partly  because of the absence of certain “fine tex tu res” in the micro-economic 
sphere. The presence of speculative capital assured a p leasant, alm ost “velvet” 
financial environm ent as long as the surplus of invisible revenues (draw n especially 
from  tourism  and, to  a lesser extent, foreign direct investm ent) could com pensate 
for the trade deficit. W hen, however, th a t coverage is missing, the m arket becomes 
nervous, the fear of devaluation strengthens, and the confidence of people involved 
w ith speculative capital s ta rts  to  evaporate. A t the same tim e, the government 
s ta rts  panicking as it tries to  keep th a t capital within the country. It should be 
noticed th a t the government is aware th a t capital may vanish from  one day to  the 
o ther, while devaluation cannot itself do good for the trade deficit overnight. A t the 
sam e tim e, devaluation cannot fill the “gap” th a t remains, despite the surplus in the 
invisible income.) Furtherm ore, inflation is bound to  accelerate after the exchange 
ra te  is no longer fixed; and the likely changes in the s tructu re  of the economy are 
expected to widen unem ploym ent and cause corporate bankruptcies, which in tu rn  
are bound to  increase the budget deficit. In fact, in the initial phase, the structu ral 
changes th a t for a long tim e used to be absent (for example, they became victims 
of well-publicised savings cam paigns), are likely to  generate increased dem and for 
im ports. T hus it is a m istake to expect devaluation to reduce the deficit in the 
short run.
T he consequences of any change in the exchange rate  are, a t best, incalculable. 
The longer the period of a fixed exchange rate, the more incalculable the afterm ath  
is. I t is, therefore, not surprising th a t expert opinions vary widely on how to use 
devaluation as a tool to  handle a trade deficit. Sooner or later, the right response 
will be found by rule of thum b, bu t the later it is worked out, the more it will cost.
I t goes w ithout saying th a t even those countries of East-C entral Europe th a t 
have opted for step-by-step devalution (which may occasionally be haphazard or 
announced well in advance) have certain problems with their balance of trade. As 
long as nominal devaluation is lower than  the difference between the ra te  of inflation
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in the exporting country and the principal im porting countries—such a difference 
can be more than  com pensated for if productivity goes up faster in the exporting 
country than  in the im porting countries— the general competitiveness (which does 
not necessarily extend to  each and every sector!) of exports can be improved. A t 
first, it appears there are no problems with this bu t the effects of devaluation are 
gradually eroded by inflation, and in fact push inflation higher. Moreover, devalua­
tion alone cannot generate massive new export capacities in a short tim e; however, 
in the wake of the collapse of Comecon, the associated countries of E ast-C entral 
Europe badly need such export capacities. The foundation of an effective export 
capacity is not price competitiveness but the presence or absence of the required vol­
um e of export capacity. Nevertheless, in most cases, the redirection of production  
tow ards export orientation is inconceivable w ithout the sim ultaneous upgrading of 
the domestic m arket. If domestic dem and is restricted or is in a sta te  of decline, 
export-oriented projects are bound to  remain no more than  plans on the drawing 
board. Furtherm ore, certain devaluation practices may provoke com plaints also 
from the EU Member States because they may seem to them  to be instances of 
“social dum ping” .
(ac) No sustainable increase in export capacity is conceivable w ithout the 
deliberate use of an export-oriented system  of incentives. Instrum ents th a t are 
available for the exchange ra te  policy can redeploy revenues for the export sector 
in the short run. In contrast, an export-oriented strategy can lay the ground for 
the long-term  rechannelling of such revenues. Tools available for an exchange ra te  
policy can be used to  direct certain revenues to the exporters at the level of direct 
corporate earnings. In contrast to  this, an appropriately evolved strategy can make 
its effects felt a t the level of capital projects and an improved structu re  of the 
economy. W hile in the previous case nothing can guarantee th a t the increased 
revenues, th a t are realised as a result of the devaluation of the national currency, 
will be used for capital projects and for improving the structure  of the economy. 
For example, they may be diverted to upgrade consum ption. In the la tte r case, 
involving capital projects, an export-oriented stra tegy  would surely be dedicated 
to  the creation of com petitive ventures.
Undoubtedly, export-oriented development means a redistribution of G D P to 
the benefit of those capital projects on which the consum ers’ well-being depends. 
T he question rem ains open: w hat is the tolerable level of redistribution  tow ards 
investm ent projects th a t the interest associations of consumers would find accept­
able (and whether such redistribution would be approved by them  a t all)? Foreign 
aid targeted  to investm ent projects could ease this “squeeze” . (In principle, th a t 
is the very purpose of the transfer of funds w ithin the EU; however, for the tim e 
being, such funds are not available for the associated countries.) A nother way of 
“rectifying” the situation  could be to “ease” budgetary restrictions. This option 
would not be acceptable to  the international m onetary institu tions, nor to  the m on­
etary authorities of the countries concerned because this would push up inflation
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and could ultim ately endanger economic stability. When, however, the need for  an 
export-oriented economic policy is also justified by a dramatic deficit o f the trade 
balance, it is worth trying to estimate which is more dangerous: a trade deficit, 
which seems to be untenable; a social and political conflict that originates from the 
redistribution o f budgetary resources; or the pressure o f the international financial 
organisations and the domestic monetary lobbies. It is impossible to satisfy all the 
requirements at the same time. Politicians have to  bear in m ind all three of the 
above considerations, yet it requires day-to-day decision-making in order to  define 
the emphases. W hen, for instance, the trade deficit reaches critical levels (which, 
am ong other things, may be a consequence of a missing export-oriented policy), 
those emphases need to  be shifted.
Often governmental recom m endations which are aimed a t improving com pet­
itiveness lay undue em phasis on exports. Such proposals tend to  forget th a t it is 
often advisable to  substitu te  the im port requirem ents of producers of exports w ith 
com petitive domestic products. This is prim arily due to  the fact th a t, in the short 
run, this seems to be the best m ethod of reducing the trade deficit given th a t the 
“lead tim e” of the export-oriented capital projects spans over longer periods. Fur­
therm ore, this is a good way of strengthening the system  of sub-contractors for the 
exporters (which can also be seen as a form of indirect exportation). Finally, such 
an approach can encourage domestic production, the generation of jobs, regional 
developm ent, the further incorporation of the national economy in the in ternational 
division of labour and, also very im portan t, it can prom ote the “indigenous” devel­
opm ent of the domestic stra tu m  of entrepreneurs (or, to be more exact, those en­
trepreneurs who are domiciled in the E ast-C entral European countries concerned). 
Devaluation can itself help the substitu tion  of im ports by domestic goods. How­
ever, its beneficial effects may be weakened or even to ta lly  neutralised by certain 
factors of inertia , such as a relatively slow response to  cost-related advantages, close 
in pu t-ou tpu t relationships w ithin certain conglomerates, or differences in term s of 
financial and organisational potentials.
Financing the balance of trade deficit from other revenues
Some of the above dilem m as can be effectively eased if in the long run sources 
o ther th an  the export of goods can cover a runaway trade deficit. Such sources can 
be as follows:
(a) Revenues from  various services can become an im portan t factor to  com­
pensate for the trade deficit of the countries of E ast-C entral Europe. C ertain 
sources can be considered which, in recent years, have been more than  enough to 
cover a trade deficit: for the Czech Republic such a source has been tourism  (concen­
tra ted  chiefly in Prague and along the respective borders w ith G erm any and Aus-
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tria ); for Slovakia there have been the transit revenues; Poland has benefited from 
the non-registered trade along the Polish-German, Polish-B elorussian/U krain ian/ 
L ithuanian /R ussian  border. However, in the fu ture reliance on these respective sit­
uations seems to  be untenable for a t least two reasons. F irst, because of the  lim its 
to  the supply and dem and for such services, the related revenues cannot grow as 
fast as the runaway trade deficit. Second, certain  revenues from services have con­
siderably decreased because the price differences between the countries concerned 
are becoming smaller and smaller; and the direct trade in goods is m aking the 
interm ediaries redundant. (The fall in such revenues is the  most spectacular in 
the case of Poland, where in recent years non-registered trade is believed to  have 
realised an annual profit of between USD 6 and 8 billion.)
(b) There is another way of financing the trade deficit, and it is perhaps the 
m ost widely used m ethod in num erous dynamically developing countries: it involves 
the rapid expansion of foreign direct investments. In recent years, foreign direct in­
vestm ent has been the m ost im portan t source covering H ungary’s trade deficit, and 
occasionally it has even produced a surplus in the balance of paym ents. In m ost of 
the countries of E ast-C entral Europe, however, foreign direct investm ent has, until 
now, played a lim ited role only (especially in Slovakia and Slovenia). In the years 
ahead, its weight may steeply grow, especially in Poland which has a large domestic 
m arket and where the growth rate is high. However, the growth of foreign direct in­
vestm ent is inconceivable w ithout an adequate macro-economic environm ent, and it 
takes tim e to  create this. To make the question more complex, in the initial phase, 
the creation of an appropriate macro-economic environm ent (which foreign capital 
may prom ote) incurs both an additional import of capital and the bankruptcy of 
numerous companies that cannot withstand competition. The two processes exert 
sim ultaneous and opposing effects on the trade deficit. Furtherm ore, when the cap­
ita l projects are financed from foreign capital, this generates growing im ports due 
to  the  fact th a t a considerable part of the investm ent requirem ents cannot be m et 
from the domestic m arket. Finally, the foreign capital th a t is entering the econ­
omy of Poland (which is a large country) is interested chiefly in satisfying Polish 
domestic dem and rather than  pursuing export-oriented objectives. Consequently, 
it is impossible to predict w hether commercial activity is likely to improve or cause 
a further deterioration in the trade balance.
Foreign direct investm ent is likely to  help reduce the deficit of the  trade  bal­
ance. It is impossible, however, to  foretell w ith certainty whether or not foreign 
direct investm ent and declining revenues from services will be sufficient to  com pen­
sate for the trade deficit in the final years of this decade.
( c) It is in this situation  th a t a tten tion  is shifted towards a trad itional form  of 
financing deficit: raising credit in the international financial m arkets. T he countries 
of E ast-C entral Europe— with the exception, in a sense, of Poland— currently have 
access to  such credits w ithout significant difficulties. Provided such external sources 
are used to  improve the trade balance w ithin a short tim e— given th a t they are
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used to  finance the production of exportable goods— the in ternational financial 
com m unity should continue to  have firm confidence in this region. If, however, the 
raising of such credit brings about massive additional indebtedness—for which the 
economic o u tp u t of the country concerned is unable to  offer cover— then confidence 
may weaken, and in fact another debt crisis may emerge. Needless to say, regardless 
of which country created such a situation, it would negatively influence the image 
o f the whole region in the eyes of international financial circles. Hence it follows 
th a t this m ethod, which m ay increase indebtedness, m ust be used w ith caution.
(d) I t is impossible to  rule out a situation in which the countries th a t are 
currently suffering from a trade deficit decide to  finance their export strategy—  
am ong other sources—from their reserves of foreign currencies ( the level of which 
is presently reassuring—in fact, higher than the required minimum). For the  tim e 
being, neither the principles, nor the macro- and micro-economic conditions of such 
a stra tegy  have been elaborated. In principle, it may be possible and, viewed from 
an economic policy point of view, even useful to  mobilize the “superfluous” reserves 
of foreign currencies in order to  develop exports. I t m ust be borne in m ind, how­
ever, th a t this technique is not w ithout risks either. Even a  m inor deterioration  in 
the economic sta tu re  of a country can create a situation  in which a considerable 
p a rt of those reserves leave the country. Provided coverage is embodied in capital 
projects in which capital is not interested (in other words, it is not inclined to 
convert its portfolio investm ent into direct investm ent), then the required coverage 
has to  be generated by the country concerned. If the rem aining reserves are in­
sufficient to  do so, or if such action were to fully deplete the coffers of the central 
bank, then there is the  danger th a t the in ternational financial com m unity would 
respond nervously. Such a development would exacerbate ra ther than  reduce the 
problem s. Consequently, this m ethod may also backfire and therefore it requires 
u tm ost caution.
(e )  The last option could be non-repayable transfers. However— partly  with 
the exception of the PH A R E program m e—such transfers are for the tim e being 
not available. Although the worsening trade balance situation  requires such an 
instrum ent— among other sources— to be available (in the same m anner as in the 
case of other countries of a m edium  level of developm ent), presently the East- 
C entral European countries th a t aspire to  accede to the EU do not have access to  
it.
Concluding comments
T he size of the trade deficit and the instrum ents to  be used in the  future to 
handle it will exert a very im portan t influence on the short- and medium-level de­
velopment of those countries of East-C entral Europe, which are about to  enter (or
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have entered) the m odernisation phase of their transition. This is a question of car­
dinal im portance both  in connection with full EU m em bership—which, it is hoped, 
will take place w ithin a few years— and the success of the  entire m odernisation 
process.
Undoubtedly, the countries of the region need to attempt to catch up with 
the most advanced countries of the world under conditions that have no parallels 
anywhere else. They have to  bring about m odernisation (which, viewed from a 
historical point of view, is belated) sim ultaneously w ith the transform ation of their 
political and economic systems; a t the same tim e they have to adjust to  the Euro­
pean Union, whose integration system  is today more complex, and whose require­
m ents are more dem anding than ever before. These are the assignments which the 
countries concerned have to realise in a situation where they can only benefit from 
an extremely low level o f support from abroad.
In the years ahead, the size of the trade deficit and the techniques employed 
to handle it will be a litm us test of these countries’ ability to adjust and to  catch 
up. For these countries of medium-level development, it is a m om entous challenge, 
w ithout a precedent, to realise free trade in industrial goods w ithin a  period of ten 
years w ithout getting any support from outside—with the exception of a tem porary  
and limited asym m etry in certain conditions of trade. The question arises w hether 
or not the E ast-C entral European decision-makers, and the peoples of th is  region in 
general, were aware of the m agnitude of this challenge when the measures related 
to  the liberalisation of trade were approved and when the Association Agreement 
was signed. There is also the issue of whether or not the European Union, which 
was the other signatory to  these Association Agreements in their present form, 
was aware of the consequences (which have only appeared recently bu t could be 
foreseen from the outset). If the EU was not aware of these consequences, then 
its thoughts and actions were m otivated by short-term  considerations and by its 
short-sighted interests. If, however, the EU anticipated such problem s (which were 
likely to  happen both because of the difficulties of transition  and the difference in 
the level of development between Eastern and W estern Europe), then why did it fail 
to assert in the Association Agreements (or in some other framework agreem ents) 
some key com ponents of “developm ent-prom oting in tegration” which the luckier 
late-com er EU Member States had access to?
yls long as no appropriate external financial support is made available, the 
worsening of the respective trade balances of the countries holds out the danger that 
the “timetable o f peaceful pre-accession preparations” of the East-Central European 
region will collapse. Such a tu rn  of events may have grave consequences bo th  for the 
countries th a t are aspiring to EU membership and the EU itself. W hat seems to  be 
a short-term  and short-sighted approach on behalf of W estern Europe during the 
early 1990s may bring about destructive consequences a t the very m om ent when 
strategic decisions have to  be made. It would be advisable to prevent such a tu rn  
° f  events to the benefit of every European s ta te  and citizen. It has to  be hoped
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th a t there is still tim e to  join forces and think about the possible consequences: to  
draw  the lessons as soon as possible, and implement an all-European developm ent 
strategy w ithout delay.
It need to  be reiterated: today th is is not a question th a t is acute in Hungary, 
even though it may well become a  problem for Hungary as well. Yet even if it is not 
a specifically H ungarian concern, it is one th a t can be regarded as being of essential 
and urgent im portance. A t stake is the future of the whole of the region— i.e. of 
the whole of Europe—of which Hungary is a part.
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FORTY YEARS OF TRADE BETWEEN EAST ASIA AND 
EUROPE
A. NAGY
T he stu d y  analyses the  developm ent of trad e  betw een th ree  E ast Asian regions (Socialist 
Asia, Ja p a n  an d  o th e r E aste rn  Asian countries) an d  th ree  E uropean  regions (W estern E urope, 
U S SR /C IS  an d  E aste rn  E urope) for th e  period  1955-1995. I t  investigates th e  grow th an d  s tru c ­
tu ra l changes of the  trad e  flows, the  trade balances and  th e ir com m odity breakdow n betw een the  
regions and  their developm ent during  th is long period.
Special a tten tio n  is pa id  to  th e  effects of trad e  policy changes, liberalisa tion  policies of 
th e  E u ropean  economies on th e  one han d , and  increased export p rom otion  efforts of th e  A sian 
countries on th e  other. For th is purpose trad e  intensity  m easures are analysed w hich reveal the  
im pact of trad e  policy changes on the  com m odity flows of the  regions. I t  was found e.g. th a t  the 
trad e  betw een W estern E urope and  the  E ast Asian regions does in m ost cases no t even reach ha lf 
of w hat would follow from  their opportun ities. T he sam e could be to ld  ab o u t C entra l an d  E ast 
E u ropean  countries where a  rap id  expansion of trad e  w ith E ast Asia m ay be expected.
Introduction
In this study the trade relations of East Asia with Europe will be analysed 
using a trade flow model covering forty years— i.e. the period 1955— 1995.1 The 
overall research project—of which this study is a by-product— deals w ith the anal­
ysis of emerging new tendencies in in ternational trade and follows research which 
has been carried out over several years on structu ra l changes in in ternational trade. 
{Nagy 1972, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1995)
Analysis of in ternational trade flows is an approach by which, instead of 
dealing w ith the foreign-trade relations of a single country, or surveying bilateral 
trade  between pairs of countries, world commodity trade as a complex system  
is exam ined in an a ttem p t to  dem onstrate its structu ral changes in a consistent 
framework.
The trade flow model used in our analysis is based on the d a ta  published 
regularly in the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (MBS) of the  UN2 and aggregated 
into 11 regions and 6 com m odity groups.3 Summing up the trade flows by regions,
1 An earlier version of th is s tu d y  was presented  to the  In terna tional Research Sem inar on E ast 
A sian Econom ies: "Economic R elations betw een Europe an d  E ast Asia” , a t  the  Université Paul 
Valéry, Nimes, France, 19-20 June  1997. T he research pro jec t was supported  by th e  H ungarian 
N ational Scientific Research Foundation  (O TK A ), No. T  018311.
2Published  on  two occasions annually  in February an d  May. See tab les D.
3For a  list of regions an d  com m odity groups see Appendix 1,
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or by com m odity groups, they add up to  to tal world trade (T W ). W hen trade flows 
are m entioned, it has to  be taken into account th a t this term  differs from the usual 
export and im port values, where exports are, respectively, usually measured in FOB 
and im ports in CIF parity. In in ternational trade flow models the value of exports 
of country A to country B has to  be equal to  the value of im ports of country B 
from country A, even if the expenditures of country B are higher than  the income 
of country A (because of transpo rta tion , insurance and other costs). The trade  flow 
d a ta  published in the MBS use exports statistics (whenever possible) m easured in 
FOB parity, which means th a t in m ost cases they exclude transpo rta tion  and other 
costs; as a consequence of this the im port values are less than  they are in reality, 
and in the trade balances surpluses are higher and deficits lower than  in financial 
sta tistics. The trade flow d a ta  published in the MBS are given in current US dollars 
and, which m eans th a t the price and exchange ra te  changes have a strong influence 
on the tendencies which can be observed.
In this study the intention is to  analyse the development of trade relations 
between three East Asian and three European regions. Following our regional 
breakdown these regions are: Japan  (JP ), Socialist Asia (SA), East Asia (AS), 
Soviet U nion/E uropean CIS countries (SU), Eastern Europe (EE) and W estern 
Europe (W E). As the intention here is to examine the long-term  developm ent of 
s tru c tu ra l change in in ternational trade relations, an a ttem p t has been m ade to 
reduce changes in the regional breakdown of our model. However, the changes 
of national borders following the political changes after 1989 obviously had to be 
taken into account.
Thus, after 1992, the region marked by SU means the European part of 
the Com m onwealth of Independent S tates (CIS), and this refers to  the European 
countries of the former Soviet Union, except the Baltic s ta te s .4 The trade d a ta  of 
the C entral and East European countries (EE) include—from  1992—the d a ta  of 
the Baltic S tates, Yugoslavia, C roatia  and Slovenia.5 Up until 1991 the Socialist 
A sia /C h ina  (SA) region included Vietnam , Mongolia and North Korea, bu t their 
intra-regional trade was not reported. The export d a ta  of this region between 
1991 and 1995 contain only the exports of the People’s Republic of China- the 
im port d a ta  are missing. From 1992 the im ports of C hina, the reported  trade  of 
the o ther three SA countries, and those of the previously Asian Soviet Republics 
are all included in the East Asian (AS) trade.
F irst, a dem onstration and comparison will be m ade of the growth of trade 
between the different East Asian and European regions; then the changes in their 
com m odity structure  will be shown. In sections 3 and 4 an exam ination is m ade of
4T he in tra -trad e  am ong these countries has no t yet been reported . S ta rtin g  in 1991, th e  trad e  
d a ta  of the  form er Soviet s ta te s  are reported  in com m ercial exchange ra te s  and are n o t exactly  
com parable to  the  previous trade  values.
5Yugoslav trade data were previously included in Western Europe (W E).
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the way in which trade policy factors have influenced the trade relations between 
these regions by com puting the tendencies in the trade intensities. Finally, some 
conclusions will be draw n on the probable future tendencies of East A sian-European 
trade developments.
The growth of East Asian-European trade
It is well known th a t East Asian exports have grown a t an extremely fast ra te  
in recent decades: to tal Japanese exports increased nearly seven times between 1970 
and 1980 and 3.4 tim es between 1980 and 1995 (see Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 2.). 
T he increase of to ta l exports of the SA and AS regions respectively was even faster: 
766 percent and 864 percent in the first period, and 645 percent and 447 percent 
in the second. However, this spectacular increase was very unequally distributed  
in the different regions of the world and especially in Europe, as can be seen in 
Figures 1, 2 and 3.
W hile Japanese exports to  W estern Europe grew nearly 3.4 tim es between 
1980 and 1995—i.e. as fast as to ta l Japanese exports— they were 56 percent lower 
in 1995 than  in 1980 in the direction of the SU, and on about the same level as in 
1980 tow ards the EE region. SA (mainly Chinese) exports to  the European regions 
show a m oderately different development: W E im ports from SA increased much 
faster than  from Jap an  (553 percent between 1980 and 1995), SU im ports grew by 
242 percent, while EE im ports decreased by 15 percent in the same period. The 
East Asian region’s exports (dom inated mainly by the “small tigers” ) behaved very 
differently: they were growing fast on the respective m arkets of all three European 
regions: by 372 percent in W E, 418 percent in EE and by 144 percent in SU between 
1980 and 1995.
However, we have to  take into account not only the differences in the speed of 
export growth rates, bu t the sizes of exports oriented towards the three European 
regions and their changing share in the to tal exports of the Asian regions. The 
value of Japanese exports to  W E was US $ 74 milliards in 1995 for exam ple, while 
only US $ 794 million and US $ 1215 million to EE and SU respectively. This m eans 
th a t the share of W E in to ta l Japanese exports was 18 percent, and those of EE and 
SU only 0.2 percent and 0.3 percent respectively in the same year. The d istribu tion  
of exports for the other two Asian regions was quite similar; the exports of SA and 
AS to the two East European regions were respectively only 6.1 percent and 3.3 
percent of the value of their exports to  the West European m arkets in 1995. In 
the light of these enormous differences of size, the variations in the grow th rates 
are even more conspicuous; the much higher export volumes directed to  the W E 
m arkets grew much faster than the much smaller ones oriented to  EE and to  SU.
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The export flows in the opposite direction— i.e. from the European to the  E ast 
Asian regions— and their growth can be seen in Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 2. It 
was quite unexpected th a t, while the to ta l exports of b o th  E ast European regions 
declined strongly in the 1990-1995 period, their exports bo th  to  Jap an  and to  the 
o ther Asian regions6 would increase significantly. This contrasts w ith the decreasing 
Japanese exports to  SU. The export growth of Eastern Europe to  Asia was much 
slower in the period of 1980 to  1995 than  in the previous decade: while it increased 
more th an  four tim es in the seventies, its growth was to  be only 52 percent over 
the next fifteen years.
W est European exports to  East Asia were not only incom parably greater than  
the E ast European exports, bu t their growth was also much sm oother and faster. It 
increased 5-6 times in the seventies and rose, nearly equally, to  above 560 percent 
between 1980 and 1995 to  Japan  and the other Asian regions.
The development of the trade balances between the three European and the 
two E ast Asian regions can be seen in Table 5. Since the mid-seventies a strongly 
negative trade balance has been evolving between the European regions and Japan . 
In the case of W estern Europe this reached US $ 32 m illiard by 1993 and then 
decreased to  27 milliard by 1995. W ith the decline in Japanese exports to  Eastern  
Europe the deficit did not increase, but fell and the European CIS sta tes have 
shown a trade surplus since 1990.
T he West European trade balance w ith the two other Asian regions has fre­
quently been negative since the eighties, even if the deficit is not very high. The 
trade  balance of the SU rem ained positive after a few negative years in the early 
nineties, while the East European countries which regularly had a surplus w ith this 
region, developed a deficit in 1994-95.
Changes in the commodity structure
To show the strong changes in the commodity structure  of E ast A sian-European 
trade we used three com m odity categories, aggregating agricultural products, raw 
m aterials and fuels into prim ary goods, and showing separately m achinery and all 
o ther m anufactured goods. The SITC numbers for these categories are the follow­
ing:
—  Prim ary goods (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 )
—  O ther m anufactures (SITC 5+ 6+8)
—  Machinery (SITC 7+9).
Figure J, shows both the changing values of exports and the com m odity shares 
of Japanese exports to  the EE between 1970 and 1995. These started  to  grow in
6 As Chinese im ports a re  reported  in AS from  1991, we h ad  to  com bine the  two regions, SA +  
AS, in  th is p a r t  of the  analysis.
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the early seventies, bu t the share of machinery remained a t around 50 percent until 
the mid-eighties. Since then the respective shares of prim ary goods and of other 
m anufactures have diminished and machinery reached about 70 percent of Japanese 
exports to  EE. East Asian exports to  EE only started  to  show substan tia l grow th in 
the late eighties (Figure 5). Since then the share of prim ary goods has dim inished 
strongly and m anufactures now cover about 80 percent of exports and machinery 
more than  30 percent of them .
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate Japanese and AS exports to  W estern Europe. The 
value of exports is 8 to 3 times higher than  th a t which was oriented to  Eastern  
Europe. The increase from the mid-eighties is spectacular and is completely due 
to  m anufactures. Prim ary goods practically disappeared from  Japanese exports 
and rem ained very low in the case of East Asian exports to  W estern Europe. The 
share of light industry products is very small in Japanese exports, bu t it is great in 
the exports of AS. M achinery exports— which were practically non-existent in East 
Asian exports to  W E prior to  the eighties-—increased rapidly and their share had 
reached more than  40 percent after 1993.
The trade policy factor—measuring trade intensities
Looking a t the very significant changes which have occurred in recent decades 
in E ast A sian-European trade relations, there are obviously questions to  be asked 
about the m ajor factors which caused these changes. It seems obvious th a t bo th  
the supply side and the dem and side developed rapidly, especially due to  the  fast 
economic development of Japan  and the newly industrialising Asian countries, and 
also because of the policies of liberalisation in both W estern and Eastern Europe. 
As Asian economic growth was export oriented, their “push” effect was certainly 
strong. Growing income and trade liberalisation in Europe also increased the “pull” 
effect of their im ports. The growing trade deficit of the European countries shows 
th a t the “push” and “pull” effects in the other direction (i.e. from  Europe to  Asia) 
were not equally strong, even considering th a t the European countries tried  to 
prom ote their exports, and the Asian countries liberalised their im ports in legal 
term s.
Analysing the results, and looking a t the dynamics of trade flows, one question 
which presents itself is: even if trade has developed rapidly among these regions, is 
tt enough? Is it too much, or too little and, if so, compared to what? What can we 
expect: will it grow further, or faster or slower, than it has done so far?
To answer these questions, we have to  look in to  the factors influencing th is 
development and try  to separate them  in order to measure their influence on the 
development of inter-regional trade. It is well known th a t in ternational trade is an 
in tricate  system  of visible and hidden attractions and resistances which regulate
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in tra- and inter-regional com m odity flows. In ternational trade is influenced— in 
addition to  being affected by economic potential, resource endowment and the 
com petitiveness am ong p artners—by a number of political, trad itional and non­
economic factors.
In the analysis below these factors are classified in two categories:
—  volume factors: these regulate the to ta l export supply and im port dem and 
of the respective regions, and they reflect their trade potentials;
—  trade intensity factors:7 these include the influence of trade-policy and 
economic-distance; they display the characteristics of the p a rtn e rs’ b ilateral rela­
tions, and they regulate the com m odity flows and the allocation of to ta l exports 
and im ports am ong m arkets.
The idea of the trade  intensity coefficients is based on the assum ption th a t 
trade flows depend on the “push” of the exporting country, on the “pull” of the 
im porting country, and on particu lar factors regulating bilateral relations. This 
m eans th a t the respective sizes of to ta l exports and to ta l im ports are determ ined 
m ainly by internal economic conditions. However, each trade flow is strongly shaped 
by factors which regulate bilateral exchanges, (such as transport costs) and— in 
m ost cases to  an even greater ex ten t— by various trade-policy measures.
I t is due to  th is distinction of two categories of factors th a t there hats origi­
nated  a separate analysis of the volume effects performed by the economic po ten­
tials, (i.e. the “push” and “pull” effects of the domestic economies), and the inten­
sity effects which separately influence each individual trade flow. The distinction of 
“volume” and “intensity” effects takes place in such a way th a t a  Active, so-called 
“normal” flow is com puted by taking into account the volume effects-, then, by 
com paring th is with the corresponding factual trade flow data , the intensity affects 
are obtained as a residuum .
T he trade  intensity indicator is defined as:
where
c Z'}k°ijk -  ----------Zi.kZ.ik
zijk =  ^ ,  zi.k =  m ,  z.jk =  m  and 
x..k x..k x..k
7T he origins of th e  “trad e  in tensity” ind ica to r (or as it was previously called, th e  “d e lta” 
coefficient) can be found  in th e  papers of Froment and Zighera (1964) and  Theil  (1967), b u t th e  
idea goes back to  the  m ulti-regional in p u t-o u tp u t analysis of Leoniief  and Strout (1963). Since 
th en  a g reat m any  publications have dealt w ith th is type of in te rnational trad e  analysis. See for 
exam ple: E C E  (1973, 1985), Nagy (1985) an d  Panic and Vacic (1995).
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x : means the value of the trade flow, 
i : the exporting region, 
j :  the im porting region and 
k: the commodity group.
The delta coefficient indicates the intensity of trade of com m odity k from 
region i to  region j  in such a way th a t it compares the share of the actual flow in 
to ta l trade of commodity k with the same share of “normal” flow. In this sense, a 
flow is “norm al” when its share in the to ta l trade of a given commodity group is 
equal to the product of the corresponding shares of the exporting and im porting 
countries, i.e. (zi.kz.jk)-8
T he trade intensity indicator shows the effects of all factors influencing the 
trade flows between a given pair of regions or countries over a given period of tim e, 
ap art from the volume effects of to ta l exports and im ports. If the effects of trade- 
policy measures, discrim ination, integration, trad itional and other historical links, 
distance, etc. do not influence strongly the bilateral trade between two countries, 
the value of the trade intensity indicator will be unity, or near to  it. If, however, 
these factors considerably reduce or increase the trade flows in question, this in­
dicator will be less or greater than unity, respectively. A trade flow of “norm al” 
intensity is bu t a starting-poin t of measurem ent, and no norm ative value judgem ent 
can be a ttached  to  it. A trade flow being “norm al” means merely th a t it is not 
influenced by trade-policy, distance and similar effects.
The trade intensity indicators are not always com parable between regions of 
very different sizes, bu t—even in this case—they are useful tools for analysing their 
tim e series in order to  see the consequences of trade policy changes between regions. 
In this sense, the term  “trade policies” is not m eant to  imply simply the barriers to 
trade and their eventual increase or decrease. Trade policies include trade  prom o­
tion efforts and any other policy intervention which can have an influence on the 
direction of trade. Many of these are, of course, politically m otivated.
In previous tim e series analyses of trade intensities three main types of change 
were observed:
a) continuation of the formerly-observed course— i.e. continued stab ility  of 
the coefficient in question, or continuation of its former tim e-trend;
b) “flattening-out” of the former trend, whereby the ra te  of change diminishes 
and the coefficient approaches a certain level in time;
c) change in the former level or trend of the coefficient, due to  significant 
changes in trade-policy factors (given th a t economic distance usually does not 
change, or a t least, not abruptly).
8 In th is s tu d y  the  trad e  intensities by com m odity groups are no t d ealt w ith in  deta il. In the  
nex t section we shall deal w ith the  in tensity  indicators of to ta l trad e  betw een regions only.
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Behind these typical movements of trade intensities, two essential trends were 
observed:
(i) intensity indicators approach unity—i.e. trade flows verge to  “norm al” 
flows as a consequence of trade liberalisation and globalization of the world econ­
omy;
(ii) integration of certain groups of countries, tends to  increase the indicators 
of intra-regional trade above unity, and to  decrease those of extra-regional trade to 
figure below unity.
It was also observed th a t the more the intensity indicators diverge from  a 
certain centre of a ttrac tio n — unity in the case of (i), and above or below unity 
in case (ii)— the greater are the changes; this explains “the flattening-out” of the 
trends m entioned above.
Changing intensities in East Asian-European trade
Table 6 shows the export intensities of the E ast Asian regions between 1955- 
1995. Looking at the development of Japanese export intensities, there is a rem ark­
able difference between the very low intensities oriented to  Eastern Europe and the 
mediocre intensities of exports to  W estern Europe and to  the SU region. T he inten­
sity  indicator of EE im ports from  Japan  rem ained below 0.2 over the whole period, 
and since the mid-eighties in m ost years this figure has been less than  0.1. This 
m eans th a t Japanese exports to  Eastern  Europe are less than  ten percent of w hat 
could be expected from the “norm al” flows (i.e. by their respective shares in world 
exports and im ports).
The intensity of W estern Europe’s im ports from Japan  showed a slowly bu t 
steadily  growing tendency: from  below the 0.3 of the sixties, approaching 0.5 un til 
the  early nineties, and fell back afterw ards to  0.4 by the m id-nineties. T he mediocre 
intensities could be explained by referring to  the great distance between the two 
regions. However, looking a t the indicators of Japanese export intensities to other 
regions, it is to  be suspected th a t trade policies are also hindering Japanese exports 
to  W E in a significant extent. For the sake of comparison Japanese export intensity 
indicators to  N orth America are shown below:
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
1.48 1.90 2.08 2.05 1.53 1.79 1.98 1.89 1.57
Japanese export intensities to  America have been very high, being near 2.0 
from  the sixties to  the late eighties, showing only a slight decrease since then.
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Similarly, the intensity indicator was high in the direction of the other developed 
countries—for instance, in the direction of Latin America, and even in relation to 
Africa it was higher than  th a t for W estern Europe.
Japanese export intensities to the Soviet Union developed very differently 
from the pattern  which was observed in the direction of Eastern Europe. It in­
creased strongly from 0.35 to  0.89 between 1960 and 1976 and started  to  decline 
from the late eighties reaching 0.19 in 1995. For a long period of tim e it was sig­
nificantly higher than the intensities of W E im ports and this was a  result which 
was not expected. Of course, the distance factor played a significant part in this 
developm ent, given th a t Russia is regarded as an Asian country; however, one can 
suspect th a t—even if diplom atic relations were cooler— trade  policy barriers could 
have been lower than  in the other two European regions.
East Asian export intensities to W estern Europe have rem ained fairly con­
s tan t over a long period, staying a t around 0.4 since the seventies. This is ra ther 
similar to  the Japanese export intensities to  W estern Europe, and it seems to  be 
ra ther low only in comparison w ith the export intensities to  North America, which 
have been between 1.4-1.8 since the early severities. East Asian export intensi­
ties to  Eastern Europe were low (like those of the Japanese exports) until the late 
eighties, bu t they have become significantly stronger in the nineties.
Soviet im port intensities form East Asia were relatively high (0.7-0.9) in the 
sixties and early seventies, bu t later declined to  a level sim ilar to  th a t of W estern 
Europe; nevertheless, between 1989-1992 it has increased again to  0.7-0.8, falling 
back to 0.4-0.5 in 1994-95. In this case distance once again plays an obvious role; 
however, as distance does not change one can assume th a t trade policy factors 
could have been more advantageous in certain periods than  in the other European 
regions.
The Socialist Asian countries had very intensive exports to  the two European 
socialist regions: in the case of exports to  the SU it was between 5 and 16 (!) in the 
fifties and sixties, but rem ained near, or significantly above 2.0 from the seventies. 
It is rem arkable th a t after a short decline between 1989-1991, in the following years 
Chinese export intensities reached again a level higher than  2.5. A serious drop 
came in 1994-95, showing the end of politically m otivated high trade intensities, 
or—in our term s— the effect of “norm alisation” in Russo-Chinese trade relations. 
SA exports to  Eastern Europe were also very intensive, even if the indicators were 
always som ewhat lower than  those of the SU. From a level of 1.7-1.9 in the seventies, 
export intensities declined to  1.0-1.2 in the eighties; then they dropped to  0.2-0.3 
in the early nineties. All these movements show how strongly politics influence 
trade relations, especially in the case of the Socialist economies at a tim e when 
political hostilities with western countries were predom inant.
T he im port intensities of W estern Europe from SA were low and they declined 
slowly from 0.4 to 0.2 till 1992, when it started  to increase above 0.3. It is much 
below of the intensities of Japanese and East Asian im ports. There can hardly be
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any doubt th a t—in comparison with SU and EE im ports— in this case politics have 
again played an im portan t role in shaping trade relations. W hat is surprising is th a t 
the im port intensities of W E are significantly below those of North Am erica from 
SA. W hile they were below 0.2 in the seventies, they started  to  increase, reaching 
approxim ately 0.5 in the eighties and a level of 1.0 by 1995. The barriers of Chinese 
exports to  the US are apparently  much weaker than  those to the EU.
Table 7 shows the export intensities of the European regions to  East A sia.9 
The intensity of East European exports to  Japan  were ju s t as low as those of the 
opposite trade flows, even if one can observe a slight increase beginning in the 
late eighties. Their export intensities to the East Asian region follow som ething 
approxim ating to  a U-shape curve: from a level of 0.35 in 1965 they diminished to
0.1 in the mid-seventies, and rem ained low until the late eighties; then they sta rted  
to  increase, reaching a level of 0.4 in the early nineties, declining to 0.2 again in 
1995. This may be due to the shift of the Chinese im port d a ta  to  AS. EE export 
intensities to SA were above 2.0 in m ost years until the late seventies, in the eighties 
they gradually decreased to  around 0.8 in 1988, increasing again to 1.6 in 1990.
West European export intensities to Japan  were much lower than  those in the 
opposite direction in the seventies and early eighties, when they started  to  increase 
from a level of 0.2 to 0.4, reaching about the same level as those of Japanese export 
intensities to W E. T his shows th a t the barriers entering the Japanese m arket were 
even stronger than  the barriers facing Japanese goods entering West European 
m arkets for a long period, this difference, however, disappeared lately. The export 
intensities to  the East Asian region were very sim ilar to W E im port intensities from 
there , w ith both  figures staying steadily near 0.4.
Soviet export intensities to Japan  declined after 1973, from a level of 0.7 go­
ing down to 0.2 in the early eighties, and then starting  to  increase in the nineties, 
reaching 0.7 again in 1993. This is rem arkable given th a t the European CIS coun­
tries are smaller than the previous USSR and their export intensities have become 
tw o-three tim es higher than  the intensities of Japanese exports to  SU. Soviet export 
intensities to  AS were between 0.3-0.4 for a long period, bu t they declined to  about 
half th is figure in 1988-1989 and jum ped to near one in the nineties (apparen tly  
due to  the fact th a t it also included Chinese im ports). SA im port intensities from 
the SU were always very high, being between 3-6 since the sixties.
Com paring the intensity indicators of bilateral flows to the trade balances 
( Table 5), one can see the reasons why the balances evolved as they did and how 
they have been influenced by trade policy differences. For example, the fact th a t 
the West European export intensities to Japan  were about 0.1 lower than  those of 
the opposite flows explains the negative balance of trade for W E. Similar differences 
in intensities can be found in W E-AS trade, even if they are smaller.
9T he d a ta  are m issing for SU in 1991. As it was m entioned Chinese im ports have been rep o rted  
in AS since 1991.
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The surprising SU export surplus to Japan  in the nineties can be regarded as 
a consequence of the much stronger SU export intensities to  Japan  than  those of 
the opposite flows. The trade surplus of the East European countries with AS +  SA 
till 1993 is explained by the fact th a t the export intensities of Eastern Europe were 
significantly higher than  those of the two East Asian regions. W hen the former 
intensities dropped in 1994-95, the trade balance became negative for EE.
Some conclusions
A fter looking a t the intensity indicators of East Asian and European trade, 
what can we say about the future? In the case of EE the direction of developm ent 
seems to  show a clear tendency: the liberalisation of trade and the consolidation 
of m arket economies in the C entral-East European countries will increase their 
extrem ely low trade intensities with the Asian regions. This means not only th a t 
the low intensities we have observed will increase, bu t quite probably also th a t the 
lower they were the faster the rise will be. This is true for both directions of the 
trade flows. It is very likely, for example, th a t the very low intensity indicator 
of Japanese exports to  EE—only 0.08 in 1995— will move in the direction of the 
level of West European im port intensities (0.43 in the same year) and a  sim ilar 
development can be expected in East Asian exports to  EE.
In the case of Asian trade intensities w ith W estern Europe, the fu tu re  is not 
so certain. We have seen the great differences, for example, between Japanese 
export intensities to  N orth America and to  W estern Europe: the former is more 
than  three tim es higher than  the la tter. One could expect th a t this difference will 
diminish— i.e. West European im port intensities will increase, both with Jap an  and 
with the other Asian regions. Further steps towards globalization and liberalisation 
will quite probably decrease trade barriers, but it does not seem evident th a t this 
will happen soon. Taking into account the great stability  of the intensity indicators 
over a long period of time, and also their uneven development, there is a question 
w ith regard to  the factors which can induce a faster increase of trade intensities 
between the two regions.
One of the possible conclusions of our study is the enormous— and for  many 
People: hidden—potential in trade creation due to the process of globalization and 
liberalisation: in our term s they represent a “norm alisation” of in ternational trade. 
Let us take two examples; w hat would have happened if;
—  the Japanese export intensity to  W E increased from its 1995 level of 0.41 
to 0.75 and West European export intensities to Japan  increased from 0.40 also to
0.75?
—  the Japanese export intensity to  EE increased from its 1995 level of 0.08 
to  0.3 and E ast European export intensities to  Japan  from 0.08 also to  0.3?
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Looking at Tables 6 and 7 such changes do not seem to be exaggerations: in 
the first case the W E im port intensities would be less than  half of those of N orth 
American im ports from  Japan , and in the second the intensities would be lower 
than  those between W estern Europe and Japan . We are using the trade  d a ta  of 
1995 and this begs the question: what would have happened if, in th a t year, the 
d istribution of trade corresponded to the estim ated intensity indicators? If we are 
looking in to  the fu ture the  consequences of such trade policy changes would be 
even greater, given the fact th a t in ternational trade is growing— i.e. our estim ates 
underrate  likely future increases.
Using the equation on page 8 and the trade d a ta  of 1995 we get the following 
results:
—  Japanese exports to  W E would have increased by US $ 61 billion and W E 
exports to  Jap an  by US $ 40 billion.
—  Japanese exports to  EE would have increased by US $ 2.4 billion and EE 
exports to  Jap an  by US $ 1.1 billion.
As can be seen, the changes are enormous: bilateral trade between the regions 
would have increased by 82 percent and 85 percent respectively in the first case, 
and by 300 percent and 270 percent respectively in the second.
O f course, the aim  here is not to  make projections: w hat has been a ttem pted  
is to  show w hat poten tia l there is for trade extension in the cases where past trade  
policies have reduced the intensities to  levels much below w hat they m ight “nor­
mally” be. There are also m any other factors which have to  be taken in to  account 
if we really intend to  look into future development possibilities—e.g. domestic eco­
nomic growth, the  trade balance, capital flows, trade in services etc. However, 
there can be little doubt that advances in the direction of the reduction o f trade bar­
riers and export promotion policies on a more global scale can and will substantially 
change not only the size but also the structure o f international trade.
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A ppendix 1
The regions and commodity groups of the trade flow model
Regions“
1) Soviet U nion/C IS sta te s SU
2) C entra l an d  E aste rn  Europe EE
3) Socialist A sia /C h ina SA
4) W estern  E urope W E
5) N orth  Am erica NA
6) Ja p a n JP
7) O th e r developed countries OD
8) L atin  Am erica LA
9) Africa AF
10) W estern Asia WA
11) E ast Asia AS
12) T otal world trade TW
“ T he list of countries belonging to  th e  regions can be found in UN S tan d ard  C ountry  
Codes, S ta tis tica l Papers, Series M No. 49.
C om m odity groups6 A bbreviations SITC  num bers
1) Food and  A gricultural m aterials AG RPROD 0 + 1 + 4 + 2 - 2 7 - 2 8
2) M inerals an d  m etals M INM ET 27+ 28 + 6 7 + 6 8
3) Fuels FUELS 3
4) Chemicals CHEM 5
5) O th er m anufactured  goods OTMAN 6 + 8 - 6 7 - 6 8
6) M achinery0 MACH 7+ 9
7) T o ta l world trad e TW 0 + ...+ 9
^D etails of th e  com m odity classification in UN S tan d ard  In te rna tional T rade C lassification, 
Revision 2 an d  3. S ta tistica l Papers, Series M No. 34.
cA fter investigation it was assum ed th a t  the  trad e  in non-specified p ro d u c ts  (SITC  9) 
consists m ostly  of a rm am ents an d  for th is reason it was included in th e  m achinery com m ondity 
group.
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Fig. 1 Export growth of Japan
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Fig. 2 Export growth of SA
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Fig. 3 Export growth of AS
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Fig. 4 Japanese export to EE by commodities
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Fig. 5 AS export to EE by commodities
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Fig. 6 Japanese export to WE by commodities
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Fig. 7 AS export to WE by commodities
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Table 1 to
East Asian exports to Europe (million dollars)
Year J P  ex p o rts SA ex p o rts AS ex p o rts
SU EE W E TW SU E E  W E  T W
im p o rtin g  regions
SU EE W E TW
55 2 9 195 1,990 740 220 120 1,410 31 61 1,990 6,768
60 60 4 475 4,057 1,000 360 235 2,062 190 125 2,060 7,552
65 170 40 1,100 8,462 410 190 305 2,018 385 185 2,200 9,283
70 341 107 2,910 19,315 235 250 394 2,305 494 271 2,964 14,822
75 1,625 574 8,081 55,750 599 637 1,009 7,241 868 467 8,779 46,428
80 2,778 807 21,463 129,541 1,230 1,415 3,031 19,959 2,145 772 25,953 142,891
81 3,259 758 23,687 151,769 1,044 1,035 2,899 22,594 2,726 759 23,673 152,173
82 3,899 584 21,454 138,380 1,362 858 2,500 23,494 2,608 548 23,172 150,793
83 2,821 747 23,048 146,660 1,549 1,054 2,801 24,050 2,507 587 22,046 158,070
84 2,518 492 23,808 169,940 1,838 1,049 2,600 24,438 2,790 611 24,439 181,795
85 2,751 564 24,934 175,659 2,328 1,462 2,676 30,061 2,206 664 25,888 160,099
86 3,150 682 36,927 208,801 2,935 1,716 3,952 34,050 2,028 616 30,476 193,148
87 2,563 717 45,155 228,787 3,078 2,091 4,620 42,781 2,366 674 43,732 252,502
88 3,130 776 55,736 264,373 3,718 2,478 5,525 51,485 2,447 957 54,937 311,492
89 3,082 673 56,283 274,742 1,849 1,557 5,555 53,048 5,329 1,498 60,188 320,436
90 2,563 745 62,412 286,272 2,239 909 6,147 61,661 6,595 1,424 72,508 344,984
91 2,115 922 68,325 314,525 1,823 255 7,340 71,113 5,502 2,835 82,504 445,146
92 1,128 762 71,584 339,651 2,448 313 8,331 84,850 4,165 2,097 88,771 500,853
93 1,581 660 64,117 360,911 2,821 675 12,677 91,744 4,913 2,483 91,326 554,038
94 1,298 598 65,134 395,599 1,694 951 15,950 121,005 4,062 2,591 101,760 647,864
95 1,215 794 73,874 442,937 1,760 1,209 19,789 148,778 5,234 4,002 122,589 781,383
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Table 2
E xport growth o f  East A sian  regions 1 970-1995  (1 9 8 0 = 1 0 0 )
JP  exports SA exports AS exports
SU E E  W E  T W  SU E E  W E T W  SU EE  W E TW
im porting  regions
12 13 14 15 19 18 13 12 23 35 11 10
58 71 38 43 49 45 33 36 40 60 34 32
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
117 94 110 117 85 73 96 113 127 98 91 106
140 72 100 107 111 61 82 118 122 71 89 106
102 93 107 113 126 74 92 120 117 76 85 111
91 61 111 131 149 74 86 122 130 79 94 127
99 70 116 136 189 103 88 151 103 86 100 112
113 85 172 161 239 121 130 171 95 80 117 135
92 89 210 177 250 148 152 214 110 87 169 177
113 96 260 204 302 175 182 258 114 124 212 218
111 83 262 212 150 110 183 266 248 194 232 224
92 92 291 221 182 64 203 309 307 184 279 241
76 114 318 243 148 18 242 356 257 367 318 312
41 94 334 262 199 22 275 425 194 272 342 351
57 82 299 279 229 48 418 460 229 322 352 388
47 74 303 305 305 67 526 606 189 336 392 453
44 98 344 342 342 85 653 745 244 518 472 547
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Table 3
Export flows of European regions to East Asian regions (million dollars)
Year SU exports E E  exports W E exports
JP SA +A S TW JP SA +A S TW
im porting  regions
JP SA +A S TW
55 2 932 3,366 3 330 4,458 160 2,195 35,050
60 76 1,065 5,508 7 550 7,305 360 2,910 51,220
65 185 855 7,902 30 495 11,458 620 3,330 78,660
70 379 875 12,004 88 638 17,677 1,679 4,293 136,244
75 927 1,902 31,551 187 1,499 43,469 3,546 11,314 360,141
80 1,464 4,574 71,046 289 2,718 77,707 8,215 25,954 804,382
81 1,130 5,003 74,085 301 2,428 76,953 8,067 26,240 737,907
82 1,042 5,462 80,630 281 2,370 77,181 7,896 26,584 710,876
83 1,115 5,982 84,317 403 2,431 82,896 8,474 26,607 698,059
84 1,035 6,515 84,735 410 2,310 81,995 9,358 28,055 716,496
85 928 6,179 68,176 349 2,965 83,837 9,972 32,085 747,337
86 1,396 8,481 86,795 383 3,063 88,848 13,777 39,004 907,438
87 1,540 9,709 96,430 467 3,249 99,792 19,068 47,841 1,093,943
88 1,951 10,855 99,050 644 3,024 102,577 24,058 54,536 1,200,711
89 2,134 8,799 95,144 739 3,483 82,831 27,733 60,518 1,287,525
90 3,351 8,654 89,473 319 3,104 91,179 34,454 71,168 1,537,982
91 0 0 0 1,872 6,344 99,128 32,720 74,271 1,566,655
92 1,784 6,536 50,060 364 3,137 56,881 31,630 84,566 1,664,487
93 2,090 6,696 51,349 362 3,607 61,509 31,523 99,172 1,519,254
94 3,203 15,369 86,954 339 3,198 71,262 37,707 117,808 1,727,590
95 3,986 19,130 108,182 422 4,156 93,320 46,541 147,673 2,081,312
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Table 4
Export growth o f  European regions 197 0 -1 9 9 5  (1 9 8 0 = 1 0 0 )
SU exports EE  exports W E  exports
JP SA +A S TW JP  SA +A S TW  
im porting  regions
JP SA +A S TW
26 19 17 30 23 23 20 17 17
63 42 44 65 55 56 43 44 45
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
77 109 104 104 89 99 98 101 92
71 119 113 97 87 99 96 102 88
76 131 119 139 89 107 103 103 87
71 142 119 142 85 106 114 108 89
63 135 96 121 109 108 121 124 93
95 185 122 133 113 114 168 150 113
105 212 136 162 120 128 232 184 136
133 237 139 223 111 132 293 210 149
146 192 134 256 128 107 338 233 160
229 189 126 110 114 117 419 274 191
0 0 0 648 233 128 398 286 195
122 143 70 126 115 73 385 326 207
143 146 72 125 133 79 384 382 189
219 336 122 117 118 92 459 454 215
272 418 152 146 153 120 567 569 259
T a b le  5
Trade balances of European regions (millio\n dollars)
Year SU EE W E SU EE W E
balances with Jap an balances w ith SA +A S
55 0 - 6 -3 5 161 49 85
60 16 3 -1 1 5 -1 2 5 65 615
65 15 - 1 0 -4 8 0 60 120 825
70 38 - 1 9 -1 ,2 3 1 146 117 935
75 -6 9 8 -3 8 7 -4 ,5 3 5 435 395 1,526
80 -1 ,3 1 4 -5 1 8 -1 3 ,2 4 8 1,199 531 3,030
85 -1 ,8 2 3 -2 1 5 -1 4 ,9 6 2 1,645 839 3,521
90 788 -4 2 6 -2 7 ,9 5 8 -1 8 0 771 - •7,487
93 509 -2 9 8 -3 2 ,5 9 4 -1 ,0 3 7 448 - 4,831
94 1,905 -2 5 9 -2 7 ,4 2 7 9,613 -3 4 4 98
95 2,771 -3 7 2 -2 7 ,3 3 3 12,136 --1,055 5,295
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Table 6
Export intensities of East-Asian regions
Year JP  exports SA exports AS exports
SU EE W E SU EE  W E 
im porting  regions
SU EE W E
55 0.03 0.10 0.23 16.15 3.37 0.20 0.14 0.19 0.70
60 0.35 0.02 0.27 11.48 2.93 0.27 0.60 0.28 0.64
65 0.48 0.08 0.28 4.81 1.56 0.33 0.98 0.33 0.52
70 0.48 0.10 0.33 2.75 1.95 0.37 0.90 0.33 0.43
75 0.71 0.19 0.34 2.02 1.61 0.32 0.46 0.18 0.44
80 0.68 0.15 0.37 1.96 1.70 0.34 0.48 0.13 0.40
81 0.63 0.12 0.38 1.36 1.13 0.32 0.53 0.12 0.38
82 0.74 0.10 0.38 1.53 0.86 0.26 0.46 0.09 0.37
83 0.49 0.11 0.39 1.65 0.97 0.29 0.41 0.08 0.34
84 0.40 0.07 0.36 2.05 1.00 0.27 0.42 0.08 0.34
85 0.42 0.08 0.36 2.06 1.21 0.22 0.37 0.10 0.41
86 0.44 0.07 0.42 2.54 1.08 0.27 0.31 0.07 0.37
87 0.37 0.07 0.45 2.36 1.15 0.24 0.31 0.06 0.39
88 0.40 0.08 0.48 2.42 1.23 0.25 0.26 0.08 0.40
89 0.45 0.07 0.46 1.40 0.88 0.23 0.67 0.14 0.42
90 0.46 0.07 0.46 1.86 0.40 0.21 0.78 0.16 0.40
91 0.43 0.14 0.47 1.64 0.17 0.22 0.80 0.31 0.40
92 0.28 0.12 0.47 2.44 0.19 0.22 0.70 0.22 0.39
93 0.36 0.09 0.44 2.56 0.36 0.34 0.74 0.22 0.40
94 0.23 0.07 0.41 0.98 0.37 0.33 0.44 0.19 0.39
95 0.19 0.08 0.41 0.80 0.34 0.33 0.46 0.21 0.38
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Table 7
E xport in tensities o f  European regions
SU exports EE  exports W E exports
JP  SA AS JP  SA AS JP  SA AS
im porting  regions
0.03 16.90 0.08 0.03 3.93 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.77
0.45 10.59 0.25 0.03 3.49 0.24 0.23 0.45 0.65
0.63 5.35 0.67 0.07 1.64 0.35 0.21 0.41 0.54
0.63 4.50 0.32 0.10 1.84 0.23 0.25 0.39 0.44
0.50 3.40 0.39 0.07 1.94 0.22 0.17 0.58 0.39
0.33 2.97 0.39 0.06 1.93 0.16 0.16 0.37 0.36
0.24 3.09 0.38 0.06 1.57 0.16 0.17 0.34 0.37
0.20 3.26 0.35 0.06 1.62 0.14 0.17 0.34 0.38
0.21 3.04 0.35 0.08 1.40 0.13 0.19 0.36 0.37
0.20 2.66 0.39 0.08 1.15 0.11 0.21 0.33 0.37
0.23 2.59 0.41 0.07 1.21 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.39
0.31 3.26 0.35 0.08 1.16 0.12 0.29 0.40 0.40
0.30 3.49 0.36 0.09 1.10 0.12 0.33 0.36 0.40
0.34 3.53 0.32 0.11 0.86 0.10 0.34 0.31 0.37
0.36 4.90 0.14 0.14 1.64 0.15 0.34 0.39 0.40
0.61 6.37 0.16 0.06 1.64 0.13 0.37 0.40 0.41
0.31 0.44 0.35 0.33
0.65 0.84 0.12 0.36 0.34 0.33
0.71 0.75 0.10 0.34 0.36 0.37
0.68 0.96 0.09 0.24 0.40 0.37
0.66 0.92 0.08 0.23 0.40 0.37
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FLEXIBILITIES AND TRUST: PRODUCTION MARKETS AND 
ROLE PRODUCTION IN THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION
SZ. KEMÉNY
In  th is study, we problem atize the  notion  of flexible economic stra teg ies. We develop two 
ideal types. In  “flexibility based  on stud ied  tru s t” , acto rs can afford to  be flexible because th e  
in s titu tio n s  supporting  th e ir  flexibility—i.e. constitu tional orders—minimize th e  likelihood th a t  
anyone will take advantage of th e ir various forms of behaviour. In “flexibility based on d is tru s t” , 
ac to rs are flexible because they  assum e th a t  others will take advantage of any th ing  th a t  th ey  m ight 
do. We exam ine th e  ways in  which stu d ied  tru s t and d istrust co n trib u te  to  ac to rs’ decisions to 
behave flexibly in the  two types of environm ents, and  we consider the  way inform ation  flows in  the 
two contexts an d  th e  contents of relations developed am ong actors in the  two realm s. We claim  
th a t  m ost flexible stra teg ies pursued by acto rs are com binations of the  two ideal types. T he aim  
of the  research  proposal presented  a t  the  end of th e  s tu d y  is to  un d erstan d  th e  different flexible 
stra teg ies which arise from  th e  com binations of flexibility based on stud ied  tru s t and  d istru st. 
The se tting  for th e  research proposal is a  p a rticu la r type of p roduction  m arket in th e  H ungarian  
economic transform ation .
Uncertainty and flexibility
T he current period of economic transform ation is characterized by heightened 
uncertain ty  in Hungary. A significant p art of this uncertainty has bureaucratic ori­
gins. Laws and regulations concerning all aspects of economic life, from taxa tio n  to 
social security dues and privatization are subject to frequent and often unforeseeable 
change (Stark 1996; Voszka 1994, 1995, 1996; Lányi 1991). This unpredictability  
is partly  the result of the lack of consultative institu tions between civil society and 
the s ta te  (a deficit is particularly  evident in Hungary among the East C entral Euro­
pean countries) ( Siark and Bruszi forthcom ing). The scarcity of such institu tional 
ties has exacerbated the trad itional d istrust between economic actors (especially 
the owners of small and medium-sized enterprises) and governm ent officials ( Gábor 
1991; Ékes 1992; Csanádi 1995; Kemény 1996).1 This d istrust has also increased 
the likelihood th a t a t least some changes in regulations are intended to  carry an 
element of surprise for economic actors.2
’ For an  ab strac t form ulation of th is link, see e.g. Sabel 1992, 1993, 1994. For a  sim ilar phe- 
nom enon in Italy, see Regini  1995.
P lease note, th a t  we do no t refer only to  changes in economic factors which are  purpose­
fully unexpected  (like in te rest-ra te  hikes, o r currency devaluation), b u t to  sweeping in stitu tio n a l 
changes in th e  economic environm ent as well.
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T he transform ation has also increased the rapidity  of change of m arket sig­
nals. T he liberalization of private enterprise, the fragm entation of large state-ow ned 
firms and the lowering of barriers to  foreign trade and investm ent have raised the 
num ber of com petitors in every m arket (Major 1995; Ehrlich and Révész 1996). 
As a result, m arkets have fragm ented and product life-cycles have shortened. The 
economic uncertainty experienced by m arket actors is further increased by the fact 
th a t several companies are em pty shells, often used for opportunistic strategies 
( Czakó ei al. 1994).
In order to  survive in uncertain environments, economic actors rely on flex­
ible strategies.3 They rarely implement plans th a t would lock them  into unique 
alternatives. In order to be able to  change quickly, they pursue tactics of hedging, 
keeping several courses of action open to themselves ( Leifer 1988, 1991; Piore and 
Sabel 1984; Sabel 1995c; Sabel and Zeillin forthcom ing).
A nalysts have often pointed to  the positive as well as to  the negative conse­
quences of the flexible strategies adopted by H ungary’s economic actors. W riting 
about the second economy, István R. Gábor emphasized not only en trepreneurs’ 
ability for organizational innovation, bu t also their focus on short-term  profitabil­
ity, leading to  widespread opportunism . He repeatedly underscored the im portance 
of the small proportion  of full-time entrepreneurs in the H ungarian economy, and 
pointed to  its negative consequences in term s of technical development and interna­
tional com petitiveness (G ábor 1985, 1991, 1992, 1996). David Stark, investigating 
the hedging strategies of companies characterized by recom binant p roperty  forms, 
has stressed the possibility of a trade-off between adaptab ility  and accountability  
(S tark 1996).
S tarting  from the above statem ents regarding the possibly Janus-faced con­
sequences of flexibility, our aim  here is to  problem atize the notion of flexible (eco­
nomic) strategies. We contend th a t flexible strategies have different forms and 
th a t the type of flexible strategies implemented by Hungarian economic actors will 
greatly influence the course of the country’s economic development. Some types, 
like those evidenced in industrial districts (Pyke ei al. 1990, Pyke and Sengenberger 
1992; Cosseniino et al. 1996; Sabel 1995a) and “lean” m anufacturing system s 
( Womack, Jones and Roos 1990; Nishiguchi 1994; Hcrrigel 1996; Cusumano and 
Selby 1995; Sabel 1991; Bowman and Kogut 1995b) are associated with economic 
development. In th is literature, the  more flexible the strategies are th a t economic 
actors develop, the better they can adap t to  their constantly  changing economic 
environm ent, and the more successful they can be— individually and collectively.
3 Flexible stra teg ies (in which th e  ability  to  change quickly is an  im portan t goal) are con trasted  
here w ith stra teg ies of stab ility  and  slow change. W hile stra teg ies of stab ility  are ad equate  when 
there  is little  variation in the  environm ent, stra teg ies of slow change are ap p ro p ria te  when the  
in tended  transform ation  is profound: for exam ple, in th e  case of changing th e  cu ltu re  of an 
organ ization  (e.g. Harvard Business School  1989).
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Expressing a common feature of these forms of flexible strategies, we shall call 
them  “flexibility based on studied tru s t” .4 However, flexibility has another face. A 
separate branch of literature on the topic, concentrating on— w hat we contend to 
be— another type of flexible strategy links flexibility to  less beneficial social phe­
nom ena. Studies on the Sicilian and Russian mafias (G am betta  1988c, 1993, 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c; Varese 1994) and Italian corruption networks ( Pizzorno 1992; della 
Porta 1992; Vannucci 1992; della Porta and Vannucci 1994) also em phasize the 
im portance th a t flexibility has for the survival and individual success of actors in 
these milieus. Underscoring a common feature of these flexible forms of behaviour, 
we shall denote them  as “flexibility based on d istrust” .5
In w hat follows, we shall examine the ways in which studied tru st and d istrust 
contribute to  actors’ decisions to  behave flexibly in the two types of environm ents; 
how inform ation flows in the two contexts and the contents of relations developed 
am ong actors in the two realms. A t this moment, our typology consists of two ideal 
types. As in the case of every typology based on ideal types, em phasis should be 
placed on interm ediate categories ( Weber 1978; Wittgenstein 1992). O ur hypothet­
ical empirical generalization is th a t m ost flexible strategies pursued by (economic) 
actors possess some features of each ideal type. Unfortunately, a t the present stage 
of our research, we cannot provide a system atic analysis of the area in between the 
two pure types. The aim  of the research program m e presented at the end of this 
study is, on the theoretical level, to a ttem p t to  fill in the existing gap. R elated to 
this, on the empirical level, we shall contend th a t the flexible strategies pursued by 
H ungarian small entrepreneurs possess a m ixture of features of the two ideal types. 
The aim  of the research program m e presented a t the end of the study is, on the 
empirical level, to deepen our understanding of these strategies, as well as of those 
evidenced in o ther sectors of the Hungarian economy.
Flexibility based on studied trust
Studied trust and constitutional orders
In the following paragraphs, we shall argue for the im portance of w hat Charles 
Sabel calls “studied tru s t” and of the institu tions through which it is created and
1In w hat follows, we shall rely on the  following definition of tru s t: “tru s t (or, sym m etrically, 
d istrust) is a  particu la r level of the  subjective probability  w ith which an  agent assesses th a t  
M o th er agent or group of agents will perform  a particu la r action, b o th  before he can m on ito r 
Sllch action  (or independently  of his capacity  ever to be able to  m on ito r it)  and in a  con tex t in 
which it affects his own action .” ( Gambetta  1988b, p. 217)
As it will be evident in our argum ent la te r, the  expression “based o n ” denotes a  different 
°gical re la tionsh ip  betw een tru s t and flexibility in our two ideal types. T h is should n o t alTect our
a r8um en t.
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m aintained (Sabel 1992, 1993) in enabling actors to  follow the flexible strategies 
th a t we classify in th is ideal type. Sabel’s starting  assum ption is th a t “tru s t is a 
precondition of social life” (Sabel 1992, p. 218). He postulates th a t “individuality  
and sociability— here, unthinking attachm ent to a  body of collectively defined rou­
tines and precepts— are indissolubly linked. Ju st as an artis t defines his or her style 
by varying some— bu t only some—of the elements defining the commonly acknowl­
edged genres, so the individual becomes an individual by applying the repertoire 
of socially acknowledged behaviors in a distinctive way.” (Sabel 1993, p. 87.)6 A 
cardinal concept in th is form ulation is th a t of the reflexive self: “a self taken as 
a hierarchy of identities or a cacophony of voices th a t somehow decides which of 
its many possible selves the self will be.” (Sabel 1993, p. 87) Com bining his ar­
gum ent about individuality w ith his notion of reflexivity, he states th a t reflexive 
selves, while enacting their individual strategies rely, and therefore make themselves 
vulnerable to , the actions of other individuals (Sabel 1993, p. 88).
Relying on the concept of reflexivity, Sabel argues th a t tru st is not an all-or- 
nothing concept. “(I)n a world of reflexive agents, everyone knows w hat it m eans to 
tru st, and everyone can im agine trusting  persons one does no t currently tru s t, and 
ceasing to  tru st persons one currently does.” (Sabel 1993, p. 90) “We do not simply 
tru st or believe or not. R ather we come to trust; we renew our beliefs; we disbelieve; 
we fear duplicity, and so on.” (Sabel, 1993, p. 92)7 T rust between reflexive selves 
is studied: granting it does not exclude questioning its basis, while raising doubts 
about it does not entail all-out suspicion. In conditions of studied tru st, em phasis 
is based on negotiations in which qualms regarding the ground-rules of behaviour 
are m ade explicit, b u t w ith the specific purpose of ironing out differences. Based 
on these assum ptions, the proper question is not “How m ight tru st be possible?” 
bu t “Given th a t  some tru st is unavoidable in hum an relations, how do we come 
to tru s t some persons, groups, or institu tions, ra ther th an  o thers?” (Sabel 1993, 
p . 8 7 .)
Studied tru st is created and m aintained in w hat Sabel calls “constitu tional 
orders” (Sabel 1993, pp. 73-75). C onstitu tional orders incorporate constituent units 
and a superintendent. In our examples, constituent units m ight be the employees 
of a company (or of several companies), or firms in a m arket. Superintendents 
m ight be people resembling, bu t in fact perform ing very different roles from, the 
trad itional supervisors of these employees; most often they are composites of the 
constituent entities, such as trade associations, or groups of employees responsible 
for the production of a gadget a t a company.
6For re la ted  form ulations see, for exam ple, Bourdieu  1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; 
Boltanksi  1996b; Boltanski and Thevenot  1987. Wagner  (1994) provides a  survey of re la ted  
argum ents.
In th e  form ulation of an  econom ist, “a  person’s rep u ta tio n  is th e  ‘public’s ’ im p u ta tio n  of a 
p robability  d istribu tion  over th e  various types of person th a t  the  person in question  can be in 
principle. R ep u ta tio n  is ra re ly  of the  all-or-nothing variety.” (Dasguyta  1988, p. 62)
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A salient feature of constituent units is their high degree of interdependence; 
they would not be able to  accomplish their tasks on their own, only jointly, w ith 
o ther constituent units. This, however, does not mean th a t the task  can be com­
pleted solely in a given group; it only means th a t a constituent unit would not be 
able to  do it, or the contribution of a constituent unit, strapped  from  those of other 
constituent units, would be meaningless. Also, constituent units usually perform  
several tasks and, as a consequence, they are the m embers of several groups a t the 
same time.
The m ost im portan t constraint of rule-m aking in constitutional orders, for 
our purposes, is th a t “all rules (about which questions arise— S.K.) m ust be set 
in consultation w ith constituents” (Sabel 1993, p. 74). This arrangem ent is based 
on the assum ption th a t constituents usually know more about the object of dis­
cussion th an  the superintendent. Normally, the superintendent facilitates com m u­
nication among the constituents; the superintendent is not the constituen t’s boss. 
“C onsultative rule-m aking.. .makes the ranking of constituents and superintendent 
indeterm inate” (Sabel, 1993, p. 75).
The basis of studied tru st in constitutional orders is the jo in t reduction  of 
inform ation asym m etry over sensitive issues and the assurance th a t disputes will 
be resolved by the participation of all parties concerned. Typical ground rules 
of constitu tional orders “specify only the forms of inform ation exchange (which 
the parties will follow) and...create no separate machinery for dispute resolution” 
(Sabel 1995b, p. 35). Since all parties agree to  reveal w hatever inform ation is 
necessary for their jo in t involvement, and their close integration (the parties exist, 
to a great degree, as members of constitutional order(s)) makes certain  th a t hiding 
inform ation is both costly and unlikely, suspicions are minimized. A t the sam e tim e, 
the explicit and reliable nature of all relevant inform ation induces the questioning of 
the present arrangem ent. Openness about inform ation and the frequent questioning 
of practices lead to  the fact th a t tru st among the parties will not be blind. W hile 
the unravelling of the arrangem ent is possible, tight interdependence prom pts the 
Parties to seek jo in t solutions to  their problem s.8
Such an arrangem ent helps the players to adapt flexibly to  changes in their 
environm ent because actors, contexts, rules and m ethods can be jo in tly  redefined 
‘n order to  enable new, m utually advantageous courses of action. As long as a 
new way of acting provides benefits to the parties the requisite redefinition of their 
■dentities and their relationship is perceived as possible because the underlying con­
stitu tional order decreases the likelihood th a t any parties will take advantage of the 
consequent bu t unforeseen vulnerabilities of others. The partic ipan ts— constituent
8 In S abel's words: “T he cen tra l effect of these in stitu tions...is to  b lu r the  b o u ndary  betw een 
Policing behavior and  articu la ting  consensus. (...) They do th is by allowing th e  p a rties  to  m on ito r 
cach o th er 's  behavior while encouraging them  to jo in tly  reevaluate  th e ir  s ituation  in th e  light of 
these observations and  ad ju s t their reciprocal expectations accordingly.” (Sabel 1993, p. 93)
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units and superin tendents alike— can perform virtually any roles as long as their 
m utual advantages are explored in consultations. Moreover, when new forms of be­
haviour are contem plated the m utual interdependence of the parties renders such 
consultations necessary since no unilateral role change is likely to lead to  success. 
As a result, flexible strategies are always jo in t endeavours in this context. My 
flexibility is m ade possible by your flexibility alone.
In the subsequent paragraphs, we shall “bring life to ” the above, ra ther ab­
strac t argum ent, and illustrate how economic actors enhance their flexibility by 
p artic ipating  in constitutional orders. The story will be th a t of emerging net­
works of specialists operating in very uncertain contexts. In their quickly evolving 
m arkets, w hat to produce is very difficult to  define, considering the am orphous 
character of consumer tastes about non-existing products, rivals’ guesses about the 
sam e moving target appearing in quick succession, and the relative lack of knowl­
edge about w hat is possible to  produce until it has actually been tried. Continued 
presence in such m arkets is possible only on the basis of the continuous exploration 
of possibilities: organizational learning and flexibility are of param ount im portance. 
Besides, in their quickly evolving environm ents, where one can be certain to  collect, 
on one’s own, only a decreasing proportion of the knowledge necessary to  perform  
one’s tasks properly, actors’jobs become profoundly interdependent and hierarchies 
fade. U ncertainty prom pts the continuous questioning of rules, m ethods and identi­
ties; interdependence and the fading of hierarchies induces actors to  engage in their 
joint redefinition. As a result, actors’ flexibility is based on their studied trust,.9 
In order to place these activities in context, we shall outline the developm ents th a t 
have led to their recent diffusion in industrialized countries.10
9 T h e  need to devise flexible organizations has resu lted  in  several innovations, no t all of w hich 
conform  to  the  ideal typical argum ent presented here. For exam ple, an  analysis of workplace 
practices, focusing on the telecom m unications and autom obile industries in seven industria lized  
countries found four recurring  p a tte rn s , while also em phasizing variation  w ith in  th e  p a tte rn s  
(Da.rbish.ire and Katz  1996). These p a tte rn s  reflect different configurations of m any  of th e  o rga­
n izational developm ents ou tlined  below, as well as of some arrangem ents which are m ore sim ilar 
to  our second ideal type. (We argue th a t  an  isom orphic diversity of organizational form s can  be 
observed in the  phenom ena conceptualized by the o ther ideal type.) T his wide varia tion  in the  
social organization  of flexibility is one of the  m ost im po rtan t reasons why we contend  th a t  th e  
argum ents presented  in th is and  th e  subsequent section of the  p ap er describe ideal types. We 
shall p resen t our a rgum ent ab o u t the  necessity to transcend  th is ideal typical fram ew ork in the 
th ird  p a r t  of th e  study.
10 Besides the  areas of m odern  economies trea ted  below, flexibility based  on s tud ied  tru s t is also 
im p o rtan t in the  economic developm ent policies of industria l d istric ts (C ossentino et al. 1996, 
Pyke 1994, Sabel 1994).
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Market fragmentation and its organizational consequences
The growing instability and saturation  of trad itional mass m arkets in indus­
trialized countries from the beginning of the 1960s has probably been the most 
im portan t economic process th a t contributed to this diffusion11 (Piore and Sabel 
1984, pp. 165-193; Herrigel 1996, pp. 178-180). Specializing one’s products in order 
to distinguish them  from those of one’s com petitors became a successful strategy 
in this environm ent.12 As a result, mass m arkets became fragm ented, and product 
life-cycles shortened.
These developments resulted in the flexible integration of several specialists, 
engaging in the continuous reflexive redefinition of their world and constitu tional 
orders.13 In the fragmented mass-markets, large, hierarchical organizations, char­
acterized by an extrem e and rigidly defined division of labour producing long runs 
of standardized products were not profitable any more. Two processes emerged: 
the first was (collaborative) subcontracting which created specialist organizations 
w ith complex identities;14 the second was the blurring of boundaries between func­
tionally or hierarchically separate parts of organizations, as well as of those between 
organizations— this process reintegrated the “complexified specialists” , let they be 
people or organizations (Piore and Sabel 1984, pp. 205-220; Bowman and Kogut 
1995b; Fisher et al. 1995; Herrigel 1996, pp. 235-253; Locke 1995, pp. 105-121; 
Nishiguchi 1994; Storper 1989; Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). The first process 
started  because it no longer m ade economic sense to  place all aspects of the  pro­
duction in-house (Herrigel 1996, pp. 182-186). Specialized departm ents, focusing 
on the production of a small com ponent of the final product could no longer be 
sustained if based on smaller production runs. Also, combining the risks resulting 
from fluctuations in—w hat becam e—several m arkets w ithin the walls of a single 
organization was too hazardous. Besides, in order to  have access to the know­
how necessary to  produce specialized items, it was more advantageous to  rely oil 
com ponents m anufacturers who became specialists in th a t particu lar p a rt of the
11 T he stra teg ies m entioned here existed  earlier b u t probably on a  sm aller scale. See, for exam ple, 
Herrigel 1996, pp. 33-71; Sabel an d  Zeitlin, forthcom ing.
B u t no t th e  only one. A no ther possibility has been to  pool together so fa r separa te  m arkets 
afound a single standard ized  p ro d u c t, thereby shielding one’s organ ization  from  th e  new un cer­
tain ties. P robably  the  m ost fam ous exam ple of th is was th e  “world car” s tra tegy  of A m erican car 
companies. T his strategy, however, proved to  be less successful th a n  th e  ones m entioned  below. 
ee , i° r  exam ple, P iore an d  Sabel 1984, pp. 197-202.
Paradoxically, th e  emergence of technologically intensive m ass m arkets from  th e  early  1980s 
as had  a  sim ilar effect ( Garud and K umaraswamy  1993; C usum ano an d  Selby 1995).
This form  of subcontracting , described fu rth er in g reater detail, is different from  dualist 
subcontracting . D ualist arrangem ents, in which th e  subcon trac to r is a  buffer against fluctuations 
'n demand, are  rife w ith d istru st. Such relations fall un d er our second ideal type. O n th e  two 
orms of subcon trac ting  see, for exam ple, Nishiguchi 1994, pp . 90-139; W omack, Jones an d  Roos 
0, PP. 138-168.
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production process by supplying several customers requesting the same type of 
item s, as opposed to relying on a unit which served ju s t one, in-house “custom er” . 
As a result, subcontracting becam e widespread.
The second process entailed the blurring, or, occasionally, the elim ination of 
barriers between different hierarchical layers and departm ents of the sam e organi­
zation, as well as between those of different organizations (Sabel 1991; Bowman 
and Kogut 1995a; Drucker 1990; Manz and Sims 1987; Nishiguchi and Anderson 
1995). The changes occurred because of two groups of in terrelated  reasons— their 
common ground being the need to  increase the adaptability  of organizations. On 
the one hand, as com petition intensified, lowering production costs and shortening 
development-cycles became im perative. On the other hand, specialized m achinery 
was replaced by generalized (flexible) machines. The la tte r change came about 
because, among other reasons, small niches could absorb significantly shorter runs 
of the  same product. As a  result, enormous investm ents in dedicated m achin­
ery, which could be recouped only by producing masses of the same, standardized 
product, were no longer feasible. It was more profitable to invest in generalized 
(flexible) machinery which could be adapted to  the quickly varying set of gadgets 
produced by the same organization. This, in tu rn , augm ented the value of skills on 
the  shop-floor.
Both the in troduction  of flexible machinery and the need to  reduce costs and 
shorten development cycles increased the im portance of organizational learning and, 
consequently, heightened the interdependence of previously com partm entalized ar­
eas of knowledge w ithin organizations. Conception and execution were no longer 
separate activities. Designs became profitable only if they could be inexpensively 
m anufactured, and correct decisions regarding economical investm ents in flexible 
m achinery became viable only on the basis of an understanding of design adequate 
enough to  allow considerations of the appropriate range of flexibility (Sabel 1991, 
p. 27.). Also, in quickly changing m arkets, where firms often moved into uncharted 
territory, m anufacturing of the prototype started  before the specifications were 
com plete, thereby providing design engineers with feedback about the feasibility of 
various options ( IEES Spectrum 1991).15 Moreover, the engineering possibilities of 
flexible m achines could be exploited only by relying on the first-hand experiences 
of the people working on them . All of this prom pted the integration of the  design 
and m anufacturing operations. Consequently, decision-making about producing a 
gadget was increasingly done in units comprising different functional areas of the
15C o n tras t th is with an  account of trad itiona l m anufacturing  operations: “Traditionally , ...m an­
ufactu ring  would w ait u n til a  p ro d u c t was com pletely designed w ith all drawings final. T h en  the  
draw ings would go to  industria l engineering, who would work ou t th e  process, and  th en  on to  
th e  shop. T hey handled  th e  in terdependencies by taking p lenty  of tim e to work issues ou t. Not 
surprisingly, each d ep artm en t also blam ed the  o th er for tak ing  too  m uch tim e." (Dougherty and 
Cohen 1995, pp. 88-89.)
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organization where no representative of any specialty could perform  an unequivocal 
leading role.16
The emerging networks of several specialists were not rigid, in the sense th a t 
roles and positions became malleable— a design engineer had to  consider m anu­
facturing problems, ju s t as the worker on the production-line became involved in 
quality-control issues. The new groups were characterized by studied tru st, as em­
phasis was placed on jo in t problem-solving based on an efficient information-flow 
between the parties, as well as on continuous improvement by questioning estab­
lished practice, while (partly  as a result of questioning routines, partly  as a result of 
increasing interdependence) hierarchical relations became blurred (M anz and Sims 
1987). Studied tru st has led to increasing flexibility, as diminished suspicion in­
creased the parties’ willingness to question established ways of doing business (and 
to  question sta tu s), as well as to  explore new avenues of practice.
Similar changes took place between different organizations. I t becam e difficult 
to  define where one organization started  and another ended, and the trad itionally  
well-defined roles between client firms and subcontractors became fluid. T he need 
to  reduce costs and development-cycles induced firms to  seek other companies th a t 
would take greater responsibility in designing parts of their product (Sabel 1991, 
p. 28; Nishiguchi 1994, pp. 125-133; Herrigel 1996, pp. 239-244 and 251-3.). Since 
companies often lacked the particular expertise needed in the particu lar production  
area in which they wished to subcontract, they often resorted to  “black-box” design. 
In this arrangem ent, the client provides only vague specifications of the product to  
the subcontractor, which are concretized through iterative com m unication. Again, 
w hat is to  be produced and how is decided in a group of interdependent parties, 
none of whom has direct com m and over the other. Their m utual interdependence 
requires and prom pts the actors to be very open about the way they m anage their 
business. Hiding w hat, in a dualist subcontracting arrangem ent, would be propri­
etary  inform ation, would hu rt the competitiveness of all members of the network by 
leaving opportunities for improvement unexplored. The result is the developm ent of 
studied tru s t— and increased flexibility— through heightened interdependence and 
the continuous questioning of past practice.
Flexibility based on distrust
We shift our a tten tion  now, moving from the tu rbulen t worlds of m odern in­
dustry  into the tem pestuous realms of the Sicilian and Russian mafias and Ita lian  
corruption-networks. They will be the stages for the dem onstration of our argu­
m ents in this section since they are the central fields where games imbued w ith
16 C ooperation  betw een various organizational layers has been fu rther reinforced by the  in tro ­
duction  of “Just-In -T im e” m anufacturing  system s (Klein  1987).
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distrust unfold.17 These environm ents are not only characterized by a high level of 
d istrust among individuals; they are also the fora where substitutes18 to  a pervasive 
lack of tru st are e laborated .19 The mafia is a specific “industry” providing private 
protection to  m utually d istrusting  agents (G am betta  1988c, 1993; Varese 1994). 
One of the factors behind the development of widespread corruption is citizens’ 
d istrust in the efficiency and im partiality  of the sta te  (della P o rta  and Vannucci 
1994).20
Distrust and robust action
Agents pursue flexible strategies in these environs, bu t these strategies are 
rem arkably different from the ones examined in the previous section. While in 
conditions of studied tru st actors can “afford to  be” flexible because they assume 
th a t (alm ost) nobody will take advantage of their various forms of behaviour, in 
fields of pervasive d istrust actors are flexible because they assume th a t others will 
take advantage of everything th a t they m ight do. A pproaching another party  w ith 
d istrust, skilful actors (Leifer 1991) are careful not to reveal their willingness to 
acquire a specific role. “A coveted role is acquired when it is both taken and given.” 
(Leifer 1988, p. 867). Exposing one’s intentions makes one vulnerable: “(t)he 
vulnerability  of try ing to  step directly into a role with unilateral role behavior stem s 
from  the power it  confers on the role complement to  define the role se ttin g ...( th a t 
is to  say, it) stem s from (1) A ’s dependence on B for a response th a t reinforces 
A ’s role claim; and (2) the alternative responses open to B.” (Leifer 1988, p. 866) 
Once A has signalled her intentions to  acquire a specific role, B can— if he has some 
freedom of movem ent—very well refuse her access to  it, thereby m aking A the loser 
of the game. Moreover, this result partly  m arks w hat A is by rendering evident 
w hat she is not, and thereby it reduces her flexibility to  capture o ther positions in 
the network.
W hile the m utual definition of roles is a characteristic of all interpersonal 
encounters (e.g. Bourdieu 1990, pp. 80-1), we probably devote particu lar a tten tion  
to  it in conditions of distrust, when we specifically assume that the other party
17 For patron-client netw orks, the  th ird  environm ent of pervasive d is tru s t and  p rivate  p ro tec tion , 
see especially Padgett and A nse ll  1993.
18We em phasize th a t  these in stitu tio n s provide only su b s titu te s— and very im perfect ones, as 
we shall see— to  tru s t. See, for exam ple, G am b etta  1993, pp. 24-28; 1994c.
19 M arkets of p rivate  p ro tec tion  have certain  characteristics which, acting  as in terven ing  vari­
ables, reinforce ac to rs’ incentives to perform  some of the  stra teg ies ou tlined  below.
20 In sp ite  of th is sim ilarity, some of its  consequences, and  the  fact th a t  th e  two different versions 
of private  p ro tec tion  m ight coexist (G am b etta  1993, pp . 214-220; de lla  P o rta  an d  Vannucci 1994, 
pp. 246-248) the  above two phenom ena are, in various ways, very different from  one ano ther. See, 
for exam ple, G am b etta  1994c, p. 293; della P o rta  and  Vannucci 1994, p. 250, n. 16.
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will take advantage of our consequent vulnerability. In such circum stances, the 
best s tra tegy  is not to  evade typifications altogether, bu t to  ensure th a t one is 
typified in many ways a t the same tim e— hence the im portance of flexibility— 
while, w ith the same action, locking others into identifiable roles, thereby lim iting 
their possibility of doing the same to  ego ,21 If A ’s actions are left ambiguous, 
their in terpretation  is up to  B,C,D... who, by com m itting themselves to  a  specific 
understanding  of A ’s actions, make themselves vulnerable to  A. The key is not 
simply to hinder unequivocal in terpretations of one’s actions, bu t to  make sure 
th a t everybody translates, m isunderstands one’s actions according to  their revealed 
goals, preferably each in terpretation  differing from the next. By revealing little , the 
robust actor induces others to  in terpret her actions as they see it. As a result, each 
in terp reta tion  can not only be denied when necessary, bu t also played against the 
others, thus further increasing the robust ac to r’s flexibility.22 The likelihood of ego 
locking into specific roles can also be avoided by reducing accountability through 
appearing reactive, acting only on alter’s initiative.
As opposed to  environm ents of studied trust, the aim  here is not m utual 
flexibility, bu t of achieving one’s flexibility a t the expense of th a t of others. Ideally, 
in th is context, ego’s flexibility is an increasing function of alter’s rigidity.
T he flexible strategies of agents operating in conditions of pervasive d istrust 
are based on these principles. Mafiosi are well-known for their reticent way of 
expressing themselves (e.g. G am betta  1988c, p. 165.). Besides their laconic expres­
sions, mafiosi are likely to use “cryptic signs, allusions and m etaphors” , which can 
give rise to  a number of different in terpretations (G am betta  1993, p. 121).
Likewise, corrupt politicians avoid making explicit political com m itm ents. 
They rarely give political speeches or statem ents of their program  th a t would lock 
them  into a concrete ideological position and lim it their freedom of movement in 
the political arena. “Maybe there were notices hanging in the squares to  announce 
(A lberto T eardo’s)23 speech, bu t someone substitu ting  him usually arrived, holding 
in his hand a telegram  from comrade Teardo, who excused himself for not being able 
to partic ipate  in the event.” (della P o rta  1992, p. 46) C orrupt politicians rarely link 
themselves to a particu lar current w ithin their party  for a long tim e (della P orta
1992, p. 47). In order to  reduce responsibility for one’s own actions, and thereby
21Leifer (1988) denotes it local action , P ad g e tt and Ansell (1993) call it robust action.
22 P ad g e tt and  Ansell (1993, p. 1264) nicely form ulate th e  essence of th is stra tegy : "(c)rucial for 
m ain ta in ing  d iscretion  is not  to  pu rsue  any specific goals. For in nasty  stra teg ic  gam es,...positional 
Play is th e  m aneuvering of opponents into th e  forced clarification of th e ir  (b u t no t your) tac tical 
lines of action . Locked-in com m itm ent to lines of action, and  thence to goals, is the p ro d u c t no t of 
individual choice b u t a t least as m uch of o th ers ' successful "ecological control" over you...V ictory 
>n (such gam es) m eans locking in o thers, b u t no t yourself, to goal-oriented sequences of stra teg ic  
Play th a t  becom e p red ic tab le  thereby.”
A po litic ian  of the  Italian  Socialist Party , the  leader of a  group of co rrup t politicians an d  civil 
servants active in th e  1960s and '70s in Savona, known as th e  clan Teardo.
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to diminish the likelihood of being locked into specific roles, corrupt politicians act 
reactively, “A nurse wanted to  get her son into the Sacco? Very good, le t’s get on 
w ith it. The comrade needed a place to  live because he has been evicted? Very 
good, le t’s try  to  find him  an apartm ent...T he doctor at the hospital wished for 
a transfer from  one departm ent to another? Very good, le t’s put pressure on the 
adm in istra tion” (della P orta  and Vannucci 1994, p. 219).24
Inscrutable markets and gossip
There is another group of reasons why people are likely to  guard inform ation 
and release it selectively in those realms of widespread d istrust where private pro­
tection is supplied. P rotection is a good which is valuable only if it is the best one 
available. Having second best protection in a particu lar setting  is like having no 
protection a t all since it can always be eliminated by the best protection available. 
(G am b etta  1994b, p. 357; della P o rta  and Vannucci 1994, pp. 331-2) Consequently, 
both protectors and protectees look for signals th a t would reveal a protector to  be 
the best possible. A nother reason why signals of being the best protector and the 
repu tation  to  which they give rise are im portan t is th a t holding the repu tation  of 
being the best protector greatly saves on the production costs of protection. If one 
is successful in convincing prospective challengers th a t they “do not have a chance” 
they are unlikely to  test the protector.25
T he problem  is th a t signals of being the best protector are extrem ely difficult 
to  find. Past perform ance is not always a guarantee of fu ture success. M arkets of 
private protection are often inscrutable: neither buyers nor sellers have a good idea 
of the  quality of the good involved (G am betta  1994b). Both parties find out the 
quality of protection only after it has been put to  the te s t.26 Consequently, the 
production  of honest signals, those which would be correlated w ith quality, proves 
to  be very difficult. P rotectors, instead, try  to  rely on symbols (G am b etta  1994b): 
signs which are arb itrarily  related to  quality. These are, ideally, easier to  rank than  
the qualitatively elusive protection and difficult to  pirate.
The arb itrary  relationship of symbols to  the good itself causes fu rther con­
fusion. It is always uncertain which among the many behavioural characteristics 
displayed by protectors is a true a rb itrary  signal. Since signals are not always
24T he au tho rs cite Andreoli 1993, pp . 42-3.
25T his re la tionsh ip  is stronger in the  m afia where assessm ent costs a re  extrem ely h igh— the 
costs of being proven wrong in th e  tes t of being the  best p ro tec to r is usually d e a th —as are  those 
of p ro tec tion—often m urder. (G am b etta  1994b, pp. 355-57) However, th e  re la tionsh ip  can  be 
observed in corrup tion  m arkets as well (della P o rta  and  Vannucci 1994, p. 335).
26It  is tru e  if there  is com petition  am ong protectors. T h is happens m ost often am ong mafiosi 
b u t it can  be perceived in a  corrup tion  m arket as well. See, for exam ple, della  P o r ta  an d  Vannucci 
(1994, pp . 337-9).
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signalled, alm ost anything might be a sign about the relative standing of com­
peting  protectors. This, on the one hand, prom pts protectors to  be even more 
cautious w ith revealing any inform ation about themselves. On the o ther hand, 
both  com peting protectors and protectees alike ceaselessly scrutinize every aspect 
of p ro tec to rs’ behaviour. Inform ation exchange, in these environm ents, is, to  a great 
extent, gossip (G am betta  1994a). Gossip, however, often creates more confusion 
than  it elim inates.27 Gossip does not require tru th  (G am betta  1994a, pp. 211-2); 
moreover, gossipers are often concerned with “deducing wholes from m inutiae” 
(G am betta  1994a, p. 213). This last factor can partly  defeat the purpose of getting 
inform ation because it often leads to  inaccurate conclusions.
Distrust and blind trust
As we have pointed out earlier, in environments of pervasive d istrust, being 
successfully flexible means locking others into rigid ties and well-defined roles.28 
Strategies which aim  to strengthen the consequent relations of dependence rely on 
the coexistence of distrust and blind trust. Blind tru st is likely to  be frequent in 
conditions of widespread distrust since, in such conditions, there is a contradic­
tion between the highly desirable act of trusting someone and acto rs’ underlying 
pessim istic expectations. W hen making an exception from the rule by trusting  
somebody, agents have to perform a reduction of cognitive dissonance (G am b etta  
1988b, p. 223; 1993, p. 46.). The result of the reduction of cognitive dissonance 
is blind tru st, where one does not so much tru st an actor because one expects, 
ra ther it is because one wishes him to be trustw orthy.29 The propensity for estab­
lishing such overly trusting  relations is further augm ented by the confusion about 
the reliability of inform ation. T rust is an expectation— which we form on the basis 
of our knowledge of the other p a rty ’s dispositions, interests, com m itm ents (Das- 
gup ta  1988, p. 51). In inscrutable m arkets, there are too few tru ly  reliable signals 
on which to  form dependable expectations, while, a t the same tim e, there is an 
overabundance of possible signs of future behaviour. W hereas such overabundance 
can cause confusion about learning the correct strategies of actors, it can be an 
excellent source of rationalizations of desired behaviour— th a t is, of granting trust.
37Largely as a  resu lt of th e  unreliability  of gossip, “(t)he  m afia is fraught w ith uncertain ty , 
d istru st, suspicion, paranoid  anxiety, m isunderstanding: who is th e  stronger? W ho will be the  
successor? Is Don Peppe really  a  mafioso? Is he abou t to  a tta ck  ano th er Don Peppe? Is M r X 
really  p ro tec ted  by  D on Peppe or ju s t  pretending? Is Don Peppe still strong enough to  p ro tec t 
M r X?" (G a m b e tta  1994a, p. 220)
28 It is im p o rtan t to em phasize here th a t  relations of dependence are th e  results of success. We 
shall re tu rn  to th is po in t.
29 “Distrust may be an unaffordable luxury for those with no alternative course o f action.” 
(Gam betta 1993, p . 26)
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We can see the work of blind trust in the way in which protectees view 
their protectors. Mafiosi were often reified by their customers as early as the 
n ineteenth century. “(There is a) tendency to  tu rn  the mafioso into a legendary 
type, a  feeling natu ra l enough indeed in a professor of literature , bu t much harder 
to  explain in wealthy landowners.”30 C orrupt politicians are also overly adored 
by their followers. “Among the entrepreneurs, there was a real and proper rivalry 
to  present oneself as the friend of this or th a t politician, to  be solidary to  him  in 
everything and for everything. ‘Your successes are my successes, your ideas are my 
ideas’, in a whirlpool of complicity.” (della P orta  and Vannucci 1994, p. 334).31
Flexibility and rigidity
In the above paragraph, we implied th a t the providers of private protection 
usually have the upper hand over their protectees— the fundam ental reason being 
th a t they offer an inscrutable substitu te  for a good th a t is in short supply.32 The 
resu ltan t asym m etric relationships help the providers of private protection to  re­
duce their dependencies th a t would arise from trusting people in environm ents of 
pervasive distrust. They often further decrease their dem and for tru st by exploit­
ing, moreover frequently reinforcing their protectees’ tendencies to blindly follow 
them . By establishing relationships in which their partners are dependent on them , 
their expectations of o thers’ behaviour will be more grounded on their knowledge 
of o thers’ interests and constraints than  vice versa. In realms of widespread dis­
tru st, such relations of dependence are used to  gain control as well as to  get action 
(W hite 1992). W hen people are reluctant to make com m itm ents to  any course of 
action there is special em phasis on decreasing the prospects of alter strategizing 
against ego as well as on increasing the probability of alter following ego’s requests 
(or, more aptly, orders). W idespread distrust, by increasing acto rs’ m otivations to 
minimize their vulnerabilities, prom pts them  to satisfy these aims by establishing 
relations of dependence.
30Franchetti, Leopoldo. (1876) 1974. “Condizioni politiche ed am m inistra tive  della Sicilia.” 
Vol. I. in  Inchiesta in Sicilia, edited by L. F ranchetti and  S. Sonnino. Firenze: Vallechi, p. 34. 
Q uoted  in  G am b etta  1993, p. 46.
31Q uoted  from  A ndreoli 1993, p. 114. Displays of such a ttitu d e s  to p ro tec to rs can  be used 
instrum en tally  as well. We shall re tu rn  to th is p o in t later.
32 W hile th e  direction  of th is rela tionsh ip  is generally tru e , it is ra re r  to  observe it in corrup tion  
netw orks where several scarce goods can be exchanged in m ore th a n  one d irection (e.g. p ro tec tio n  
for votes, p ro tec tion  for pro tection , etc .) and , especially if corrup tion  is w idespread, th e  organi­
zation  of providing private p ro tec tion  can be very com plicated. See, for exam ple, della P o rta  and 
Vannucci 1994, p. 250, n.16; pp. 357-365.
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T he mafiosi’s willingness to resort to violence in order to  achieve the compli­
ance of their protectees is probably the strongest indicator of this strategy.33 Even 
when corrupt politicians are protected by the mafia, the two parties do not have 
the same options. While the mafioso m ight refuse to  comply w ith a request, in the 
po litic ian’s case it is usually unthinkable. As A ntonino Calderone, a mafioso turned 
s ta te ’s witness explained: “W hen I was in Sicily, many politicians were involved 
w ith the mafia. (They)...asked for serious, engaging help from the men of honor. 
Normally, the mafiosi did these favors, bu t they could also say no...B ut when the 
mafiosi asked for a favor from the politicians, there was no choice: they had to  do 
w hat was asked from them .” (della P o rta  and Vannucci 1994, p. 387)34
C orrupt politicians often relate to their followers with extrem e arrogance— 
th a t is to  say, by emphasizing their capacity to  be flexible a t the expense of their 
protectees— in order to  underscore and thereby augm ent the asym m etric character 
of their relationship, (della P o rta  1992, p. 49). The intended result is to  increase 
the protectees’ sense of dependence on the corrupt politician, and consequently, to 
enhance their blind devotion to  him. Underscoring relations of dependence is used 
not only for gaining control but also for getting action. Pizzorno speaks of the “vi­
cious circle of arrogance” (Pizzorno 1992, pp. 10-11), in which arrogant behaviour, 
by augm enting one’s reputation of being powerful, leads to  a concentration of re­
quests on the corrupt politician. This enlarges the group of his supporters, which 
increases his political power, thereby leading to  an even greater ability to  make 
arb itra ry  decisions—over more salient m atters.
So far, we have portrayed asym m etric relations as the result of robust (flex­
ible) actors acquiring control in worlds of widespread distrust. Success, however, 
is not guaranteed; flexibility does not necessarily lead to  victory. In environm ents 
where players rarely tru st each other, robust actors often face other robust actors.35 
In such situations, if both partners are skilful, they “organize for involvem ent” 
(Leifer 1990, 1991, 1995). Their aim will be to m aintain equilibrium , to  deny the 
other party  the accurate reading of their strategies, and thereby to avoid their 
partner gaining control over them. In such circumstances, even the appearance 
of control can hide a different reality. An agent might take on the role of the 
submissive follower not only to  acknowledge his dependence, bu t also to  ease his 
p ro tec to r’s suspicion and gain a greater room to m anoeuvre. Several entrepreneurs 
have tried to  im plem ent this stra tegy  in corrupt environm ents. “For example, 
the M erlos’ firm was commonly known to be 'in  the socialist a rea’, but the en­
33T here  a re  several o th er reasons why the  world of th e  m afia is so violent. See G a m b e tta  1993, 
PP. 40-43.
31T he au tho rs quote Arlacchi, P. 1992. Gli uomini del disonore. M ilano: M ondadori, p. 210.
35T his s ituation  presupposes a t least a  relative equality of the  parties in term s of the  qu an tity  
°f resources with which they  are endowed—not forgetting th a t  resources are often socially con­
d u c t e d  ( Latour  1988). In light of w hat we have said so far ab o u t the  different worlds of p rivate  
Protection , th is is m ost likely to  arise in a  corrup tion  framework.
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trepreneurs have reached the conclusion...that the best strategy was ‘to  rely on the 
(C hristian  Democratic Party) for national m atters, and on the (Socialist P arty) for 
local ones.’” (della P o rta  and Vannucci 1994, p. 337)36
Hedging between studied trust and distrust
Flexibilities
We have to  move beyond the above two ideal types in order to  understand  the 
flexible strategies of m ost actors under conditions of uncertainty. O ne’s flexibility 
is rarely based solely on studied tru st or d istrust. Firstly, people rarely gran t tru st 
to  a person w ithout qualifying w hat the action in question is. T rust is “a three- 
p a rt relation: A tru sts  B to do X” (Hardin 1993, pp. 506-7). There probably 
are actions in which we are unwilling to make ourselves vulnerable to  another 
party  even if we tru st her in many other respects. This is likely to  be an issue in 
uncertain  environm ents where interests related to com m itm ents in fu ture actions 
are likely to undergo substan tia l change. In such circum stances, actors are bo th  
probably unwilling to  test the com m itm ents of others to the m axim um  and hesitant 
to  make others very dependent on them —even if renegotiations are possible am ong 
the parties. In connection with this, in to d ay ’s industry, constitutional orders 
are rarely complete institu tions of work or business. A fundam ental question for 
m ost constitu tional orders is to  which m atters the jurisdiction  of constitu tional 
orders should be extended, and which m atters should be organized outside them . 
Conversely, even if we live in a world paralyzed by pervasive distrust, there are likely 
to  be m atters in which we negotiate our flexibility as m embers of a group— and we 
can find related examples even in the mafia, as we shall see below.
Secondly, these considerations acquire im portance because operating  in two 
(or more) separate worlds grants an actor such possibilities for flexibility which few 
players, operating  in uncertain conditions, would be ready to sacrifice. To pu t it 
another way, accepting the assum ption th a t actors hedge in uncertain environm ents 
(Sabel 1995c; Sabel and Zeitlin, forthcom ing), we also have to  enterta in  the thought 
th a t the dimension of granting tru st will be governed by this principle as well. It 
is likely th a t acto rs’ flexible strategies will be based on recom binations of gran ting  
(and creating) studied tru st and exploring solutions th a t reduce their dem and for 
it.37 Agents, in most uncertain  environm ents, sustain their flexibilit(ies) probably
36P artly  quo ted  from  L'Espresso  Septem ber 20, 1993, p. 38.
37C entra l to  th is idea  is the  th ough t th a t  tru s t can  be n o t only a  by -product of o therw ise 
differently d irected  behaviour, b u t it can  also be fairly purposively c reated  am ong actors. See, for 
exam ple, G a m b e tta  1988b, pp . 232-235; Sabel 1992.
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through mixed strategies of, on the one hand, establishing m utually redefinable 
identities, and, on the other, a ttem pting  to  gain control over their partners.
To the extent th a t actors operate in realms where several organizing prin­
ciples are a t work a t the same tim e (which is valid for the Hungarian economic 
transform ation (Stark 1996; Voszka 1995)), it becomes difficult to  find any over­
arching utility  function on the basis of which one could calculate the right m ix of 
the different (flexible) strategies. Consequently, rational choice-based theories of 
cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Taylor 1987) cannot be fully adequate guides in these 
realm s. In such circumstances, most agents are likely to  exploit, ra ther than  resolve, 
the dilem m a of the combination or separation of adaptab ility  and accountability.
We can see these principles at work in several different settings. One of the 
biggest conflicts in the decentralized sectors of today ’s G erm an industry is between 
the coun try ’s trad itional craft system  and a ttem pts a t introducing team -based m an­
ufacturing (Herrigel 1996, pp. 193-204; 1994; Sabel 1995a). The two ways of orga­
nizing production operate according to  antithetical principles. In a craft system , 
the flexibility of the craftsm an is based on his professional autonomy, pertain ing 
to  him  in recognition of his special skills. He is flexible because nobody has to  nor 
should tell him  w hat to  do; he, however, precisely since he knows w hat he is doing, 
can and should direct a group of apprentices. In team -based m anufacturing, as we 
have seen above, team -m em bers’ flexibility results from their close interdependence; 
they partic ipate  as equals in elaborating design and m anufacturing solutions. The 
problem  for Germ an companies is th a t the second system  clearly outperform s the 
first; however, the craftsm en’s staunch defence of their particular type o f flexibility 
can only lead to  recombinations. In the emerging solutions, craftsm en usually re­
tain some power of control over certain parts of the production process, while team s 
gain governance over others. Flexibilities, in these schemes, are seen to be guaran­
teed by a com bination of one’s independence from others and one’s engagem ent in 
jo in t exploration—and action— w ith the same units.
On the o ther side of the spectrum , even mafiosi m anage to  cooperate some­
times. An im portan t forum in the Sicilian mafia is the commissione which is a 
cartel of mafia families w ithin a Sicilian province. The commissione regulates the 
use of violence and makes decisions in problem atic cases of succession (G am betta
1993, pp. 112-8). Its operation, however, is far from infallible, and m afia families 
Play a careful game of combining independence and collaboration in order to  gain 
the greatest possible room to manoeuvre.
We have found similar hedging strategies among H ungarian entrepreneurs. 
In a study  of a construction m arket of a Hungarian city of 110,000 inhabitan ts, 
we have observed entrepreneurs perform ing a cautious balancing act am ong the 
strategies of com petition, cooperation and corruption (Kemény 1996). In their un­
certain environm ent, m aintaining their flexibility(ies) is of param ount im portance. 
A crucial question is the right mix of means through which the advantages of fiex- 
ibility can be maximized. While a tightly knit social fabric resulting from their
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previous work-relations38 could generate enough tru s t to  prom pt them  to engage 
in m arket-sharing cooperative arrangem ents, the fact th a t they regularly compete 
in several settings a t the same tim e (either in term s of price and quality, or in 
term s of corrupt ties) for orders which are of varying im portance to  them  makes 
their collaborative networks difficult to  organize.
The result is a m ixture of arrangem ents the s truc tu re  of which changes with 
tim e. A salient question in these “networks”39 is the extent to  which their con­
stituen ts are willing to  collaborate with each other. W hile m ost entrepreneurs help 
one another in small m atters (like lending raw m aterials, or even workers), only 
a few reach the point where they coordinate their offers in some (but never all) 
m arkets. A frequent interm ediate form ation is one in which a  number of companies 
boost each o ther’s flexibility by continuously redefining their identities and their 
relations to  one another through participation  in various, and often com plicated 
subcontracting  arrangem ents. In other realms, the same entrepreneurs continue to  
com pete w ith each other in term s of price and quality; and again in others they 
keep using their corrupt ties to  snatch a contract while relegating their friends to 
the sidelines. Not all entrepreneurs combine the different strategies of flexibility in 
the same way; while some predom inantly rely on corruption, others combine collab­
orative subcontracting  with com petition, and another group attem pts to  balance 
the three strategies.
In my research, I wish to  investigate the hedging strategies th a t owners and 
m anagers of small- and medium-size enterprises perform am ong the different ways 
of gaining flexibility in the H ungarian economic transform ation. Both the rem arks 
of S tark and Gabor, quoted earlier, and my empirical study suggest th a t m ost flex­
ible strategies pursued by this group of actors fall in between the two ideal types. 
My research will be exploratory. The prim ary aim  is to gain an understanding 
of the different flexible strategies followed by actors between the two ideal types. 
Agents get action on the basis of different principles w hether they act in the fram e­
work of flexibility based on studied tru st or d istrust. They en terta in  dissimilar 
typifications and expectations about each other, trea t inform ation differently, and 
generate d istinct types of social action vis a vis one another. W hen actors combine 
the two principles of flexibility (there are probably several ways of doing this) a 
considerable am ount of work (Boltanski 1996b) m ust be involved in bridging the 
gap. Our principal focus will be to comprehend this bridging activity and the 
synthesized flexible strategies to which it gives rise.
38T h e  m ajority  of the  en trepreneurs were colleagues w ithin th e  form er, now defunct, socialist 
dinosaur.
3J Since action  takes place am ong a  constan tly  varying set of actors the  boundaries of the  netw ork 
are often  difficult to define. I am  grateful to David Dornisch  for th is point.
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Production markets with uncertain roles
The concrete setting in which I intend to  examine acto rs’ hedging strategies 
among the different forms of flexibility is a particular type of production m arket. 
In the writings of Harrison W hite (W hite 1981, 1988; Leifer and White 1987), pro­
duction m arkets are stable role structures. P roducts are distinguished in term s of 
quality; these distinctions are manifest in different volume-revenue combinations. 
The existing quality-volume-revenue combinations form the menu of possible roles 
in the m arket, linked to  a specific set of companies. Producers select roles (m arket 
niches) in order to  gain the greatest am ount of profit (w ithin a limited set of op­
portunities) by watching the behaviour of other producers in the previous period. 
Provided th a t producers’ costs do not change from one period to  the next, produc­
ers, when reconsidering the possible quality-volume-revenue com binations against 
their variable costs a t the beginning of each period, reselect their previous role for 
fu ture activity. “ (E)ach enterprise assesses its situation in each cycle and reaffirms 
that its niche in a structure of niches is where it is best suited.” (Leifer and W hite 
1987, pp. 89-90, italics in the original)
T his is a picture of m arket stability. W hite concentrates on the reproduction 
of particu lar m arkets as role structures. However, not all m arkets are stable. To 
the extent th a t relatively homogeneous producers (in term s of technical ability and 
variable costs) compete for ever varying sets of unique projects, m arket roles are 
subject to gaming among producers. In such conditions, (re)producing certain m ar­
ket roles becomes problem atic. C onstruction m arkets in H ungary’s 'larger cities,40 
like the one th a t I have examined (Kemény 1996), provide an example.
C onstruction m arkets in H ungary’s larger cities usually satisfy the following 
set of criteria:
1. There are several producers in the m arket with a similar range of abilities, 
technical as well as costwise. General contractors are usually capable of perform ­
ing alm ost all activities involved in constructing buildings of various shapes and 
sizes, from simple one-family homes to fancy oflke-buildings. The range of skills 
they com m and can also be employed separately, in subcontracting work as well as 
in sm aller projects, like roof-repair or painting and decorating.41 Consequently, 
companies can com pete in several different m arket segments, sequentially, or a t the 
same time.
40Probab ly  over 100,000 inhab itan ts.
T his is usually th e  case even if a  con tracto r is relatively sm all. Besides con tractors, typi- 
caHy o th er partic ip an ts  of th e  construction  m arket also com m and m ultip le skills. For exam ple, 
larger com panies of pain ters and decorators are likely to employ insulation  specialists, bricklayers, 
fioor-cover specialists, etc. W hile such com panies can undertake all th e  covering and  decorat- 
lng activ ities in a  building, th e ir various specialists can also be employed separately, on diverse 
Projects.
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2. The projects for which contractors bid are evaluated along m any different 
and, am ong projects, varying sets of criteria, of which price is only one. A lthough 
projects are not entirely unique in term s of the requirem ents th a t successful bid­
ders have to  satisfy, there is great variation among them , rendering specialization 
difficult. Each tim e a contractor bids for a project it is likely th a t he has to  es­
tablish  his “equivalences” (Boltanski 1996a) vis a vis other contractors in different 
term s. One of the m ain reasons behind this is the fact th a t (a t least in Hungary 
during the transform ation) m ost buildings are individually commissioned. W hen 
the custom er defines the product the likelihood th a t standardized item s can appear 
on the m arket is relatively low.42
3. Different projects are performed in dissimilar social organizations among 
producers. There is rarely a one-to-one correspondence am ong projects and produc­
ers— probably its sim plest reason being th a t p ro jects’ requirem ents of resources 
either exceed or are less than  w hat individual contractors can offer. Usually several 
contractors work on the same project, and a contractor is involved in more than  
one project a t the same time.
In these conditions, roles are unstable in the m arket in the sense th a t they 
are difficult to  reproduce from one period to  the next. Even if com panies’ m arket 
roles do not change in tim e— which, we would argue, is quite unlikely in the afore­
m entioned conditions— there is significant work (Boltanski 1996b) involved in their 
reproduction. Companies do not occupy for long m arket niches on the basis of a 
particu lar activity because a new set of projects redefines how specific m arket roles 
can be achieved. The distribution of roles is subject to  significant gaming. The 
inform ation revealed ex-post by producers’ behaviour is an inadequate indicator of 
the way roles should be pursued in the next one. Taking the activity associated w ith 
the role th a t one occupied in an earlier period as som ething to  be copied in the next 
is a likely recipe for failure. The dimensions along which an actor won a project 
in one phase is an im perfect indicator of relevant dimensions to  be em phasized in 
the next one.43 In such settings, flexibility is associated w ith success; s tab ility  of 
activities is usually viewed as rigidity, and as such, a basis of failure. In these 
m arkets, the best way to occupy one’s resources, as well as to insure the capacity
42 A lthough some contractors try  to  dim inish th e ir risks by in itia tin g  property  developm ent 
p ro jec ts— where con tractor(s) “define” w hat the  p roduct is—a t th is m om ent such in itia tives 
are  ra re  an d  very few contractors deal w ith p roperty  developm ent to  the  exclusion of all o th er 
activ ities.
43C om panies are m ore often busy  building rep u ta tions ra th e r  th an  a rep u ta tio n . O n th e  one 
han d , com panies in tend  to  associate such vague term s w ith them selves which can  appeal to  alm ost 
all segm ents of th e  m arket (excellence in quality; p ro m p t service, e tc .) an d  can  be su itab ly  
in te rp reted  (L atour 1988) t(> alm ost an)' p a rticu lar context; on th e  o th er hand , they  m arket 
th e ir  abilities in several different activities. W hile establishing an  unequivocal re p u ta tio n  re la ted  
to  a  p a rticu la r activ ity  can  be advantageous (as it m ay be used to  c rea te  a  p ro tec ted  m arket 
niche), such a  s tra tegy  is risky for most  actors in  m arkets where p roducers’ abilities are relatively 
hom ogeneous and  products vary g reatly  in  time.
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for fu ture involvement, is to  covet several roles a t the same tim e, to  have stakes in 
the high, as well as in the  lower ends of the m arket; to  build office buildings for 
“blue chip” companies, to  partic ipate  in school-renovations, to  construct family- 
houses in the suburbs and to  use one’s spare painting crew in a sm all project in 
the same period— while contem plating hospital-building and factory-construction 
in the next one, thereby intending to  invade niches occupied by other actors in an 
earlier period.44
Such m arkets have two interconnected features which are relevant for the pur­
poses of our research. Firstly, since projects differ from one another, actors need to 
establish equivalences vis a vis their com petitors in different term s when they are 
bidding for each undertaking. Bidding is rarely only in term s of price; technical 
expertise, aesthetic qualities, tim ing, brand of protection, etc. all come into play, 
and their specific configuration varies in each project. Secondly, different com­
binations of equivalences usually correspond to  dissimilar social organizations of 
production. This arises, on the one hand, because actors can satisfy different eval­
uative criteria by organizing production in diverse ways; on the other hand, since 
different projects are viewed by distinct producers in different frames ( Goffman 
1974) dissim ilar configurations of producers are willing to participate in them . The 
prerogative of meeting diverse evaluative principles— w ithin projects and among 
different ones— requires considerable flexibility. The need to  organize production 
in dissimilar ways in different projects— and often in different phases of the same 
project as well—probably implies th a t flexibilities are achieved on the basis of a 
com bination of flexibility based on studied tru st and d istrust. Actors are likely 
to  combine dissimilar strategies of flexibility when they are bidding for, as well as 
when they are working on, different projects.
In order to  understand how different forms of flexible strategies are combined, 
I intend to  investigate construction com panies’ a ttem p ts to (re)produce roles in 
their m arket(s). I wish to examine the bidding activities of building contractors, as 
well as the strategies they employ vis a vis their business partners while com plet­
ing their projects. How do they combine their different social resources in order 
to satisfy dissimilar sets of d istinct evaluative criteria a t any tim e? W hat are the 
arrangem ents through which companies corrupt certain officials while creating an 
understanding w ith some “com petitors” th a t the partially protected niche is not 
fair game? How can they compete with the same people in another setting , while 
collaborating w ith them  in yet another one? W hat is the content of the emerging 
ties in such settings— how do actors view each other, and w hat kind of actions 
are acceptable? W hat is the work involved in balancing flexibility based on stud- 
led tru st and distrust? W hile projects are under way, how do contractors blend 
dualist subcontracting  arrangem ents with collaborative subcontracting? How are
4 4 TIn the  language of organizational ecologists, these organizations are polymorph ge.ne.ra.Usls. 
'See, for exam ple, Hannan and Freeman  1989, pp. 110-114; pp . 310-311.)
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subcontracting relations modified when a new criterion suddenly appears during a 
project?
U ndertaking the research in Hungary will have a t least two advantages. On 
the one hand, the uncertain conditions of the transform ation (beyond the above, 
general characteristics of the m arkets in which they operate) probably further in­
duce actors to  m aintain  their flexibilities, and to do it on the basis of hedging 
strategies. As a result, this setting is likely to  be particularly  rich in practices 
aimed a t gaining flexibility, especially in those which combine the principles of our 
two ideal types. On the other hand, studying these strategies in the H ungarian 
setting  will also allow us to learn more about the consequences of the institu tional 
uncertainties of the transform ation. The institu tional uncertainty of the Hungarian 
economy has been cited as the cause of several negative consequences, from acto rs’ 
unwillingness to invest in capital-intensive technology and m arkets, to  widespread 
opportunism , and the “too many and too sm all” character of individual sm all busi­
ness undertakings (G abor 1991, 1992, 1996). I contend th a t one of the m ain reasons 
behind these phenom ena is the special attention  th a t actors devote to  m ain tain­
ing their flexibility in the Hungarian setting. U nfortunately, so far, no system atic 
analysis has been conducted on acto rs’ strategies th a t would give an account of the 
direct link between (institu tional) uncertainty and the associated, usually negative 
consequences. Since my focus will be on understanding the flexible strategies per­
formed by a certain part of H ungary’s small and medium-size enterprises, I hope 
to contribute to a greater comprehension of these mechanisms.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HIDDEN ECONOMY IN 
HUNGARY, 1995-96 
An Estimation on the Basis of the Empirical 
Analysis of Household Expenses1
I. J. TO TH
In H ungary in  the  m iddle of the  nineties th e  ex ten t of the  h idden  economy as com pared 
to  th e  officially rep o rted  G D P is no t negligible. During the  first p a r t of th e  econom ic transition , 
in th e  m idst of the  recession—when the  living stan d ard s of a  significant p a r t  of the  households 
decreased o r were a t  risk—a n  im portan t characteristic  of th e  behav iour of a  significant p a r t  of 
the  households was th a t they  ob tained  some of the  necessary goods in unregistered  form s. T his 
fact, however, does no t m ean  th a t  all households take advantage of th is possibility in  an  equal 
p roportion . On th e  contrary, from  the results of this p ap er it could be seen th a t th is type  of 
behaviour is only characteristic  of a  sm all proportion  which decreases parallel to  th e  increasing 
ra tio  of unregistered  expenses. T his m eans th a t  the  proportion  of households which depend  
significantly on the  advantages provided by the hidden economy is very lim ited . T he p ap er shows 
th a t  th e  income an d  financial condition of a  household or the  perception of these, as well as the  
size and  in fras tru c tu re  of the  settlem ent where the  household lives can only partly  explain  the  
affinity of the  household towards unregistered expenses.
In tr o d u c tio n 2
T he hidden economy3 is a phenomenon th a t can be found in all m arket 
economies. Governm ental measures m ust take into consideration the im portance
1T h e  p resen t work is a  shortened an d  revised version of a  s tu d y  carried  o u t by th e  au th o r 
w ithin the  fram ework of th e  N ational Strategical Research Program m e of th e  H ungarian  A cadem y 
of Sciences, pub lished under th e  sam e title.
2T he research an d  the  em pirical survey conducted  by th e  K opint-D atorg  R t. and  T árk i, w hich 
included 1000 households, were carried  ou t w ith the  supp o rt, and  a t th e  request of th e  P rim e 
M inister’s Office. T he research was also supported  by the  Orex T rad ing  R t. an d  the  H ungarian  
Tobacco Trade Union. We would like to express our thanks to  János Köllő, A ndrás K öves, 
M ária Lackó, M ihály Laki, György Lengyel, E ndre Sík, Zsolt Spéder and  R óbert Tardos for th e ir 
rem arks on th e  various versions of th e  study; to Erika Révész an d  József Tarjányi from th e  T árk i 
staff for th e ir valuable advice and  help during the p reparation  of the  survey; and also to  my 
research a ssistan t, Réka Tóth, for he r work in the  research. T he calculations found in  th is  s tu d y  
Were carried  ou t by th e  au th o r— he is responsible for any errors or weaknesses in the  tex t.
W hen describing the  concept of hidden economy in our s tudy  we take th e  EUROSTAT clas­
sification in to  account (Árvay and Vértes 1994; Willard 1989). T he KSH (C entra l S ta tistica l 
Office) working group (Bedekovics et al 1995) uses a  sim ilar classification for “hum an activ ities” 
described in the  H ungarian  N ational Accounts. According to  th is, in th e  concept of h idden econ- 
ortiy we do no t take into consideration work done a t hom e, do-it-yourself activities, voluntary  
Work (com m unity services), exchange of p roducts between households, crim inal activ ities, a c tiv ­
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of the hidden economy w ithin the national economy, especially when its ra tio  is 
considerable or increasing. In transition  economies this problem needs even more 
a tten tion  since, besides the radical transform ation of the legal economy, the eco­
nomic sector which was earlier referred to  as the “second economy” (Sík, 1992) 
also goes through a change of similar proportion. Moreover, the in the years prior 
to  and following the transition  the extent of the hidden economy com pared to  the 
official G D P was estim ated to  be considerable and it showed an increasing tendency 
(Lackó 1992 and Árvay and Vértes 1994).4
T his research is the second in a sequence, the goal of which is to  esti­
m ate  the  extent and am ount of unregistered expenses w ithin the to ta l expenses 
of households.5 In this sense, it can be considered as a repetition of our earlier 
(1995) investigation6 bu t, owing to  the fact th a t it is a repetition , it undertakes 
more than  previously: namely, it tries to  estim ate w hether there has been a change 
in the extent of the observed phenomenon, and if so, in w hat way. In other words, 
it looks at how the am ount of unregistered expenses have changed over one year, 
w ithin all expenses of a household.
There is another way in which we wish to contribute to  the better understand ­
ing of the phenomenon of the hidden economy: sim ilarly to  our previous em pirical 
analyses (T óth  1996a; 1996b), we will try  to  test the assum ptions th a t m ight ex­
plain the presence of the hidden economy in the expenses of various households.
As a result of the effectiveness of norms related to  tax  disciplines, great sig­
nificance is a ttrib u ted  to th a t p art of the hidden economy which m ight affect a 
wide range of the population. It is possible th a t the part of the hidden economy 
which is related to  public expenses is only a small portion of the overall hidden 
economy, but its im portance is greater than its ratio. From the po in t of view of
ities which are productive b u t no t legal (e.g. production  and  trad e  of drugs). T h is d istinc tion  is 
significant in  order to avoid the  error in the  direct com parison betw een th e  concept and  th e  resu lts  
of th e  analysis, which are based  on the  definition of the  hidden economy from  an o th er p o in t of 
view (Lackó  1995; 1997).
4 L ackó’s cash-earning m odel shed light upon th e  continuously increasing tendency of the  illegal 
economy betw een 1970-1989 (Lackó 1992). According to her estim ation  the  illegal economy 
increased from  6 percent to  20 percent as a  percentage of G D P betw een 1971-1989. On th e  o th er 
h an d , a  com prehensive investigation  carried  ou t a t  the  beginning of the  90s p u t the  am ount of the  
h idden  economy a t 12 percent of the official GDP, and a t 27 percent in 1992 (Árvay an d  V értes 
1994).
5 In accordance w ith our earlier analysis ( Tóth 1996b) those expenses can be considered as 
non-registered  purchases when th e  buyer does no t get a  receipt or a  le t te r  of guaran tee  in the  case 
of m ore valuable goods. In these cases we can suppose th a t these transac tions will no t ap p ear 
in any k ind  of sta tistics or in any forms subm itted  to the  tax  au th o rities. More generally, these 
can be described as expenses which do no t appear in official sta tistics . T his includes the  wages 
of illegal employees paid  by th e  enterpreneurs. We will no t deal w ith the  la tte r , as th is  research 
only covers household expenses.
6T he previous investigation—sim ilarly to  th is one— was supported  by the  P rim e M inister's 
Office. T he results can be seen in T ó th  1996a; Boc and Klauber  1996 and  T ó th  1996b.
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public opinion on hidden economy— i.e. collective consciousness and norms related 
to the hidden economy—it is very im portan t to  know how often it occurs in a house­
hold th a t, as a buyer, a person participates in a transaction  which is considered 
as p a rt of the hidden economy. Its extent and the probability of its occurrance is 
im portan t because they show to w hat extent illegal economic activity is accepted 
by the m embers of society and to  w hat extent they accept the norm s th a t approve 
of these. W hen judging illegal economic activities, it is not the same when these 
occur occasionally and to a small extent, or when it is the everyday practice of a 
wide range of the population.
In the following, we will first describe d a ta  sources th a t were used and the 
basic theories of estim ation, and then the estim ations of the am ount of unregis­
tered expenses among the examined expenses which were obtained during the 1996 
survey. After this, we will also do the same in the case of the aggregated groups 
of expenses. Furtherm ore, we will try  to estim ate the volume of unregistered ex­
penses in the case of expenses which the survey did not include: this will enable us 
to  give an estim ate of the range of unregistered expenses compared to all expenses 
of Hungarian households in 1996. Finally, we will examine the relationship between 
unregistered expenses, social sta tus, income and financial s ta tu s  of households, as 
well as the relationship between the characteristics of their residences.
Data sources
This study is based on two surveys—each of which included 1000 households— 
enquiring about the shopping habits of the households. The first took place in 
November-December 1995 (VASAR95); the second was carried in the following 
year, 1996 (VASAR96). Both surveys were conducted by T árki (Social Research 
Inform ation C enter-SR IC ). W hen examining the affinity toward unregistered ex­
penses, besides the above, another database compiled from the above two surveys 
(VASAR56) was also used.
In Section 3 we used a settlem ent-based database (VASUT) set up by János 
Köllő which, besides the characteristics of the settlem ents, provides inform ation 
on their public transpo rta tion  network, the accessibility of larger settlem ents in 
the neighbourhood, and the expenses of daily commuting. These d a ta  are used 
only in the case of households outside Budapest. Besides these, we also use some 
d a ta  from the 1994 version (T-STAR94) of the Central S tatistical Office (CSO) 
database, which includes d a ta  on 3200 settlem ents in Hungary, as well as the d a ta  
° f  the 1996 survey of the H ungarian Household Panel (M H P96).7
7 For the  M HP 1996 survey see the  report sum m arizing the  first resu lts  of the  research (Sík  
and Tóth  1997).
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In the case of VASAR95 and VASAR96 the household was the un it of ob­
servation, while in the case of the other two sources of d a ta  it was the settlement. 
Due to the fact th a t, while conducting VASAR95 and VASAR96, the codes of the 
settlem ents which are usually used by CSO were also recorded, and the survey 
included about 70 settlem ents, we had a chance to  compile the VASAR d a ta  and 
the two settlem ent-based databases.8 This seemed to be a sensible venture as the 
settlem ent-based inform ation was m eant to  play an im portan t supplem entary role 
in explaining the am ount of the unregistered expenses w ithin household expenses.
Methods and limits of estimation
W ithin  the expense structures of the households, some parts of the expenses 
were assessed during both the 1995 and the 1996 surveys. O ur goal was to  collect 
inform ation for the widest possible range of household expenses and to  separate the 
registered and unregistered expenses w ithin the assessed expenses. This m ethod 
serves as basis for the estim ation of the am ount of registered expenses besides the 
expenses included in the survey and all household expenses. During the survey 
an “expense” was determ ined as being “registered” or “unregistered” on the basis 
of the place of purchase and whether a bill was m ade out or not. Besides stores 
operating  w ith over 5 employees (1) we distinguished between the so-called “sm all 
shops” , in which the num ber of employees does not exceed 5 (2) and m arket and 
s tree t purchases (3).9 All things bought in the first belong to the category of 
registered expenses; in the second case we only considered them  registered if the 
salesperson m ade out an invoice w ith the cash register, otherwise they were listed 
as unregistered. Things bought in m arkets and on streets were all considered as 
unregistered expenses.
ff the place of purchase did not supply any useful inform ation (e.g. in the 
case of consumer durables or services), the value of goods obtained was considered 
unregistered if the receipt or the le tter of guarantee was m issing.10
We have four ways of estim ating unregistered expenses, gradually generalizing 
the results of estim ations obtained from the surveyed expense items. The steps used 
were the following:
BWe are grateful to  János Köllő and  G ábor Kezdi  for m aking th is solution possible.
9In H ungary th is la t te r  is th e  so-called “COM ECO N (or flea) m arket" (Sík 1997). T he logic 
beh ind  the  m ethod  we used was the  sam e as the concepts of the  research carried  ou t by M cC rohan 
an d  Sm ith , who investigated  th e  extent of th e  hidden economy in the  sale of goods a n d  services. 
Ih e  resu lts  of th e ir analyses m ake a  good com parison w ith our results (McCrohan and Smith  
1986).
lc Thus, if the  travelling agent gave a  receipt or a  le tte r  of guaran tee , th is tran sac tio n  was 
considered as registered.
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1. F irst, we calculated the am ount and the ratios of the registered, the un­
registered and the to ta l expenses with respect to  the surveyed expenses.
2. The same was done in the case of the surveyed expenses, while the separate 
expense item s were compiled into aggregated groups of expenses and w ithin this 
we determ ined the average estim ated ratios of the unregistered expenses.
3. Taking into consideration the d a ta  of the CSO household sta tistics ( CSO 
1997) we also calculated the ratio  of unregistered expenses w ithin the to ta l expenses 
of households.
4. Finally, on the basis of the ratios obtained for the surveyed expenses, we 
tried  to  determ ine the possible ratio  of unregistered expenses w ith respcct to  the 
whole economy.
Thus, the first step involved estim ation of the observed turnover, then the 
to ta l expenses of the households, and finally we can m ade some careful sta tem ents 
w ith respect to  the to ta l turnover of retail trade.
W hen estim ating the surveyed expenses we started  out from elem entary d a ta  
related to each expense item  (often the goods themselves) and, sum m arizing these, 
we reached an estim ated sum of the to ta l expenses in the samples of registered and 
unregistered expenses. For the summarizing we used the annual to tal in the case 
of each expense item.
After this we formed four aggregates ( j  =  1 ,..., 4), which also show the yearly
expenses and their structures: food and consumer goods (1), clothing (2), other
goods (3), services (4). Accordingly, we used the following equation:
CSj =  Y > =1,niJ and C N R j =  Y ^ cnrii=i,n,j
where cs ij  is the estim ated to tal sum  used for each elem entary expense item  and 
enri j  is the to ta l of unregistered expenses, i the num ber of elem entary expense 
items surveyed (i =  1,2, ...,n ), and n is the number of all surveyed elem entary 
expenses in the j -th  expense aggregate. Due to  the above:
CR j =  CSj - C N R j  (1)
T hen, taking into consideration all the expenses:
CSS =
CNRS = Y ^ CNRj=', 4 and
C R S =  CSS -  C N R S  (2)
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where C S S  m arks all the expenses, C N R S  all unregistered and C R S  all registered 
expenses included in the survey.11
Besides this, we calculated the average expenses of a household w ith regard 
to , respectively, each expense item , each aggregate and all expenses— th a t is, the 
above sums were divided by the number of surveyed households.
If we w ant to  estim ate the to ta l of unregistered expenses w ithin each expense 
item  and the to ta l expenses, we have to  bear in mind th a t not all of the expenses 
regarded as unregistered can really be considered as such.12
Besides these, we also have to  take into consideration th a t the survey did not 
cover all the  expenses of a household—e.g. the questionnaire did not include the 
purchase of cars or petrol, nor home building or catering as services. This is im por­
ta n t because, in the area not covered by the survey, the proportion of unregistered 
expenses is not the same as in the surveyed area. In th is case the unregistered 
am ount w ithin all expenses (N R H s c ) depends on the am ount registered for the 
surveyed and non-surveyed expenses (N R H oc  and N R H m o c ),  as well as on the 
am ount of surveyed expenses w ithin all expenses (C o /C s):
N R H sc =  N R H o c  x Co/Cs  +  N R H noc  x (1 -  C o/C s), (3)
where 0 <  C o/C s  <  1.
If, from among the expense groups (C S j ) which form C S S ,  we take those 
Cij expense item s in the case of which it can be a priori acknowledged th a t the 
unregistered am ount is zero ( N R H co =  0), then the unregistered am ount can be 
obtained as follows:
N R H CSj  =  ( ^ c 0 , = i , n j  x 0 +  0CSj -  5 3 C°«-=>."J) x N R H oc,j)IC S j  (4)
After this, using the same m ethod as in the analysis of the 1995 survey (T o th  
1996b), we calculated two quotients for each aggregated expense item: the am ount 
of unregistered turnover w ithin all expenses, and as a comparison with all registered 
expenses ( N R S H  and N R R H ) .  We used the following equations to  calculate the 
m inim um  and m axim um  values for both  quotients:
11 W hen sum m arizing the  non-registered  and registered expenses, as well as the  to ta l expenses, 
we d isregarded th e  fact th a t to ta l registered expenses and  the  non-registered expenses, respec­
tively, do no t or only p a rtly  include VAT or du ties re la ted  to  th e  purchase value of th e  goods. 
N either th e  buyer no r th e  seller can  be charged for th e  full am ount of du ties no t paid  by  the  buyer 
in re la tion  to  a  non-registered purchase. T his is because th a t is the  sum  they divide betw een 
them selves du ring  the  transac tion . We have no inform ation w ith regard  to the  d is trib u tio n  itself, 
b u t  it can  be reasonably  supposed th a t  under the  tax a tio n  conditions which were valid in 1996 
th is sum  was div ided half-and-half betw een th e  buyer and  the  seller (T o th  1997).
12For d isto rtion  factors to  be taken  in to  consideration see T ô th  1996a.
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N R S H m i n j  =  C N R mi nJ/ ( C N R mintj  + CRrrxaxj') (5)
N  R S H  max j  — C N  Rm a x , j / ( C N  R max,j  +  C R min,j),  ( 6 )
where C N R j  and C R j  are the average to ta l of unregistered and registered expenses, 
respectively, in the j- th  aggregated expense group in the sample of surveyed house­
holds. Lower indices min and max show the m inim um  and maxim um  values of 
these averages, calculated w ith the standard  error. We assume th a t in the case of, 
for example, N R S H m t he average of the actual unregistered expenses in all Hun­
garian households falls onto the lower borderline of the reliability range,13 while 
in the case of the average registered expenses we use the m axim um  value for our 
calculations. Thus, using the sums and proportions of the average registered and 
unregistered expenses of the 1000 households, we can deduce the extent of unreg­
istered expenses within the expenses of all H ungarian households.
Equation (4) could be used if we wanted to  make estim ations with respect to 
the to ta l turnover of retail trade. However, here we come across the problem  th a t 
we do not know the extent of household expenses related to  retail trade. F irst, we 
would need to  know the to ta l turnover of retail trade (not only the p art covered 
by the CSO  survey), and then we would have to  divide this among the house­
holds, the governm ent, the enterprises, the non-profit sector, and the expenditure 
of foreigners.14 Given the lack of a reliable empirical background, we cannot calcu­
late this; thus we can only assume th a t with regard to  retail trade the am ount of 
unregistered expenses is lower than  the minimum unregistered expenses estim ated 
for the surveyed household expenses.
The estimated amount of unregistered expenses in 1995 and 1996
Estimations regarding the surveyed expenses
Similarly to our experiences during the analysis of the 1995 survey, services 
form the widest range in which unregistered expenses can be estim ated. If we 
examine each expense group— i.e. all surveyed expenses shown in Table 1— then 
the value of NRSH can be estim ated in the ±1,5 percent zone and NRRH in the 
i2 ,5  percent zone for both years.
13T he averages were calculated  a t a  s tan d ard  reliability  level of 95 percent.
4 It is obvious, th a t  the  expenses we defined as non-registered are an  insignificant p a r t  of the  
r etail purchases of enterprises. T he situation  is not so unam biguous in the  case of foreigners’ 
expenses.
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Table 1
The estimated amount of unregistered expenses within the surveyed expenses of 
Hungarian households in 1995 and 1996 (percent)
Household expenses T he estim ated  am ount of 
unregistered expenses w ithin 
the surveyed expenses 
NRSH
T h e  estim ated  am ount of 
unregistered  expenses com pared 
to th e  registered expenses 
NRRH
1995 1996 1995 1996
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Food an d  consum er goods 11-14 13-16 14-16 15-20
an d  w ith in  th is, food 12-14 13-17 13-17 15-20
consum er goods 11-15 12-16 12-18 13-20
C loth ing 25-33 25-32 33-49 34-46
O th e r goods 6-10 9-13 7-11 10-15
Services 35-50 41-51 55-100 69-103
All surveyed expenses 17-20 19-22 20-25 24-29
From Table 1 it can be seen th a t the interval in which the average amount of 
the unregistered expenses of households can change has increased in the case of each 
expense group, both within all the expenses and in comparison with the registered 
expenses.
In accordance with this, in the case of all surveyed expenses and all Hungarian 
households, the volume of unregistered expenses can be estimated as 19-22 percent 
in 1996, as compared to 17-20 percent in 1995.
The increase which can be observed, as compared to 1995, could be the result 
of two things: on the one hand, it could be due to the increase of unregistered 
expenses in the case of some expense items and, on the other hand, it could be due 
to  the  increase in the weight of expense items with higher unregistered ratios. The 
ex ten t of the increase, however, cannot be considered statistically  significant; thus, 
we cannot declare th a t the extent of unregistered expenses has increased w ithin the 
expenses of all Hungarian households. Nevertheless, it can be sta ted  th a t between 
1995 and 1996 there was no decrease because, according to  our estim ations, this 
am ount could not have decreased significantly.
Estimations regarding all household expenses
The above calculations—even though they enable us to follow through the 
changes in the am ount of unregistered expenses— have a significant deficiency. As 
has been mentioned previously, they do not enable us to  determ ine the am ount of
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unregistered expenses within all household expenses. To be more precise, th is is 
due to  two things: on the one hand, the ratios between the weights of the surveyed 
aggregated expenses do not correspond to  the ratios between the aggregates of the 
actual household expenses; on the other hand, out of the household expenses we 
have to  select those expenses which we cannot possibly classify as unregistered (e.g. 
household energy consum ption).
T hus, first each expense item  has to  be considered with respect to  their ac­
tual weight in order to enable us to give an estim ation for each surveyed aggregated 
expense item  for all households. This only solves the smaller problem —the exam i­
nation of each elem entary expense item  of households still rem ains to be done; the 
calculations for the estim ation of all household expenses can only be carried out 
after this. For this reason we followed the above described procedure and exam ­
ined each expense item included in the household statistics in order to exclude all 
expenses where the possibility of them  being unregistered expenses is insignificant 
or equal to  zero.
As several of the steps were essentially different from those which we used in a 
study published previously (Boc and Klauber 1996)— i.e. using the d a ta  of the 1995 
survey— and as a result of this the obtained estim ation results are also significantly 
different from the ones published there, it seemed necessary to  recalculate the d a ta  
of the 1995 survey and, for the sake of comparison, publish the d a ta  for both years 
in this s tudy .15
Table 2
The amount of unregistered expenses within all household expenses (percent)
Household expenses The estimated amount of unregistered 
expenses within all expenses
(NRSH)
1995 1996
Food 9-10 9-12
Consumer goods 10 14 12-15
Clothing 25-33 25-32
Other 3-4 4-5
Services, home building, purchase of property 15-22 18-22
Total expenses 10-13 11-14
5 The difference is probably due to the mistake which occurs when we “project” the non- 
•^Sistered amounts obtained for the surveyed household expenses onto the whole trade turnover.
Ven the direct generalization as to th e  expenses of a  household—as we shall see la te r—can  cause 
Ser,°us m istakes. We have already m entioned th e  difficulties of m aking any estim ations w ith 
r®spect to  to ta l trading.
8 Acla Otconomica 49, 1997-9$
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Table 2 includes the final results of the calculations. If we look a t the  num bers 
in this tab le  it is conspicuous th a t, considering all household expenses in 1995, the 
am ount of unregistered expenses was 10-13 percent, while in 1996 it was 11-14 
percent. If we compare the unregistered expenses w ith the registered ones, then in 
1995 the am ount is 11-15 percent, while in 1996 it is 12-16 percen t.16
The possible extent o f the hidden economy within the whole of the economy
Given the am ount of unregistered expenses among households, it becomes 
possible to  measure the extent of the hidden economy and its proportion in the 
GDP. Before we s ta rt describing the results, it would be useful to  look at the 
relationship between the hidden economy and the GDP. W hen calculating the G D P 
in Hungary the CSO (C entral S tatistical Office) includes a significant proportion  of 
the hidden economy in the GDP; thus the G D P produced by the economy— or the 
exteded G D P (G D Ps)— can be divided into parts which are declared as belonging 
to  the hidden econom y:17
G D Ps =  G D Pd +  G DPh e  +  G D Ph n e  and 
G D P o — G D Pd +  G D P ^ e , 
G D Ph =  G D Phe  +  G DPh n e  where
16 We know, however, th a t  household s ta tistics do no t include all household expenses w hich are 
p a r t  of our na tio n a l economy (and  which show an am ount th a t is ab o u t 28 percent lower— CSO 
1996). According to  th is, in 1995 the  average per cap ita  expense was HUF 94,764/0,72=270,506 
in  H ungarian  households. According to  th e  CSO th e  difference is due partly  to  th e  item s they 
denied, d id  no t want to  m ention or simply forgot, and p a rtly  due to  the  fact th a t people w ith  h igher 
incom es were b e tte r  represented  in the  survey. T he question now is: in to  w hat category should  we 
p u t th e  H U F 75,742 average pe r c ap ita  expense which does no t ap p ear in the  household s ta tistics?  
If we include all of the  la t te r  expense w ith the non-registered expenses, th en  its am oun t would 
ju m p  to  33-35 percen t in 1995 an d  to  34-36 percent in 1996. A lthough it can  be  assum ed th a t 
th e  expenses which were denied, no t m entioned (or sim ply forgotten) are p robably  non-registered 
expenses, it does no t seem  well-founded to  consider all m issing expenses as non-registered. A nother 
argum en t against handling all m issing expenses as non-registered is th a t  in o u r sam ple th ere  were 
fewer people w ith h igh incom es. In case of these households it can be assum ed th a t ,  w ithin 
th e ir  expenses, the  am ount of registered  expenses is no t higher th an  in our rep o rt. A fter th is all 
we need to estim ate  is th a t ,  w ithin th e  om itted  expenses, w hat is the  ex ten t of th e  expenses of 
households w ith h igher incom es who were left out. A well-founded estim ation  of the  d istribu tion  
of th e  concealed expenses can be carried  ou t by using the  d a ta  of th e  H ungarian H ousehold Panel 
and  th e  m icrosim ulating database  of T arki.
17 See also Arvai and  V ertes 1994
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G D P d — declared (i.e. explicitly exposed) G D P which appears in tax  retu rn  
forms and official statistics,
G D Ph e  — G D P produced by concealed activities; its am ount is estim ated in 
the official statistics using different methods and is thus p art of the official GDP, 
G D P o  =  the official GD P
G D Ph n e  =  a part of the G DP produced by concealed activities b u t which 
is not included in official statistics,
G DPh — all GD P produced in the hidden economy
If we wish to  express the sum  of unregistered expenses as a percentage of 
the officialy calculated G D P then, using the G D P ratios characteristic for 1994 
for our calculations, we can sta te  th a t the extent of the hidden economy related to 
household consum ption in 1995 could be considered 5-8 percent of the official GDP. 
This ra tio  is twice the am ount measured by the same m ethods in G reat B ritain  at 
the end of the 1970s (2.3 percent) and three times as much as was estim ated on 
the basis of a survey conducted in 1981 in the USA.18 Even so, it is still a lot lower 
than  some assum ptions and empirical research results estim ating the extent of the 
hidden economy which pu t the ratio  of the hidden economy to  be one th ird  of the 
official G D P in Hungary a t the beginning of the 90s. In our opinion this deviation 
is not only a result of the different definitions of the hidden economy or the different 
estim ating processes, bu t it means a real difference. We can either assume th a t, 
compared to  a peak around the beginning of the 90s, by the second half of the 90s 
the ra tio  of the hidden economy really did decrease in Hungary—or, at least, th a t 
there had been no change compared to  earlier years; only earlier research projects 
overestim ated the extent of the hidden economy of those times.
If we assume th a t, in the case of transactions we did not include in our survey 
(e g. com m unity consum ption, accumulation of fixed assets, export and im port), 
the weight of the hidden economy is twice the extent of our estim ation (which is an 
obvious exaggeration) then, as the whole, its am ount would be about 16-20 percent 
° f the official GDP. In other words, the extent of the hidden economy would still be 
lower than the value estimated at the beginning of the 90s.
I t m ight be assumed th a t the extent of the hidden economy can be neglected 
>n the respective areas of public consum ption, accum ulation of fixed assets and 
foreign trade; at the same time, during the sta tistical observation of households, 
the difference between the declared and the actual expenses— th a t is, the concealed 
or forgotten expenses—m ight be listed as unregistered expenses. If these two above- 
mentioned standpoints are held, then the ratio of hidden economy can be considered 
have been 17-18 percent of the official GDP in 1995.
Even if we accepted these ratios it would not mean th a t the official G D P 
should be increased by this much in order to reach the “to tal or extended G D P ” .
T T • J
u s*ng various m ethods of estim ation, the CSO builds a significant part of the
Data source: Willard 1989
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hidden economy into the official GDP. In 1992, for example, the ratio  of the hidden 
economy was estim ated in such a way th a t it was over 10 percent of the official G D P 
(Arvay and Vertes 1994). Given th a t there is no way of knowing w hat percentage 
of the official G DP the actually declared G D P is at p resen t,19 we cannot tell how 
much the official G D P should be increased by in order to  reach the actual G D P 
using our definition of the hidden economy. It is probable th a t, considering the 
possible development of the statistical estim ating m ethods, the ratio  of the hidden 
economy which is included in the official G DP is nowadays higher. In other words, 
in 1996 the official G D P did not have to be increased by 17-18 percent to  reach 
the to ta l G D P (as was the case w ith estim ations made in 1992—Arvay and Vertes 
1994).20
Possible explanations for affinity toward unregistered purchases
Assumptions
Having given an outline of the average am ount of unregistered household 
expenses, an exam ination can be made of how the investigated households are 
divided with regard to  the ratio  of unregistered expenses w ithin their respective 
expenses. Furtherm ore, an analysis can be made concerning characteristics of the 
households and their places of residence with respect to  the affinity of households 
for unregistered purchases.21 Can we establish the range and characteristics of the 
groups of households which are usually characterized by a high level of unregistered 
expenses— th a t is, by more intensive participation  in transactions th a t are part of 
the  hidden economy?
During our investigation we compiled the 1995 and 1996 d a ta  and used both  
as bases for calculation. If there was no relevant d a ta  which could be used for 
the exam ination of household characteristics for 1995 (e.g. subjective judgem ent 
of the financial situation of the household), we only used d a ta  collected in 1996. 
T his transform ation made sense because— as could be seen earlier— there was no 
significant difference between the am ount of unregistered expenses in the two years 
with regard to the aggregated expense items or to all recorded expenses. Thus, 
we assum ed th a t the effects of the factors responsible for the ratios of unregistered 
expenses were not different in either of the two years.
19 T he CSO does no t carry  ou t calculations in relation  to these.
20If we consider th a t  the  declared G D P is 90 percent of the  official G D P then , on th e  basis of 
th e  d a ta  we ob tained, th e  am ount of hidden economy is ab o u t 18-20 percent of th e  declared GDP- 
T his also m eans th a t  th e  official G D P should be increased by 7 -8  percent to reach the  extended 
GDP.
21 T he definitions and d istribu tion  of the  investigated variables can be seen in Appendix  1.
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T he compilation was made possible by the fact th a t the questionnaires used 
in the two surveys were alm ost the same and so they could be easily transform ed 
into a new database.
Several assum ptions could be m ade during the exam ination concerning the 
affinity of the households towards unregistered expenses. These are the following:
Income standards. F irst of all, it seems evident th a t the affinity of a household 
tow ards unregistered expenses is in a very strong negative relationship w ith the per 
cap ita  income (EH JO V ) of the household: the am ount of unregistered expenses 
is higher in households with lower income standards, than in the expenses of the 
well-to-do.22 It is obvious th a t in poorer households people are probably more 
often forced to adap t to this kind of consumption. A form of this is the purchase 
of goods a t a lower price; this would certainly mean an increase in unregistered 
expenses w ithin the expenses of the household.23
Property. T he effect of the financial condition (HVAGYON) can be assumed 
to be sim ilar to th a t of incomes: i.e. the richer households have less unregistered 
expenses than  the poorer.
The perception and the dynamics of financial circumstances. W ith relation 
to the influence of incomes it can be assumed th a t it is not the actual income 
condition bu t its subjective perception th a t plays an im portan t role in the volume of 
unregistered expenses.24 On the other hand, it is not the actual s tandard  of income 
but the dynam ics of the income th a t is more closely related to  the involuntary 
adaption of the consumers— th a t is, to  the ratio of unregistered expenses w ithin 
recorded expenses.
Accordingly, the ratio  of unregistered expenses depends, on the one hand, on 
the subjective perception of the standards of income and, on the other hand, on 
the changing of the standards of income. We expect th a t those who perceive their 
financial circum stances to  be bad, instead of considering their actual standard  of 
income, will have more unregistered expenses. Also, the ra tio  of unregistered ex­
penses is higher w ithin the expenses of households which report th a t their s tandard  
° f  income has been falling.
We used two variables to measure the subjective perception of the standard  
° f income: the first was the ordinal variable describing the financial circum stances
22 Analyses carried  ou t on the  basis of the  1995 survey did n o t verify th e  assum ptions re la ted  
to the  negative effect of the income. M easuring the income stan d ard  of a  household in relation  
to Per c ap ita  incom e in the  household, we found no significant re la tionsh ip  betw een the  surveyed 
e*penses and  th e  non-registered expenses a t  any level of acceptance. We could no t disclose any 
kind of re la tionsh ip  even when we exam ined the  non-registered ra tio s  related  to  each expense group 
' e g. food and  consum er goods, clothing, o ther goods, or services) one-by-one (T o th  1996a).
It should be added, that empirical analyses examining the supply and prices o f the flea markets 
'Varn Us that in many cases the “low prices” o f the flea markets arc only an illusion for the buyers
(Czako 1997),
The sub jective  perception  of the  income s tan d ard  can also be a  relevant accounting factor, 
‘‘'dependen t of th e  actual income stan d ard  ( Lcngycl and Toth  1996).
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of the family (SZAHELY), and the other was a continuous variable sensitive to the 
deviation between the actual and the expected standard  of income (D EPR IV H ). 
This yields the ra tio  of the difference between the expected and actual incomes 
com pared to  the actual incomes.
To approxim ate the dynam ics of the perceived incomes we used the ordinal 
variable describing the changes in the financial circumstances of the families during 
the previous year (CSAHELY).
Social status. The choice between the registered and unregistered expenses 
can also be com prehended as the choice between the non-m aterial advantages (guar­
antee) and the tangible, m aterial advantages (lower price). The a ttitu d es of con­
sum ers preferring one or the other are quite different. W hen buying the same 
products some consumers prefer registered purchases in order to obtain  an “en­
forceable” guarantee, while others prefer to pay less and in doing this they are 
willing to  waive the sense of safety which is provided by the guarantee. T his dif­
ference in preferences is related to  the social s ta tus of the consumers— th a t is, the 
social s ta tu s  of the m embers of the household can have an influence on the shopping 
habits of the household. We assume th a t households where the members are b e tte r 
educated and of higher social s ta tu s spend less on goods and services purchased 
in unregistered form th an  the ones w ith lower social positions. We m easured the 
social position by the qualification of the head of the household (HFOISK).
Enterpreneur in the family. In Hungary it can be observed th a t the budgets of 
those who are self-employed in the form of enterprises and of m icro-enterprises based 
on family participation  are considerably intertw ined w ith the household budgets. 
The results of empirical analyses ( Tóth and Abraham. 1996) also indicate th a t, in 
order to  minimize tax  obligations, some enterprises include the day-to-day expenses 
of the household in the expenses of the enterprise as “production consum ption” . 
As a result of this we expect th a t the presence of an enterpreneur in a household 
(VALLALK) decreases the affinity towards unregistered purchases because goods 
purchased in this form, in the absence of invoices, cannot be accounted for as 
expenses of the enterprise.
The size of the settlement. In Hungary the areas th a t serve as bases for m ost 
of the flea m arkets are concentrated mainly in the larger towns and in B udapest. It 
can be assumed th a t the range of goods these m arkets offer increases with the size 
of the  se ttlem en t.25 As a result of this, we expect th a t there is a close connection 
between the type of settlem ent in which the household is located (T E L E P) and 
the affinity towards unregistered expenses: the ratios are probably higher among 
those who live in larger settlem ents— ceteris paribus— than am ong those who live 
in smaller settlem ents.
25 T h e  resu lts  of em pirical investigations re la ted  to  the  supply and  size of the  flea m arkets 
ind icate  th e  sam e (C zako 1997).
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Availability and transaction costs. The other way in which the size of the 
settlem ent also has an influence is th a t the expenses related to  the actors of the  un­
registered transactions vary— th a t is, the transaction costs related to  the purchases 
are different. It makes a difference where and how often the given goods can be 
purchased, how long it takes and how much it costs to  get there, and w hat chances 
the m em bers of the household have to  go to  the closest flea m arket.26 T hus, we 
suppose th a t in the households of those settlem ents where the network of public 
tran sp o rta tio n  to  the neighbouring larger towns and to  the county towns is b e tter 
developed, the ra tio  of unregistered expenses is higher. The situation  is sim ilar if 
there is a car in the given household (AUTO), because th is can widen the range of 
easily accessible places for m aking unregistered purchases.
The rest of the variables used as indicators of availability show how m any 
larger settlem ents within 40 kilometers of the household can be reached by bus 
(BUSZ), by tra in  (VONAT), or either one of these (KAPCS).
Environment. W hen exam ining the shopping habits of households it cannot 
be left out of consideration th a t this can be influenced by contextual effects. The 
norm s shown by neighbouring households can also influence the shopping habits 
of the given household. We assume th a t if the income standards of people living 
in the sam e settlem ent are high, then this fact decreases the ra tio  of unregistered 
expenses. To measure the income standard  characterizing a settlem ent we divided 
the taxable income of all of the taxpayers by the num ber of inhab itan ts and accord­
ing to  this quotient we listed households into ten categories. The variable obtained 
(NADOALAP) shows which of the ten income categories the settlem ent of the given 
household belongs to.
State o f development o f the business network. Considering further the  con­
textual effects, we expect th a t if the commercial infrastructure of a settlem ent 
is well developed, then there are more shops with a better chance for registered 
Purchases and a wider range of goods, and this will decrease the affinity of the 
inhabitan ts of the settlem ent towards unregistered expenses. The deficiencies and 
under-developm ent of the official commercial network contributed significantly to  
the form ation and survival of flea m arkets which provide the opportun ity  for unreg­
istered purchases. The flea m arkets can be considered as “supplem enters” , whereas 
if the official commercial network is well-developed, the chances for the form ation 
° f the former are not so strong.
T he level of development of the commercial network is indicated by the num ­
ber of departm ent stores for every ten thousand inhabitants (ABCR) and the num ­
ber of all retail stores— not including pharmacies— also for every ten thousand 
inhabitan ts (SH O PR).
26The relevancy o f the assumption related to availability is verified by the results o f  Janos 
''o l io 's  study examining the conditions o f local unemployment and commuting (Kôllô 1997).
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Results
Now let us take a look a t the d istribution of the households according to  the 
ratio  of unregistered expenses w ithin the surveyed groups of expenses and w ithin 
all the surveyed expenses! In the following we will analyse the am ount of unregis­
tered expenses one-by-one w ithin each expense group (e.g. consumer goods, durable 
goods, clothing, services) and within all expenses, not including food (C2FH ). We 
decided to  exclude money spent on food because the m ethod we used (i.e. house­
hold survey) was the least accurate when estim ating the am ount of unregistered
97expenses.
The distribution of the households according to  the unregistered expenses 
directs our a tten tion  to  three facts:
F irst of all, the unregistered expenses have no, or hardly any significance in 
the recorded expenses of a large number of the households; secondly, all expenses of 
a considerable number of households are paid in the form of unregistered expenses; 
and thirdly, taking into consideration all of the recorded expenses, it can be seen 
th a t there is a decrease in the num ber of households where the ratio  of unregistered 
expenses is increasing.
These all indicate that the phenomenon of unregistered expenses plays a role 
within the expenses of a limited group of households and only in the case o f a small 
proportion of these households can we say that unregistered expenses have a domi­
nant role within the recorded expenses. This can be clearly seen if the households 
we questioned during the two surveys are listed in two categories in relation to  the 
am ount of unregistered expenses (See Table 3).
A ttention  can now be turned to  the exam ination of the relationship between 
the ra tio  of the above factors and the unregistered purchases. For this purpose 
we carried out logistic regressional and ordinate logit estim ations; the subord inate 
variables of the la tte r were the ordinate variables which were calculated according 
to  the ratios of unregistered expenses.28 In the models we try  to estim ate to  w hat 
extent and in w hat direction a unit change of the illustrative variables changes the 
probability  th a t the ratio  of unregistered expenses of a household’s expenses will 
fall in to  one of the given categories.29
27In th e  case of expenses re la ted  to  food we can only estim a te  th e  am ount of non-registered  
purchases, because in the  trad itio n a l vegetable-m arkets th e  farm ers are no t obliged to  give receipts 
an d  also, in the  case of the  o th er salesm en no t giving a receipt, th is does no t m ean th a t  th e  value 
of th e  purchase will n o t be declared in th e ir tax  re tu rn  forms.
28 0 n  th e  o th e r  hand, due to the  fact th a t  the  d istribu tion  of C2FH R is a  Poisson-type d is trib u ­
tion , it seem ed appropria te  to  use Poisson regression. Also, for th e  values of variables showing the 
ra tio s  of non-registered expenses as expense groups we also carried  ou t sim ple linear regressional 
estim ations to test th e  effect of each explanatory variable. T he d irection of the  effects e stim ated  
on these bases do n o t differ from  those ob tained  during the  o rd inate  logit estim ations.
29 For a  detailed  description of the  o rd inate  logit m odel see C om puting Resource C enter 1992.
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Table 3
The distribution of households in relation to the unregistered expenses within the 
different groups of expenses
G roups of expenses Average ra tio  of 
unregistered 
expenses
R atio  of unregistered 
expenses (percent)
n
(%)
Zero
(0)
A round
average
(1)
Above
average
(2)
1. C onsum er goods* (ELFH R) 11.2 85.5 14.5 - 1361
2. C lothes (R FH R ) 36.4 52.2 9.5 38.4 1170
3. O th e r goods (VFHR) 14.0 71.4 6.6 21.9 1893
4. Services (SFH R )
5. Surveyed expenses (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 )
53.8 14.8 32.4 52.8 1702
(C 2FH R ) 27.0 16.2 45.6 38.2 1980
‘ In th e  case of consum er goods the  categories are: 0 -  there  is none, 1 -  there  are some
T he effect of the examined factors were tested by two models. In the first one 
those variables were used as illustrative variables which were a t our disposal dur­
ing both surveys (M ODELL1). These were the following: VALLALK, HFOISK, 
A UTO, EHJOV, TELEP, and IDO. In the second one (M ODELL2) the above 
variables were supplem ented by those which characterized the se ttlem en t’s level of 
development and the living standards of the people living there (which we only 
had during the 1996 survey). The former group included the num ber of larger 
settlem ents which were w ithin 40 kms and were accessible by public tran sp o rta ­
tion (K A PCS), the average taxable income of the people living in the settlem ent 
(A DOALAPO), and the number of departm ent stores for every ten thousand inhab­
itants. The la tte r group includes the financial situation of the households and the 
Perception of changes in financial circum stances (D EPRIV  es C SA H E IA ).30 Ac­
cordingly, this model only includes d a ta  of the 1996 survey on households outside 
° f  B udapest.
The results of the calculations are included in Table J . These results show 
th a t there are no uniform  effects between the different groups of expenses. The 
characteristics of the households have a different effect on the ra tio  of registered 
expenses in each group of expenses.
We cannot confirm our hypothesis concerning the presence of an enterpreneur 
"i the fam ily— although the estim ation results in the same effect as was assum ed-
30 As we used the  variable KA PCS, which we defined as having th e  value “m issing” in th e  case 
° f households in B udapest, resu lts appearing  in M ODELL2 are only re la ted  to households outside 
the capital.
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Table 4
Results of the logistic regression and ordered logit estimations (MODEL1)
independent
variables E LFH R  (1) R FH R
dependent variables 
V FH R  SFH R C 2FH R C2FH R2
VALLALK -0 .0 8 4 9 -0 .2 1 0 2 0.1932 -0 .1 9 4 5 -0 .1 3 2 7 -0 .0 8 6 3
H FOISK -0 .0 2 7 8 -0.2863** -0.1014* -0 .0 1 6 5 -0 .0 1 4 7 -0 .0 5 0 7
AUTO -0.3913* -0 .0 1 4 8 0.2319** -0.2568** 0.0823 0.0148
EH JO V 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T E L E P 0.4192** 0.0069 0.2167** -0.1084** 0.1004** 0.1075**
IDO 0.0700 0.0275 -0 .0554 0.0551 0.1474* 0.1642*
C onstan t -2.7672** - - - - -
C u t p o in t 1 - -0 .7 4 8 6 1.3188 -2 .2 0 3 2 -1 .3 1 7 2 -0 .6 0 4 2
C u t p o in t 2 - -0 .3 3 5 8 1.7022 -0 .5 2 7 5 0.8147 0.1128
C ut p o in t 3 - - - - - 0.8398
N 1298 1118 1831 1642 1912 1912
C hi2 = 44.82 35.79 28.87 25.46 11.44 11.55
Log Likehood -1036 .093 -1030.7916 -1371.8288 -1623.3136 -1948.7978 -2548 .9106
P rob  >  C hi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0756 0.0728
P seudo R 2 0.0415 0.0171 0.0104 0.0078 0.0029 0.0023
(1): logistic regression 
*p <  0.10 
**p <  0.05
because the effect of the variable used for m easurem ent (VALLALK) is not signifi­
cant in any of the cases.
T he effect of the social s ta tu s which was measured by the education of the 
head of the household (HFOISK) is more unambiguous: households of high social 
s ta tu s  buy less clothing and other consumer goods in unregistered form. T his con­
firms the hypothesis concerning the relationship between the choice of non-m aterial 
advantages— m aterial advantages and social status: when making a decision related 
to a product, those o f higher status value the non-material advantages higher, while 
those o f lower status value the advantage of the price. We can also say th a t those of 
higher sta tu s  can be described by the model of quality-sensitive consumers, while 
those of a lower sta tu s  by the model of price-sensitive consumers ( Galasi and Kertesi 
1991).
Since the flea m arkets offer m ainly clothing (Czako 1997) we can say th a t 
in the trade of clothing, which makes up a significant part o f the business of flea 
markets, the higher the level of education the lower the probability of unregistered 
purchases.
A household’s ownership of a m otor car (AUTO), as has been mentioned 
am ong the assum ptions, can mean two things: on the one hand, as a piece of prop­
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erty it can measure the financial circumstances of the household and, on the other 
hand, as a means of transpo rta tion  it can improve the chances of the household 
for shopping. The la tter effect prom otes unregistered purchases because it makes 
those m arkets accessible a t which the household can have the advantage of a b e tte r 
price; such m arkets could not be reached w ithout a car.
The proportions of the param eters we obtained are the same: the alm ost 68 
percent decrease in the chance of unregistered purchases in the case of consumer 
goods can be related to the financial situation  of the households. In the case of 
these goods the place of purchase—in the case of unregistered purchases— is the 
s tree t itself, and this is a phenomenon which occurs m ainly in cities. Due to  this, 
the role of cars as a means of transporta tion  can be neglected. The situation  is the 
sam e in the case of services, for we cannot talk about the changing of the place of 
purchase as a precondition of the purchase.
In both cases (i.e. consumer goods and services)  we suspect that the financial 
situation of the household is behind the decreasing influence that the ownership of 
a car has on registered expenses. Among the richer households the unregistered 
purchases from  these groups of goods are more limited.
In the case of other goods the ownership of a car can also be considered as 
an im provem ent of the shopping possibilities and an indicator showing the finan­
cial situation  of a household. The shopping possibilities of households which are 
richer and own a car are better than  those of the poorer and they use this ad­
vantage to  increase the ratio  of unregistered purchases w ithin their expenses. On 
the o ther hand, in the case of people living in bigger towns where— due to  b e t­
ter public transpo rta tion—the transactional costs of purchases are lower to  s ta r t 
with, a higher unregistered ratio  can be estim ated than  in the case of people liv­
ing in smaller towns or villages. The negative influence o f the social status o f the 
household warns us that—similarly to buying clothing—households of higher status 
behave as quality-sensitive shoppers in the case of these goods, too. N on-m aterial 
advantages such as quality and guarantee are more im portan t to  them  than  lower 
price.
T he negative influence of the size of the settlem ent can be related to  the 
unified influence of AUTO and TELEP: more people living in larger settlem ents 
have cars, and the probability of a family using their neighbours’ car or some 
relatives’ car for shopping— who live in the same settlem ent— is also higher. If the 
non-possession is considered—since we assume a positive relationship between the 
goods offered in the m arkets and the number of people living in the settlem ent 
where the m arkets are— the place of the m arket also influences the dem and.
O ur hypothesis concerning the negative influence of the standard  of income 
(EH JO V ) is not confirmed by the results obtained either in relation to the certain 
groups o f expenses or in the cases of the aggregated expenses. According to  the 
models, a household’s standard  of income has no significant influence on the ratio  
° f unregistered expenses regardless of which level is considered: people with higher
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incomes are ju s t as likely to  buy a t a higher or lower ra te  in unregistered form as 
households with lower incomes. This result corresponds to  the  one obtained during 
an earlier investigation (T oth  1996a).
The absence of the incom e’s influence can be linked w ith the fact th a t, while 
in the case of people w ith lower incomes shopping is more frequent a t flea m arkets 
where goods are cheaper and of lower quality, the ratio  of shopping in registered 
form  is not higher among households with higher incomes (who shop here less 
frequently), because these people often buy more expensive and b e tte r quality 
products from  craftsmen who also do not issue invoices.31
The size of the settlem ent where the household is located (T E L E P), however — 
excluding the services— is in a positive relationship w ith the ra tio  of unregistered 
expenses in each case. According to  this—in case there is no difference between two 
households w ith respect to all examined characteristics— this ra tio  is the highest in 
the households in B udapest and the lowest in the case of people living in villages. 
T his result is due to  the uneven distribution of the unregistered m arkets (flea m ar­
kets) in relation to  the types of settlem ents: most of these markets (with the widest 
range of goods) are in the capital and in the county towns. T his means th a t these 
are more accessible for people who live in settlem ents where there is a m arket m ak­
ing unregistered purchases possible and the ratio  of unregistered expenses w ithin 
their expenses is higher than  in the case of people who live in settlem ents where 
there are no such m arkets.
T his is especially valid in the case of consumer goods because, in case of 
these goods, it is mainly in the streets and in the m arkets th a t cigarettes', al­
coholic beverages or coffee can be purchased in unregistered form. O ut of all ex­
pense groups estim ations related to  these come closest to  the practical d a ta  (pseudo 
R 2 =  0.0415).
In the case of services, the above tra in  of thought cannot be logically valid 
because, in this case, the place of transaction cannot be unam biguously determ ined: 
it takes place either in a  shop, or a t the seller’s place of work, or a t a place designated 
by the  seller. The empirical results show another kind of relationship: the ratio 
o f unregistered expenses is estimated to be the highest in households in smaller 
settlements. This result is probably related to  the fact th a t services in villages are 
done on the basis of m utual help between the households in the form of a direct 
exchange of services or goods (a) or in the form of m onetary transactions (b ).32
31 Zsolt Spéder called my attention to this fact. The results of a survey which covered the 
m anagem ent of households in a  provincial town and  th e  surrounding  a rea  ind icated  th e  saine 
(Spéder 1997).
32 In the first case there is no money involved in the transactions (these are not included in 
our circle o f observation) while in the second case money is used as the means o f payment. Our 
analysis o f the two recordings supply information on the amount of unregistered purchases within 
the latter. According to this, in the case of monetary transactions the amount o f registered 
expenses increases with the size of the settlement.
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A professional supplier living in the same village is looked upon by the buyer as 
a member of a household with whom they are in day-to-day contact. Due to  this 
personalized relationship the ratio  of unregistered sales is higher in the villages than  
in towns.
The effect of the IDO models is always positive and significant in the aggre­
gated model. The direction of its effect is not surprising if we take into account 
th a t in 1996 the am ount of unregistered expenses was som ewhat higher in all house­
holds than  in 1995. The only difference is th a t a t the household level the model 
estim ates a significant increase between 1995-96, while in the aggregated estim ation 
this change was not found to  be significant.
It m ust be added to the above th a t the reliability of the models used for the 
estim ation of the unregistered ratios (C2FHR es C2FHR2) w ithin the aggregated 
expenses is questionable. The models obtained do not really explain the differences 
in the am ount of unregistered expenses. Knowledge of the analyzed household 
expenses contributed only in a small extent to a more accurate determ ination of 
unregistered expenses.
We expected a somewhat better result in the case of the second model 
(M ODEL2), which also contained variables describing the financial situation  of the 
households, the sta te  of development of the settlem ents, and the living standards 
of their inhabitants. According to our results, however, in m ost cases the newly 
included factors did not improve the reliability of the estim ations significantly. In 
the case of clothing it is also the effect of the social s ta tu s  of the household and 
the availability of the flea m arkets (AUTO) th a t are more significant. The higher 
social s ta tu s  decreases the ratio  of unregistered expenses while the ownership of a 
car— which characterizes the financial circumstances of a household—increases this 
ratio. The model estim ating the ratios related to other consumer goods does not 
supply an acceptable result: here the variants do not prom ote the estim ation of 
the ratio  of unregistered expenses significantly. In the case of services the obtained 
results were acceptable and it was the influence of the newly included variants th a t 
was significant. The negative influence of the size of the settlem ent stood out in the 
same way as in the previous model. This can be supplemented by the fact that— as 
expected— in settlements where the average income of the inhabitants was lower 
the ratio of unregistered expenses was higher within the expenses of the househols. 
The role of the other two factors (public transportation  connections and number 
° f stores in the area), however, is quite puzzling: according to  both, higher ra­
tios of unregistered expenses can be estim ated in settlem ents w ith more developed 
infrastructures.
W ith relation to all recorded expenses (C 2FIIR  es C2FHR2) it can be seen 
tha t the results obtained are not independent of how we determ ine the variable 
which shows the ratio  of unregistered expenses. In the first case the estim ation 
supplies a significant value while in the second case it does not. The results of 
the first estim ation confirm the role of availability in the amount of unregistered
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Table 5
The results of the ordered logit estimations (MODELL2)
Independent
variables E LFH R  (1) R FH R
D ependent variables 
V FH R  SFHR C 2FH R C 2 F H R 2
VALLALK 0.3065 - 0 .2 1 0 2 0.5206* -0 .4 0 8 9 + -0 .2 5 3 4 -0 .1 4 6 4
H FOISK -0 .0 1 2 9 -0.3597** -0 .0 8 8 0 -0 .1 0 8 3 -0 .1 0 8 4 -0 .1 3 1 6
CSAHELY -0 .3 5 1 9 + -0 .0 1 4 9 -0 .8241 0.0620 -0 .0 4 9 0 -0 .0 1 8 4
AUTO 0.4844 0.4568* 0.3226+ 0.0235 0.3730* 0.2645
EH JO V 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D E PR IV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T E L E P 0.1568 0.1923 0.0865 -0.5079** -0 .2901+ -0.18&3
AD OA LA PO 0.0098 -0 .1 7 8 2 0.0500 -0.3458** -0 .0 4 1 8 -0 .0 7 7 9
K A PCS 0.0158 -0 .1 0 2 5 -0 .0 8 5 8 0.3217** 0.2378** 0.1935
ABCRO -0 .0 0 9 8 -0 .0 0 9 3 -0 .1 3 1 4 0.2737* 0.0780 0 .0 1 1 0
C onstan t -1 .8 2 2 8 - - - - -
C u t po in t 1 - -1 .1 6 3 5 0.8653 -2 .8 6 2 6 -1 .7 4 0 9 - 1 .0 2 2 0
C ut po in t 2 - -0 .7 3 4 0 1.1965 -1 .0 8 3 5 0.5037 -0 .3 2 0 6
C u t po in t 3 - - - - - 0.4695
N 490 435 713 639 748 748
C hi2 = 8.719 29.89 13.50 54.82 21.33 18.08
Log likelihood -179 .7705 -393 .0639 -4 9 9 .3 0 -6 0 1 .4 9 -7 4 5 .7 5 -9 9 2 .3 9
P ro b  >  C hi2 0.5562 0.0000 0.1968 0 .0 0 0 0 0.0189 0.0537
P seudo  R 2 0.0271 0.0366 0.0133 0.0436 0.0141 0.0090
( 1 ): logistic regression 
+ p < 0.10 
*p < 0.05 
**p <  0.01
expenses: both  the  ownership of a car and the better transpo rta tion  possibilities 
point tow ards a higher unregistered am ount. In this case the increase in the size of 
a settlem ent decreases the willingness to pay in an unregistered form. T his proba­
bly results in the fact th a t— as has been mentioned— in the expenses of households 
in sm aller settlem ents o ther households play a greater roie, while the role of pro­
fessional retailers or vendors are less im portan t than  is the case with households in 
larger settlem ents.
Conclusions
O ur results show th a t in Hungary, in the middle of the 90s, the ex ten t of 
the hidden economy as compared to  the officially reported G D P is not negligible. 
D uring the first p a rt of the economic transition, in the m idst of the recession—
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when the living standards of a significant number of households decreased or were 
a t risk— an im portan t characteristic of the behaviour of a very large proportion 
of households was th a t they obtained some of the necessary goods in unregistered 
forms.
T his fact, however, does not mean th a t all households take advantage of 
this possibility in an equal proportion. On the contrary, from the results of the 
analysis it could be seen th a t this type of behaviour is only characteristic o f a 
small proportion, and this decreases parallel to the increasing ra tio  of unregistered 
expenses. This means th a t the proportion of households which depend significantly 
on the advantages provided by the hidden economy is very limited.
On the other hand, it must be mentioned th a t, considering the m axim um  
ratios which we estim ated in comparison to the official G D P (17-18 percent), the 
extent of the hidden economy in Hungary can be estim ated to  be lower than  is 
shown by the results of other analyses. According to  the model which uses the 
electric energy consum ption of households as the basis for estim ation (Lackó 1997), 
in 1994 the ratio  of the hidden economy was around 31 percent. There can be 
two reasons for the significant difference in the results: 1) the difference in the 
calculation of the hidden economy; 2) differences resulting from  the m ethods used 
for estim ation. The first refers to  the fact th a t our definition of the hidden economy 
is more lim ited than  the one used by the m ethod which makes estim ates on the 
basis of electric energy consum ption (e.g. “do-it-yourself” activities of households 
are not included in our definition of hidden economy, while in the other one they 
are included). The other reason for the difference might be due to  the fact th a t 
estim ations based on surveying households and assessing the structu re  of expenses 
usually show the extent of the hidden economy to be lower than  ones based on 
other m ethods. In the United States, for example, when assessing the expense 
structu re  of households, the ratio  of the hidden economy was 1.5 percent in 1981, 
while on the basis of cash dem and it was 6.1 percent.33 Among other things this 
could be the result of the fact th a t estim ations assessing the expense s tru c tu re  of 
households only include some of the economic actors and transactions, and in this 
the household is one of the acting parties. On the other hand, when the estim ation 
is carried ou t on the basis of direct questioning it can happen th a t the people 
questioned— because of the negative moral judgem ent of the phenomenon of the 
hidden economy— will not give (or, indeed, cannot give) the actual am ount of their 
unregistered expenses.34
33D a ta  sources: W illard 1989 and M orris 1993
34 A sim ilar situ a tio n  can be expected when “econom y” creates negative associations in the 
^ n d s  of th e  people questioned. In th is case the  households are m ore likely to estim ate  th e  sum  
of th e ir expenses and loans m ore fully and  accurately, th an  th a t  of th e ir incomes and  savings. On 
the  o ther hand, looking a t  the  incomes of the  m em bers of the  household as well as the  item s which 
appear o r do no t ap p ear in th e ir tax  re tu rn  forms, it can be seen th a t  in the  case of the  two income 
groups the  resu lts  of the  household survey are different. In the  case of th e  declared incom es the
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The models estim ating the am ount of unregistered expenses provide several 
lessons for us.
The first of these is th a t the income and financial condition of a household or 
the perception of these, as well as the size and infrastructure of the settlem ent where 
the household is, can only partly  explain the affinity of the given household towards 
unregistered expenses. The explanation for this fact could be th a t, besides factors 
describing the actual circum stances of the household and how the m em bers of the 
household see it, the role of the unintentional, ad-hoc decisions of the household can 
also be important. The decision between the registered and unregistered form of 
expenses is not always based on a sensible argum ent. Frequently it is determ ined 
independently of the buyer’s decisions th a t a transaction  is considered to  be a 
registered or an unregistered expense (i.e. will they be given an invoice or not). In 
some of the cases the buyer does not have the option to  choose the unregistered 
expense (if he/she did, the vendor would refuse to do business w ith h im /her).
On the other hand, the survey th a t was based on households can only show 
how unregistered transactions happen from the side of dem and; we can only make 
assum ptions about the reasons and structure  on the side of supplies. The existence 
of unregistered transactions is influenced by the behaviour of the suppliers and the 
s tru c tu ra l characteristics of the given local market.
A nother lesson is th a t the determ ination of the am ount of unregistered ex­
penses in the case of some expense groups is influenced by various household and 
contextual characteristics— as a m atter of fact, the same factor can have a different 
effect in the case of different expense groups.
Furtherm ore, the results obtained show th a t—contrary  to  public opinion— 
there is no discernible relationship between the income standards of a household 
and their affinity toward unregistered expenses. It is the same if we consider the per 
cap ita  income characteristics of a household or the difference between the desirable 
and the actual incomes.
The surroundings, however, have a  significant effect on the volume of unreg­
istered expenses, thus confirming our previous results (T oth  1996b). The influence 
of public transporta tion  connections is significant and positive: if, ou t of two set­
tlem ents belonging to  the same category, from one it is possible to  reach more 
large settlem ents, then this increases the possibility th a t in th a t settlem ent the ra­
tio  of unregistered expenses is higher within the expenses of the households. This 
relationship verifies the relevance of the assum ption regarding availability.
Finally, we must mention a tendency th a t, in the long run, can influence 
the ra tio  of unregistered expenses in relation to household expenses. By th is we 
mean the changing of shopping habits: as compared to 1995, in 1996 the surveyed
sum s calculated  for the  households a re  th e  sam e as th a t shown by the  m acrosta tistics, while in the 
case of incomes which were no t declared the  estim ation  based on th e  household survey supplied  a 
sum  which is over 30 percent less (Kolosi  et al. 1996).
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households shopped more in larger departm ent stores. On the basis of this it is 
likely th a t, since the appearance of large shopping malls in Hungary, they have 
a ttrac ted  a significant number of people who usually did their shopping in flea 
m arkets. According to this, the network of flea m arkets— which play an im portan t 
role in the unregistered expenses of the households— will become scarce, no t as 
a result of police actions or taxation  measures but due to  the increasing role of 
shopping malls built by large commercial companies.
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A ppendix 1
Definition of variables used in the analysis and distribution of households 
according to the variables
Name of 
variable
Definition of variable Explanation of 
categories
Distribution of 
households according 
to the categories 
o f the given variable 
(percent) or average 
values
GA KTIV Are any m em bers of the  family 1 : yes 71.1
economically active? (n=2006) 0 : no 28.9
CSTAG N um ber of people in the
household (n —2006) average 2.9
G Y EREK N um ber of children (n=2006) average 0 .8
HFOFO GL* O ccupation of the  head  of the 1 : independent 9.7
household (n=963) 2 : jun ior m anager 5.2
3: physical worker 
in agriculture 
4: skilled worker 
5: unskilled worker 
6 : senior m anager 
7: professional 
8 : o ther white-collar
8.7
33.7
2 1 .6
9.0 
3.9
8 .1
VALLALK Is there  an en terpreneur in the 1 : yes 15.5
household? (n = 2 0 0 2 ) 0 : no 84.5
h f o i s k Q ualification of th e  head 1 : elem entary school 36.3
of th e  household (n=1998) 2 : industria l school 28.0
3: secondary school 
4: college/university
23.4
1 2 .2
m n e l k r Is anyone unem ployed in the 1 : yes 14.9
household? (n=2006) 0 : no 85.1
h f o d o l * Position  of the  head of th e 1 : inactive 37.0
household in th e  labour 2 : active, unemployed 7.9
m arket (n=995) 3: active, employed 55.1
h o s s z e s T otal income of the
HVAGYON*
household (n=2006) average (HUF) 473,545
T otal possessions of the house­
hold: house, valuable assets,
HVAGY0N2*
money, securities (n=997) average (HUF) 2,983,185
T ota l possessions of the  house­
hold: house, properties,
EHJOV
valuable assets (n=997) average (HUF) 2,943,614
T otal yearly income for one 
m em ber of th e  household
(n=1948) average (HUF) 181,218
9* Acta Oeconomica 49, 1997-98
132 I. J. TÓTH: HIDDEN ECONOMY IN HUNGARY
A ppendix 1 (continued)
Definition of variables used in the analysis and distribution of households 
according to the variables
Nam e of 
variable
Definition of variable E xplanation  of 
categories
D istribu tion  of 
households according 
to th e  categories 
of th e  given variable 
(percent) or average 
values
DEPRIV * O pinion on financial circum ­
stances: the  sum  which they 
th ink is necessary for an  ade­
quate  s tan d ard  of living, 
m inus th e  actual to ta l income 
of th e  household, divided 
by the  la t te r  (947) average 1.168
SZAHELY* Individual opinion of financial 1 : are m anaging well 15.7
circum stances (n=992) 2 : can  h ard ly  m anage 50.8
CSAHELY* In w hat way have the  financial
3: have problem s 
1 : becam e
33.5
circum stances of your family significantly worse 27.3
changed over the  past 2 : becam e worse 46.4
12 m onths? (n=997) 3: have no t changed 22.9
T E L E P T ype of settlem ent
4: im proved 
5: improved 
significantly 
1 : village
2 .8
0.5
35.4
AUTO Is there  a  car in the
2 : town 
3: county town 
4: B udapest 
0 : no
25.9
19.4
19.3
60.2
household? (n=2007) 1 : yes 39.8
VASUT N um ber of tra in 0 27.5
connections (n=1515) 1 20.7
BUSZ N um ber of bus
2
3
4 or m ore 
0
31.0
7.7
13.1
7.7
connections (n=1515) 1 26.5
2
3
4 or m ore
28.0
27.3
1 0 .6
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A ppendix 1 (continued)
Definition of variables used in the analysis and distribution of households 
according to the variables
Nam e of 
variable
Definition of variable E xplanation  of 
categories
D istribu tion  of 
households according 
to  th e  categories 
of the  given variable 
(percent) o r  average 
values
KA PCS N um ber of public tran sp o r­ 0 3.3
ta tio n  connections 1 23.6
(tra in  or bus) (n=1515) 2 27.2
3 22.3
4 or more 23.4
SH O PR N um ber of shops per 10,000
inh ab itan ts  (1901) average num ber 152.4
ABCR N um ber of departm en t stores
p e r 10,000 inh ab itan ts  (1901) average num ber 0.779
AD ÓALAP Taxable incom e calculated  for
one in h ab itan t of th e  settlem ent average (HUF) 127,762.7
IDO Year of survey 0 -  1995 1007
1 -  1996 1 0 0 0
*only h ad  th e  d a ta  for the  year 1996
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Appendix 2
Variables related to the amount of unregistered expenses
Nam e of D efinition of the  variable
th e  variable
CFH U nregistered am ount w ith respect to  all expenses
C2FH U nregistered am ount w ith respect to  registered expenses, n o t including food
C2FH R U nregistered am ount with respect to  expenses, no t including food— a t ordinal 
m easurem ent level
0  -  there is none
1 -  average, a t  the  m ost
2 -  above average
C 2FH R2 U nregistered am ount w ith respect to  expenses, no t including food— a t ordinal 
m easurem ent level
1 -  under 5 percent
2 -  5-15 percent
3 -  15-30 percent
4 -  above 30 percent
ELFH A m ount re la ted  to  consum er goods
R FH A m ount re la ted  to  clothing
VFH A m ount re la ted  to  o th er goods
SFH A m ount re la ted  to  services
Acta Oeconomica 49, 1997-98
Acta Oeconomica, Vol. 49 (1 -2),  pp. 135-156 (1997-98)
KEEPING THE STATE AS A MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
THE CASE OF A FOREIGN-OWNED COMPANY IN THE 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SECTOR
A. SZALAVETZ
This study investigates the mechanism by which a foreign, professional investor and the 
state cohabit as majority and minority shareholders in a company, and the expectations o f both 
parties from  the cohabitation.
The case study analyses the various aspects o f marketing and sales, focusing on the conse­
quences of the com pany’s integration into the international production and distribution network 
o f its multinational owner. It shows how an increase in intra-group trade has resulted from the 
Hungarian state’s weak performance in providing a coherent, protective industrial and trade pol­
icy and creating the macroeconomic conditions for success. Looking at the com pany’s investment 
policy, the study highlights the decision-making weaknesses common to multinational corpora­
tions. Finally, applying the methods of management consultancy companies, the study analyses 
how corporate efficiency evolved.
Introduction*
Although a worldwide consensus has rapidly arisen about the m erits and 
benefits of foreign direct investment, specific privatization deals still tend to  pro­
voke hot debate about letting foreign investors gain a stronghold in “strategic” 
industries.1 Analysts may well consider whether in principle, viable companies 
should be retained in domestic ownership, and who will tu rn  out to be the best 
owner in the end, for the long-term national interest.
Transform ing economies th a t opted for individual,2 “m arket-based” privati­
zation of their state-ow ned enterprises (SOEs) have rarely been able to consider 
possible trade-offs between long and short-term  national interests.3 Most of the  en­
terprises offered for sale are severely undercapitalized, with exhausted assets. They 
have built up huge investm ent backlogs, met with baleful liquidity problems, lost 
their earlier m arkets, and so on. W ithout a wcll-capitalized investor, able to supply 
the resources needed for viability, they are bound to be squeezed out of the m arket. 
So short-term  interests logically squeeze out any long-term considerations in these 
Privatization deals.
'T h e  research was supported by the European Commission’s PHARE ACE Programme 
p 95-2019-R.
’ This applies especially when the “family silver” (well-known, long-established national com­
panies) is being sold to foreign investors.
“ Individual” as opposed to mass privatization.
31 stress the word “possible” to counter any assumption that the trade-off is automatic.
0001-6373/95/$5.00 ©  1997-98 Akademiai Kiado, Budapest
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A nother ostensible area of trade-offs where real alternatives are rarely present 
is the value to  be set on the foreign investor’s global com petitive position and cor­
porate image. In some cases investors able to provide a fam iliar nam e— a virtue 
in a strategic alliance, since membership of a global group enhances the com peti­
tiveness of the privatized com pany4—make lower offers than  others, for whom  the 
good nam e of the purchased company may be worth m ore.5
There are some strategic industries where ownership, and the nationality  of 
the owner, certainly plays a role in com petitiveness— defined as an ability to  acquire 
orders. This applies especially to  the m ain com petitors for public-procuremeni 
tenders.
In these cases there is a conflict between two opposing argum ents about the 
m ost beneficial corporate governance structure , which causes some deliberation 
even am ong foreign privatization applicants. On the one hand it is clear to  the 
seller (privatization agency) and the potential buyer th a t the  survival and viability 
of the com pany depend on quick, determ ined action by a  well-capitalized investor. 
In m ost cases, only a foreign investor would be capable of m odernizing the firm and 
increasing its com petitiveness through financial consolidation and the provision of 
technology, organization and m anagem ent expertise, m arket connections, and so on. 
T he large transfers of funds required call for exclusive control. T he buyer wants 
100 percent ownership. On the other hand, if the business is strongly influenced 
by public-procurem ent decisions, the advantages of having a national, m inority 
shareholder, even m inority sta te  ownership, may in principle exceed any consequent 
constrain ts on control.
These are the strategic argum ents th a t foreign privatization applicants con­
sider when bidding for specific SOEs or accepting the outcom e of privatization  nego­
tiations. T he other side of the coin is why the state would accept such cohab ita tion .6 
W hat are the argum ents for not offering all the shares? How can and should the 
s ta te  act as a m inority owner in such companies?
T he m otivation of the sta te  in retaining a m inority shareholding has proved 
unclear in m ost H ungarian privatization deals. The influence gained over the com­
pany has been small. T he intention may have been to  sell the retained shares 
eventually a t a higher rate, after the company has been restructured by the present 
m ajority  owner. This, however, entails risks: (1) The interest of the m ajority  
owner in seeing a rapid, spectacular increase in equity value may be diminished.
M ore deta il appears in Török  (1996). However, the  advantage can  only be estim a ted  com­
paratively, in relation  to  the  global positions of the  o th er p rivatization  bidders.
It is true , th a t Ansaldo offered fa r the  highest price of th e  seven privatization  app lican ts and 
assum ed th e  m ost com m itm ents (e.g. th e  relocation of the  p roduction  from  th e  cen tra l head q u ar­
ters , e tc .) b u t i t  is also tru e , th a t G an z’ nam e—as well as th e  associated  corporate  im age is still
an  “in tangible asse t” of a  high value a t in te rnational tenders.
In French political parlance, “cohab itation” denotes th e  m echanism s of jo in t governance by
two politically  opposed parties.
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(2) The m ajority  shareholder, having gained control, may see no reason to  acquire 
the s ta te ’s stake a t a higher price.
In the second case, the possibility of a ttrac ting  a second strategic investor, a 
com petitor of the m ajority  ow ner’s, can be alm ost excluded. The only alternative 
to  a sale to  the present m ajority shareholder is to a ttrac t a financial investor. 
W hichever happens, a spectacular rise in the share price before the second sale 
will require the s ta te ’s active participation in restructuring the company (through 
industrial policy, trade policy, or possibly a cash injection).
Ganz Ansaldo Electric PLC  is a m anufacturer of turbo generators for power 
stations, railway and public-transport traction equipm ent and other item s saleable 
m ainly through public-procurem ent tenders. The sta te  has retained a m inority 
shareholding alongside a foreign owner. As a case study, it exemplifies the relevance 
and the lim itations of this reasoning.
T he study has been based on in-depth interviews with various m embers of the 
company m anagem ent, and on secondary source of inform ation.7 The interviews 
were m ade in November and December 1996. The object was to  investigate the 
mechanism of cohabitation between a foreign investor and a representative of the 
s ta te , from the Italian owner’s standpoint, with special emphasis on the restruc­
turing  process and its results and shortcom ings.8 The study tries to identify the 
role the Ita lian  investor has played in this restructuring process. It seeks to  analyse 
the government-business interactions, in term s of the obstacles to  increasing the 
com pany’s in ternational competitiveness and the prospects for doing so.
Privatization
Ganz Electric Works (founded by Á brahám  Ganz in 1844) was facing grave 
liquidity problems by the mid-1980s, well before m ost o ther large SOEs. A part 
from the domestic m arket, Ganz E lectric’s sales were mainly to  Gomecon member- 
countries and certain developing countries supported a t Comecon level for political 
reasons.9 By the second half of the 1980s, the socialist countries were scaling down
7Com pany brochures, balance sheets and  new sletters for 1994-6; Forrás (1996); P K I  (1995); 
Merényi  (1996); Szakadat  (1996); H ungarian press articles on G anz A nsaldo, 1993-6.
8 T his seemingly one-sided approach  is partly  explained by the  passive, non-in terventionist 
stance taken by th e  S ta te  P rivatization  and Asset M anagem ent PLC  as a  shareholder, a n d  p a rtly  
by th e  focus of the  research. T he aim  is to  uncover th e  role of governm ent, no t as an  elem ent
1 n the  corporate  governance stru c tu re , b u t as a  player in  the  governm ent business in teractions 
th a t inevitably  take place in  various business fields. T his focus also m eans th a t  a p a r t  from  some 
references to  events before th e  change of political system , th e  s tu d y  deals only w ith th e  period 
1991-6.
9In th e  1970s and  1980s, G anz had m ade considerable sales to  Iraq , E gypt an d  India (and  
80 me to  A lgeria). All these countries were recipients of official Com econ developm ent aid.
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their support to  favoured developing countries, w ith dram atic effects on the bo ttom  
line for certain enterprises heavily involved in them .10
T he developing countries had begun to orient themselves more to  the  West. 
This induced, or simply coincided with the discovery of these countries as good 
m arkets by W estern m ultinationals. The fall in the dem and for Ganz E lectric’s 
products accelerated with the partia l liberalization of investm ent-good im ports into 
the socialist countries. W estern com petitors m anaged to  squeeze Ganz Electric out 
by offering favourable paym ent conditions in public tenders.
Falling dem and, increasing indebtedness, liquidity problems, and insufficient 
bargaining power by the m anagem ent led to  liquidation proceedings being filed 
against the  enterprise. A lthough this was largely a propaganda move— a dem on­
stra tiv e  exam ple of how the regime was hardening the traditionally  soft budget con­
stra in ts  of a state-socialist system — Ganz Electric later underw ent a governm ent- 
in itia ted  consolidation program m e. Despite this, the performance again worsened 
dram atically  in 1990, when the enterprise had to be placed under direct governm ent 
control. A crisis-m anagem ent program m e seemed essential: the enterprise had run 
up debts to talling  HUF 3.5 bn, with vast useless stocks and a bulging portfolio of 
accounts due.11
The best option, according to government officials, was to  in terest a capital- 
rich foreign investor, and the privatization m ethod chosen was a jo in t venture. This 
would ensure th a t instead of serving fiscal purposes, the purchase money would 
be a “real investm ent” serving restructuring goals. P a rt of the en terprise12 was 
converted into a public lim ited company (R t.) on January  1, 1991; 51 percent of 
the shares were bought by Ansaldo Sp.A, a m ember of the Finm eccanica group 
w ithin the largest Italian  state-ow ned holding company, IRI.
Organizational structure
A key elem ent in any restructuring program m e is to  m odernize the organiza­
tional structure  w ithin the company. Ansaldo followed a gradual, sometimes even 
cyclical policy of organizational renewal, with periods of accelerating change al­
ternating  with consolidation periods. The organizational changes were spurred by 
various corporate events:
1 0H ungary 's p roportion  of overall developm ent aid to GN P in the  first ha lf of th e  1980s varied 
betw een 0.1 and  0.12. Alongside technical assistance in th e  form  of g ran ts an d  scholarships, 
H ungary  specialized in in fras tru c tu ra l aid  program m es, especially railway equipm ent , e lectrical 
engineering, alum inium  and  power stations,  and  in foods an d  pharm aceuticals. Source: OECD  
development cooperation, 1981, 1985 and 1987.
11 T he last am ounted  to  ab o u t H U F 2 bn. (PK I 1995, p. 2 1 .)
12G anz E lectric W orks rem ained as an  SOE. T he final se ttlem ent in itia ted  in Jan u a ry  1994 is 
still in  progress.
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—  T he contraction in dem and in the early years coincided w ith a radical 
downsizing.
—  Cyclical changes took place in the senior and m iddle m anagem ent.
—  A sudden increase in dem and led to  the emergence of grow th problem s 
th a t required further organizational renewal.
—  Some of the production was moved from B udapest to  Tâpiôszele, where 
a new factory— TEM M  Tâpiôszele Electro Mechanical Works— was established as 
a “brown-field” investm ent.
Table 1
Number of employees at year end"
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996***
3800 2302 1856 1612 1515** 2 0 2 1 ** 2300**
* Excluding h ired  tem porary  employees.13
** Including em ploym ent a t TEM M  PLC, Tapioszele.
*** E stim ate .
T he first wave of downsizing occurred in 1991, ju s t after the privatization  
deal, when about a thousand of the 3800 employees in the SOE were not taken 
over by the new company. In the next three years, the payroll fell by about 1400. 
W hite-collar workers were in a b e tter bargaining position, which rapidly d istorted 
the ra tio  of non-production employees to  production workers. The tide turned af­
ter 1993, when it was mainly white-collar staff who were m ade redundant, parallel 
w ith a qualitative change.14 However, the downsizing did not follow the textbook 
procedure, whereby each corporate function is re-evaluated according to  the  anal­
ysis of each separate (separable) p art of the production process, to  arrive a t the 
functional and organizational solution th a t improves efficiency the m ost. (Hammer 
and Champy 1993) W hat happened instead was a blanket type of downsizing. This 
brought a spectacular improvement in productivity during the period of con trac t­
ing dem and, bu t caused bottlenecks once production started  to  rise, due to  the 
abolition of certain functions.
13 T h e  com pany resorted  to  hiring employees from  em ploym ent agencies when o rders began  to 
Pick up  a t  d ram atic  speed. These num bered ab o u t 140 in 1995.
14 A bout 2000 employees were m ade redundan t or left of th e ir  own accord betw een 1991 an d  
1994. Payroll grow th resum ed in  la te  1994, and by the  end of 1996 the  com pany h ad  regained 
its initial size of workforce as a  PLC, b u t with a m uch im proved stru c tu re . T he p roportion  of 
unskilled workers is a  m arginal, 2 -3  percent of all m anual employees. T he first wave of radical 
downsizing and  th e  “rejuvenation" policy pursued by some m anagers led to  th e  loss of m uch 
Company-specific expertise. T h is caused difficulties some years la te r, when th e  order books began  
to  recover. One of the  bo ttlenecks to  fu rther growth a t  G anz Ansaldo is a  shortage of su itab ly  
skilled personnel.
A da Otconomica 49, 1997-98
140 A. SZALAVETZ: KEEPING THE STATE AS A MINORITY SHAREHOLDER
Table 2
Labour productivity (HUF mn)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996“
Net sa les /s ta ff costs* 3.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 4.9 N /A
N et sales/em ploym ent* 1.44 1.5 2.26 3.13 4.9 5.2
Source: Own calculations from  com pany balance sheets.
* Excluding tem porary  agency employees.
“  E stim ate .
Meanwhile the idea of flattening the corporate hierarchy, lessening the num ber 
of decision-making levels and decentralizing au thority  rem ained a  strategic goal, 
ra ther th an  a reality. There were some changes in the senior m anagem ent from  tim e 
to  tim e, and Italian experts arrived to  m anage the tu rn-round of the loss-making 
company. This brought language problems and frequent clashes of cultures at 
p lan t level, where Ita lian  production m anagers supervised H ungarian and im ported 
Rom anian workers.15
The response to  the rapid worsening of the balance-sheet figures was to  cen­
tralize decision-making. Although this reduced the num ber of decision-making 
levels, it m eant th a t strategic managers were involved even in m inor operational 
issues.
The decision-making bodies a t Ganz Ansaldo have m ainly Italian members. 
O ther m ajor decisions are taken in Italy, a t group headquarters .16 S trategic invest­
m ent, buying, financial and other m atters are decided upon a t headquarters.
Marketing and sales strategy and cohabitation
Ganz A nsaldo’s m arketing and sales strategy is determ ined by the following:
— The specific characteristics of its product range, which prescribe the for­
mal framework of com petition and the sales channels.
15 Having been  “socialized” in th e  com m unist period , workers (and  skilled w hite-collar staff) 
found it  difficult to  accustom  them selves to the m ore pa ternalistic , au th o rita rian  style of Ita lian  
m anagers.
16 For instance, th e  decision ab o u t where to  locate  th e  new factory, to  which th e  p resent h ead ­
q u a rte rs  were to  be relocated , was taken in Rome. All kinds of investm ent decisions are considered 
significant enough to  require consu lta tion  w ith the  m ultinational h eadquarte rs. M arketing  and 
buying are  m ore decentralized w ith in  th e  m ultinational organization. T he sources for stra teg ic  
p ro d u c ts  are  determ ined in  Italy, b u t th e  local C om ita to  is responsible for sourcing non-stra teg ic  
in pu ts . (For m ore deta il, see chap ter on corporate  efficiency)
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—  The radical contraction of its domestic m arket, which has transform ed its 
sales orientation and introduced the goal of a global presence even a t subsidiary 
level.
The la tte r factor has become more prom inent. The fact th a t the parent 
m ultinational is a global company with a sales network present in more than  40 
countries did not autom atically bring a global orientation to  the new H ungarian 
subsidiary. Ganz A nsaldo’s presence in selected countries and its retained business 
connections and prospects there after 1990 did not alter the traditionally  domestic 
orientation.
In the first couple of years of the jo in t venture’s existence, m ost of the com­
p an y ’s m arketing efforts went into improving its position on the domestic m arket. 
(Domestic references in this branch of m anufacturing are indispensable for success 
in in ternational tenders.)
Table 3
Ratio of exports to net sales (percent)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
29.7 38.5 40.5 54.0 64.0 69.3
Source-. Own calculations from company balance sheets.
Up to 1995, a 50-60 percent ra tio  of domestic to  to ta l net sales was the 
com pany’s sta ted  objective. Ganz Ansaldo adopted an active approach to  winning 
more domestic orders. I t ran professional presentations for potential customers, 
while lobbying for more public investm ent projects (to  improve m arket conditions) 
and for governmental financial support (export prom otion), so as to  be able to  offer 
b e tter paym ent term s in in ternational tenders.
T he main advantage Ansaldo expected from co-ownership of the com pany 
with the H ungarian sta te  was to benefit from government industrial policy and 
trade policy. The biggest disappointment was not the drastic contraction of the 
H ungarian m arket, bu t the liberalization of the m arket and lack of local-content 
Prescriptions in the privatization contracts of its main domestic custom ers. After 
the privatization of the cement industry and its receipt of the right to im port invest­
m ent goods customs free, Ganz Ansaldo was crowded out of one of its trad itional 
m arkets, where had sold significant numbers of industrial m otors for various kinds 
° f plant.
The second blow was the privatization of the local electricity networks and 
Power stations. The Public Procurem ent Act is incompletely form ulated, so th a t
11 does not apply to this sector a t all. The m anagem ent of Ganz Ansaldo considers
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there is a real danger th a t these privatization deals will lead to  a further radical 
fall in its domestic orders.
So while lobbying at the highest levels for a more coherent industrial and 
trade  policy, Ganz Ansaldo started  to  build up its global presence. The H ungarian 
subsidiary participates in some tenders independently, and in others as p a rt of the 
Ansaldo Group.
In either case, it may deliver its products directly to  the end-user. (As a 
subcontractor in international projects it delivers, installs and services its products 
abroad.) The th ird  possibility is for it to  deliver directly to  other subsidiaries of 
Ansaldo, in a global production cooperation.
T he second m ost frequent m arketing channel covers sales through the world­
wide distribution channels of Ansaldo. This, in other words, is intra-firm, trade, in 
which Ganz Ansaldo products are incorporated into A nsaldo’s complete system s. 
The best indication of its im portance is th a t 90 percent of Ganz A nsaldo’s export 
sales transactions take place in Europe, while only 35-40 percent of exports have 
a final destination in Europe. According to  the original ideas of the  m ultinational 
owner, A nsaldo’s role in providing orders for its H ungarian subsidiary would be 
significant only in the first, “consolidation” phase of restructuring. In the  second, 
“developm ent” phase, Ganz Ansaldo should acquire increasing autonomy, reflected 
by a steady fall in the share of intra-firm  trade and a rise in direct sales.
Besides acquiring orders independently, Ganz Ansaldo is supposed to  repre­
sent the  whole Ansaldo G roup in some markets: neighbouring Eastern and C entral 
E uropean countries, and some N orthern European countries where the H ungarian 
firm has long-standing connections.
A nsaldo’s planned shares in Ganz A nsaldo’s to ta l sales have been revised 
several tim es in the strategic plans. Instead of the original plan— a high initial 
share and a steady decrease thereafter—A nsaldo’s role as a m ain contractor has 
s ta rted  to  show a significant increase only in the last two or three years. The share 
of intra-firm  trade reached about 40 percent in 1994 and 45 percent in 1995 and 
1996. T his causes liquidity problem s for the H ungarian company, as A nsaldo’s 
paym ent deadlines are longer than  the average for Ganz A nsaldo’s contractors, and 
A nsaldo does not accept any advance-paym ent stipulations. (The usual sequencing 
of paym ent a t Ganz Ansaldo is an advance of 10-20 percent on signing the contract, 
10-20 percent when technical docum entation is completed, and a further 20-25 
percent paym ent for purchasing the m aterials and com ponents.) Ansaldo, on the 
other hand, pays only after the delivery and installation of the ordered p roduct— 
with a paym ent deadline averaging 120 days.
According to some members of Ganz A nsaldo’s m arketing staff, the  most 
im portan t com petitive advantages, apart from a good financial position, are local 
connections (and of course quality, s tric t observation of delivery deadlines, and so 
on) and an active approach. Some in ternational tenders are form ulated in a way 
th a t benefits certain  bidders more than  others. To achieve a b e tter position in
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in ternational tenders, bidders have to  know in advance where tenders are going to 
be invited (in which countries and which areas). Moreover, they need to  m onitor 
the global m arket opportunities, identifying the potential needs in specific fields 
and the sources of finance (the EBRD, World Bank, etc.) they can propose to 
governm ents and companies.
So it is crucial to have agents in various countries who know the m ain players 
in the m arket and can keep an eye out for the opportunities th a t emerge.
A nother kind of active approach is to hold presentations abroad, w ith the 
help of H ungary’s commercial representatives, for the benefit of relevant m inistries 
or m inisters. Plans for necessary infrastructural projects in the country can be 
presented, along w ith Ganz A nsaldo’s potential role in the realizing of these. Such 
presentations may prom pt foreign governments or m inistries to  invite a tender 
form ulated in a way favourable to  Ganz Ansaldo.
A further possibility is to examine Ganz A nsaldo’s product reference lists. 
These go back to  the 1950s, recording the year of sale, the technical specifications 
of the product sold, the client and the destination. By calculating product life 
spans, G anz Ansaldo staff can forecast when specific m arket opportunities may 
arise.
Supplier relations
Like m ost H ungarian enterprises under the state-socialist system , Ganz Elec­
tric W orks’ production was almost completely vertically integrated. It had its own 
foundry, welding plant and galvanizing plant. I t m anufactured its own bearings and 
insulated cables, and m ost of the machinery need for production. This astonishing 
proportion of in-house inputs began to  diminish some decades before privatization, 
and the process accelerated significantly thereafter. Even today it rem ains higher 
than a t Ansaldo or its in ternational com petitors despite the aims of establishing 
optim al out-sourcing proportions, and buying whatever can be bought from  spe­
cialized companies, ra ther th an  producing in-house.
A part from the “m ake-or-buy” issue, the purchasing strategy of a com pany is 
usually analysed by exam ining whom the company buys from, w hether there have 
been any changes in sourcing and preferences since the change of ownership, and 
w hat factors influence buying decisions.
In term s of strategic material inputs there have been no radical changes in 
Ganz A nsaldo’s sourcing policy. Many of the strategic input item s have always been 
Produced by no more than  three to  four producers worldwide. This means th a t even
111 periods of stric t im port controls, the same producers would be used. Specific 
sourcing decisions are taken prim arily on the basis of the technical specifications. 
Com pared with these, even prices, delivery dates and delivery have secondary im­
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portance. Under these circumstances, rules of origin, tariff considerations and so 
on will not have a great influence. Only when all other circum stances are equal 
will Ganz Ansaldo opt, say, for a European or an Italian  supplier.
The num ber and proportion of Ganz A nsaldo’s Hungarian suppliers fell by 
some 10-15 percent in the initial years of the joint venture’s operation. This was 
due to  the  slowness of suppliers in adapting  to A nsaldo’s requirem ents on price, 
quality, delivery and paym ent deadlines.17
Since 1994, Ganz Ansaldo has laid considerable em phasis on increasing the 
proportion  of domestic suppliers. It may rent plant to  its suppliers (often under a 
rent-free agreem ent), and pre-finance some of their production by delivering m ate­
rial inputs. This is part of the com pany’s overall cost-cutting policy. W ith  exported 
products, Ganz Ansaldo can reclaim  the supplem entary customs du ty  on im ported 
item s, which its suppliers (delivering to  Ganz Ansaldo) cannot.
A m anagem ent-textbook m ethod of cost-cutting is centralized sourcing. In­
creasing the purchased quantity  improves the bargaining position of the buyer. 
A nsaldo Industria  operates a d a ta  bank th a t includes the m ain suppliers to  A nsaldo’s 
various subsidiaries, and some inform ation about the prices and specifications of 
the various inputs supplied. This makes it possible to  combine purchasing ileeds 
and find the optim al supplier. T he same objective is served by efforts a t product 
standardization .
T he strategic principles of sourcing are overshadowed by the grave liquidity 
problems of the company, detailed in the next chapter. Faced with long paym ent 
arrears by its m ajor customers, Ganz Ansaldo has been forced to  increase dras­
tically its stock of commercial paym ents due. The lack of a coherent paym ent 
s tra teg y 18 and foreseeable paym ent conditions prom pted Ganz A nsaldo’s suppli­
ers to  adopt unilateral measures to  urge paym ent, or stop further supplies. This 
causes unnecessary changes in Ganz Ansaldo’s supplier circle. A liquidity m anage­
m ent program m e adopted in September 1996 prescribes longer paym ent deadlines, 
which the com pany undertakes to keep.
17 T he insolvency of several suppliers in the  early 1990s an d  the  stream lining efforts of th e  su r­
vivors also con tribu ted  to  lessening the  local content of G anz A nsaldo’s p roducts . T he H ungarian 
C able W orks exemplifies the  second case. Bought up  by Siem ens, it phased  ou t some item s of its 
p ro d u c t portfolio, including diesel-oil resistant cables. G anz Ansaldo had been a  long-standing 
and reg u la r custom er for these, b u t in relatively sm all quan tities. W hen the  p ro d u c t was dropped, 
G anz A nsaldo faced difficulties in obtain ing  the  sam e sm all quan tity  from  a  foreign company.
18T here  was no “system atic" d iscrim ination am ong the  various suppliers in th is  respect. The 
u sual differentiating factors (size of supplier, nationality, im portance of inpu t supplied, existence 
or lack of a  trad itio n a l business relationship  or of an  annual supply  con tract, existing d eb t to  the 
supplier, e tc .) have no t seemed to  affect Ganz A nsaldo’s decisions on w hether to  pay now or later-
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Corporate efficiency
The financial consolidation of a company, with the restructuring  and im ­
provem ent of its debt portfolio, is a key element of restructuring. W hen corporate 
growth resumes, after a necessary period of downsizing, it m ust rest on an increase 
in corporate efficiency, a renewed m arketing, sales and product policy, and a sound 
financial basis. Otherwise, according to  the m anagem ent textbooks, there will be 
the well-known pitfall of grow th-related negative liquidity. This chapter considers 
the initial financial consolidation of the company, before going on to  analyse its cost 
policy and rationalization measures. After exam ining its investm ents and liquidity 
problem s in the light of growth resum ption, the chapter concludes w ith a look at 
the indicators th a t highlight the improved corporate perform ance.
As m entioned in the introduction, Ganz Electric Works was in a difficult s it­
uation  in 1990, when its main m arkets having radically diminished (H ungary) or 
collapsed altogether (the GD R and the Soviet Union). T his left it as an enter­
prise w ith depreciated, worn-out assets. (Even basic m aintenance activities were 
being postponed “until b e tter days” , and no new development was being under­
taken.) W ithou t A nsaldo’s massive capital injection, the new m arkets brought by 
the m ultinational, and the restructuring measures imposed, the com pany would 
probably have been crowded out of the market and gone into liquidation before its 
150th anniversary.19
The new jo in t venture did not take over the SO E’s huge stock of debt. The 
initial issued capital of HUF 2083.3 mn was 51 percent-owned by Ansaldo and 49 
Percent by Ganz Electric Works. The S tate Privatization Agency (SPA) holds a 
golden share with a face value of HUF 10,000. Ganz Electric W orks’ m ade its 
capital contribution in kind: p lants and assets, bu t no inventories. The existing 
stocks rem ained the property of Ganz Electric Works and were gradually taken over 
hy Ganz Ansaldo. The jo in t venture took over the headquarters site in B udapest 
and four o ther premises. The former is only rented, because it was stipu lated  in 
the privatization contract th a t Ganz Ansaldo should relocate its production away 
from the centre of Budapest.
The huge trading losses (to  be detailed later) m eant th a t capital injections 
were required in every year except 1992. The issued capital rose to  HUF 4050 mn 
>o 1993, HUF 5706.4 mn in 1994, and HUF 7683.1 mn in 1995. A lthough Ansaldo 
explicitly required th a t the original ownership proportions should rem ain, which 
was accepted at the time, the Hungarian sta te  has not contributed to any of the 
subsequent capital increases. This means th a t A nsaldo’s share in the equity rose 
74.8 percent in 1993, 82.13 percent in 1994, and 86.7 percent in 1995.
G anz A nsaldo came 1 1 1 th  in the  1996 list of the top  2 0 0  H ungarian com panies by ne t sales 
revenue. It was am ong the  ten  firms m oving up  fastest, having been 196th on th e  1994 list.
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T his leads back to  the question, raised in the in troduction , of the argum ents 
for and against preserving a m inority share in sta te  ownership when a com pany 
is sold to  a foreign professional investor. Why is the sta te  content to  rem ain as a 
passive owner, refusing to  take any strategic steps implying an intention to obtain  
a b e tter price when it sells its rem aining shares? Why has it allowed its stake to 
decline?
Even the parent company was expecting trading losses for several years, due 
to  the restructuring and huge capital investm ent required. These factors, along 
w ith the dram atic shrinkage of the overall m arket dem and, obviously m eant th a t 
the company would not break even for some tim e. However, the actual losses 
exceeded the most pessimistic expectations, continuing to grow each year up to  
1994:
Table 4
Profits before tax (HUF mn)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
-5 2 8 .5 -1339 .1 -1 6 5 6 .3 -1 9 6 3 .6 1 0 .2 29.48
Source: Company balance sheets.
In the light of these results, it is more interesting still to see how the sta te  
fared while passively allowing its stake to diminish. Strangely enough, in spite of 
the passive nature  of the transaction and the disappointing company results, the 
s ta te  brought about a dram atic increase in the effective price paid by its partner for 
increasing its stake. The initial value of Ansaldo’s investm ent when the jo in t venture 
was founded was HUF 1062 mn, for 51 percent of the shares, so th a t each 1 percent 
of Ganz Ansaldo cost HUF 20.82 mn in 1991. W hen the first capital injection was 
m ade by Ansaldo in 1993, the issued capital rose by HUF 1966 mn and A nsaldo’s 
share of it by 23.8 percentage points. The cost of obtaining 1 percent of the shares 
had risen to HUF 82.6 mn, an increase of 396 percent. W hen Ansaldo m ade its 
second capital injection in 1994, its share of the equity rose by 7.33 percentage 
points. The cost of 1 percent of the shares was then HUF 225.9 m n, which m eant a 
fu rther increase of 273.5 percent. Finally, the th ird  injection in 1995 cost Ansaldo 
HUF 1976.7 mn for an increase of 4.57 percentage points in its stake: each 1 percent' 
had cost HUF 432.5 mn, representing a 191.4 percent increase.
However, if the calculation is made in the more usual, backward direction, 
the increase in the cost of 1 percent of the equity is less dram atic. It corresponds
20 C alculating  how m uch a "further” 1 percent share costs is a k ind of “forward" calculation. 1 
usual way of calculating th e  value of th e  shares acquired is to  d ivide the  cum ulative investment' 
in to  th e  increase of issued cap ita l by th e  cum ulative am ount of the  shares owned.
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more closely to  the increase in the to tal issued capital: HUF 20.82 m n in 1991, 
HUF 40.48 m n in 1993, HUF 57 mn in 1994 and HUF 76.8 mn in 1995.
W hy did Ansaldo accept such a seemingly bad bargain— an increase a t a tim e 
when the com pany’s results would have warranted a sharp fall in the value of its 
shares?21 W hy did Ansaldo insist on retaining the presence of the s ta te  and the 
label of a partly  state-owned company? One aspect may have been the benefits 
ascribed to s ta te  ownership, although these have yet to  m aterialize:
—  The sta te  authorities have lobbying powers th a t may help to  obtain  orders 
a t home.
—  The efforts of H ungary’s economic diplom ats may gain ex tra  orders in 
countries w ith which Hungary has good diplom atic relations.
-----The company increases its chances of benefiting from various sta te  funds
aimed a t increasing exports, local capital form ation, regional development, employ­
m ent, etc.
—  There is a greater chance of retaining the h itherto  rented headquarters 
office building in the centre of Budapest, which the s ta te  provided as a capital 
contribution in kind.
Ansaldo also hopes th a t the Hungarian sta te  (now represented by the S tate 
P rivatization and Asset M anagement PLC) may change its passive approach and 
participate in further capital increases.22 For instance, after the relocation of pro­
duction to Tapioszele and the sale of the valuable central B udapest property, the 
proceeds could be the s ta te ’s contribution to Ganz A nsaldo’s future. (Merényi 
1996)
Meanwhile Ganz Ansaldo is making every effort to break even. As a m an­
ufacturer of one-off products, the com pany’s operating results may vary widely
21 G eneral Electric chose a “usual m arket-econom y m ethod” under sim ilar circum stances. W hen 
losses a t its H ungarian acquisition, Tungsram , exceeded its expectations, and  the  future viability 
° f the com pany required a further capital injection, it decided to  write down the  value of GE- 
T ungsram 's shares. GE was likewise forced into a  unilateral cap ital injection, as its  H ungarian 
Partner, the  state-ow ned H ungarian C redit Bank, refused to follow suit. In  th is  case, General 
E lectric’s unila tera l capital injection squeezed out the  H ungarian partner.
22 It is w orth  considering to  w hat extent G anz Ansaldo can be considered a  partly  state-ow ned 
Company a t all. W hen the jo in t venture was form ed, 49 percent of the shares went to G anz E lectric 
Works, an SOE th a t  is currently  being wound up. So the s ta te  ownership has been indirect (ap art 
from the  sym bolic golden share held by the SPA). This ownership d istribu tion—th e  fact th a t  the 
Minority shareholder is no t the  SPA, b u t an SOE undergoing liquidation— may am ply explain 
the s ta te ’s passive behaviour, in corporate governance, and  in refraining from  con tribu ting  to  the 
capital injections. A nsaldo’s expectations have been thw arted  in th is respect. A nsaldo h ad  also 
e*Pected the  s ta te  to  play a m ore active role in producing macroeconom ic conditions favourable 
to the com pany's growth. T he s ta te ’s perform ance in “pro tecting” national industries w ith ap t
coherent industria l and  trad e  policies has been very weak. T he sam e applies to  its  efforts 
a t economic diplom acy. Lobbying for in ternational business opportun ities for national com panies 
a widely used instrum ent of economic diplomacy. In ternational experience, however, does not 
o^ p s t  a  correlation of th is w ith s ta le  ownership. This again m eans th a t  A nsaldo’s expectations 
cohabitation" were misconceived.
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according to the mix of orders and products in a particu lar year. However, the 
huge fixed costs mean th a t operating profits are greatly determ ined by the volume 
of sales.
Table 5
Net sales and operating profits (HUF mnj
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
N et sales 
O perating  profits
3317.7
-500.9
2806.7
-1052.3
3651.4
-1308.4
4752.4
-1314.6
9977.9
1017.2
12816.7
1161.5
Source: Com pany balance sheets.
These figures raise the question whether Ganz Ansaldo has already m anaged 
to  break even with this m arked increase in orders and net sales.
The answer requires further consideration of the figures. Insofar as the  oper­
ating  profits in 1995 exceeded HUF 1 bn, the company indeed broke even. However, 
it is worth considering net sales alone, w ithout o ther income, which grew consid­
erably, and w ithout the changes in the stock of the capitalized own perform ance 
(i.e. changes in the stock of self-produced assets and self-m anufactured invento­
ries), which increased more th an  tenfold in 1995. The resulting difference between 
net sales and to ta l costs ( “operating profit” ) will be negative: IIUF -9 4 4 .6 7  mn 
in 1995 and HUF -1327.6  mn in 1996. Assuming sim ilar shares for the various 
cost item s ( Table 6), the break-even point th a t guarantees a stable operating profit 
(w ith capitalized own perform ance) comes at a level of net sales of HUF 14-15 bn.
The figures in Table 6 show th a t the sum  of the cost shares directly influencing 
operating  profits exceeds 100 percent of net sales in every year. (It is also apparen t 
th a t the drastic contraction of dem and—net sales—distorted the individual cost 
proportions in 1992-3 and the radical changes in the proportions when net sales 
more than  doubled in 1995.) To calculate the potential break-even point, account 
m ust also be taken of some other items of income and of the value of capitalized 
own perform ance. The share of these altogether was 9.8 percent of net sales in
1994, 19.6 percent in 1995 and 19.4 in 1996.
T he item  of financial costs—expenses on financial transactions— is the one 
considerable item  th a t can be modified relatively easily in a  cost-cutting pro­
gram m e. Since 1991, Ganz Ansaldo has had no long-term  liabilities. I t finances 
its production and exports w ith short-term  loans. A lthough there was a radical 
im provement in 1995, the indebtedness (equity/liabilities) is still far from the rel­
atively favourable initial proportion .23 (See Table 7)
23 The favourable initial proportion arose because the newly created joint venture had been 
cleansed o f earlier financial obligations.
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Table 6
Kanou.s cost items’  compared with net sales (percent)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
M aterials 75.9 62.5 63.8 60.2 63.5 67.9
Labour 31.2 43.2 40.3 34.3 2 0 .2 20.5
D epreciation 1 .6 5.4 6.5 6.7 3.8 3.2
O ther costs 17.3 17.6 13.6 17.0 9.9 8 .0
O th er expenses 2.9 13.0 19.9 19.2 11.9 1 0 .6
Sub-total** 128.9 141.7 144.1 137.4 109.3 1 1 0 .2
Source-. Own calculations from  company balance sheets.
*In th is tab le  I analyse only th e  costs th a t  influence operating  profits. F inancial costs a re  deta iled  
la te r. “M aterials” m eans m ateria l-type costs, n o t ju s t m ateria ls in th e  s tr ic t sense. “L abour” 
Weans gross labour costs.
**I call th is a  sub -to ta l, because there  are m any item s no t detailed here th a t  influence th e  b o tto m  
line of the  company. This line analyses the  tren d  in th e  share of costs th a t  directly  influence the  
fictive category  of the  operating-profit (other-incom e) value of capitalized  own perform ance. T his 
I created  as an  ind ica to r to  work w ith when calculating the break-even point.
Table 7
Equity/liabilities ratio (percent)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
87.5 14.9 15.9 7.3 25.1 19.5
Source: Own calculations from  com pany balance sheets.
T he indicator for profits on financial transactions relative to  operating  profits 
even more telling:
Table 8
Profits on financial transactions/operating profits* (percent)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
- 5 .5  - 2 7 -2 7 .9 -5 0 .8  - 9 6 -9 0 .2
O
ource: Company balance sheets.
I he minus sign indicates that the loss from financial transaction diminishes the operating profits 
or increases the losses. So if the operating profits were themselves negative, I did not change the 
^ n u s  sign, to indicate that the balance o f financial transactions was always negative.
As can be seen from these figures, the loss on financial transactions alm ost 
consumed the operating  profits in 1995 and 1996. This provides some justification
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for the argum ent of Ganz A nsaldo’s m anagem ent th a t costs could be radically cut 
and the com pany’s performance and profitability improved by a further considerable 
capital injection, not simply to  finance the losses, but to  improve the current assets 
position or the liability portfolio.
Ganz Ansaldo is trying to improve its current-assets position by introducing 
a  stric t inventory-control system  th a t will curb the velocity of individual inventory 
item s and try  to  discover frozen items. In the early years of the jo in t venture, 
inventory m anagem ent was facilitated by a stipulation in the privatization contract. 
Ganz Ansaldo would not take over Ganz Electric W orks’ inventories autom atically, 
only gradually, as specific needs arose. The share of inventories relative to  net 
sales has been a rem arkably stable 28-9 percent every year since the new com pany 
was founded. The situation  is much more difficult w ith another com ponent of 
curren t assets: receivables. Ganz A nsaldo’s trade receivables have always m ade up 
a considerable share of its current assets. The proportion improved significantly in
1995. (See Table 9)
These d a ta  show (1) an improving current-assets position, with the volume 
of current assets exceeding or very close to net sales since 1993, bu t (2) a relatively 
unfavourable current-assets portfolio, with a high share of trade receivables.
Table 9
Trade receivables as a proportion of current assets and of net sales (percent)
T rade receivables relative to
C urren t assets Net sales
1991 42.0 33.5
1992 39.0 27.2
1993 38.6 39.9
1994 31.8 34.1
1995 19.9 18.9
1996 15.2 14.7
Source'. Own calculations from  com pany balance sheets.
T he dram atic improvement in 1995 looks much less favourable if the item  
“other receivables” is considered. The item  includes receivables from partner com­
panies, such as other Ansaldo subsidiaries and the Ganz Electric Works, now under­
going liquidation. Figures for the receivables from partner companies are available 
only for 1993, 1994 and 1995, when they made up 57 percent, 91 percent and 93 
percent of the ’other receivables’ respectively.
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“T otal” trad e  receivables relative to
C urren t assets Net sales
1993 51.5 53.2
1994 67.0 71.9
1995 63.0 59.8
1 9 9 6 " 52.0 50.3
Source: Own calculations from  company balance sheets.
‘ T rade  receivables +  receivables from  p a rtn e r companies, d a ta  for 1996 are  estim ated  ones.
These figures show not only the increasing proportion  of in tra-industry  trade, 
bu t the especially intense liquidity pressure on Ganz A nsaldo’s operations.24 The 
other side of the coin is best reflected by the custom ary indicator: the ratio  of trade 
receivables to  trade payables. (See Table 11)
Table 11
Ratio of trade rcceivables to trade payables (percent)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1.35 1.40 2.70 1.40 0.76 0.59
Source: Own calculations from  com pany balance sheets.
The dram atic worsening of this figure since 1995 is worrying. T his is an 
indicator th a t sheds light on the com pany’s ability to  cover operating  costs ou t of 
current revenues. It has more relevance to  daily operational issues than  any of the 
operative indicators calculated “in principle” .25 The problem could be solved by an 
additional cash injection from the m ultinational shareholder. This, after the huge 
am ount of previous investm ent aimed a t restructuring and m odernization, would 
capitalize” the company by improving its current-asset position.
24 T he situation  im proved substan tia lly  in 1996.
2 iT he concerns a re  reflected on the  business pages of H ungarian  dailies, where false a larm s 
a bout liquidation  proceedings against G anz Ansaldo have already appeared  m ore th a n  once. T he 
s ,tuation  is n o t as bad as th a t ,  of course. In reality, liquidation  proceedings are a  bargain ing  tool 
°ften  used in d eb t collection by H ungarian companies. A creditor who loses patience applies for 
the liquidation  of the  deb tor company. T his m ay p rom pt the  deb to r to  pay, so th a t  th e  su it is 
"’¡thdraw n. For m ore detail, see Szanyi  (1997).
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Ansaldo has certainly invested a large am ount in modernizing its H ungarian 
subsidiary: a cumulative to ta l of HUF 10.4 bn till the end of 1995, which equals 8 
percent of A nsaldo’s global investment. (Merényi 1996) Besides loss-financing26 the 
biggest item  of investm ent was the construction of a new factory to  which produc­
tion is being relocated from the B udapest headquarters, in line w ith a contractual 
stipu la tion  of the 1991 privatization deal.
The locational choice fell on the premises of the previously state-ow ned M et­
alworks C onstruction Enterprise.
The existing premises proved unsuitable for Ganz A nsaldo’s purposes and 
had to be completely rebuilt to  meet its technological requirem ents (a  “brown- 
field” investm ent). The new factory, tailor-m ade to the com pany’s technological 
and logistic requirem ents, brought a spectacular increase in efficiency. Instead of 
production  and machinery on three floors, which led to  logistic chaos, it became 
possible to  apply optim um  m ethods of production organization from scratch .27
T he investm ent required was considerable, however. The site was short of 
basic in frastructure, which added to the relocation costs. W hen the problem  was 
viewed from Rome, the distance of 80 km from Budapest did not appear to  be an 
insurm ountable obstacle. But in a poorly developed area of the country, the journey 
takes two hours by car or bus, which precludes daily com muting. Employees had to 
accept either weekly com m uting (with weekday hostel accom m odation) or a move 
to  Tâpiôszele. The Hungarian workforce is characterized by low mobility, w ith a 
particu lar reluctance to  move away from B udapest. I t was expected th a t m any of 
the skilled workers would quit when the relocation of production was com plete (by 
the end of 1996).
Looking at the composition of A nsaldo’s investm ent, it tu rns out th a t after 
the grandiose investm ent in the new plant, the next biggest item — HUF 10.4 bn— 
has been creation of a viable28 current-assets position. (The inventories had not 
been carried over into the jo in t venture.)29
26T he cum ulative am ount of the  un ila tera l capital increases m ade accounts for ab o u t 55-8 
percen t of th e  to ta l investm ent.
27T his gave G anz Ansaldo th e  k ind  of clean sla te  enjoyed by countries th a t  were la te  in 
industrializing.
28In an  industry  m arked by a  long period of re tu rn  on p ro ducts , a  viable curren t-asse ts position  
would be a  level of a t least 1 0 0  percent. B e tte r still would be 110-120 percent for th e  app ro p ria te  
ind ica to r (cu rren t assets to  to ta l assets).
29M uch of the  in itial cash injection of capital by A nsaldo went on acquiring o u tp u ts  an d  bu ild ­
ing u p  acceptable inventory  levels.
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The following table provides some evidence for the claim th a t the huge 
am ount invested went mainly into creating a viably operating  company, ra ther 
th an  acquiring new machines and equipm ent.30
Table 12
Ratio of current assets to total assets (percent)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
70 52 65 71.6 82.4 83.9
Source: Own calculations from  com pany balance sheets.
These figures support the claim th a t it takes a long tim e and a large invest­
m ent to build up a viable company. In Ganz A nsaldo’s case, the process is far 
from over. Nonetheless, after worsening rapidly, Ganz A nsaldo’s profitability indi­
cators took a spectacular tu rn  for the better in 1995.31 The differences between the 
indicators in Table 13 show th a t the main bottlenecks are of financial character:
Table 13
Some indicators of profitability
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
O p eratin g  p ro fits /n e t sales (percent) -1 5 .0 -3 7 .0 -3 5 .8 -2 7 .6 1 0 .2 9.0
P re -tax  p ro fits /n e t sales (percent) -1 5 .9 -4 7 .5 -4 5 .3 -4 1 .3 0 .1 0 .2
O perating  p ro fits /equ ity  (percent) -2 8 .7 -244 .1 -1 7 8 .1 -2 9 8 .8 44.8 50.7
P re -tax  profit s /equ ity  (percent) -3 0 .3 -3 0 9 .4 -2 2 5 .5 -2 2 5 .5 0.45 1.28
Source: Own calculations from  company balance sheets.
These d a ta  underline the assum ption made in the introduction. W ithou t a 
well-capitalized foreign investor able to  finance the initial losses of the company and 
>nvest huge am ounts in restoring the viability of its operations, the  company would 
have gone into liquidation long ago. The indicators (especially those com paring 
gross profits with the various corporate attribu tes) do not return to  w hat can be 
considered norm ality even in 1995, while in previous years they issued increasingly 
fa rm in g  signals. It must not be forgotten th a t the company is carrying forward
°D ue to th e  special character of th e  p roducts , G anz Ansaldo invests a  g rea t deal in  research 
ar»d developm ent an d  workforce training. M em bers of the  research and developm ent s ta ff spend 
m°n th s and  years a t the  Italian  headquarte rs, p a rtic ip a tin g  in jo in t developm ent program m es.
T he reason, as m entioned before, was a  d ram atic  increase in orders, or to  p u t it an o th e r way, 
a d ram atic  im provem ent in th e  com pany’s ability to  ob tain  orders.
Acta Oeconomica 49, 1997-98
154 A. SZALAVETZ: KEEPING THE STATE AS A MINORITY SHAREHOLDER
huge losses from previous years, and still faces huge costs before its grandiose 
investm ent program m e is completed. Here it is worth recalling th a t A nsaldo is 
owned by the Ita lian  state. It m ight be hypothetically assumed th a t if th is had 
not been the case, and the foreign investor had been subject to stronger short-term  
profitability constraints, the company might have been left to its fate before the 
tu rn-round took place.
Conclusions and prospects
Ganz A nsaldo’s foreign m ajority owner has made sweeping changes to  the 
com pany’s organizational, control and operational structure. The new m arket op­
portun ities it brought have reoriented Ganz A nsaldo’s m arket relations. I t has 
taken  the initial steps towards ensuring viable financial and technological condi­
tions for stable growth. Ganz A nsaldo’s ability to  acquire orders has been d ram at­
ically improved by the ISO 9001 quality-audit system , creative m anagem ent of the 
product mix, and provision of the infrastructural and technological background for 
im proving efficiency. The changes have brought Ganz Ansaldo much closer to  the 
break-even point.
T he benefits have not all been on one side. The investor has gained on 
in ternational m arkets from the well-established Ganz brand  name. It has acquired 
G anz’s skilled and inexpensive research and development staff, m any of whom have 
worked for periods of several m onths at the Italian  headquarters. Ganz A nsaldo’s 
full inclusion into A nsaldo’s worldwide m arketing and distribution  channels will 
cause a synergy th a t improves the global m arket position of the m ultinational 
investor as well.32 A lthough some aspects of the strategic m anagem ent policy have 
had negative side-eiTects,33 the presence of a well-capitalized m ultinational investor 
financing Ganz A nsaldo’s losses and its restructuring and investm ent requirem ents 
vindicates the privatization decision in 1990.
Still, confidence between the Italian  and Hungarian m anagem ent needs to 
be restored. If Hungarian middle m anagem ent had the powers to  provide a real­
istic feedback, their h itherto  frustrated  energies, ideas and local knowledge could 
contribute greatly to improving the still mixed prospects facing the company.
32 One of A nsaldo's m ain reasons for m aking the  investm ent was th a t  the  SO E 's p roduct portfolio  
was com plem entary to  its  own. A com plete portfolio of p roducts is indispensable these days for 
a b idder for in te rnational turnkey projects.
33 However, w hat m edium -sized or large com pany is ever free of m ism anagem ent sym ptom s?
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BANK RESTRUCTURING IN HUNGARY 
I. ÁBEL— L. SZAKADÁT
In this study the authors describe the process of bank restructuring in Hungary. They argue 
that the “desertion" of the state exacerbated the financial distress o f the enterprise and financial 
sectors. Moreover, the delayed responses of the government were inadequate in many respects. 
The recapitalization of the banking sector was rather costly, partly because the occurrence of 
moral hazards were not prevented. Nonetheless, some positive signs can also be seen. The 
respective portfolios of banks improved significantly and this made the privatization of state-owned 
commercial banks possible. In fact, the sale of these financial institutions was completed in 1997. 
The controlling-stakes of privatised banks have mainly been obtained by strategic investors and 
therefore the state no longer has direct control over credit allocation in the Hungarian economy. 
All these factors suggest that Hungary is, so far, the most successful in transforming the banking 
sector in the Central European economies. Eventually, this may help the development o f the 
economy as a whole.
This study  reviews the development of the Hungarian banking sector since 
the late 1980s.1 The process has not been at all sm ooth and steady. The political 
decision to  reform the banking sector was taken under the auspices of the old regime 
in 1983. However, the transition  was completed in 1997, with the privatisation of all 
large state-ow ned commercial banks (SOCB). Privatisation of the former SOCBs 
was nowhere on the agenda of the socialist government in the 1980s. Since then 
private banks have become dom inant and a significant part of the H ungarian credit 
m arket is now controlled by foreign banks. Here we will focus on the restructuring  of 
sta te  banks; this process has resulted in an alm ost fully-fledged private commercial 
banking sector, the first in C entral Europe. We will sketch the developm ent of the 
banking sector before 1992, discussing the evolution of the bad debt problem , and 
the various policy measures Hungarian governments have taken in order to stabilise 
domestic banks. We will also try  to  show the alternatives policymakers had to 
choose from. A lthough the process has been long and expensive, the respective 
Portfolios of the SOCBs have been cleaned. We will argue th a t this development 
was more or less determ ined by the liberalisation of the entry of foreign banks in
1989 and by the adoption of the Banking Act in December 1991. As a result of this 
Process, m any SOCBs were privatised. The controlling stakes of privatised banks
1 An earlier version of th is study  was presented  as a  paper a t th e  CERT/Pkare-ACE Conference 
0n Bank and Enterprise Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe, E dinburgh, M ay 2—3, 1997. 
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Research S u p p o rt Scheme of the  Higher E ducation Support Program m e" (g ran t # :  876/1995).
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have been obtained m ainly by strategic investors and therefore the s ta te  no longer 
has any direct control over credit allocation in the Hungarian economy. All these 
facts suggest th a t Hungary has, so far, been the most successful am ong the C entral 
European economies in transform ing the banking sector, and this should eventually 
help in developing the economy as a whole.
Reforming the Hungarian banking sector, 1987-1991
In 1987, following a political decision, a two-tier banking system  was artifi­
cially created by decrees. The credit departm ents of the N ational Bank of Hungary 
(NBH) were split into three, creating the respective foundations of the three large 
commercial banks. G radually the central bank withdrew from the direct financing 
of enterprises.2 The prim ary goal of the reform was to  create a com petitive environ­
m ent for credit allocation (free from sta te  intervention), and to establish a proper 
stru c tu re  for effective m onetary policy. This early phase of transform ation was 
reviewed in Esirin et. al. (1992), Spéder (1991) and Spéder and Várhegyi (1992); 
Nyers and Lutz (1992) provides good source of data.
T he newly-established commercial banks—the Hungarian Credit Bank (MHB), 
the N ational Commercial and Credit Bank (K&H) and the B udapest Bank (BB)— 
inherited their portfolios and clientele from the central bank. T he equity base of 
these banks was inadequate a t the time when they were formed. In the early 1990s 
a significant p a rt of their loan portfolios became non-perform ing as a consequence 
of the economic recession. The problem was exacerbated by the weaknesses of the 
m anagem ent and staff, who were unable to secure prudent operation, properly eval­
uate  new loan applications, make correct risk assessment, or conduct o ther evalua­
tions. Moreover, banking regulation was poorly designed and effective supervision 
did not exist. This la tte r fact made banks vulnerable to political interventions.
2 However, indirect contro l through central bank  refinancing tem porarily  played an  im p o rtan t 
role in th e  sho rt-te rm  borrowing of enterprises and  is still significant in  long-term  financing. At 
th e  beginning of 1987 th e  gap betw een the  assets, equity  and  deposit stocks of th e  newly created  
SO CBs was entirely  filled up w ith refinancing credits of th e  NBH. T his stock am ounted  to  70 
percent of th e  to ta l liabilities of the  large banks. Due to  an  increase in  their deposits , equity, and  
th e  developm ent of in terbank  m oney m arket, banks becam e m ore independent from  cen tra l bank  
refinancing. However, in 1990 these sources still accounted for 15 percent of the  banking  sec to r’s 
to ta l  liabilities.
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How did banks accumulate bad loans?
Bad debts include those inherited from the past and, in cases in which the 
whole issue is a stock problem , those generated by the banks themselves (which 
is a flow problem ). These two cases of debt can, and probably must, be trea ted  
differently (see Bonin and Schaffer 1995). H ungarian SOCBs bo th  inherited and 
produced bad loans. For this reason accurate and well-designed sta te  in tervention 
would have been necessary in order to  solve the stock problem, in line w ith com­
prehensive changes in the regulatory framework, in order to  curb the flow problem . 
In practice, however, precisely the opposite happened. F irst, the  sta te  deserted the 
economy (type 1 “desertion of the s ta te” ) and then it also drew back from  run ­
ning the m arket infrastructure (type 2 “desertion of the s ta te” ). (For more details 
see Abel and Bonin 1994.) This study is concerned w ith the second type of state 
desertion, which has proved to be ra ther costly for the H ungarian taxpayers.
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Source: N ational B ank of H ungary
Fig. 1 Nominal interest rates and the interest margin (percent)
The switch to  a two-tier banking system  took place at th a t tim e when the 
economy fell in to  recession and inflation started  to  increase. (See Figures 1 and 2.) 
I his development had a significant im pact on both sides of the credit m arket. On 
the supply side long-term  financing became riskier because of increasing inflation- 
ary uncertainty (m aking rational calculation for the longer term  more difficult). As 
a consequence of all these facts, banks stopped extending more investm ent credits.
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Real loan rale ----------Real deposit rate
Source: National Bank of Hungary
Fig. 2 Short term real interest rates (percent)
T he dem and for loans by first-rate clients also decreased. A lthough the dem and by 
sm all businesses continuously increased as a consequence of the growing num ber 
of sm all private ventures, this could not counterbalance the decreasing dem and of 
creditw orthy clients. ( Table 1 shows the changes in some aggregates of the Hun­
garian economy and the banking sector. See also Figure 3 .) Lending to  completely 
new businesses was also ra ther risky. A lthough to  some extent both  dem and and 
supply were sim ultaneously constrained, the two effects could not cancel each other 
out. The situation got worse because good, creditworthy firms switched to  equity 
and bond financing instead of taking expensive bank loans, while big loss-making 
state-ow ned enterprises (SO Es)—which were struggling w ith heavy liquidity prob­
lems and w ith no o ther alternatives— wanted to m aintain  their borrowing, and were 
thus dependent on bank lending. The short term  credit supply did not meet the 
dem ands of financially distressed SOEs and, as a consequence, interfirm  commercial 
credits s tarted  to evolve as enterprises stopped paying each other.
Firm s in financial distress responded to  the shortage of bank credits by forcing 
their suppliers to  provide commercial credit and by delaying paym ents. The bulk 
of the arrears was concentrated in about 25-30 enterprises in engineering and light 
industry, m ining and m etallurgy respectively. However, this phenom enon becam e 
a feature of the whole economy. By the end of 1989 these arrears am ounted to  about
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T a b  le  1
Selective aggregates o f the Hungarian banking sector
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
N om inal G D P  (b n  H U F) 1,226.4 1,440.7 1,722.8 2,089.3 2,498.3 2,942.6 3,548.3 4,364.8 5,499.9 6627.95
N om inal G D P  (b n  USD) 26.104 28.571 29.152 33.059 33.434 37.257 38.551 41.518 43.758 43.442
N om inal g row th r a te  (H U F) 12.63 11.7 19.58 21.27 19.57 17.78 20.58 23.01 26.60 20.5
Reed g row th  ra te  (percen t) 4.1 - 0 .1 0.7 - 3 .5 -1 1 .9 -3 .1 - 0 .6 2.9 1.5 1 .0
T o ta l assets o f b an k in g  sec to r 996.3 1,023.0 1,247.3 1,620.5 2,108.7 2,276.0 2,630.4 3,071.8 3,693.6 4,735.28
T o ta l dom estic  c red its  (stock) 1,262.7 1,334.4 1,550.9 1,726.4 1,864.5 2,057.3 2,401.7 2,792.0 2,7413 3010.2
B usiness sec to r 383.0 395.8 492.6 636.1 765.3 768.0 761.9 869.7 982.6 1,265.2
B usiness sec to r H U F cred its n .a . 395.8 481.3 6Q8.3 718.0 706.2 696.3 777.1 764.8 914.4
E n te rp rise  H U F c red its n .a . 382.8 462.6 564.3 656.6 630.0 610.6 687.9 693.7 852.0
S h o rt-te rm n .a . 254.7 327.7 418.1 509.6 484.9 475.7 520.2 n .a. n .a .
L ong-te rm n .a . 128.1 134.9 146.2 147.0 145.1 134.9 167.7 n.a. n .a .
Sm all en trep ren eu rs 6.9 13.0 18.7 44.0 61.4 76.2 85.7 89.2 71.1 62.4
Forex c red its - - 11.3 27.8 47.3 61.8 65.6 92.6 217.8 350.8
G overnm ent 589.6 629.7 726.6 737.2 872.3 1,060.9 1,370.8 1,579.4 1,442.9 1447
T o ta l dep o sits 420.2 455.9 707.7 914.3 1,183.0 1,505.8 1,758.7 1,994.9 2,355.6 2,846.3
B usiness (en terp rise) sector 158.9 138.7 179.9 277.7 324.5 395.5 499.7 518.3 616.5 759.0
Forin t 158.9 138.7 166.2 228.2 258.6 332.3 374.7 406.2 427.8 554.6
Forex - - 13.7 49.5 65.9 63.2 125.0 1 1 2 .1 188.7 204.4
Sm all en trep ren eu rs n .a . 20.5 23.9 36.6 57.5 61.8 33.2 32.0 34.4 47.3
Households 261.3 284.2 273.4 323.8 432.0 582.4 696.0 866.4 1,079.0 1,339.1
E n te rp rise  H U F cred its -d ep o sits n .a . 244.1 296.4 336.1 398.0 297.7 235.9 281.7 265.9 297.4
B usiness sec to r
n e t liab ilities to  b an k s n .a . n .a . 288.8 321.8 383.3 310.7 229.0 319.4 331.8 458.9
A verage exchange
ra te  (H U F /U S D ) 46.98 50.424 59.096 63.198 74.722 78.98 92.04 105.13 125.69 152.57
Sources: N a tio n a l accoun t 1991-94, A nnual re p o rts  of th e  N ational B ank  of H ungary, an d  Nyers and  L u tz  (1992)
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HUF 127 bn (USD 2.1 bn), of which HUF 73 bn (USD 1.2 bn) was the accum ulated 
debt of firms having arrears over HUF 25 mn. As a consequence of the  deterioration 
of financial discipline, the value of inter-enterprise arrears simply increased fu rther 
(see Table 2). Most o f these firms also had bank debts. Therefore, some people 
expected the active partic ipation  of banks in the solution. However, the  banks were 
ra ther passive for several reasons: (1) approxim ately one-third of the to ta l am ount 
of arrears was owed to  banks, i.e. the m ajor p art of the debt was due to  suppliers 
and sta te  creditors; (2) banks had direct access to  the accounts of their debtors and 
could autom atically  debit the accounts of their debtors, even w ithout the consent 
of firms, if a positive balance appeared on them . Banks usually dem anded such 
a  creditor seniority when enterprises opened an account w ith them . (3) If banks 
tried  to  collect these debts, even the failure of collecting th is one-third could have 
a detrim ental im pact on their own existence.
600
500
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100
\
—
J M M J S N J M M J S N J M M J S N J M M J S N  
91 92 93 94
-----------Short term loans — -------Long term loans
Source: N ational B ank of H ungary
Fig. 3 Corporate loans between 1991-95 (in bn HUF)
Nonetheless, where it was possible, banks sought to w ithdraw  credits from 
less creditw orthy enterprises. However, in the case of big debtors th is would have 
im m ediately pushed them  into the red. SOCBs were not interested in filing their big 
debtors for liquidation for several reasons: first, banks usually had access to  their 
clients’ accounts; second, due to  the extended nature of indebtedness, a chain of 
liquidation would have devalued enterprise assets significantly and therefore banks 
could have lost even more; th ird , it is probable th a t in the la tte r case banks would 
have been the next in line to  face liquidation; fourth, banks could rationally  expect 
some kind of s ta te  intervention, since the failure of big SOEs in the short run had
Acta Oeconomica 49, 1997-98
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Table 2
Arrears of larger firms between 1987-1992
A rrears 
(HUF bn)
F irm s
1987 14 82
1988 46 208
1989 73 314
1990 90 432
1991 159 1021
1992 April 197 1,097
Source: Marsi and Pap  (1993)
huge economic and social cost implications, it was therefore more convenient to  wait 
for the sta te  to  take the first step; fifth, in the short-run it was also more profitable, 
because of the existing accounting and banking regulation which enabled banks to 
earn in terest income on overdue credits which they usually rolled over; sixth, if 
banks filed for the liquidation of their debtors, they would have acted against some 
of those SOEs which were the owners of banks and whose CEOs were m em bers of 
the boards of SOCBs. (See Table 3 .)
Table 3
Files for bankruptcy and liquidation
Year B ankrup tcy L iquidation
T otal of which filed by banks
1987 _ 65
1988 - 144
1989 - 384
1990 - 630 2 0
1991 - 1,268 9
1992 4,169 9,891 93
1993 987 7,242 159
1994 189 5,711 113
1995 145 6,316 1 1 2
1996 80 7,397 113
Source: Ministry o f Finance
Banks were also dependent on their borrowers because of the decreasing de- 
rtland for loans by creditworthy borrowers, and because of the fact th a t they could 
charge default interest on top of their prime rate in cases of late paym ent. Ac­
11* Acta Oeconomica 49} 1997-98
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cum ulated bank claims in the form of default interest provided a b e tte r tool with 
which it was possible to  capture the collateral. This was a b e tter s itua tion  than  
the possible liquidation would have offered, when accum ulation of unpaid in terest 
stopped in the early stages of liquidation. Banks could not, and perhaps did not 
w ant to , stop financing large SOEs.3 The old tru th  sta ted  by Dewatripont and Ti- 
role (1994) applied particularly  to  large Hungarian SOCBs: “If you owe the bank 
$100,000 you are in trouble; if you owe the bank $10 billion, the bank is in troub le .” 
In the short run, banks were more or less interested in preserving the s ta tu s  quo.
As a result of the passivity of creditors, bad debts accum ulated and were 
concentrated in domestic banks, bu t especially in large SOCBs. (On creditor pas­
sivity see Mitchell 1993.) In 1990, less than  one percent of the num ber of clients 
held 40-50 percent of all credits; large loans had about a 50-80 percent share in 
the loan portfolios of large banks. Approxim ately tw o-thirds of bad (or potentially  
non-perform ing) loans were concentrated in about fifty large firms. The concen­
tra tio n  of debts did not change significantly, even after enterprises were allowed 
to  change bank. The financial distress of firms generated risk not only to  creditor 
banks, bu t also to  the entire banking sector and ultim ately to the whole economy.
However, another legacy of the past was the sectoral concentration of b anks’ 
clientele. The three large SOCBs (MHB, K&H and BB) were formed from the, 
respectively, industrial, food processing and infrastructure financing directorates 
of the central bank. Instead of establishing these banks w ith diversified portfo­
lios, they inherited portfolios and clients almost unchanged from  the NBH. The 
MHB had about a 60 percent share in the financing of m anufacturing (engineer­
ing) industry. The food industry and agriculture had almost a 50 percent share 
in the  K&H credit portfolio. BB financed alm ost exclusively coal mines. These 
banks were very vulnerable to  systemic risks stem m ing from  economic recession or 
n a tu ra l catastrophe, in principle as well as in reality. Because of stagnation  and 
the recession between 1989 and 1992 (and the collapse of COM ECON in 1991) 
all banks, bu t especially the MHB, found themselves in trouble. The drought in 
1990 and the uncertain ty  created by political debates over land ownership in the 
early 1990s caused difficulties for the K&H. The unavoidable closing down of in- 
efficient coal-mines m ade the B B ’s situation  untenable. (Extension of syndicated 
loans could have helped to some extent, but they were rather exceptional because 
there was no o ther bank willing to  share such a risk.)
3 P c T o t t i  (1993) develops a m odel in which he shows a  certain  bias tow ards excessive allocations 
of scarce b an k  resources to  (indebted) SOEs instead  of m ore profitable private borrow ers. T h is had 
the  effect on slowing down the  transition  and produced the  danger of a  p o ten tia l concen tra tion  of 
risk  in  banks, even after b ank  privatization . T his finding m ay apply  to  these big SO Es. H o w e v e r ,  
as B onin an d  Schaffer (1995) indicate, on th e  basis of aggregate calculations showing th a t  fresh 
cred it was negative in 1992, in m ost cases banks tried  to  w ithdraw  from  lending to  risky firms- 
M oreover, private firms, as has been pointed  ou t, were a t  least as risky as th e ir  s t a t e - o w n e d  
coun terparts.
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In p a rt because of this heavy concentration, the H ungarian money m arket 
rem ained rather segm ented.4 In 1990, the “big four” granted 62 percent of short 
term , and 82 percent of long-term enterprise loans; the N ational Savings Bank 
(O T P) had a 65 percent share of the to ta l stock of small private business loans (70 
percent of long term  and 38 percent of short term  loans), while the “big four” had 
a 29 percent share of this m arket segment (46 percent in short term  loans and 16.7 
percent in long term  loans); the “big four” and O TP had a 44-44 percent share 
in the deposit m arket. However, a m ajority  of wholesale deposits was placed w ith 
the “big four” , while 80 percent of household savings were deposited w ith the O T P 
(Spéder and Várhegyi 1992).
The entry  of foreign banks has preserved this segm entation. ( Table J pro­
vides a sum m ary of the institu tional development in the banking sector over the 
last decade.) Foreign banks sought to avoid risky lending. They provided services 
for foreign firms and jo in t ventures, and competed for only the best domestic firms. 
The com petition for creditworthy firms put pressure on domestic banks.5 SOCBs 
could not compete with foreign banks, for the portfolio of the la tte r was not bur­
dened w ith bad debts, they had access to the cheap foreign sources of their parent 
banks, and enjoyed some tax  concessions. However, this was not price com petition 
because, instead, foreign banks offered better quality services. Due to  th is m arket 
imperfection, the high interest margin has remained and, as a result, foreign banks 
could earn huge profits.
4 N onetheless, some developm ent took place. In 1987, ou t of 21  financial in stitu tions, only five 
' arge com m ercial banks were au thorized  to  keep the  accounts of business entities. Except for the  
H ungarian Foreign T rade B ank (M K B), which was established in 1950 an d  specialized in  financing 
foreign trad e , and  th ree  o th er banks operating  w ith foreign participation , dom estic banks were no t 
allowed to  tran sac t in foreign exchange and nor could they  collect household deposits . T he O T P 
and saving cooperatives h a d  an  exclusive licence in retail banking (i.e. financing of households, 
small en trepreneurs and m unicipalities). These restrictions were gradually  abolished. A fter Ju ly  
1989 com m ercial banks were authorised  to  ex tend  credits in foreign exchange to  dom estic  firms ou t 
°f their own foreign currency deposits a t th e ir own risk. In the  first q u a rte r of 1990, certa in  banks 
received a  licence to  carry  ou t trad e  re la ted  transactions for th e ir clients as well as in te rnational 
services and  transac tions when th e  m oney was transferred  from  th e ir  c lien ts’ forex accounts. (In 
^ larch  1989, re la ted  to  the g radual liberalisation  of convertible im ports, a  lim ited  foreign exchange 
Market was opened. T he cen tral ban k  m ade foreign exchange available to  economic en tities, or 
Private persons au thorized  to trade in convertible currency.) In th e  m iddle of 1988 the  Post Bank 
and Savings B ank  C orporation  L td . (Postabank) was established in  o rder to  break th e  m onopoly 
Position of O T P in re ta il banking. Since Jan u ary  1989 o ther com m ercial ban k s have also been 
Authorized to provide services for households. At the  same tim e the  O T P and  P o stab an k  received 
a full licence for com m ercial banking. (In  order to  enable banks to pay th e  m arket ra te  of in terest 
°f> household deposits , the  in terest ra te  on housing loans was ad justed  to  th e  m arket ra te  from  
beginning of 1989.)
H ungarian SOCBs frequently established jo in t ventures w ith foreign capital, or purchased 
a res of such financial in stitu tio n s which, in m any cases, o p erated  in the  sam e segm ent of th e  
Market. In o th er words, they  created  com petitors for themselves.
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Table 4
Institutional development of the Hungarian banking sector
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
C om m ercial banks 15 16 16 23 32 32 37 37 36 36
foreign 3 3 5 12 14 17 19 22 21 24
Specialized financial
in stitu tio n s 6 8 8 8 5 4 4 6 6 8
Investm ent banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Banks (total) 21 2 4 2 4 31 37 36 42 44 43 42
foreign a ltoge ther 3 3 8 9 15 16 20 24 23 27
Savings an d  credit
cooperatives 260 260 260 260 259 257 255 258 254 255
Source: S ta te  B anking Supervision (SBS), and  Nyers an d  L utz  (1992)
In 1990, according to Speder (1991), about 30 percent of the three big SOCBs’ 
to ta l loan portfolio could be considered as directly inherited. The stock of di­
rectly inherited qualified debts was about 35 percent. The directly inherited part 
of doubtful claims was somewhat smaller (21 percent), while irrecoverable (bad) 
debts am ounted to  41 percent of all bad debts. This suggests th a t the new credit 
evaluation was not much better than  the old one. However, alm ost half of the new 
credits were rolled-over old ones. Approxim ately one-third of qualified loans were 
newly created. This indicates th a t the bad debt problem in Hungary was a stock, 
ra ther than  a flow problem in the early 1990s. Bonin and Schaffer (1995) and Kirdty 
(1995) also argue for the characterization of the development as a stock problem- 
W hat seems to  be the core of the problem is not the inherited portfolio, bu t rather 
the inherited clientele. Big SOCBs were simply in a deadlock. They could not cu4 
off all the credits extended to  big debtors. All they could do was to roll them  over 
Bonin and Schaffer (1995) concluded th a t Hungarian banks “did no t throw  ne'v 
money after old” ; nonetheless, we cannot say th a t the respective m a n a g e m e n t s  of 
these banks were entirely responsible for the situation th a t had developed by 1 9 ^ ' 
Banks sometimes acted under political pressure.
If banks— understandably— did not take significant measures in order to  solvC 
these problems, why did the government not intervene? The NBH, as the  lender 
of last resort of commercial banks, although it more or less insisted on a stric< 
m onetary policy, always provided refinancing credits for problem  banks facing al1 
emergency situation . I t was obvious already in the 1980s, th a t the problem  
over the lim its of the m onetary sphere. The M inistry of Finance (M oF) was shor1 
sighted in its policies. Due to  the inadequate domestic accounting and bankiff’ 
rules, banks earned huge profits th a t the MoF could tap  in the form of profit tax °r 
dividends (see Table 5). If the MoF ordered the banks to push those of their debtor*
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who did not pay into liquidation, then instead of collecting these revenues the MoF 
would have spent a huge am ount on the banks (or on SOEs if the governm ent had 
desired to  save them ). Before 1992, the MoF consistently chose the first option. To 
take another example, in 1989, after a modification of the annual budget, SOCBs 
were obliged to  purchase housing bonds for 50 percent of their loan loss reserves. In
1989-90 the M inistry did not allow banks to accum ulate tax-free provisions. The 
MoF a ttem pted  to  shift all the responsibility on to  the banks. For exam ple, in the 
early 1990s, SOCBs were requested to make a “death-list” of big debtors which 
banks were contem plating for liquidation. Finally, the banks put the names of 
some fifty enterprises on the list and, in fact, SOCBs started  to  in itia te  liquidation. 
Nonetheless, these measures were rather symbolic and served as a warning only 
(see Table 3).
Fortunately, the government was somewhat divided on this issue. In 1989, the 
S tate Banking Supervision (SBS) stipulated  th a t banks should write off 10 percent 
° f their doubtful loans. As a result of this obligation, five big SOCBs wrote off 
a HUF 3 bn (USD 50 mn) loss.6 In Spring 1991, SBS pu t pressure on banks to 
accum ulate a loan loss provision, because they did not have enough reserves.7 If 
all doubtful outstanding debts had become irrecoverable, then about HUF 30 bn 
(USD 500 mn) additional loss reserves would have been needed to  w rite off this 
loss.
Having no b etter option, SOCBs— but especially the MHB—started  to  swap 
debt for equity (see Table 8). In the short run it was “good” for banks as well as 
f°r enterprises.8 These investments, however, were usually less profitable. They 
earned about 10 percent dividend on average in 1990 (and even less in 1991), which 
Was below the interest income of banks. Obviously, the purpose of these swaps was 
to reduce the expected loss; ra ther than  maximise the return  on investm ent, banks 
hoped th a t they could sell their stakes in the planned privatisation. A part from 
s°m e exceptional cases, such as the sale of TU N G SR A M ’S shares by MHB, banks 
had to keep these shares for a longer period of time. Before 1994 the banking rules
6 As has happened b o th  before and  since, financial au tho rities—but especially line m inistries— 
° r state asset management agencies assume that it is sufficient to write off the debts o f SOEs and 
‘hen everything will continue sm oothly. F irm s’ restructuring  an d  loan  conciliation have no t been 
'Uterlinked.
7 T here  was only one ban k  (BB) which followed the  instruction  of th e  SBS, while all th e  o th er 
banks pa id  m ore a tten tio n  to  the  M oF’s tax  m otive. T he m in istry  heavily criticised an d  b lam ed 
‘he m anagem ent of the  BB because, according to the  M oF, the  m anagem ent w anted to  h ide  the  
Profit  from  the  Treasury.
A lthough in 1989 banks still invested m ore in o th er financial in stitu tio n s (H U F 4.2 b n ), sw ap 
^ansac tio n s increased rapidly. At th e  end of 1989 the  stock of investm ents in the  real sector held 
^ banks am ounted  to HU F 4.7 bn. T he share of the  big five SOCBs in  th is investm ent com prised 
out 70-80 percent. On the  basis of non-consolidated balance sheet d a ta , S p id e r (1991) estim a ted  
a t the  MHB had  a  concen tra tion  of 46 percent of all investm ents in the  banking sector, while 
”  had  a 15 percent share, M K B ’s po rtion  was 13 percent, an d  B B ’s share  was only 6  percent.
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Ownership of SOCBs
In 1987, when banks were established, SOEs could subscribe for the  shares 
of SOCBs. The big debtors of SOCBs became shareholders of these financial in­
term ediaries and (heavily indebted) SOEs could delegate their CEOs to the boards 
of banks.9 By the 1990s the s ta te ’s direct share in large SOCBs (excluded O T P ) 
was between 42 and 55 percent. “Cross-ownership” contributed to  allocative ineffi­
ciency. In the  case of the three SOCBs, the to ta l value of credits extended to  their 
own shareholders am ounted to  HUF 165.6 bn (USD 2.8 bn). It became a common 
view th a t although the sta te  was a bad owner, enterprises should not be allowed to 
own banks. In principle, the sta te  could have been a good owner, since in the long 
run it was interested in the sound operation of the banking system. In reality, the 
s ta te  always fell hostage to the short term  (and short-sighted) aims of particu lar 
interests of lobbies (which underm ined the long term  prospects). The question was 
then raised: “W ho should own banks?”
In principle, Hungarian private citizens could become shareholders. However, 
a dispersed ownership was not desirable. Anyway, small investors did not show a 
strong interest in buying the shares of SOCBs. The a ttem p t of K&H to sell its 
shares to  small investors failed. Low dividends, a weak (less liquid) capital m arket 
and a 20 percent tax  on dividends, did not make bank shares a ttrac tive . (It is no 
surprise th a t under these conditions SOCBs suspended the trade of their shares 
in order to  avoid a worsening of their reputation .) For similar reasons, domestic, 
private, and institu tional (financial) investors did not show too much in terest either. 
Institu tional investors were almost non-existent in Hungary at the end of the 1980s 
and in the early 1990s. The same applies to  strategic investors. The only other 
a lternative solution was to sell shares of SOCBs to  foreign stra teg ic  or institu tional 
investors.10
9SOCBs frequently tried to persuade thier clients to subscribe to their shares and sometimes 
banks themselves granted loans to SOEs in order to reduce the dominance of direct state own­
ership. Firms probably subscribed to bank shares because they assumed that they could have 
better access to bank finance.
10Speder and  Várhegyi (1992) m ention ano ther a lternative . In principle, SOCBs could have 
been privatised  indirectly  in the  m edium  term . P rivatization  of SO Es holding shares of SOCBs 
would have eventually resu lted  in th e  p rivatisa tion  of these banks. Moreover, if these  SOEs had 
been decentralised, such a  downsizing would have reduced the  vulnerability  of banks to  th e ir  de­
pendence on big debtors.
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The advantages of the take-over of SOCBs by foreign investors were obvious 
to  everybody.11 Nonetheless, there was a fear th a t profit-maximising owners would 
repatria te  all the profit, or even a part of the income. The main argum ent against 
foreign investors was th a t, if foreign owners obtained m ajor banks, then the do­
mestic control over strategically im portan t sectors of the economy would have been 
lost. Given the hesitation on the supply side, the deep recession of the economy in
1990-91, and after a short aud it of the financial position of the  respective banks, 
the  dem and for H ungarian banks largely decreased.12 The governm ent rem ained 
w ithout real alternatives. The “nationalisation” of SOCBs became the official pol­
icy. This policy also gained support for other reasons. Because of the increasing 
rate  of interest on credits and the reluctance of banks to  extend loans to new private 
businesses, a hostile a ttitu d e  towards banks by certain politicians and the popula­
tion s ta rted  to  evolve. Accordingly, the S tate P roperty  Agency (SPA) sought to 
collect all the  shares of the SOEs. The ownership rights over SOCBs were divided 
between the SPA and the MoF. The m inistry retained the right to make strategic 
decisions.
Legislative shock therapy
D uring 1991 the a ttitu d e  of the financial authorities (i.e. s ta te  owners) be­
gan to  change. In ternational financial institu tions pu t pressure on the H ungarian 
government to  solve inter-enterprise arrears and to  put an end to  the accum ulation 
of bad debts of SOCBs. They strongly suggested th a t there was a need to  create 
a comprehensive legal framework for the operation of the central bank and finan­
cial institu tions. Nevertheless, the room for government intervention was seriously 
limited by the ceiling imposed on the budget deficit.
In May 1991, a t the annual meetings of the SOCBs, w ith the consent of the 
MoF, the chief executive officer of SPA voted for a m oderate dividend, against 
the wishes of corporate shareholders. Later, in the sum m er, the governm ent is­
sued guarantees for 50 percent of the credits extended before 1987. This guarantee 
am ounted to  HUF 10.3 bn (USD 140 mn). This measure was far from being suf­
ficient to  solve the problem of SOCBs, since about HUF 40 bn of bad debts still
11 Besides usual benefits (such as fresh capital, technology, know-how, markets, etc .). The 
NBH and the M oF supported the sales of banks, since these transactions could have resulted in 
hard currency revenues, additional credit lines and an export-financing capacity for the country. 
Furthermore, the strong profit motive of new owners could also have had some positive spillover 
effect on borrowers. Yet the tax allowances that, presumably, would have been necessary, could 
have reduced the stream of future revenues, and the necessary liberalization of foreign exchange 
w°uld have immediately reduced the discretionary power o f the central bank.
12Sándor Demján, the CEO of the MHB, could find a buyer for his bank but the deal was 
stoppe(j  in its tracks by officials and later he was removed from his position.
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rem ained in the banks’ portfolios. Even so, a t th a t tim e banks did not suffer liq­
uidity problems. In the early 1990s, the short term  insolvency of H ungarian banks 
was not a problem either. The money m arket could pass sufficient interm ediate 
resources from retail banks to  the large SOCBs and they could m anage their sho rt­
term  liquidity. At the same time, it became clear th a t this situation  would not 
be sustainable forever. The im m ediate im pact of the recession of the real sector 
was not yet reflected in the accounts of the banks. On the contrary, although in
1990 and 1991 G D P (and industrial production) declined by 3.5 percent and 11.9 
percent respectively, (and by 7.7 percent and 17.9 percent respectively), the banks 
reported  significant profits (see Table 5 and 6). This fact alone indicated th a t there 
m ust be some problem w ith the system of regulation, so the government decided 
to  impose new laws on financial institutions.
In 1991, Parliam ent passed several new economic laws. In addition to  the 
acts on, respectively, investm ent funds, the central bank, and the am endm ent on 
the act on foreign investm ent, three other im portan t changes in the legislation must 
be m entioned here: (1) Act LXIX of 1991 on financial institutions and financial 
activities (i.e. the Banking Act) which became effective in December 1991 so th a t it 
could be applied in the final accounts at the end of the year. I t gave rise to  radical 
changes in the regulation of financial institutions. This Act, am ong other things, 
required banks to accum ulate loan loss provisions, and prescribed an 8 percent 
capital adequacy ratio  (CAR) by January  1994; it also introduced other elements 
of more prudent regulation. This new Act followed the BIS accords although, as 
it will be shown below, in some im portan t aspects regulators deliberately “ad­
ju s ted ” the requirem ents to local conditions. The Hungarian system  is not exactly 
Anglo-Saxon, nor is it German-like. Although policymakers paid atten tion  to  EU 
requirem ents, the current s ta te  of the capital m arket as well as the lack of expertise 
in risk assessment of investm ents made it advisable th a t universal banking should 
not be explicitly allowed. However, in practice, commercial banks could trade  w ith 
securities and through their subsidiaries they could run investm ent funds. (See also 
Várhegyi 1994a and Ábel and Bonin 1994). (2) Act X VIII o f 1991 on accounting, 
which became effective on 1 January  1992; this stipulated  th a t economic entities 
m ust prepare balance sheets and income statem ents th a t showed a true and fair 
picture of their economic activities. In general, th is law corresponded to  in ter­
national auditing standards (IAS). (3) Act IL of 1991 on bankruptcy, liquidation 
and final accounting (i.e. the B ankruptcy Act) came into effect in April 1992 and 
im m ediately increased the num ber of bankruptcies and liquidations (see Table 2)- 
Policym akers believed th a t this strict rule, having an au tom atic  trigger, could re­
store financial discipline in the economy and inter-enterprise arrears would thus be 
curtailed.
All these legislative changes had an unprecedented im pact on the financial 
sector. SOCBs were unable to accumulate sufficient loan loss provisions, and they 
had HUF 30 bn (USD 400 m n) unprovisioned, even using the less stringent Hungar-
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Table 5
Development o f the portfolio of the Hungarian banking sector
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Nominal G D P (HUF) 1,226.4 1,440.7 1,722.8 2,089.3 2,498.3 2,942.6 3,548.3 4,364.8 5,499.9 6,627.95
Total assets o f banking sector 996.3 1,023.0 1,247.3 1,620.5 2,108.7 2,276.0 2,630.4 3,071.8 3,693.6 4,735.28
Total off-balance sheet items n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 225.0 304.5 379.6 551.5 1,192.49
Equity 49.8 65.1 74.3 91.3 117.7 109.1 256.5 296 220.3 218.91
Own capital 60.0 75.5 93.9 122.4 169.9 166.9 147.8 209.6 295.8 397.63
Capital investment 6 .2 1 0 .1 20.7 30.3 50.3 n.a. 92.0 106.6 139.7 155.68
Pre-tax profits 28.3 35 49.7 63.3 35.5 n.a. -1 4 9 .1 25.57 53.91 84.539
Profit tax and dividends to the state 21 23.35 21.33 48.58 44.47 1.69 8.349 30.448 12.985 16.038
Total enterprise HUF credits n.a. 382.8 462.6 564.3 656.6 630 610.6 687.9 693.7 852.0
Total credits to business sector 383.0 395.8 492.6 636.1 765.3 768 761.9 869.7 982.6 1,265.2
Total classified portfolio 787 800 671.7 994 1,230 1,610.7 1,828.1 2,504.5 2,731.0 3,817.9
Qualified loans 2 .8 6.7 2 2 .6 43.3 152 173.1 536 534.1 438.9 412.82
Under observation - - - - - - 124.2 194.1 193.4 222.39
Substandard - - - - 30 36.5 53.7 51.3 43.1 37.04
Doubtful 2 .8 6.7 2 2 .6 43.3 82 59.7 112.3 85.4 68.7 47.63
Bad - - - - 40 76.9 245.8 203.3 133.7 105.75
Provision— required - - - - 87 114.0 - - - -
Provision— available n.a. n .a . n .a . n .a . 52.8 73.5 272.9 233.8 176.8 138.2
Qualified p rtfo lio /G D P  (% ) 0.23 0.47 1.31 2.07 6.08 5.88 15.11 12.24 7.98 6 .2 2
Q ualified p rtfo lio /T o ta l a sse ts (%) 0.28 0.65 1.81 2.67 7.21 7.61 20.38 17.39 1 1 .8 8 8.71
Q ualified p r tfo lio /T o ta l classified portfo lio  (%) 0.36 0.84 3.36 4.36 12.36 10.75 29.32 21.33 16.07 10.81
Q ualified p rtfo lio /B u sin ess sec to r loans (%) 0.73 1.69 4.56 6.81 19.86 22.54 70.35 61.41 44.67 32.62
Q ualified p rtfo lio /E n te rp r ise  HUF loans (%) n.a. 1.75 4.89 7.67 23.15 27.48 87.78 77.64 63.27 48.45
Bad p ortfo lio /G D P  (% ) - - - - 1 .6 2.61 6.93 4.66 2.43 1.59
B ad p o rtfo lio /T o ta l a sse ts (%) - - - - 1.9 3.38 9.34 6.62 3.62 2.23
B ad p o rtfo lio /T o ta l classified p o rtfo lio  (%) - - - - 3.25 4.27 13.45 8 .1 2 4.90 2.76
B ad  po rtfo lio /B u sin ess sec to r lo an s (%) - - - - 5.23 1 0 .0 1 32.26 23.38 13.61 8.35
B ad  p o rtfo lio /E n te rp rise  HUF lo an s (%) - - - - 6.09 12 .2 1 40.26 29.55 19.27 12.41
Sources: A nnual a n d  m o n th ly  re p o rts  NBH, SBS, a n d  Nyers an d  L u tz  (1992)
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Table 6
Selective indicators of the Hungarian banking sector
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
G D P nom inal (H U F) grow th  ra te 12.63 11.7 19.58 21.27 19.57 17.78 20.58 23.01 26.0 20.5
G D P real grow th ra te 4.1 -0 .1 0.7 - 3 .5 -1 1 .9 -3 .1 - 0 .6 2.9 1.5 1.0
C P I 8.6 15.5 17.0 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6
P P I
N om inal g row th  r a te  of to ta l  asse ts
3.3 4.5 14.6 20.9 31.5 10.7 11.0 11.3 28.9 21.8
of banking  sec to r 
R eal g row th ra te  of to ta l  a sse ts
n .a . 2.68 21.92 29.82 30.68 7.47 15.57 16.78 20.24 28.2
of b ank ing  sec to r (P P I)
R eal g row th  ra te  of to ta l  assets
n .a . -1 .7 4 6.39 7.46 - 1 .1 - 2 .5 4.1 4.92 -6 .7 2 5.2
of b ank ing  sec to r (C P I) 
N om inal g row th  ra te
n .a . -1 1 .1 4.21 0.79 - 3 .6 -1 2 .2 - 5 .6 - 1 .7 - 6 .2 3.7
of en terp rise  H U F loans 
R eal g row th  ra te
n .a . n .a . 20.85 21.98 16.36 -4 .0 5 - 3 .0 8 -1 2 .6 6 0.8 22.8
of en terp rise  H U F loans (C P I) 
R eal g row th ra te
n .a . n .a. 3.29 -5 .5 7 -1 3 .8 1 -2 1 .9 9 -2 0 .8 8 -5 .1 7 -2 1 .3 4 - 0 .7
of en terp rise  HUF loans (P P I) n .a . n .a . 5.45 0.9 -1 1 .5 2 -1 3 .3 3 -1 2 .6 8 1.22 -2 1 .7 7 0.8
T ota l a sse ts o f bank ing  s e c to r /G D P 81.24 71.0 72.4 77.56 84.76 77.34 74.13 70.37 67.15 71.44
T o ta l en te rp rise  H U F lo an s /G D P 30.67 26.57 26.85 27.01 26.28 21.41 17.21 15.76 12.61 12.85
T o ta l en te rp rise  lo an s /G D P 30.67 26.57 27.51 28.34 28.18 23.51 19.06 17.88 16.57 18.14
T o ta l business lo an s /G D P 31.22 27.47 28.59 30.44 30.63 26.09 21.47 19.92 17.86 19.08
T o ta l en te rp rise  lo a n s /T o ta l asse ts n .a . 37.42 37.09 34.82 31.14 27.68 23.21 22.39 18.78 25.4
T o ta l business lo an s /T o ta l a sse ts 38.44 38.69 39.49 39.25 36.29 33.74 28.97 28.31 26.60 26.71
B usiness sec to r d e p o s it/c re d it  ra tio n n .a . n .a . 41.4 49.4 49.9 59.5 69.9 63.3 66.2 63.7
Sources: National Bank o f  Hungary and own calculations
I. Á
B
E
L
-L
. SZA
K
A
D
A
T
: BANK 
R
E
STR
U
C
TU
R
IN
G
 
IN 
H
U
N
G
A
R
Y
ian banking rules which, a t th a t time, did not require adequate provision against off- 
balance sheet items or investm ents. (According to the Act, general provisions had 
to  be accum ulated from after-tax profits to the value of 1.25 percent of the balance 
sheet to ta l, and up to one percent of guarantees.) If in ternational s tandards had 
been adopted, banks would have needed approxim ately HUF 60-70 bn more loan 
loss reserves: in this case the m ajor banks would have lost their capital immediately. 
In order to  avoid the collapse of the banking system  as a whole, banks were allowed 
to build up loss reserves over three years. These economic and legislative changes h it 
SOCBs especially hard. Nonetheless, the CAR of m ost banks fell below 7 percent, 
and two m ajor domestic banks had a negative CAR. However, the worst was still 
to  come. (See Table 5.)
T h e  recession worsened in 1992. As a consequence of the collapse of the 
COM ECON m arket in 1991, m any SOEs got into serious trouble. No legislative 
rigour had previously jeopardized their existence bu t, from  April 1992, insolvent 
firms could not avoid bankruptcy or liquidation. All these economic and legislative 
changes led to  a financial shock for Hungarian banks. Even if banks could perceive 
the difficulties, they could not do too much to avoid them , since the MoF had 
already diverted funds from SOCBs, and they rem ained seriously undercapitalised. 
The new Banking Act and the other changes in the regulations merely m ade visible 
w hat had before been hidden. M onetary authorities as well as commercial bankers 
feared th a t the losses would underm ine the tru st in banks, im pair the chances of 
SOCBs to  acquire funding, and would increase the costs of financing. In principle, 
banks could perhaps have m anaged to  build up loan loss reserves— e.g. through 
widening the interest m argin—but it would have taken too long. Nevertheless, 
banks increased the margins. As a consequence, high real interest rates (on loans) 
occurred, which obviously cooled down the economy. By Spring 1992 it was obvious 
th a t the government had to intervene in order to help out banks. In essence, the 
new Banking Act wrongly imposed a flow solution to the bad loan problem  when 
it was essentially a stock problem.
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Credit conciliation
The government had several alternatives with which to address the bad loan 
Problem. Bad debts could be carved out from the balance sheets of the respective 
banks, or the capital of banks could be increased to an appropriate level. Such 
a policy can be carried out with cash, or risk-free government securities can be 
transform ed to  banks. To a limited extent subordinated capital can also be used. 
The government can provide guarantees, or the central bank may refinance banks’ 
liabilities. In practice, the MoF rejected any idea of transactions in cash. The NBH 
also opposed any suggestion for refinancing. If the s ta te  had undertaken guaran­
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tees, it would not have solved the short term  cash-flow problems of certain banks. 
Moreover, their profitability would not improve either. G uarantees are less liquid 
than , for example, s ta te  securities, because necessary court decisions are tim e con­
suming, and Hungarian courts had been overloaded by the flood the B ankruptcy  
Act initiated. Moreover, the issue of sta te  guarantees requires parliam entary  ap­
proval. It is also difficult for the MoF to assess the am ount of guarantees needed 
annually. To inflate away the deposits was not a practical alternative. The central 
bank rejected th is alternative as well as any idea of a currency reform.
There were still two competing proposals. According to  the m arket oriented 
(decentralised) version, banks could sell their bad debts or doubtful claims a t m ar­
ket price to  specialised firms w ith venture capital. The government could partia lly  
cover the losses of commercial banks. Unfortunately, the adm inistration hesitated 
in its decision, which was postponed until the end of 1992. In December, acting 
under the pressure of tim e, the financial authorities decided on a hybrid solution: 
a portfolio cleaning combined w ith a firm oriented carve-out and a partia lly  cen­
tralised work-out were im plemented. The question which im m ediately arose was: 
why were firm restructuring and portfolio cleaning not carried ou t sim ultaneously? 
On the one hand, the H ungarian government worried about the reaction of the 
in ternational financial market: “In 1992 the stock of qualified credits s ta rted  to  in­
crease w ith a dram atic speed and according to  in ternational standards m ost of the 
H ungarian financial institu tions would have lost their capital. A further increase of 
the stock of qualified credits could be expected from the logic of the process thus a 
quick accum ulation of losses had to  be stopped.” ( Ministry of Finance 1993, p. 10) 
On the other hand, the government and the whole financial com m unity feared a 
possible bank panic because two banks and a saving cooperative went bankrup t in 
the sum m er of 1992, and three other banks became insolvent.
T he government also had to  decide which banks and w hat credits should be 
included in the program m e. Since, according to  the government, the m ain reason 
for the  crisis was the economic recession which, in general, affected all financial 
institu tions, the program m e was extended to  all domestic banks in trouble.
Bank oriented credit consolidation
The aims of the bank oriented credit consolidation were: to  improve certain 
financial indicators of troubled commercial banks; to narrow the in terest m argin; 
to  provide a sound basis for prudent banking activities th a t would also facilitate 
the privatisation of SOCBs; and to  help the reorganisation of enterprises.
Banks having a CA R below 7.25 percent a t the end of 1992 (prescribed tem ­
porarily by the Banking Act) were eligible to participate. A ltogether, 14 banks and 
69 saving cooperatives took p art in this scheme. In order to  avoid the m oral haz­
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ard, the government decided th a t banks could sell to the sta te  bad loans (excluding 
housing loans, consumer credits and loans extended to  foreigners or financial in­
stitu tions) th a t had been extended prior to 1 O ctober 1992.13 Decision-makers 
speculated th a t “an im portan t part of the substandard  credits can be m anaged 
by the financial institu tions and if they get rid of the bulk of credits qualified as 
doubtful and bad ones, they will be able to cover their credit losses” . (M inistry of 
Finance 1993, p. 12)
Banks could decide w hat loans they wanted to  offer for sale to  the governm ent. 
They wanted to get rid of debts am ounting to  HUF 150 bn, but eventually in 
M arch 1993 they could sell much less to the MoF. The classification and selection 
were m onitored by the m inistry and international auditing firms. The government 
purchased the bad debts at 50 percent of face value if the loan was classified as such 
in 1991 or before; at 80 percent of the nominal value if the loan was classified as bad 
in 1992, and in certain  cases—to help the ongoing privatization of banks— banks 
could sell certain claims at full price. According to  a decentralised version, workout 
firms could have purchased these claims from banks, but these business entities did 
not exist a t th a t tim e, or the few th a t did were financially too weak to  purchase 
claims reaching such a volume. Therefore, the sta te  had to purchase these claims. 
Altogether, their nominal value amounted to HUF 100.1 bn (USD 1 bn) and the 
s ta te  paid HUF 79.4 bn (USD 830 mn) for them .14 The government used long 
term  bonds to  replace loans in order to  shift the burden to the fu tu re .15 (A nother 
consideration was th a t as tim e passes the capital represented by these bonds would 
be inflated away.) The government deducted the accum ulated risk reserves from
13 “T he m ain  cause— i.e. th e  portfolio-deteriorating effect of the  shrinking of th e  econom y— 
asserts itself even a t  p resen t. On th is basis it m ay be asked w hether th e  consolidation  should 
also be ex tended  to  credits g ran ted  a t  present an d  which becom e <  q ualified»  la te r. T h is would, 
however, stim u la te  the  banks to be irresponsible in their lending policies. We have, therefore, 
chosen the  solution (as a  com prom ise) th a t  credits granted prior to 1 October 199S may be included  
in the system.  (A t th a t  tim e the  banks hardly knew th a t  th e  system  of cred it consolidation would 
he expected, therefore the  M inistry  of Finance could no t influence them  when taking decisions on 
extending cred its .)” M inistry  of F inance 1993, pp. 11-12.
14 These claim s were concen tra ted  m ostly in large banks. Large SOCBs transferred  th e  cred it 
stock of H U F 85.2 bn  to th e  governm ent and  received bonds of HUF 66.7 bn in exchange. However, 
lhe d eb ts of 2,647 firms were also concen tra ted  in a  sm aller group: HUF 77.5 bn  (75.6 percent
all claim s) represented  the  deb ts of 709 firms facing ban k ru p tcy  or liquidation . A t th e  end 
°f 1992 banks got rid  of 95 percent of the  debts of those firms facing bankrup tcy  o r liquidation . 
T he deb ts of firms in the  process of being liquidated  am ounted  to HU F 63.6 bn , an d  those facing 
b an krup tcy  to HUF 13.9 bn. T his high concentration  is shown by th e  fact th a t  337 firms, ou t of 
709 enterprises facing b an krup tcy  or liquidation , were clients of th e  big four SOCBs and  owed th e  
hanks H U F 64.4 bn. (M arsi and  Pap 1993).
5B anks received “A” series consolidation bonds, which b ear in te rest sim ilar to  th e  m arket 
ra te  of in te rest and  they  received “B” series consolidation bonds for th e ir  ou tstan d in g  in terest 
Paym ents. A lthough according to  th e  original p lan  the  treasury  would w ithhold 50 percen t of the  
'n terest paym en t on  these “B” bonds in the  form  of a  consolidation fee, it was la te r  cancelled, 
and “B ” series bonds were exchanged for “A” series ones.
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the sales price in order to  share the costs w ith banks. This am ounted to HUF 20.6 
bn. (See also Ábel and Bonin 1994 and Várhegyi 1994a)
As a result, the CARs of most of the banks participating  in the program m e, at 
least according to H ungarian accounting and banking regulations, became positive 
(although they were still m ostly negative calculated by in ternational standards). 
These banks still accum ulated HUF 7.1 bn of aggregate losses. W ithou t credit 
consolidation these fourteen banks would have had to  accum ulate alm ost IIU F 50 
bn loan loss provisions. Their to ta l losses would have been even bigger and they 
would have lost tw o-thirds of their solvency capital, even applying the m oderate 
dom estic regulation which allowed banks to replenish their risk reserves in three 
years. The aggregate CAR of these banks would have been one percent instead of 
the 7.25 percent prescribed by the Banking Act, and the solvency capital of half of 
these financial institu tions would have been negative. According to  BIS standards, 
twelve banks would have lost their entire capital and reported a  negative CAR. 
Their to ta l losses would have amounted to almost HUF 125 bn (USD 1.6 bn), since 
the required level of loan loss provision would have been nearly HUF 200 bn (USD
2.5 bn). In sum, as a result of the sta te  intervention, im m ediate bank failures were 
avoided. A lthough the capital adequacy of the banks was weak, on average they 
could m eet Hungarian standards. (The MHB and Agrobank had negative CARs, 
and the K&H’s CAR was 1.9 percent. Only BB, O TP and MKB could pass the 
lim it among the large SOCBs.)
In addition to this norm ative part of the program m e, the governm ent also 
included three smaller banks in the process of consolidation in spring 1993. The 
MoF purchased the bad debts of these banks at face value for HUF 17.3 bn (USD 
188 mn). Ybl Bank was one of the three small financial institu tions which went 
bankrup t in 1992 and it was later liquidated. The other two banks (K onzum bank 
and Industrial Banking House), although they were technically insolvent, due to  a 
quick s ta te  (NBH) intervention, did not have to file for bankruptcy in 1992. After 
the bankruptcy of the three financial institu tions mentioned above, the  financial 
com m unity wanted to  prevent the open failure of other banks a t any price. Al­
together, the bank oriented credit consolidation, including savings cooperatives as 
well, increased the sta te  debt by HUF 98.6 bn (about USD 1 bn).
Firm oriented credit consolidation
In 1992-93, various government agencies and lobby groups becam e active and 
sought to  obtain direct support for their “constituency” . In 1992 the government 
decided to give support to  certain SOEs in industry. The SPA proposed to select 
200-300 firms for debtor consolidation, but the MoF strongly opposed this idea
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and finally the government rejected this proposal.16 Nonetheless, the effort was in 
p a rt successful, because, albeit on a smaller scale, a sim ilar program m e was finally 
im plem ented. In the autum n of 1993, the authorities “based upon certain  strategic 
considerations” first selected thirteen big SOEs from heavy industry. T hen, under 
the pressure of the M inistry of Agriculture, eight additional (food processing) firms 
and several s ta te  farms and agricultural cooperatives were added to the list of 
the “d irty  dozen” . Finally, the H ungarian Railways (MÁV) were also included in 
the firm oriented credit consolidation. The debts of industrial and food processing 
firms were purchased a t 90 percent of their face value— th a t is for HUF 32.4 bn and 
HUF 4 bn (USD 352 mn and USD 43.5 mn) respectively; the debts of the railway 
company (HUF 16.2 bn) and agricultural cooperatives and sta te  farm s (HUF 4.5 
bn) were carved at their face value. In order to  cover the costs of these transactions, 
the governm ent issued consolidation bonds to the value of HUF 57.2 bn (USD 621 
m n ).17
It was not quite clear in this case w hat could be done w ith the debts th a t had 
been carved out from the banks. Policymakers assumed th a t no s ta te  organisation 
was interested in or prepared for work-out. It was taken for granted th a t banks 
could do a b e tter job  with the la tter, bu t this view was unjustified as banks lacked 
both the necessary experience and skill.18 Moreover, the short-term  interests of 
banks in siphoning out from debtors as much as they could and as soon as possible 
in order to  cover their losses were costly for the government.
It was accepted a t the s ta rt th a t debtors would need a case by case trea tm en t. 
In March 1993 the Hungarian Investm ent and Development Bank (M BFB), a 100 
percent state-ow ned investm ent bank, purchased HUF 41.2 bn of the debt of 57 
firms from  the s ta te  at a discount price. (M BFB paid 4 percent of the sales value 
im m ediately after the transaction, and according to  the contract between the MoF
16T he NBH, th e  M oF and  th e  SBS did no t support the  idea of centralized portfolio  cleaning, 
because they  did no t want to  see ano ther top  s ta te  asset m anagem ent o rganisation  responsible 
for SOEs besides the  existing ones. T hey also argued  th a t  it would be difficult to  recru it sta ff for 
this new agency, an d  the decisions of th is agency probably would have been ra th e r discretionary, 
raising problem s of m oral hazards in banks.
17 T he deb ts of these insolvent firms rem ained in the books of th e ir c reditors a fte r th e  bank  
oriented credit consolidation. T his m eans th a t  they  were no t classified as bad  a t  th a t  tim e. So we 
n>ay suppose th a t  banks probably behaved strategically. They m ight assum e th a t  it was b e tte r  to 
sell th e  d eb t of big SO Es a t face value to  the  s ta te  th an  to include them  in the  consolidation scheme. 
Needless to  say, th is fact alone foreshadowed the  necessity of an o th er phase of consolidation, since 
lhe credit stock  of these enterprises was significant and these debtors were really  in b a d  shape.
18For the  sam e reasons Dittus and Prowse (1996) argue against the  claim  th a t  E ast E uropean  
comm ercial banks could be successful in active m onitoring of th e ir borrowers (like th e  Japanese) 
0r investm ents (like the  G erm ans). T hey lack  hum an resources and therefore financial institu - 
tlons them selves are no t particu larly  in terested  in investm ent banking activity. In the  sh o rt run , 
Credit allocation  alone was already too big a  challenge for them . N onetheless, they  also a d m itted  
th a t work-out of default firms m ight be a  useful “exercise” for a  bank to  gain experience in the  
^ s tru c tu r in g  of firms.
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and MBFB it was obliged to  transfer 25 percent of work-out revenues to  the  Ttea- 
sury.) A vast m ajority  (90 percent) of these firms were in the process of liquidation, 
bu t only one-fifth of them  were expected to  be completely liquidated. The others 
were supposed to go through at least a partia l restructuring. The other part of the 
debt carved ou t by the MoF was also, in principle, m anaged by M BFB. However, in 
fact, due to  its lim ited capacity, these claims rem ained in the lender banks’ books. 
A t the end of 1993, the MoF and MBFB offered this portfolio for sale, b u t only 
one-tenth  of the claims (about HUF 7 bn) found a buyer at a price which was, 
on average, ten percent of the face value. Until mid-1994 banks form ally m anaged 
the claims on the basis of continuously renewed short-term  contracts between the 
M BFB and the banks. The banks did not do anything effectively w ith these claims. 
From mid-1994 until the end of 1994 this portfolio remained w ithout control. F i­
nally, in early 1995, the MBFB took over HUF 63 bn debt, and was allowed to 
keep 35 percent of the net revenues from the work-out. Except for a  few cases, 
the credit consolidation did not have any real im pact on the financial conditions 
of firms. The Treasury did not benefit too much from the work-out either. U ntil 
the end of 1995, the sta te  budget recovered only about HUF 6 bn. If we were to 
add a few more billion forints to  these revenues, we can still point to  a less th an  10 
percent recovery rate.
In the case of the firm oriented bank conciliation the approach chosen and the 
outcom e were not significantly different. In 1992-93, the S tate Development Insti­
tu te  (A FI)— another 100 percent state-ow ned organisation— cancelled, rescheduled 
or capitalised HUF 15 bn of its loans to these firms. In addition, guarantees for 
these industrial enterprises were provided by the government and their tax- and 
tariff-arrears were forgiven. The MoF then sold the debts of these firms to  the 
s ta te  asset m anagem ent agencies and these agencies used privatization revenues to 
pay for these claims. Although the debt could have been rescheduled or swapped 
for equity, the S tate Asset M anagem ent Company (AV Rt.) chose to  w rite off 
HUF 23 bn of debt in 1993 w ithout requiring any restructuring on the p a rt of the 
firms. Since the SPA was not authorised to  forgive any debt w ithout parliam en­
ta ry  approval, it silently accepted th a t debtors would not service their debts after 
Septem ber 1993.
It turned out (as early as spring 1993) th a t the bad debt problem  of banks had 
not been solved, although the whole consolidation process was supposed to  have 
been completed by the end of 1993. In 1993 the real grow th rate was still negative; 
the number of bankruptcies or liquidations increased steadily; firms suffered from 
financial distress; the m anagem ent of banks did not improve; and further tighten­
ing of the regulation was expected. As a result, the banks’ portfolio deteriorated 
further. By au tum n 1993 the solvency capital of m ajor banks became negative- 
T he high level of loan loss provisions (even according to  the domestic rules) caused 
the m ajor SOCBs to fall into the red. The balance sheet of the banking system 
as a whole showed a more than  HUF 30 bn loss a t the end of Septem ber 1993-
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The government, relying upon the recom m endations of foreign and H ungarian ad­
visors, decided to  continue the bailout of the banking sector. However, instead 
of carving out bad debts, now it was recapitalisation of the banks which received 
priority. (In March 1993, the IM F and the World Bank had already advocated 
the recapitalisation of troubled banks to  the level where their CAR would reach 4 
percent, bu t a t th a t tim e the H ungarian government rejected this option.) In au­
tum n 1993, banks were able to apply for the new round of consolidation. O ut of 14 
applicants, the government finally allowed 8 commercial banks to  participate. The 
other banks were excluded because the government considered their perform ance 
relatively good, so sta te  funds were not to be used to  improve their situation . These 
eight banks extended 51 percent of all enterprise loans, bu t represented only 34.6 
percent of the to ta l assets of the whole banking sector. Nevertheless, they had  more 
than  60 percent (IIUF 211 bn) of the qualified loans, and more than  70 percent 
of bad loans. Tw o-thirds of the problem loans had already been overdue for more 
than a year, and the cash-flow of these banks was expected to become negative in
1994, adding another reason for intervention.
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Bank conciliation
The H ungarian government opted for so-called “bank conciliation” . How­
ever, a t this stage bank restructuring and debtor conciliation were also p a rt of the 
program m e. (See Balassa 1995)
The m ain aims of bank conciliation were: (1) the elim ination of loan losses 
from the accounts of banks, and the stabilisation of the banking sector (i.e. solv­
ing the stock problem); (2) helping to reduce lending rates in order to boost the 
economy by providing cheaper financing; (3) helping to  restore the profitability 
of the SOCBs; (4) the creation of an environment for prudent banking operation; 
(5) the preparation of the SOCBs for privatisation, thus eventually solving the 
flow problem . The goal of bank conciliation was to  reach an 8 percent CA R for 
all partic ipating  banks. This required an am endm ent of the Banking Act and the 
full ad justm en t of prudential regulation to international standards. The changes in­
cluded the point th a t all shares had to be bearer shares. A nother im portan t change 
was th a t, instead of evaluating individual debts, clients were to  be assessed and pro­
visioning was also extended to investm ent and off-balance sheet items. Banks also 
enjoyed more flexibility in provisioning, within certain limits. Accounting principles 
were also modernized.
Four sm aller domestic banks and four large SOCBs partic ipated  in bank 
conciliation. In addition to  the eight banks, the O T P and OTIVA (the Deposit 
insurance Funds of Savings Cooperatives) were also included a t this stage. The 
^ ° F  increased the capital of the large SOCBs (i.e. of the BB, K&H, MHB, and
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Takarékbank) in three steps, thus enabling these banks to  achieve 8 percent CARs. 
In the case of small banks (i.e. Agrobank, D unabank, Iparbankház and M ezőbank) 
the government increased their equity only up to  the point where it reached 4 
percent. The to ta l assets of these small banks represented less than  three percent 
of the  banking sector. I t was assumed th a t, using a m ethod of privatisation  through 
capital increase, these banks would find a partner more easily and the CARs could 
be increased to  over 8 percent.
The MoF increased the capital of troubled banks in three steps. T he consol­
idation bonds which the eight banks received in December 1993 am ounted to  HUF
114.5 bn (USD 1.24 bn), out of which MHB and K&H received HUF 88.19 bn. 
The capital increase enabled banks to lift their respective CARs above zero, and 
this measure also restored a positive cash-flow for the banks. Since in December 
audited figures were not available, the am ount each bank received was determ ined 
by the MoF on the basis of d a ta  provided by banks in Septem ber. Changes in the 
prudential regulations and the individual actions of the banks to increase their loan 
loss reserves were incorporated in the assessment. W hen the balance sheet for the 
whole year becam e available (late February), banks and the MoF recalculated the 
am ounts used in recapitalisation. Loans extended before 30 Septem ber 1993 and 
qualified as bad a t the end of 1993 were covered by the program m e. T he M oF’s 
estim ate was th a t banks needed to  accum ulate HUF 113 bn more reserves under 
the new regulations compared to  the previous one. The equity of banks was in­
creased again in May at the shareholders meetings of banks. The M oF, perhaps 
understandably, preferred a lower level (four percent) of CAR, while the NBH, SBS 
and SPA recommended the internationally suggested eight percent. A t the same 
tim e IBRD experts advised th a t w ith a positive, bu t less than  8 percent CA R, the 
government could exercise pressure on SOCBs in order to  speed up their restruc­
turing. In May 1993, the eight banks received HUF 17.2 bn (USD 163 million) in 
to ta l in the form of conciliation bonds. This was to  help them  reach a two percent 
CA R in the case of small banks, and 4-8 percent CAR in the case of large banks. 
In addition to  this, small banks received HUF 896 mn of subordinated  capital to 
reach 4 percent CAR.
In exchange for the recapitalisation, banks were expected to  subm it their 
m edium -term  restructuring program m es and a privatisation plan to the annual 
shareholders meetings. They were also expected to partic ipa te  in a debtor con­
solidation which would address the financing problem of large enterprises. The 
governm ent held back the strategic plans of the MHB and K&H and therefore their 
consolidation was a bit delayed. These two banks had to  subm it a revised strategic 
plan. Because the efforts of the m anagem ent of these banks did not satisfy the 
governm ent, the top m anagem ent of MHB and K&H was replaced by a new one 
in late 1994 and early 1995. Eventually, the CARs of these banks were increased 
to  8 percent a t the end of 1994, bu t they were still calculated on the basis of their 
1993 balance sheet data . These two banks received IIUF 15 bn (USD 142 mn)
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of subordinated  capital. As a result of these capital increases, the sta te  became 
a m ajority  owner of consolidated banks. S tate ownership exceeded 75 percent in 
seven banks.
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Debtor conciliation
Enterprise indebtedness or restructuring was not addressed as the m ain issues 
in the bank conciliation programme. Bank conciliation did not remove any claims 
against the firms, although banks were free to make any decision concerning en­
terprise debt. As a result of the measures taken, banks had sufficient provisioning, 
and it was exclusively their own business decision as to  w hat they intended to do 
with these claims. For policymakers the passivity of the banks was a m ain concern. 
B ankruptcy regulations did not allow banks to  forgive any arrears against sta te  
creditors (e.g. tax , social security), although these arrears could be rescheduled. 
Debtor conciliation corresponded to the out-of-court agreements of bankruptcy  
procedures, or they functioned like pre-filing conciliation. Only representatives of 
banks and sta te  creditors (i.e. tax and customs offices, social security authorities 
and the N ational Technical and Development Com m ittee) could participate in con­
ciliation procedures. Although banks, NHB and World Bank advisors strongly 
opposed the idea, branch ministries could also send their delegates to  these com­
m ittees. Nonetheless, the interests of small creditors could not be ignored. In 
this scheme sta te  creditors were authorised, under a special resolution and w ithin 
certain lim its, to  forgive debts. The main purpose of the conciliation was to  help 
to reorganise enterprises in financial distress. In cases where agreem ent was not 
reached the norm al bankruptcy procedure was initiated.
Conciliation procedures started  in early 1994. The SPA and branch ministries 
(1) had the right to select firms for an accelerated debtor conciliation procedure and 
to lead or a ttend  the negotiations with creditors; (2) if no agreem ent was reached, 
then the SPA was allowed to  buy-out debts from the banks at net value (face 
value minus provisions); (3) the ministries had the right to set up inter-m inisterial 
com m ittees for resolving disputes among government agencies, or for m onitoring 
the process. In fact, three different types of debtor conciliation were designed:
1. Accelerated debtor conciliation. Under this scheme, the SPA and the m in­
istries (i.e. M inistry of Industry and Trade and M inistry of A griculture) selected 
some debtors, and agreements had to be reached w ithout delay. O ut of 55 selected 
enterprises, conciliation took place in 46 cases. Nevertheless, in 1994, 15 firms filed 
f°r liquidation and 9 were privatised. 17 firms were able to  reach an agreem ent 
w>th their creditor. The SPA purchased the bank debts in five cases. The bank 
debts of those 55 firms am ounted to about HUF 40 bn, and these firms also owed 
ahout HUF 10 bn to  sta te  creditors. As a result of conciliation, a  debt reduction of
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HUF 18 bn was achieved. In the event, the accelerated debtor conciliation was not 
very successful, partly  because the time available for preparing the restructuring  
plan and reaching an agreement with banks was short. A nother im portan t aspect 
of the process was th a t banks gained some experience in work-out. T he deadline 
for com pletion of the procedures was extended to  the end of April 1994.
2. Normal debtor conciliation. Firm s having bad debts a t the end of 1993 
were allowed to  apply for debt relief. An inter-m inisterial com m ittee then selected 
those who could partic ipate  in the programme. Finally 76 firms were deemed 
eligible, of which 41 had been supervised by the M inistry of Industry  and Trade 
and 35 by the M inistry of Agriculture. These firms had a to ta l of HUF 47.143 bn 
debts, of which HUF 28.4 bn were bank debts. The participating  firms subm itted  
a reorganisation plan. However, in most cases proposals were returned for revision. 
Some banks were active, some of them  not. S trict deadlines again proved to  be a 
drawback, and thus the deadline for completion was extended to  the end of June
1995.
3. Simplified debtor conciliation. All other applicants (who did not take 
p a rt in the previous two schemes) were eligible to  participate in the simplified 
scheme under the same conditions. In this scheme government au thorities did not 
participate in the negotiations.
Table 7
Main characteristics of debtor consolidation
Banks S ta te
creditors
SPA Social
security
Potential applicants (Decem ber 31, 1993)
N um ber of cases 13,069 - - -
D ebts (million HUF) 227,329 - - -
Applications  (D ecem ber 31, 1993)
N um ber of cases 1,890 708 - 655
D eb ts (million HUF) 121,008 25,506 - n .a.
Unsettled cases (Decem ber 31, 1993)
N um ber of cases 1,536 559 - 754
D ebts (million HUF) 77,039 15,909 - -
Agreements
N um ber of cases 354 149 31 81
A greem ent w ith forgiving (m illion HUF) 19,536 3,890 267 966
rescheduling (m illion HUF-) 6,649 5,562 - 4,345
swap (m illion HUF) 3,986 293 1,008 52
m ixed (m illion HUF) 30,171 9,745 1,275 5,363
Source: various issues of Privinfo
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Table 7 provides a sum m ary of debtor conciliation. O ut of 13,069 debtors, 
1,890 firms indicated their interest in participating in the debt conciliation. C redi­
tors reached agreement w ith their debtors in 354 cases. The to ta l value of the  bad 
and doubtful bank loans of these firms amounted to  HUF 227 bn, and the banks 
had HUF 154 bn loan loss reserves behind these claims. The to ta l debts of firms 
which finally remained in the debtor conciliation were HUF 121 bn, against which 
banks had about HUF 80 bn loan loss reserves. S tate  creditors were involved in 
debt arrangem ents in 149 cases, while the SPA was involved in 31 cases.
According to  Balassa (1995) in these debt settlem ents 29 percent of bank debt 
and alm ost 6 percent of the debt of sta te  creditors were forgiven. Banks did not use 
all of their loan loss reserves for this purpose and a significant p art of these reserves 
was transferred for other purposes. However, as can be seen from  Table 8, the 
vast m ajority  of debtors did not apply and therefore their debts had to  be w ritten 
oif. Two m ajor banks (the MHB and K&H) followed the advice of the IBRD and 
“sp lit” into a “good” bank and a “bad” bank. They transferred bad debts to  those 
of their subsidiaries who were specialised in work-out. Even if debtor conciliation 
did not come up to  expectations, banks could eventually get rid of m ost of their 
non-perform ing loans. As Table 5 indicates, the portfolio quality of banks improved 
significantly after 1995. This also paved the way for bank privatisation.
I. ABEL-L. SZAKADAT: BANK RESTRUCTURING IN HUNGARY 183
Privatisation of state banks
T he Banking Act of 1991 stipulated th a t direct and indirect ownership of 
any single owner, with the exemption of financial institu tions, could not exceed 25 
percent of the equity. Although this restriction did not apply to  the s ta te  until the 
end of 1996, the Act put a ceiling on the voting rights of the sta te  as an owner 
after 1 January  1995. The 1995 deadline of the elim ination of voting power was 
extended later.
A t the beginning of 1992, financial institu tions were obliged to renew their 
licences by law, and bearer shares had to be converted into registered shares. The 
sta te  property  agencies tried to  collect the shares of SOCBs from SOEs. A lthough 
this effort was not fully successful, the ownership of banks becam e more transparen t.
In the period of 1991-94 the macroeconomic conditions did not favour the sale 
°f SOCBs. The net asset value of the m ajor Hungarian SOCBs was negative, and 
the H ungarian government decided to clean up banks’ portfolios, and to  restructure  
troubled banks so as to  make them  viable for privatization. I h e  au thorities first 
envisaged a sequential privatisation: strategic investors could obtain  control via a 
capital increase combined with the sale of the rem aining shares of the sta te . The 
argum ent was th a t strategic investors would guarantee higher proceeds from such 
transactions.
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Table 8
Bank and debtor conciliation in Hungary between 1987-1996
Y ear T arge t T arg e t group M ethod Face value E xpenses (b n  HU F)
B anks F irm s (bn  HU F) G C S O
1991 baink portfo lio  
cleaning
3 b an k s n .a. g u aran tee  (G ) 20.6 10.3 - - -
1993 b a n k  p ortfo lio  
c leaning
14
+  3  banks 
(+ 6 9  savings coops.)
(2,619 firms 
& coops.) b u y-ou t
100.1
17.278
2.419
— 79.423
17.278
(1.895)
—
1993 b a n k  portfo lio  
c leaning
(13 banks) 21 firms 
+  coops.
buy-ou t 61.308 - 57.292 - -
1994
b an k
re s tru c tu r in g
8 +  1 banks 
(-fsav ing  coops.) -
recap ita lisa tio n  (C) 
& su b o rd in a ted  lo an  
cap ita l (S)
& o th e r  (O)
- -
114.45
17.207
10.000
(4.712)
(1.724)
0.896
15.003
(0.388)
(0.276)
1.882
12.000
1995 ban k  re s tru c tu rin g 2 b an k s - recap ita lisa tio n - - 0.800 5.000 5.951
1994
1995
firm  re s tru c tu rin g (8 ban k s) 1,890
firms
w ork-out
(out-of-court
conciliation)
121.008 J
Sources : M oF, N a tio n a l A u d itin g  Office, an d  NBH
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However, not everybody supported the sale of SOCBs to  foreigners. A lthough 
foreign banks could enter the H ungarian credit m arket, they im m ediately enjoyed 
significant com parative advantage over domestic banks. Foreign and jo in t venture 
banks had a clean portfolio. In the first years they enjoyed certain tax  concessions. 
They had easy access to  cheap foreign sources and they could also take advantage 
of m arket imperfections. Consequently, these banks were very profitable.
O ut of the five big SOCBs, the MKB was the first th a t the government offered 
for sale. The G erm an Bayerische Landesbank and EBRD obtained, respectively, 25 
and 16 percent stakes in late 1994 and mid-1995 (again, respectively). These two 
investors first purchased existing shares and then subscribed to  newly issued shares. 
A nother foreign investor owns 8 percent of shares, and the rem aining shares are in 
domestic hands or in the bank’s portfolio. After these transactions the ex ten t of 
sta te  ownership had decreased to 25 percent by 1995.
In 1994, 19.5 percent of the O T P ’s equity was offered for sale to  Hungarian 
investors. A year later, another 21 percent of shares were transferred to  Social 
Security and Pension Funds, and municipalities, while 20 percent were sold directly 
to  foreign institu tional investors, and employees purchased 5 percent. In 1995, 
domestic small investors purchased another 8 percent. These transactions resulted 
in revenues of HUF 10 bn (about USD 90 mn) for the government. (According to 
privatisation laws the sta te  wants to retain 25 percent +  1 vote in the bank.) The 
reason why the O T P was not offered to foreign strategic investors was to  enable 
this bank to  retain  its dom inant position in retail banking.
In December 1995, the American General Electric C apital and EBRD pur­
chased 32.5 percent and 27.5 percent of shares, respectively, of BB for a to ta l of 
HUF 12 bn (USD 87 m n ).19 The Hungarian S tate had to  buy back the Polgári 
Bank (a retail banking subsidiary of BB) from the new owners for HUF 1.1 bn 
(USD 7.3 million).
It was a  generally shared opinion th a t the MHB and K&H were the two large 
banks in the worst shape of all the SOCBs in Hungary. Therefore it was a m ajor 
success when the Dutch ABN-AMRO purchased 89.23 percent of M HB’s equity for 
about HUF 14 bn (USD 89.23 mn) at 225 percent of the face value. (The M K B ’s 
shares had been sold at an approxim ately similar m argin some years before, while 
the O T P ’s shares were distributed a t 120 percent of their face value. The margin 
° f B B ’s shares is not easy to  assess because of other provisions in the contract, 
hut in the first round it was roughly 100 percent.) Shortly after the privatisation, 
the Dutch investors increased the equity of the bank, and MHB became a really 
hig bank again. In the privatisation contract the new owners promised a capital
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19 In 1995 th e  SPA transferred  to BB cap ital reserves of HUF 12 billion in o rder to  increase 
the w arran ty  cap ita l of th e  bank. Decision-makers expected th a t  it would be possible to  reach a 
b e tte r  price  by doing this.
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increase of USD 100 m n by the end of 1997. It seems th a t MHB will become one 
of the m ajor banks in the Hungarian m arket again, as it was in 1987.
In the spring of 1997 the Deutsche Genossenschaft Bank purchased a 61 per­
cent share (HUF 818 mn) of the Takarékbank (Savings Bank) for HUF 4.4 (DM
41.3 million), a t 532 percent of the face value of the shares. After this transaction 
the H ungaria Insurance Company had the task of subscribing shares of the bank 
according to an agreement among the current owners. As a result of this capital 
increase the insurance company obtained 5 percent of the shares. Employees can 
also subscribe to  5 percent of the shares with a 50 percent discount. The Germ an 
owner (which is also a cooperative bank) provided strategic voting rights for the 
H ungarian cooperatives in the m anagem ent of the bank m aking their position equal 
to  th a t of a golden share. The current stake of 32 percent of H ungarian coopera­
tives will decrease to 23 percent as a result of the annual increases of the equity. 
Takarékbank currently has about 5.4 percent on the money m arket, and a share of 
about 15 percent in the retail (household) m arket.
The privatisation of the K&II started  in 1997. A lthough the m anagem ent of 
K&H sought to  im ita te  the strategy of the O T P ’s m anagem ent, the  government 
was eventually able to  resist and a significant stake of the  b ank’s shares were offered 
for strategic investors. Two bidders were selected from five applicants in the first 
round of the tender. The strategic investors were expected to  buy a t least 25 
percent plus one vote. Finally, the consortium  of the Belgium K redietbank and 
the Irish Irish Life insurance company obtained 10 percent of the shares (HUF 1 
bn) for USD 30 mn a t 567.3 percent of the face value. As with the case of the 
MHB, the government did not have to provide any special guarantees ap a rt from 
the regular ones. The new owners will increase the equity of the bank by USD 60 
mn by the end of 1997 a t 105 percent of the face value. The EBRD has a swap 
option am ounting to USD 30 mn. The employees can also purchase bank shares 
up to  a value of HUF 519 mn. If all these transactions are carried ou t the bank 
will become the second largest commercial bank in Hungary, and the share of the 
consortium  of the new owners will be around 45-48 percent. The rem aining stake 
of the sta te  of HUF 4.5 bn and HUF 3.115 bn of social security will be introduced 
on the stock exchange. The government hopes th a t this transaction , e ls  well as the 
privatization of some sm aller banks, will be completed in 1997.
Some lessons can be drawn from the experience of the privatisation  of the large 
SOCBs: (1) the s ta te  has to  take an active role in the privatisation of SOCBs; (2) 
the b etter the banks are prepared for privatisation and the more thoroughly the 
tender is organised, the more the benefit is felt by the sta te  as well as by the banks;
(3) com petition for buying a bank should be m aintained until the last round of the 
sale; (4) after portfolio cleaning, recapitalisation and restructuring, SOCBs m ust be 
privatised as quickly as possible; (5) if there is ju s t one interested buyer, flexibility 
on the seller’ side is crucial in order to avoid detrim ental strategic behaviour by the 
buyers; (6) the governm ent m ust resist pressures from political or in terest groups-
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T he rival private banks (including already privatised SOCBs) will obviously lobby 
heavily against any deal because they do not want to see another strong com petitor 
on the m arket.
Assessment and policy recommendation
W ith all of its defects, in many respects H ungarian bank restructuring  has 
been able to meet its main aims. Although at a high cost, the bad debts of the 
SOCBs have been carved out. ( Table 8 provides a sum m ary of the various stages.) 
As a result of various credit and bank conciliation schemes the portfolio of the 
SOCBs has resulted in lower lending rates in real term s and a narrower m argin 
(see Figures 1 and 2). In 1994 consolidated banks had a positive cash-fiow, and 
becam e profitable. This may have contributed to  the fact th a t all m ajor SOCBs 
have now been privatised. In order to cover, at least partially, the expenses of 
various schemes, the Treasury has been able to  collect some revenues from the 
privatisation  of SOCBs as well as increasing profit taxes. Since m ajor banks are in 
foreign hands, the sta te  has no direct control over credit allocation. For Hungary, as 
a small country with an open economy, the free flow of resources may substan tia lly  
assist in the im provement of the allocative efficiency of the market.
The restructuring of the banking sector has taken place gradually. The whole 
process covered 18 banks altogether. Three big ones participated  in all stages, seven 
in two, and eight banks in one phase only. This gradualism  roughly corresponds 
to the H ungarian tradition . Nevertheless, in this special case, gradualism  was not 
efficient. If banks had started  their restructuring in 1992-93, the transform ation of 
the banking sector would perhaps have been cheaper. Many authors argue th a t  the 
stock problem  was dom inant, and the deterioration of the portfolio of the banks 
was a consequence of external economic or political factors, or it can be explained 
by changes in the system  of regulation. According to  Balassa (1995) the cost of 
the credit and bank conciliation could have been, in an optim al case, 20-25 percent 
lower. The lengthy m ulti-stage procedure is also now considered as a m ain reason 
for the high expenses. W ithout the consecutive stages, the moral hazard of various 
agents, especially commercial bankers and firm m anagers, could have been avoided. 
W hen some details of the debtor consolidation program m e for businesses became 
known in the au tum n of 1993, firms started  to  stop servicing their debts. In the 
case of the MHB the end of the year the interest paym ent and bank fee arrears of 
debtors had increased by fifty percent, compared to the end of 1992. According to  
some anecdotal evidence fraud a t banks could not be excluded either. According 
to a report of a large SOCB prepared in early 1994, the loss in the whole banking 
sector due to  fraud could am ount to HUF 20 billion. These costs, being not properly 
•dentified, could not be excluded either.
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Bond financing of these schemes was not the best choice either. Probably 
for political reasons, the interest paym ents on consolidation bonds sta rted  only in 
the spring of 1994 (when the m andate of the conservative governm ent expired). 
Between 1994 and 1996 the MoF paid out interest of HUF 54.47 bn, HUF 96.61 bn 
and HUF 78.04 bn, respectively, on consolidation bonds.
The rules of the game m atter a great deal. R egulation plays an im portan t 
role. As most of the decisions were made by the M inistry of Finance, the fiscal 
considerations dom inated the whole process. As Tirole (1994) and Dixii (1996) 
point ou t, in the case of m ultitask  agency problems, the control of public enterprises 
(in our case SOCBs) can best be performed if m ultiple principals w ith different 
objectives are created. In this situation, as has been shown, external discipline, 
com petition or transparency may also help in overcoming difficulties. W hen, under 
external pressure, the Banking Act and various elements of prudential regulation 
were introduced, the SBS gained more ground and could a t least, to  some extent, 
counterbalance the interest of other government agencies, even if the SBS did not 
perform  perfectly.
On the o ther hand it was, in our opinion, a m istake to adopt BIS rules grad­
ually. Moreover, the eight percent CAR for banks as a criterion for p rudentia l op­
eration became a fetish. For the government, this view could simplify bank restruc­
turing  to  a one-dimensional issue which was relatively easy to  handle. Nonetheless, 
the failure of small banks after their recapitalisation clearly shows th a t it is not 
true th a t below eight percent CAR everything is wrong and over eight percent CA R 
everything is fine. D ew atripont and Tirole (1994) trea t comprehensively the prob­
lem of banking regulation, although in a different set-up. However, the practice 
of the Hungarian governm ent corresponded to one of their findings. In m acroeco­
nomic recessions aggregate shocks may hit every bank sim ultaneously and therefore 
a tem porary  waiver of the eight percent CAR requirem ent can be advantageous.
The H ungarian banking sector has gone through significant changes. In m any 
respects success has been achieved, but the bill has also been sizeable. H ungar­
ian firms use less bank credit than  their counterparts in other countries. This 
clearly shows th a t inflation should have been and still m ust be taken more seriously. 
Nonetheless, banks are supposed to, and hopefully, as a result of the consolidation 
measures, will take an active part in financing the economy in the future.
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AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AND UTILIZATION OF 
CENTRAL RESOURCES
P. JUHÁSZ— K. MOHÁCSI
A gricultural investm ents fell back, considerably, in th e  first years of the  nineties w ith the 
lowest ebb in 1993. A huge num ber of agricultural en trepreneurships which h ad  form ed a t the  
tim e of th e  changing of th e  p lan t an d  ownership system  were no t able, from  th e ir own sources, 
to  renew the  technical basis and  thus create a  suitable background for farm ing. Also, technical 
bases were seriously endangered in m any fields. A ppreciating these difficulties decision-m akers 
have developed various p rojects in  order to  encourage agricu ltu ra l investm ents. A lthough th e  
grow th in agricu ltu ra l investm ents since 1994 cannot com pensate for the  failure of developm ents 
in previous years, nevertheless it is a  movement forwards and  away from  the  earlier situ a tio n  and  
ind icates th e  growing activ ity  of those who are involved in economy.
Agricultural investment
Investment in the 1980s
A gricultural investm ent took a downward trend in the early 1980s. The 
volume of investm ent between 1981-1985 dropped 14-15 percent a t a com parative 
price against the previous five-year period. After a tem porary boom in 1986-1987 
generated by the Congress of the Hungarian Socialist W orkers’ Party, investm ent 
plunged. Except for this two-year period, the real value of investm ent also shrank. 
Com paring the periods 1981-1985 and 1986-1990, the drop was a to ta l of 12 percent 
(Vissy-Takacs 1985). Owing to the sta te  of investm ent as described above, obsolete 
and worn out equipm ent was impossible to replace after 1983. In three-quarters 
of agricultural organizations the value of depreciation exceeded th a t of investm ent. 
On the other hand, w ithering investment released reserves and thus rationalization 
resulted in more efficient development.
The lack of development can be traced back to several causes. One was th a t, 
owing to  cuts and an increase in the price of agricultural inputs as well as to  ef­
ficiency problems, the profitability of agricultural enterprises dropped drastically 
in the 1980s while a tax  was levied on investment. From the mid-1980s, agricul­
tu ra l companies were free to use depreciation to cover their losses. I h i s  snatched 
resources from development. A nother im portant factor was the serious cuts in sub­
sidies for agricultural investm ent during the 1980s coupled with an increasingly 
stringent fiscal and m onetary policy. This made access to credits for agricultural 
businesses increasingly difficult. A large portion of investm ent was concentrated in 
development schemes supported by the World Bank.
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Investment between 1990 and 1995
In the first half of the 1990s, the reduction of agricultural investm ents con­
tinued and this process actually accelerated between 1990 and 1993. Owing to  the 
strengthening support of investm ents and to a certain degree of stabilization  in the 
transition  process of the agricultural sector, investm ent activities took an upswing 
in 1994 followed by additional increases in 1995 and 1996. However, excessive u ti­
lization of equipm ent and the failure to  replace and repair this equipm ent has had 
very serious ram ifications to  date. In 1987, agricultural investm ents contributed  12 
percent to  the to ta l investm ent of the national economy; in contrast th is contribu­
tion had dropped to  below 5 percent by 1991. Despite subsequent enhancem ent, 
the trend  could not be curbed and agricultural investm ent am ounted to  no more 
th an  2-3 percent of to ta l investm ent in 1994 and 1995.
T he collapse of investm ent in the early 1990s (1990-1993) can be a ttrib u ted  
to  several in terrelated  causes, each stem m ing from an unfavourable economic envi­
ronm ent:
—  Profits of agricultural enterprises dropped drastically in the early years 
of th is decade.
—  W hile no capital injection was given to  a large num ber of agricultural 
enterprises, revenues were continuously w ithdraw n from the branch of the econ­
omy owing to  the im plem entation of the Com pensation Act and the Act on the 
Transform ation of Cooperatives; thus there were many uncertainties in agricultural 
operating  conditions.
—  By the beginning of 1994, about 600-700 agricultural companies were 
subject to  bankruptcy procedure. Approxim ately 40-45 percent of the agricultural 
cooperatives and tw o-thirds of the sta te  farms went bankrup t or near-bankrupt. 
Consequently, hardly any fixed assets were produced before 1993. A t th a t tim e, 
foregone expenditures on development amounted to  HUF 70-100 billion. M ounting 
liquidity pressures forced agricultural enterprises to  use an increasing portion of 
depreciation for financing current expenditures. A gricultural investm ents which 
took place by the end of 1993 were ad hoc instead of being p art of a long-term  
strategy.
—  In the wake of the im plem entation of the Acts on Com pensation and 
Cooperatives, land ownership and land use were increasingly separated . T his made 
the establishm ent of agricultural enterprises more difficult and ham pered, over the 
long term , the efficiency of existing ventures. The same applies to the Land Act, 
which bans or lim its proprietorship and allows a m axim um  of ten years of tenancy.
—  Achievements were m odest as regards development of the m arket and its 
institu tions (Lányi and Fertő 1993).
—  Investm ents were impaired by the deterioration or disappearance of the 
relationships between agricultural and food industrial entities.
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—  Owing to  the processes described above, a large num ber of agricultural 
businesses became insolvent by 1992-1993. Commercial banks considered busi­
nesses belonging to an unstable agricultural sector and crippled w ith financial diffi­
culties to  be high-risk debtors. This view was reinforced by the lack of transparency 
of relationships w ith suppliers and customers w ithin the sector as a result of the 
transform ation of operations. Some of the banks therefore tried to  w ithdraw  from 
financing the agricultural and food sector. However, because they lost the m ost 
of their agricultural links, banks have been unable to restore their agricultural fi­
nancing activity  despite the fact th a t operating systems as well as suppliers have 
s ta rted  to become more clearly delineated. An indispensable prerogative for long­
term  (investm ent) credits for agriculture is the introduction of the land m ortgage 
system  and its institu tions— a step which has been very slow to come. U ncertainty 
surrounding the ownership of land was another serious obstacle barring agricultural 
companies from credits.
—  In the early 1990s, the m ajor problem for agriculture in term s of the 
secto r’s relationship to the budget was not prim arily the decrease of subsidies; 
rather, it was the shrinking of the real value of agricultural support. A t the same 
tim e, investm ent subsidies were also clipped.
—  The price of investm ent goods increased substantially  in the early 1990s. 
W hile the liberalization of im ports significantly facilitated the procurem ent of as­
sets, their price was still a m ajor obstacle for prospective buyers.
Sum m ing up the details given above, agricultural investm ent dow ntrended 
significantly in the early 1990s (between 1990-1993). The technical basis of agri­
culture was in a critical situation  in many operations. Investm ent bottom ed in 1993 
when the to ta l value of projects accomplished during the year am ounted to  only 
HUF 6.7 billion, or a quarter of the 1988 investments a t a com parative price. This 
m eant a 60 percent drop in contrast to  1992. It was a drop which exceeded by far 
the level justified by the transition, decreasing production owing to the changes in 
sales m arkets, and the need to  find new functions to make up for those lost. A t the 
same tim e, the ageing and deterioration of assets was extensive. It was obvious th a t 
agricultural operations would be unable to curb these unfavourable trends on their 
°wn. On the other hand, the progress of the change in ownership in the food sector 
resulted in a gradual comeback for several sub-branches, which cast a sharp light 
°n the problem s of connections between the food sector and agriculture. Tensions 
agriculture hindered full exploitation of the m arket potential in the processing 
m dustry. It became a m ajor task for the investm ent subsidy system  to create scope 
for the movement for businesses which were capable of looking into the future, and 
also to  make this expanding entrepreneurial s tra tum  conspicuous for the banking 
sector. Aware of this difficult situation , from 1994 decision-makers started  taking 
steps to prom ote agricultural investment. The role of development support w ithin 
the subsidy system  increased. These measures contributed to  the expansion of agri­
cultural investm ent. The value of investments accomplished in 1994 reached HUF
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13.4 billion a t current prices (compared to  HUF 7 billion in 1992 and 6.7 billion in 
1993). Investm ent further increased in 1994. Its value am ounted to  HUF 18.8 at 
curren t prices, which increased to HUF 46 billion in 1996. This, however, is only 
enough to  replace currently operating assets over a period of ten years.
Changes in the structure of the agricultural support system
In the second half of the 1980s and until 1991, expenditure on support for 
the food sector decreased substantially. This can be explained by the weakening of 
the agricultural lobby, the unveiling of efficiency problems w ithin the industry, a 
s tru c tu ra l change in exports (with the gradual disappearance of heavily subsidized 
exports denom inated in roubles), and the liberalization of prices. Support from 
the budget for agriculture was again cut in 1992 (support being HUF 36.9 billion 
in th a t year), then it s tarted  to  pick up in 1993 with HUF 50.0 billion, followed 
by HUF 74.3 billion in 1994 and HUF 73.3 billion in 1995. Due to  the increase of 
prices, this rise in subsidies only partially  increased the real value of agricultural 
support. The renewed expansion of support was to a great extent due to  the fact 
th a t by this tim e the drop in agricultural production resulting from agricultural 
transform ation reached exports and the country’s need for currency improved the 
chances of support for agricultural exports. On the other hand, the problem s of raw 
m aterial production became so stringent th a t additional resources inevitably had 
to  be involved if a slide in the quality of livestock production was to be avoided 
and agricultural production stabilized. It was also necessary to  give a boost to 
agricultural investm ents which had been stalled for years.
T he structu re  of the agricultural support system has been going through a 
gradual transform ation since the early 1990s owing to  changing economic priorities 
and the creation of a m arket economy. 1. Price subsidies which essentially p r e s e r v e d  
the situation  of the industry were gradually dismantled. 2. Since 1993, a growing 
significance has been allocated to  export subsidies as a result of the appreciation 
of agricultural exports; indeed the largest portion of the full am ount available for 
support has been used for this purpose. 3. A nother im portan t feature of support 
was the so-called intervention allocation, which theoretically allowed s ta te  inter­
ference which was in accordance w ith the m arket. Together with export subsidies, 
m arket intervention am ounted to  over half of the full support in 1994 and 1995- 4- 
Sensing the problem s of finance across various production systems and the partial 
collapse of high quality production, production and income supplement support has 
been increased since 1994. 5. In the wake of the agricultural transform ation, new 
entities were formed and these had to be equipped. As m entioned above, agricul­
tural development support aimed at the renewal and upgrading of ageing assets and 
facilities has become increasingly im portan t since 1995, together w ith the s o - c a l l e d
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“reorganization subsidy” . The la tter is aimed a t the utilization of assets belonging 
to  sta te  farms and cooperatives. Various schemes, such as the reorganization sub­
sidy and the Agricultural Development Fund were created; these are described in 
detail below.
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Experiences of development support schemes
Support for promoting the reorganization of the agricultural sector
Aimed a t prom oting the structural and organizational transform ation of the 
food sector, support for reorganization was first launched in 1992. The scheme was 
made im perative by the agricultural transform ation which jeopardized a large num ­
ber of assets, prim arily livestock farms. The mobilization and renewed involvement 
of these assets had to  be prom oted through central allocations. U ndercapitalization, 
a phenomenon widely prevalent in agriculture, coupled with the financial problems 
of old and new agricultural enterprises called for a special m ethod of support. This 
m ethod allowed the utilization of assets in a new structure  and it transferred to 
the sta te  a  proportion of the interest costs—which were extremely high against the 
profitability (and load-bearing ability)—of the sector. In other words, if an enter­
prise considered purchasing certain assets, it was granted access to credits whose 
interests were for the m ost part covered by the national budget.
Banks also had to be made interested in extending reorganization credits. In 
order to  alleviate the risks undertaken by financial institutions willing to offer this 
scheme, a Credit G uarantee Fund for Agricultural Enterprises was created with 
the assistance of the PHARE Programme. The Fund undertook guarantees on re­
organization credits and on half of the interest payable for the first year. Credit 
coverage was assisted by the refinancing loan of the National Bank of Hungary 
this am ounted to a quarter of the reorganization credits. Credits were drawn from 
the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) with the govern­
m en t’s guarantee; this became another im portant contributor to long-term  agricul­
tural credit sources. Commercial banks (a to tal of four) which met the EBRD s 
conditions received allocations from this credit scheme.
A pplicants for reorganization support had to subm it an application for long­
term  credit to a commercial bank participating in the scheme. A business plan, 
°wn resources, collateral, etc. had to be documented. The purpose of the credit was 
°bviously the procurem ent and involvement of assets described in the programme. 
The application was rated by the bank and in the case of a favourable decision, a 
com m itm ent was offered. Reorganization support could be applied for by com plet­
ing a special application form in conjunction with the bank s com m itm ent, lh e  
bank subm itted  the docum ents to  the Inter-M inisterial Reorganization Com m ittee
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whose m embers were: the M inistry of Finance, the M inistry of Environm ent and 
Regional Development, the M inistry of Labour and the M inistry of Agriculture. 
T he Com m ittee assessed the applications and notified the banks of its decision. In 
the case of a favourable outcome, the bank concluded a credit contract w ith the 
applicant and opened the credit line and notified the Com m ittee to  th a t effect. 
A gricultural entrepreneurs could request support on the relevant form subm itted  
to  their local tax  authority.
The subsidy scheme prom oting the reorganization of the food sector has 
changed slightly in term s of means and objectives, bu t the m ain com ponents of 
the reorganization support in term s of entitlem ent rem ain the following:
1. N atural persons considered H ungarian residents in accordance w ith the 
currency regulations;
2. Business associations and forest ownership associations whose m ajority  
owners are na tu ra l persons;
3. Transform ed cooperatives w ith the m ajority  partic ipation  of n a tu ra l per­
sons as well as business associations established and owned by a m ajority  of such 
cooperatives;
4. A gricultural and forestry organizations where the sta te  retains to  some 
extent long-term  ownership.
Tw o kinds of support appeared w ithin the reorganizational scheme: interest 
support (which has been operating  since 1992), and non-refundable support or aid 
(which operated between 1993 and mid-1995). In addition to  in terest support, an 
entrepreneur who started  business w ithin one year prior to  subm itting  an applica­
tion to  a bank— and since 1994, all entrepreneurs who operate in an economically 
backward area— are eligible for non-refundable support also. The la tte r am ounts 
to  a m axim um  of 10 percent of the reorganization credit.
Operation o f the reorganization programme. In 1992 banks offering the re­
organization credit instrum ent granted com m itm ent to some 200 projects, which 
were in tu rn  passed on to  the Inter-M inisterial Reorganization C om m ittee. The 
new scheme worked in fits and sta rts  at th a t stage, slowing down the contract­
ing procedure. Consequently the m ajority  of the HUF 1.5 billion undertaken  by 
com m itm ent was only allocated in 1993 to  entrepreneurs setting  ou t to  reutilize 
cooperative assets. The to ta l expenditure on reorganization credits in 1992 was 
HUF 33 million.
The reorganization scheme was expanded in 1993. The circle of applicants 
was more clearly delineated and application objectives extended. In addition  to 
the reutilization of cooperative assets, purchase of assets from agricultural and 
forestry sta te  farm s or their legal successors was also made possible by the scheme- 
T his is the tim e when non-refundable support was first granted. A decree was 
issued providing for subsidized reorganization interest for projects which aimed
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a t a t least 25 percent of developments which had emerged from the large food 
industrial enterprises after decentralization and privatization. (This was the so- 
called “reorganization proportion” .) In 1993 HUF 3 billion was available for the 
expanded scheme. In the course of the year subsidized reorganization in terest was 
m ade accessible to applicants involved in the decentralizing privatization of grain 
m eat and dairy operations.
In 1993 the Inter-M inisterial Reorganization Com m ittee dealt w ith over 1 100 
applications. A to ta l of HUF 15.6 billion was awarded to successful applicants as 
long-term  credits. If the businesses’ own resources are included, this m eant th a t 
altogether HUF 22.3 billion was used for reorganization and development The 
scheme contributed to saving jobs. Owing to a delay of up to 4 or 5 m onths between 
drawing the credit and interest paym ent on the one hand, and the drawdown of 
support on the other, HUF 1.8 billion was extended as reorganization support in 
1993. This m eant a saving of HUF 1.2 billion out of the HUF 3 billion available in 
to ta l; the  saving could then be deployed in other areas w ithin agriculture.
In 1994 the reorganization scheme was further expanded by allowing en­
terprises (former sta te  farms and forestry operations) which remained entirely or 
partia lly  in sta te  ownership to apply for an interest subsidy on credits for self­
reorganization. In this way, these operations could upgrade their own assets and 
add new ones w ithin the framework of the reorganization scheme. The order of 
applying for non-refundable support was changed. From 1994 s ta rt-up  private 
businesses, as well as entrepreneurs operating in economically backward communi­
ties, could request th a t 10 percent of the credit in their project be allocated as an 
in stan t non-refundable support. Banks forwarded almost 800 applications to  the 
Inter-M inisterial Reorganization Committee, which accepted about 700 of them. 
W hile the num ber of projects subm itted dropped, the size of credit requested and 
granted per project increased (due primarily to the need to buy more expensive as­
sets in the food sector). Consequently, the amount of reorganization credits reached 
HUF 15.5 billion in 1994. W ith the mobilization of the businesses’ own resources 
and assets, the to tal development during this period amounted to HUF 44.1 billion. 
The am ount of support called for during the year was HUF 5 billion.
According to the M inistry of Agriculture, in 1995 HUF 8 billion would have 
been needed to continue with the scheme. Nevertheless, only HUF 6.5 billion were 
approved. This curtailed am ount would have only been enough to cover the in­
terest subsidy on projects approved in previous years and therefore the M inistry 
reallocated its resources. HUF 800 million was transferred from the intervention 
funds. Still, the HUF 7.3 billion made available in this way were only sufficient 
to finance 300 new projects. Coupled with a drastic lim itation of objectives to be 
supported  (due to  the unavailability of funding), this was a serious hindrance for 
new applicants. From mid-1995 assets sold within the framework of the decen­
tralizing privatization of the food industry were deleted from the set of objectives 
to be supported; non-refundable support to starting  businesses and entrepreneurs
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operating in economically backward regions was abolished; self-reorganization was 
no longer to  be supported; interest subsidy on assets purchased from businesses in 
the process of liquidation was done away with; support for the refurbishing and 
upgrading of used assets was cancelled; and eligibility was narrowed.
As a result of these constraints, the real expenditure on reorganization (HUF
7.47 billion) involved about HUF 7.3 billion in term s of budgetary resources. This 
allowed HUF 4.8 billion to  be allocated as credits. Together with the businesses’ 
own resources and assets, this accounted for HUF 12.9 billion going to  develop­
ments.
In 1996 no new projects were accepted under the reorganization scheme. 
Only those applications were dealt with which had been subm itted  prior to  Decem­
ber 31st, 1995 bu t not assessed because of a lack of funds.
Evaluation of the reorganization scheme. During the period between 1992 
and 1995 a to ta l of 2,664 projects were subm itted, of which 2,448 were accepted 
and some 2,200 are still running. A bout 200 projects had been accomplished, re­
paid before the due date, or stopped (owing to  bankruptcy, etc.). On the basis 
of the projects still in process, the to ta l am ount of credit allocated was HUF 35.3 
billion for a term  of 5 to 7 years. S tarting  enterprises and businesses in backward 
regions received non-refundable support to talling  HUF 369.2 million. T he to ta l 
am ount of the  applicants’ own assets and resources involved in developm ents was 
HUF 52.6 billion. All told, assets am ounting to  HUF 88.9 billion were mobilized 
for reutilization, upgrading and purchases. Unutilized assets to talling  HUF 59.1 
billion were re-involved as a result of reorganization with the following breakdown: 
HUF 36.2 billion cooperatives assets, HUF 19.3 billion sta te  farm  assets, and HUF
3.6 billion food industrial assets. The interest subsidy on credits under the reorga­
nization scheme am ounted to  HUF 30.2 billion. Of this, HUF 9 billion will be due 
between 1997 and 2000, upon the m aturity  of the last reorganization credits.
All things considered, the reorganization programme of the agricultural branch 
(w ith the in terest subsidy and the non-refundable credits) more or less reached its 
goal. It expedited the reutilization of unexploited sta te  and cooperative farm  as 
well as food industrial assets (particularly of buildings and durable assets). At 
the same tim e, it prom oted the utilization of en trepreneurs’ tangible assets, the 
reconstruction and upgrading of used assets, the preservation of both existing and 
newly-purchased assets and a general and healthy change in the ownership and user 
s truc tu re  of agricultural and food processing assets. In addition, it helped alleviate 
em ploym ent problems w ithin the sector.
The budgetary resources deployed in the context of the reorganization scheme 
had a significant im pact upon entrepreneurship. Besides mobilizing the businesses 
own resources they prom oted a more efficient use of existing assets. T he new 
business structu re , if viable, improved operation. In the m ajority  of the cases
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efforts were aimed at not merely acquiring support. The reorganization application 
had to  be preceded by an application for a bank credit. Inclusion of the banks as 
interm ediaries pu t caution into the scheme from the outset.
O f the projects considered by the banks 91.9 percent were accepted. Ninety 
percent of them  are still running. Some of the credits have been repaid before 
m atu rity  and the rate of accepted projects which have failed is under 10 percent 
The figures suggest th a t the m ajority of projects which passed the initial filtering 
are viable and the applicants service their debts in a timely fashion.
W hereas banks tend to shy away from the financing of agriculture, they have 
been willing to participate in the reorganization scheme, particularly  as they were in 
control “from  moment one” , being the first entities to rate, then pass on the project 
docum ents. Coverage for projects was also available and the heavily subsidized 
interest made a successful accomplishment more for the businesses.
The reorganization scheme contributed to  the structural change of agriculture. 
Agribusinesses had access to long-term credits with an affordable interest, which 
laid the  basis of future development for several operations. C riteria of eligibility 
helped smaller businesses to ascend and gain strength.
Similarly, according to  the figures, the reorganization program m e boosted 
the stru c tu ra l and ownership change in livestock farming. The change in owner­
ship and continued operation of the biggest livestock farms pu t the brakes on the 
deterioration and loss of high quality breeding stock. In addition, the scheme had 
an im pact on the restructuring of the infrastructure of agricultural production (e.g. 
storage facilities, mixing plants, etc.) and promoted ownership change. In contrast, 
it played a lesser role in the reallocation of machinery and equipm ent.
Agricultural Development Fund (Agricultural and Forestry Fund)
To energize agricultural investment which had shrunk to a fraction of its 
former value, a tool was needed which set policy guidelines and prom oted small- 
and medium-sized agribusinesses (SMEs). This tool emerged in the wake of the 
changes in the sector when, in 1993, the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) 
was created. Refundable and non-refundable resources of the ADF (from 1995, of 
the A gricultural and Forestry Fund, AFF) were allocated on an application ba­
sis. The following development goals had a priority: 1. S tarting  and developing 
agricultural SMEs; investm ents necessary for pursuing the basic agricultural activ­
ity. 2. In frastructu ral development (e.g. water and power supply, farm  drives, crop 
storage, etc.) necessary for continued agricultural activity. 3. Development and 
application of the biological basis (e.g. high quality breeds, propagating m aterials, 
seeds, etc.). 4. Prom otion of forestry. 5. Development of the agricultural extension 
system. 6. Interest subsidy on credits needed to make purchases for development.
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operating  in economically backward regions was abolished; self-reorganization was 
no longer to  be supported; interest subsidy on assets purchased from  businesses in 
the process of liquidation was done away with; support for the refurbishing and 
upgrading of used assets was cancelled; and eligibility was narrowed.
As a result of these constraints, the real expenditure on reorganization (HUF
7.47 billion) involved about HUF 7.3 billion in term s of budgetary resources. This 
allowed HUF 4.8 billion to  be allocated as credits. Together w ith the businesses’ 
own resources and assets, this accounted for HUF 12.9 billion going to  develop­
m ents.
In 1996 no new projects were accepted under the reorganization scheme. 
Only those applications were dealt with which had been subm itted prior to  Decem­
ber 31st, 1995 bu t not assessed because of a lack of funds.
Evaluation of the reorganization scheme. During the period between 1992 
and 1995 a to ta l of 2,664 projects were subm itted , of which 2,448 were accepted 
and some 2,200 are still running. About 200 projects had been accomplished, re­
paid before the due date, or stopped (owing to  bankruptcy, etc.). On the basis 
of the projects still in process, the to ta l am ount of credit allocated was HUF 35.3 
billion for a term  of 5 to  7 years. S tarting  enterprises and businesses in backward 
regions received non-refundable support to talling  HUF 369.2 million. T he to ta l 
am ount of the applicants’ own assets and resources involved in developm ents was 
HUF 52.6 billion. All told, assets am ounting to  HUF 88.9 billion were mobilized 
for reutilization, upgrading and purchases. Unutilized assets to talling  HUF 59.1 
billion were re-involved as a result of reorganization w ith the following breakdown: 
HUF 36.2 billion cooperatives assets, HUF 19.3 billion sta te  farm  assets, and HUF
3.6 billion food industrial assets. The interest subsidy on credits under the  reorga­
nization scheme am ounted to  HUF 30.2 billion. Of this, HUF 9 billion will be due 
between 1997 and 2000, upon the m aturity  of the last reorganization credits.
All things considered, the reorganization ■programme of the agricultural branch 
(w ith the in terest subsidy and the non-refundable credits) more or less reached its 
goal. It expedited the reutilization of unexploited s ta te  and cooperative farm  as 
well as food industrial assets (particularly of buildings and durable assets). At 
the sam e tim e, it prom oted the utilization of en trepreneurs’ tangible assets, the 
reconstruction and upgrading of used assets, the preservation of both existing and 
newly-purchased assets and a general and healthy change in the ownership and user 
stru c tu re  of agricultural and food processing assets. In addition, it helped alleviate 
em ploym ent problems w ithin the sector.
The budgetary  resources deployed in the context of the reorganization scheme 
had a significant im pact upon entrepreneurship. Besides mobilizing the businesses’ 
own resources they prom oted a more efficient use of existing assets. T he new 
business structu re , if viable, improved operation. In the m ajority  of the cases
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efforts were aimed a t not merely acquiring support. The reorganization application 
had to  be preceded by an application for a bank credit. Inclusion of the banks as 
interm ediaries pu t caution into the scheme from the outset.
Of the projects considered by the banks 91.9 percent were accepted. Ninety 
percent of them  are still running. Some of the credits have been repaid before 
m atu rity  and the rate of accepted projects which have failed is under 10 percent 
The figures suggest th a t the m ajority of projects which passed the initial filtering 
are viable and the applicants service their debts in a tim ely fashion.
W hereas banks tend to shy away from the financing of agriculture, they have 
been willing to  participate in the reorganization scheme, particularly  as they were in 
control “from  moment one” , being the first entities to rate, then pass on the project 
docum ents. Coverage for projects was also available and the heavily subsidized 
interest made a successful accomplishment more for the businesses.
T he reorganization scheme contributed to the structural change o f agriculture. 
Agribusinesses had access to long-term credits with an affordable interest, which 
laid the basis of future development for several operations. C riteria of eligibility 
helped smaller businesses to  ascend and gain strength.
Similarly, according to the figures, the reorganization program m e boosted 
the s tru c tu ra l and ownership change in livestock farming. The change in owner­
ship and continued operation of the biggest livestock farms pu t the brakes on the 
deterioration and loss of high quality breeding stock. In addition, the scheme had 
an im pact on the restructuring of the infrastructure of agricultural production (e.g. 
storage facilities, mixing plants, etc.) and prom oted ownership change. In contrast, 
it played a lesser role in the reallocation of machinery and equipm ent.
Agricultural Development Fund (Agricultural and Forestry Fund)
To energize agricultural investment which had shrunk to  a fraction of its 
form er value, a tool was needed which set policy guidelines and prom oted small- 
and medium-sized agribusinesses (SMEs). This tool emerged in the wake of the 
changes in the sector when, in 1993, the A gricultural Development Fund (ADF) 
was created. Refundable and non-refundable resources of the ADF (from 1995, of 
the A gricultural and Forestry Fund, AFF) were allocated on an application ba­
sis. The following development goals had a priority: 1. S tarting  and developing 
agricultural SMEs; investments necessary for pursuing the basic agricultural activ­
ity. 2. In frastructu ral development (e.g. water and power supply, farm  drives, crop 
storage, etc.) necessary for continued agricultural activity. 3. Development and 
application of the biological basis (e.g. high quality breeds, propagating m aterials, 
seeds, etc.). 4. Prom otion of forestry. 5. Development of the agricultural extension 
system . 6. In terest subsidy on credits needed to  make purchases for development.
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Businesses eligible for funding included business organizations (companies), sole 
proprietorships, small scale farms, service providers and cooperatives where sales 
per year did not exceed HUF 150 million and the planned investm ent was not less 
th an  HUF 500 thousand bu t did not exceed HUF 60 million over a period of two 
years. These term s ensured access to  funding for SMEs engaged predom inantly in 
agricultural activities.
An appara tus was set up by the M inistry of A griculture to  adm in istra te  the 
Fund. Projects were rated  by the Agricultural Development C om m ittee a ttached  
to  the  M inistry, whose job it was to  assess larger projects after 1994 (i.e. projects 
aimed a t investm ents exceeding HUF 1 to  2 million, then HUF 5 million after 
1995). Smaller scale projects were assessed by the county A gricultural Offices. 
Funding contracts were concluded by the N ational Development In stitu te  and funds 
were channelled through designated commercial banks. The following types of 
support were offered by the Fund: interest subsidy, interest-free refundable capital 
loan, and non-refundable support. Applicants had to undertake an obligation to  
repay refundable loans. T he investm ent, i.e. the p lantation or tangible assets, 
were m ortgaged. The subsidized funding extended by ADF was guaranteed by 
the A gricultural Enterprise Credit G uarantee Foundation. Allocations of ADF and 
investm ents under the projects awarded funding were supervised by the N ational 
Development In stitu te , the M inistry of A griculture, the county A gricultural Offices 
and the village extension officers.
T he A gricultural Development Fund was launched on January  1, 1993 bu t it 
did not s ta rt operating un til the second quarter. In the first year 1,644 projects 
were subm itted  of which 1,351 were awarded funding. A bout 200 accepted projects 
were shifted to 1994. The ADF disposed of a to tal of HUF 4 billion in 1993. Non- 
refundable support could be requested am ounting to  half of the costs of investm ent 
in to  production (i.e. into buildings, equipm ent, plantations, forestry m achines, etc.). 
Refundable loans could be requested am ounting to  40 percent of the costs of de­
velopm ent of services related to  the basic agricultural operation. N on-refundable 
support was available to  the am ount of 40 percent of the costs of in frastructu ral 
investm ents (e.g. w ater and power supply, telecom m unication, storage facilities, 
etc.) and 30 percent of farm  road construction costs. In addition, the in terest was 
subsidized on 50 percent of long-term  stock financing (w ith a  term  of over 1 year) 
and investm ent credits drawn from banks.
The first m onths of operation of the Fund were surrounded by a great deal 
of uncertainty. It was conspicuous th a t the change in struc tu re  and ownership 
was still in progress and entrepreneurs who were otherwise eligible often could not 
decide w hether or not their venture was viable in the long term . T hus despite 
am ple and tim ely inform ation, it was not until the second sem ester th a t projects 
started  coming in. Businesses’ own resources were scarce and often they were 
unable to  present the coverage required for commercial bank credits which could 
have involved subsidized interest. C redit and support term s were not a ttrac tive
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and elaborate enough to push large numbers of (starting) small- and medium-sized 
agribusinesses towards development. Therefore the support paid by ADF by the 
end of 1993 am ounted to HUF 625 million, leaving the bulk of funds available (i e 
HUF 3.375 billion) unused.
The am endm ent introduced in 1994 brought significant changes in the op­
eration of ADF. As the Fund initially did not fulfil expectations, developments 
plunged to an aggravating level in 1993. Stronger m otivating forces had therefore 
to  be implemented to  reserve this trend. In 1994 ADF received HUF 6 billion from 
the national budget and an additional HUF 3.9 billion were transferred from the 
Telecommunications Fund. While the 1993 support scheme was still in place a 
new elem ent was introduced whereby applicants could request additional one-tim e 
non-refundable support am ounting to 30 percent of the development expenditures 
but not exceeding HUF 500 thousand. The assessment system was also changed: 
while in 1993 all projects were rated by the A gricultural Development Com m ittee 
in the M inistry of Agriculture, from 1994 smaller projects were assessed by the 
county A gricultural Offices.
These new elements boosted the number of applications— prim arily of smaller 
scale projects—subm itted to the count offices. Ninety percent of these projects were 
awarded support. In order to filter out applications aimed a t securing the HUF 500 
thousand “free money” , which required no guarantee, assessment of projects was 
suspended in late April and criteria were tightened. (For instance, vehicle purchase 
was deleted from the scope of support and a quantified statem ent of the ability to 
repay the refundable support was required.) Funds allocated to ADF were depleted 
by July. As a result about 500 applicants whose projects were awarded support 
received a com m itm ent granting funding in 1995.
T he approxim ately 7,000 approved projects envisioned a to tal investm ent 
of HUF 13 billion. The value of investment per project was HUF 1.5 million at 
the level of the county Agricultural Offices and HUF 4.8 million a t the level of 
projects assessed by the M inistry of Agriculture; the average was HUF 1.8 million 
per project. A lthough the support per project was lower compared to 1993, the 
level of support to development increased to  more than 70 percent. The breakdown 
of the support was as follows: 31.6 percent one-time non-refundable support, 61.6 
percent interest-free refundable support and 6.8 percent non-refundable support.
Own resources contributed 21 percent to 1994 investm ents prom oted through 
the A gricultural Development Fund, in addition to 70 percent various support 
schemes and 9 percent bank credits. The low rate of bank credits is explained by 
the fact th a t most projects indicated smaller investment figures not necessitating 
bank loans; on the other hand, banks tend to be unwilling to lend to small and 
risky businesses. The structure of resources differed at the level of the counties and 
the Ministry. In the case of larger projects assessed by the Agricultural M inistry 
the proportion of own resources and bank loans was higher, and support was re­
quested primarily to avoid heavy involvement of own resources and bank credits.
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The m ajority  of projects relied on carefully conceived long-term  economic consid­
erations. On the other hand, the average investm ent of projects subm itted  to  the 
county A gricultural Offices was lower with very modest own resources and bank 
loans. This is explained, ap art from the poor credit ra ting  of small farm s and 
agribusinesses, by the fact th a t the pro jects’ main in tent was to  secure short-term  
supplem entary funds (of HIJF 500 thousand) or interest-free refundable support. 
T he m ajority  of projects accepted in 1994 were targeted at crop production w ith 
livestock farm ing featuring much less prominently. Similarly to 1993, the main rea­
son was low profitability and insecure m arkets in the livestock sector, coupled with 
the need for sizeable capital in the long term . The m ajority  of projects therefore 
aimed at procurem ent of basic machines and equipm ent in field crop production in 
order to  prom ote a quicker change in the product structure.
The year 1995 brought new changes in the Fund’s operation. T he Agricul­
tu ra l Development Fund and the Forestry Fund were combined under the nam e 
A gricultural and Forestry Fund (A FF). The scheme continued to  be the m ost im ­
p o rtan t prom oting force for agricultural investment. One of the m ost im portan t 
new features of A FF was the withdrawal of the one-tim e HUF 500 thousand sup­
po rt. Furtherm ore, investm ent support for machines was shifted to  another subsidy 
scheme. The practicality of projects improved and long-term  business considera­
tions were clearly coming to  the fore.
T he efficiency of the scheme was hindered by the fact th a t it was not until 
April th a t the law pertinen t to its im plem entation was prom ulgated and conse­
quently the call for projects was issued late. Projects subm itted  in 1995 were not 
assessed until the second half of the year, as applications which had already been 
awarded support in 1994 had to  be dealt with first.
A number of projects receiving the Fund’s com m itm ent in 1994 had no hope 
for support from the A FF because these particu lar projects intended to  purchase 
agricultural and power machines— a project goal which in the m eantim e had been 
dropped from the scheme. A pplicants requesting funding for projects not involv­
ing machine purchase were to  reiterate their intent to invest and had to  subm it 
additional data . R ating of new applications was delayed until la te  O ctober, thus 
contracts were signed only in late November early December. This m eant th a t allo­
cations were paid and investm ents started  only in 1996. About 85-90 percent of the 
applications were deemed worthy of support. Half of the applicants were business 
organizations and one-fifth were cooperatives. Increasing partic ipation  of coopera­
tives was made possible by the fact th a t while there was no lim itation w ith regard 
to  the sector of operation or type of business, the m axim um  am ount th a t could be 
applied for was HUF 20 million in 1995; this prevented the larger businesses’ dispro­
portionate  dom inance w ithin the scheme. Seventy-four percent of the applications 
dealt w ith a t county level were subm itted by sole proprietors. Cooperatives and 
business organizations still represented a m odest weight, although their proportion 
increased to  some extent (to  7.4 percent and 17.3 percent respectively). Similarly
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to  its predecessors, the A FF m aintained the principle of supporting sta rting  busi­
nesses in 1995. On the whole, the governm ent’s intent to  support investm ent met 
w ith the dem ands on the business and farming side. Rejection of projects occurred 
purely for professional reasons ra ther than on the grounds of insufficient funds A 
large proportion of the projects were well-conceived and carefully prepared.
The businesses’ own sources represented over 40 percent in the funding of the 
A FF  projects, which was twice w hat the am ount dem anded by the relevant decree 
Businesses which had adequate capital (at least in term s of the planned invest­
m ent) were m ost numerous with applications made at both county and M inistry 
levels. Banks appeared more willing to  contribute to financing projects in itia ted  
by stronger entities as the proportion of bank credits increased in 1995 (in contrast 
to  11.98 percent at the M inistry level and 3.35 percent at the county level in 1994 
it was 26.9 percent and 13.9 percent respectively a year later). On the o ther hand, 
sm aller businesses still had a highly limited access to the scheme due to  either the 
lack of sufficient collateral or reticent and clumsy bank bureaucracy. As a result, 
the  average level of support was around one-third, or half of the level in 1994.
Approxim ately two-thirds of the accepted projects were aimed at develop­
m ents in crop production and about one-third invested into the less profitable 
livestock sector. However, the increase in the number of livestock farm ing projects 
showed an upswing in willingness to  invest in this area of production— a positive 
development considering earlier reluctance. Most of the crop production projects 
envisioned storage facility construction whereas livestock projects aimed a t upgrad­
ing livestock housing.
The 1995 A FF scheme triggered a total of HUF 27.5 billion investm ent— 
over twice the previous year’s figure (HUF 13 billion). The bulk of the projects 
(76-77 percent) belonged to the M inistry’s sphere of competence (in contrast to 
30 percent in 1994). This m eant a definite shift towards larger scale (and often 
more viable and long-term) investm ent projects, while a large num ber of smaller 
projects were equally supported. About 80 percent of the projects required in­
vestm ents under HUF 10 million, or 30 percent of the to ta l development. A t the 
same tim e, investm ents exceeding HUF 25 million and representing 8 percent of 
the applications carried more than  50 percent of the to ta l investm ent value. The 
bigger the investm ent, the lower the level of support. Entrepreneurs mobilized their 
own resources and obtained bank credits to  an increasing extent. Thus the level of 
support dropped to  32-33 percent as against 70 percent in 1994.
In 1996 agricultural funds were cancelled. Nevertheless, the former A F F ’s 
objectives again appeared in various support schemes. Only prelim inary d a ta  are 
available regarding the 1996 operation of the investment support system but it is al­
ready clear th a t there was a trem endous interest in investm ents into p lantations and 
buildings which involved a fixed am ount of support plus subsidized interest. After 
the invitation for projects in March, applications were stopped in April. Over 6,000 
projects were subm itted  up to th a t point, aiming at HUF 39 billion investm ent and
Acta Oeconomica 49, 1997-98
204 P. JUHÁSZ-K. MOHÁCSI: AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT
HUF 19 billion support. Many of the projects were inadequately conceived. In the 
case of feasible projects, support could be a maximum of 18 percent of construction 
costs and 36 percent of plantation  costs, contrary to  the originally envisioned 20 
percent and 40 percent respectively. The Treasury commenced contracting with 
successful applicants in June.
Assessment of the Fund’s activity. On the whole, the Fund played an im ­
p o rtan t role in giving a new im petus to drastically shrinking agricultural invest­
m ent. In addition it prom oted the relative stabilization of small- and medium-sized 
agribusinesses.
Checking upon investm ents was the task of the institutional system attached 
to the scheme. Supervision improved over the years and abuse of the system  was 
kept to  a m inim um  (2-3 percent). Supervision, on the other hand, pointed out th a t 
many applicants had no clear idea about the investm ent envisioned— prim arily  in
1993 and 1994—which caused serious problems and consequently underm ined the 
businesses’ ability to  service their debts. It also transpired th a t applicants and 
the village extension officers helping them , as well as ra ting  officers, had  acquired 
a routine by 1994 and particularly  by 1995; this improved project feasibility and 
quality of im plem entation. Tim ely repaym ent was expected in the case of 50-60 
percent of the  projects. Rescheduling or tem porary suspension of repaym ent (for 
1 or 2 years) was foreseen for a sizeable group— i.e. 20-30 percent of the projects. 
In some instances collection measures had to  be taken.
T he application scheme was subject to  various degrees of criticism. Appli­
cants generally endorsed it as being useful. O bjections were related to  the imple­
m entation rather than  the intent. Many applicants complained of slow adm inis­
tra tio n  a t the ra ting  stage, which created a problem  as inpu t prices soared. A 
recurren t problem  was th a t the scheme was launched late each year-—consequently, 
applications were subm itted , then rated in haste. M any projects were pu t off to 
the following year, which compounded the problems resulting from the chaos.
T he ADF and A FF managed to mobilize businesses’ own sources as well as 
bank credits. In 1993 support was one-third, in 1994 70 percent, then  again one- 
th ird  in 1995 of the to ta l value of investm ent of accepted projects. Thus, except 
for 1994, the scheme engaged mainly entrepreneurial and, to  a lesser extent, bank 
resources, merging together to  double the support. In 1993 and 1994 commercial 
banks had only a m inim um  share in financing. The proportion of bank credits 
was well below 20 percent of the value of investm ent. This ra te  climbed som ew hat 
in 1995 (to  23-24 percent) owing to the appearance of larger scale projects and 
also due to the fact th a t banks could involve more resources in funding projects, 
including those from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. The 
guarantee offered by the A gricultural Enterprise C redit G uarantee Foundation also 
had a positive im pact. The attractiveness of application-based investm ents was
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enhanced by the involvement of the sta te  through the support, which in itself was 
a kind of guarantee.
T he Fund prom oted transformation in the agricultural sector in several ways:
1. Parallel with the transform ation and refining of the application system  the 
num ber of businesses with a long look increased among the applicants. N otw ith­
standing the high standards of many project im plem entations, particularly  of plan­
tations, the quality of developments did not rise in any spectacular way. Still, the 
scheme contributed to the structu ral transform ation in agriculture as it allowed 
access to  central funding for those businesses which have the potential to  build 
their fu ture in their own areas, even if for the tim e being their activity is not a t 
the  highest level.
2. The Fund targeted small- and medium-sized agribusinesses and thereby 
strengthened middle peasantry and medium size farm operations— both being scarce 
in H ungarian society. Their existence is vital for an agricultural system  which 
should be capable of integrating into a  m arket economy.
3. The years of operation of the scheme triggered a mutual learning process 
w ith the participation of agribusinesses, sta te  adm inistration, banks, etc., which 
not only enabled these agents to learn about one another’s intents and aspirations 
(and thus m aking b etter deals with one another), bu t gave rise to  attitudes which 
are indispensable in long-term  for m aking serious development decisions.
4. The scheme acted as a selector. It is not only th a t non-feasible projects 
were not supported bu t also th a t it offered an opportunity  to agents which were 
culturally  suitable for implementing the projects.
5. Transform ation of the food processing sector was prom oted because a num ­
ber of suppliers assisted by the scheme were stabilized and the m arketability  of their 
products improved. In this way the domestic input relationships of a  strengthening 
food processing sector were reinforced.
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ASPECTS OF TRANSFORMATION AND PUBLIC OPINION1 
R. ANGELUSZ— R. TARDOS
In many respects Hungary is a case on its own among the E ast C entral 
European post-socialist countries w ith respect to  the antecedents of the change 
of regime. A lthough the same as in the other countries of the so-called “E astern 
bloc” , the relations of ownership were formerly modelled on w hat was basically a 
socialist (state-redistributory) paradigm  representing a pragm atic economic policy. 
The la tte r was asserted with shorter or longer intermissions from the second half 
of the sixties, and it assigned a growing role to  m arket coordination as well as, 
w ithin certain limits, private property. By the seventies and eighties, the “second 
economy”—by-passing the official routes of sta te  re-distribution and becoming ever 
more legitim ate— had spread to such an extent th a t an influential line of H ungarian 
sociology, such as Kolosi (1987) and Szelenyi (1990) had actually come to consider 
it a s tru c tu ra l element. From the early eighties on, its trad itional forms (such as 
the household economy in agriculture, small industry /re ta il trade or housing based 
on the ow ner’s own resources) were accompanied, in addition to  enterprise-based 
private business partnerships (namely, the equivalent of “household economy” for 
industrial workers), by more modern forms of enterprise and association in the form 
of civil law and lim ited liability companies; by the second half of the decade, private 
enterprises w ith more employees and a larger equity also appeared on the scene, 
albeit sporadically.
Given the above, it can be seen th a t H ungarian society was not completely un­
prepared for the radical transform ation of ownership relations following the change 
of regime. According to  certain surveys, some three-quarter of all households were 
involved in some form in the quasi-private second economy.
Public opinion was somewhat ambivalent even w ith respect to  these early, 
“to lerated” forms of private property. The relevant survey findings corroborate 
such common wisdom as “Hungarians like langos (fried dough), they like those who 
fry it less” . This inconsistent attitude, not devoid of envy, was basically a response 
conditioned by the central equality ideal of the prevailing ideology. Many of the 
wage and salary earner public employees, who play an im portan t part in shaping
'T h e  present s tu d y  is an  abridged and som ewhat am ended version of „A piacgazdaság 
társadalm i m egítélése” (Social assessment of m arket econom y), a  study  prepared  in  the  fram ework 
of th e  “C om peting  the  world" research project of the  B udapest University of Economics. T he 
ch ap ter on th e  assessm ent of the  influx of foreign capital was om itted  from  the  English version 
for lack of space.
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public opinion, have found it difficult to  pu t up w ith the idea th a t “outsiders” with 
an inferior education should sometimes earn several times their pay.
Nevertheless, these adverse feelings were not persuasive enough to  hinder the 
gradual expansion of the m arket sphere. The special resentm ent generated by the 
“maszeks” (i.e. the class of more or less envied and maligned private entrepreneurs 
who were tolerated despite the communist principles) was counter-balanced to  a 
large extent by the fact th a t, in many areas, small production eased the typical 
shortage phenom ena of the s ta te  sector. As for the other forms of second economy 
generating secondary income or allowing self-subsistence, these obviously m et w ith 
more widespread sym pathy, being profitable in one way or another to  m ost families.
Development of market attitudes, 1988-1995
In Hungary it can be clearly shown th a t the move to m arket economy fol­
lowing the change of regime was anticipated by two to three decades of H ungarian 
reform policy. This passed through many smaller or greater phases of wave-troughs. 
This tendency towards reforms supporting m arket-oriented economic structu res in­
tensified with the aggravation of the economic crisis phenom ena in the second half 
of the eighties. Instead of being considered a heretical tenet, the propagation  of a 
m arket-oriented a ttitu d e  had, by th a t time, become more and more integrated into 
official policy.
Contem porary survey findings corroborate this development tendency of m ain­
stream  public opinion. In 1988, a comprehensive survey carried out by the present 
authors queried attitudes to  m arket economy, among other th ings.2 Some of the 
questions of the relevant block recurred in later surveys. In addition to  allowing a 
glimpse of opinions held on the eve of the change of regime, responses to  these ques­
tions provided us w ith a certain insight into the dynam ism  of the public opinion 
which could be expected in the future.
O f course, no interpretation of the findings could be considered valid w ithout 
taking into account the modification of the sem atic contents of the sta tem ents in 
the questions which had occurred in the meantime. As for the more general first 
item — i.e. the restriction/liberalisation  of m arket com petition—the limits it refers 
to  had obviously been stricter and more numerous in 1988, both w ith respect to 
the scope of m arket relations and the freedom of price and capital m ovem ents (i.e. 
s tric ter than  after the change of regime). Consequently, the approval or rejection 
of the im position of lim its on the m arket did not im ply to  the sam e issues as it
2 T he survey on cultu ral-in teractional stra tifica tion  was organised by the  R esearch C entre on 
M ass C om m unication betw een 1986 and  1988. T he panel-type surveys were carried  ou t w ith a 
sam ple of some 3000 people by T A R K I (Social Research Inform atics C entre) and  were published 
in  1990, ed ited  by Andorka ei. al.
Act a Occonomica 49, 1997-98
REVIEWS 209
does today. Nevertheless, the findings in question m erit our a tten tion . The 2.59 
average score in 1988 ( Table 1) indicated th a t, a t th a t tim e, many more wanted to 
free the m arket than  to  m aintain the limits imposed on it. Opinions for and against 
liberalisation levelled very shortly after the change of regime— in fact, already by 
1991— despite the relative novelty of the decisive wave of m arket liberalisation th a t 
had, a t th a t tim e, hardly reached certain areas.
Table 1
Opinions concerning market economy, 1988-1995 (average score between 5 and 1)
1988 1991 1993 1995
M arket com petition  in H ungary should be lim ited 
Loss-m aking p lan ts should be closed down
2.59
3.76
3.01
3.72
3.29
3.35
3.40
3.43
T he perceptible strengthening of m arket-restricting attitudes, already present 
a t th a t tim e, was obviously not independent of the marked rise of inflation from 
1988 to 1991; this rise exceeded wage growth by far (in 1991, the annual ra te  of 
inflation was near 40 percent). Another im portant difference relative to  the Polish 
or the Czech cases was the absence of the obvious advantage intended for the 
benefit of everybody: namely, the rapid expansion and diversification of m arket 
supply. W hile in the la tte r countries price liberalisation pu t an end to  everyday 
com m odity shortages a t a stroke, in Hungary, the improvement was undercut, so 
to  say, by its having been anticipated by the earlier reforms. The specific dates 
when all this took place are also relevant. In 1991, Hungary had already been 
over the first shock: th a t is to  say, illusions concerning the fast im provem ent of 
the economic situation of the country after the change of regime, the slow-down 
of inflation included, had been shattered  (the taxi cabm en’s blockade occurred 
in O ctober 1990). Considering the overall situation, it is quite possible th a t the 
strengthening of pro-restriction attitudes had been driven to  a large extent by such 
nostalgic motives as the restoration of central intervention in order to  halt price 
increases.
T he predom inance of the same a ttitudes in 1993 and especially 1995 suggests 
a strengthening of the motives in question. Let us remark, however, th a t by th a t 
tim e m arket-principle-based regulations had actually m ade considerable headway, 
spreading to  areas of the economy which had hardly been affected by it formerly 
(e.g. culture, health care). Adverse feelings generated by this last circum stance 
may have contributed to the fact th a t the dem and for m arket control now be­
came a priority issue for public opinion. The tendency in question is discernible 
in practically every social group, with special regard to  the pro-m arket profession­
als: while in 1988 the members of the best-educated stra tu m  took a definite stand 
against restrictive policy (average score: 1.80), by 1995, they, too, had become
14 Acta Oeconomica 49, 1997-98
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highly uncertain on this issue (score: 3.03). Those who have consistently advo­
cated the liberalisation of the m arket are probably m ost the “winners of the change 
of regime”— i.e. the  m ost successful people in term s of income. The average score 
of those in the  highest income brackets (the top 1 percent) is a mere 2.41. In other 
words, a ttitudes supporting restrain t of the market are rare among this group.
T he elim ination of loss-making production and the closing down of loss- 
m aking plants had also been present among the earliest slogans of the reform 
movement. In 1988, and even in 1991, the m ajority  of the survey subjects sup­
ported  th is dem and. The coming into force of the B ankruptcy Act, triggering a 
huge wave of liquidations in 1991 and 1992, signified an im portan t caesura in this 
respect: although the m ajority  still consider the financing of loss-making operations 
unjustified, the  rapid increase in unemployment has reduced consensus on this issue 
as well among others. The social distribution of opinions largely follows the usual 
pa tte rn  observable in cases in which there is a break w ith trad ition— i.e. decisive 
action against loss-making operations is urged more by the younger and be tte r 
educated groups th an  the older and unqualified ones, but differences by economic 
branches show a rather peculiar image. U ntil the m id-nineties, those employed in 
the non-productive branches (e.g. culture, health and social care) had been the 
m ost ardent proponents of liquidating loss-makers, but recent developments pro­
voking significant redundancies in the state-financed areas of the te rtia ry  sphere 
may well modify the picture.
Attitudes to private property under the first coalition government (1990-1994)
D ata  available to  H ungarian empirical social research on the relationship of 
p roperty  and public opinion after the change of regime are ra ther scant, given the 
im portance of this subject. We know of no investigations which have m onitored 
changes in public opinion in a recurrent and system atic way throughout the entire 
period in question. However, the findings of various surveys on this subject (cf. 
Vásárhelyi 1990; Hann and Laki 1992; Andorka et al. 1990) are in good accord in 
many respects, highlighting as they do reservations concerning the spread of private 
property  and the rejection of certain property forms.
On the basis of a  M edian survey, in 1990 M ária Vásárhelyi rep o rted  on reservations 
concerning large private  property. As th e  survey continued, E ndre  H ann  an d  M ihály 
Laki po in ted  ou t th a t  the  aversion in question continued, and  in som e respects even 
intensified, a fte r th e  change of regim e. T his was in  spite  of th e  fact th a t  th e  p opu lation  
was no t radically  opposed to  p rivatisa tion  in general. T he A ndorka et al. survey, on 
the  o th er hand , called a tte n tio n  to  the  contradic tion  th a t,  a lthough people norm ally ac­
cep ted  p rivatisa tion  as such, they  adopted  a  m uch m ore reserved a tt i tu d e —p articu larly  
due to  the  fear of being m ade redundan t them selves— when it was m entioned in  re la tion  
to  their own workplace.
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O ur own earlier surveys and eventual longitudinal d a ta  also provide certain 
addenda to  these issues. From 1992 on, several of our surveys included sta tem ents 
relating to  the desirable role of private property. The relevant findings confirmed the 
ambivalence of public opinion concerning this topic. A lthough people who would 
“base economic development on private companies” are som ewhat more num erous 
than  those opposed to  this idea in principle, when it comes to  large industria l com­
panies, only a  m inority finds the predominance of private ownership an acceptable 
solution.
Table 2.1
Economic development should be based on private companies (percent)
May 1992 Nov. 1993
Agreem ent 35 31
Undecided 35 35
Disagreem ent 20 23
No opinion 10 11
100 100
Table 2.2
Private property should become predominant in large industry as well (percent)
M ay 1992 Nov. 1993
Agreement 25 22
Undecided 30 27
D isagreem ent 34 42
No opinion 11 9
100 100
T he above findings can also be related to the conclusions of Andorka et al. 
quoted above— namely, th a t people adopt a much more negative a ttitu d e  than  
would be expected on the basis of their general stance when it comes to  the privati­
sation of their own company (i.e. their own workplace). Negative attitudes to  the 
privatisation  of big enterprises are likely to have been m otivated to a large extent 
by the fact th a t, traditionally, the m ajority of the wage and salary earners used 
to  be employed by these organisations, and ownership transition  was frequently 
associated w ith the transform ation of “in-house unem ploym ent” into real unem ­
ploym ent.
From among the various forms of privatisation, typical m arket transactions 
based on tenders and auctions— i.e. sales to the buyer paying the m ost— provoked
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the m ost aversion. From 1991 on, several surveys querying opinions concerning four 
com peting options of the transform ation of sta te  property—i.e. cash privatisation  
with the a ttrac tion  of capital, re-privatisation benefiting the original owner, ESOP 
(the employee share ownership program m e), and the upgrading of s ta te  enterprises 
(w ith the assistance of com petent m anagers) provided us w ith d a ta  on this. Under 
the A ntall government, cash privatisation was the m ain form  of p rivatisation of s ta te  
enterprises—if only to  increase the revenues of the central budget— (although one 
of the  coalition partners, the Sm allholders’ Party, actually declared re-privatisation 
their m ain objective). Survey data, however, repeatedly confirmed th a t public 
opinion was m ost averse to  this form. As can be seen from the details presented 
below, the choice of cash privatisation from among the four options exceeded 10 
percent in a single case only. This negative a ttitu d e  was m ost probably due, am ong 
other things, to  widespread aversion to  privatisation by foreign cap ita l— superior 
in strength— and this can be seen in the survey d a ta  to  be presented below. On 
the o ther hand, tender/auction  privatisation has m ost probably been discredited 
to  some extent by various anomalies, the m anipulation of the tender term s, and 
instances of suspected corruption which have been disclosed by the press.
Ideas and conditioning regarding “ju s t” privatisation, on the o ther hand, have 
also contributed to  the decreasing popularity of the alternative in question. M any 
considered re-privatisation—to which government had recourse in exceptional cases 
p artly  for theoretical, bu t also partly  for practical reasons— a well-justified measure 
of redress ( “the original owner is due w hat had been earlier on taken away from  
him ”). As for employee share ownership, this goes back to  the old ideal of workers’ 
control, espoused a t one tim e by the reform circles as well. This idea was not 
far removed from the employees themselves who, although distrusting  the earlier 
slogan “the factory is yours” , had been watching privatisation transactions carried 
ou t “above their heads” w ith, a t least, a certain degree of suspicion. According 
to  the people’s historically conditioned common sense of justice, cash privatisation  
was probably regarded as the least legitim ate form of interference in to  established 
relations.
More comprehensive d a ta  regarding the four choices, however, are indica­
tive themselves of certain reservations concerning private property. T he combined 
choice of sales and re-privatisation— the two forms clearly associated w ith private 
ownership—hardly atta ined  one quarter. This tendency was further strengthened 
by the fact th a t, of the rem aining two choices, the item  “upgraded operation of 
s ta te  p roperty” received the most votes. (The relevant d a ta  will be discussed in 
more detail in the following section.)
D ata  provided by other surveys, on the other hand, suggest th a t relatively 
few considered the prom otion of privatisation a priority issue. As for the  priority  
ranking of the problem s to  be solved by the government, the proportion  of those 
considering the “restoration of the prestige of private p roperty” (or the “significant 
increase of the role of private property”— an equivalent item  in another survey) the
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first and foremost task was negligible, and relatively few assigned it any priority  
a t all (or ranked it after such problems of more personal relevance such as fighting 
inflation, poverty etc.).
Table 3
Percentage distribution of “restoration of the prestige of private property” being 
mentioned among the priority tasks
Jan . 1991 M ay 1992 Nov. 1993
Top priority 4 3 2
Priority 36 21 19
Not chosen 58 73 76
No opinion 2 3 3
100 100 100
Beside the tendency discernible from the basic distributions, the chronologi­
cal development of the opinions also merits a ttention . Given accelerating expansion 
of private property after 1990 and the ever more em phatic assertion of the corre­
sponding values by the “official ideology” (e.g. by financing a television series to 
popularise privatisation), it might have been expected th a t the aversion to private 
property  and m arket economy would eased gradually. D ata  available to us on this 
issue, however, indicate ju s t the opposite tendency: reservations concerning pri­
vate property  and privatisation multiplied rather than  decreased as the previous 
adm inistration  cycle proceeded towards its end.
We shall return to certain correspondences between the various a ttitudes to 
p roperty  later on, bu t it seems worth mentioning a few facts here. In the early 
nineties, sim ultaneously with the transition to m arket economy, the num ber of the 
unemployed rose a t a  very rapid rate indeed. A lthough the sta te  socialist taboo con­
cerning unem ploym ent had already been bidden farewell by the last p re-transition  
governm ents of Mr Grosz and Mr Nemeth, in early 1990 the official unem ploy­
m ent ra te  was still below 1 percent. The dram atic rise in unem ploym ent figures 
occurred in 1991 and 1992 under the im pact of the significant drop in H ungarian 
industria l and agricultural production and this situation was exacerbated by the 
sim ultaneous collapse of H ungary’s eastern markets. The rate of unem ploym ent 
grew to more than 10 percent over a very short period of time, and the num ber of 
those th reatened  w ith it expanded at a similar pace. Although the privatisation 
of the big enterprises did not necessarily entail redundancies— certain figures sug­
gest th a t unem ploym ent in the private sector actually lags behind th a t experienced 
in the  public sector—new owners often initiated re-organisation by rationalisation 
measures and severe lay-offs.
Acta Oeconomica 49, 1997-98
214 REVIEWS
M ention should again be m ade here of the inflationary processes and their so­
cial consequences. Although no shock therapy sim ilar to th a t applied in Poland was 
a ttem pted  in Hungary, prices rose at an unprecedented pace in the early nineties, 
w ith wages, especially public-sector ones, lagging behind. A t the same tim e, para l­
lel w ith the deterioration of the economic position of the  middle s tra ta , successful 
private entrepreneurs acquired w hat, in the given circum stances, qualified as a 
fortune. T he gap between the higher and lower income groups widened very signif­
icantly in the space of a few years (while the previous relatively sm all differences 
corresponded by and large to  the levels of the Scandinavian countries, the current 
values of the difference indicators are more rem iniscent of the W estern European 
extrem es). The trad itional, partly  ideologically m otivated, resistance to  differences 
in incomes was in fact intensified by the new polarisation. W hile in 1988, 63 percent 
of the population was of the opinion th a t income differences should be diminished, 
by 1993 the same ra tio  rose to  75 percent.3 Over the same period, the  proportion  
of those urging the differentiation of incomes declined from 18 to  11 percent.
Given the above, it can be said th a t in the first few years of transition  to  m ar­
ket economy, the population experienced the drawbacks of the process more th an  
anything else. The m ajority  were “losers” ra ther than  “winners” in the a lteration  
of the economic structure. As mentioned already, owing to the specific H ungarian 
antecedents of the process, neither did positive developments— perceptible to  all in 
certain  areas— (e.g. quality commodity choice, disappearance of m any of the  for­
mer anomalies of the shortage economy) exert such a strong influence as in some 
of the other former COM ECON countries. Of course, a ttitudes to  private prop­
erty  (which will be dealt with in a separate section of this study) have also been 
greatly influenced by the ways and means of privatisation and the social scope of 
the new forms of ownership. The above background makes it easier to understand  
the mixed feelings generated by the transition  to a private economy am ong people 
from  whose num ber the m ajority  actually voted for such an economy in 1990.
Public thinking and privatisation under the second coalition government,
1994-1995
The previous section traced the development of a ttitudes to property  and 
privatisation  up until 1994. Thus it examined the objective processes of owner­
ship transform ation after the change of regime, the stratum -specific features of 
accession to proprietary  sta tu s and the contradictory development of a ttitu d es to 
privatisation. As a follow-up, our previous surveys were com plem ented by another
3T h e  d a ta  a re  from  na tiona l representative sam ples of 2500 persons in 1988 an d  2000 persons 
in  1993.
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one carried out at end-1995, bringing some of the more recent developments of 
a ttitudes to  privatisation within our reach. These recent d a ta  are all the more 
relevant since a new socialist/liberal government has come to  power in the m ean­
tim e and their privatisation program m e differs in several respects— prim arily in the 
categorical rejection of re-privatisation—from th a t of the previous, conservative 
coalition. The novel experiences are also of special relevance in th a t, theoretically, 
the gradual expansion of private property may well have different im pacts on the 
various public opinion trends. Let us add th a t, since the period under scrutiny 
covers no more than  one third of the current adm inistration cycle, our view of the 
public-opinion-shaping im pact of these developments is also much more lim ited, for 
obvious reasons, than  th a t of the previous four-year period.
A lthough the 1995 survey encompassed only some of the a ttitu d es being 
considered here, it did include the question th a t had reflected interesting changes 
earlier as well—namely, the four-choice question covering more or less the full spec­
trum  of ownership alternatives in the transition. The first two choices referred 
to  re-privatisation and trad itional—auction-bidding-based— forms of privatisation 
respectively; the other two concerned employee ownership and the m odernisa­
tion /upgrad ing  of sta te  enterprises, respectively.
Table 4
Who should the owners be? Percentage distribution of choices, 1991, 1993 and 1995
1991 1993 1995
Confiscated property  to  be restored to form er owner 16 15 12
S ta te  property  to  be sold to highest bidder 11 7 8
Ow nership to  be transferred  to  company workers 
S ta te  p roperty  to  be upgraded w ith assistance
26 29 30
from  com petent professionals (i.e. m anagers) 36 41 47
O th er/does no t know 11 9 5
100 100 100
Aversion to  the traditional forms of transition to private ownership has not 
only proved lasting, but has even intensified. While, in 1991, the aggregate choice 
of the first two items still approxim ated to th a t of the other options, on the last 
occasion it was definitely in a minority. At the same tim e, preference for “m od­
ernised sta te  p roperty” has become more typical, so much so th a t in 1995 it was 
chosen by as many as the other three options put together.
In order to  interpret the findings, one should take in to  account the prac­
tice of the recent past. As mentioned already, the government in office rejects 
re-privatisation more radically than the previous one used to  do (although it still 
provides certain m inim um  return services to  the owners of the com pensation vouch-
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ers introduced in the previous cycle). Auction privatisation still exists w ithin a 
definite circle— prim arily in the sphere of large-scale privatisation. This a ttrac ts  
foreign capital, bu t the privatisation of the small- and medium-size plants is dom ­
inated by m anagem ent buy-outs. This la tte r type of privatisation is well-adjusted 
to the expectations of the economic and political élite, bu t it definitely has not 
involved large social groups. Furtherm ore, so far it has also failed to  bring about 
such m ajor economic achievements as could have dispersed the doubts of public 
opinion with regard to  the transform ation of property relations which were present 
from the very start.
A lthough certain public opinion priorities are clearly discernible already, dif­
ferences in social position and political/ideological orientation are dividing opinions 
concerning the privatisation alternatives. We investigated the social/ideological 
background of privatisation preferences using a series of analyses (viz. four re­
gression analyses), including the above four options analysis, by one as dependent 
variables (transform ing them  into so-called “dummy variables” ).
Table 5
Socio-demographic and ideological/political factors determining the choice of 
privatisation options in 1995 (regression analysis, beta coefficients)
R e-privatisation A uction sale Employee
ownership
U pgrading of 
s ta te  p ro p erty
E ducation -0 .9 0.10 0.06 -0 .1 0
E arning 0.11
Residence (B p :+ ) 0.07
Age (old:+) 0.08 -0 .0 6
Sex (female:-f) -0 .0 7 0.10
Religion 0.06 -0 .0 6
TU m em bership 0.04
H SW P m em bership“ -0 .0 5 -0 .0 4 0.06
L eft/rig h t6 (rig h t:+) 0.10
L iberal/conservative (cons.:+ ) -0 .0 5
r2 4% 5% 1% 2%
“m ore precisely, ex-com m unist-party  m em bership
bFor le ft/rig h t and  liberal/conservative  a ttitu d es , the  10-grade scale known from  in ternational 
lite ra tu re  was used.
A lthough the totalised sums above do not indicate a  very strong regression, 
the findings do identify the contours of the social groupings behind the various 
privatisation options. The respective hinterlands of the two versions which defi­
nitely refer to  the expansion of private property— i.e. re-privatisation and auction 
p rivatisation—are alm ost totally  different (this social division probably also weak­
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ens each group’s influence). The main proponents of re-privatisation come from 
the social sphere of interest of the Smallholders’ Party, from among the members 
of the older generations, and from those with inferior educational qualifications 
(i.e. former small landowners). Cash privatisation, on the other hand, is preferred 
by groups occupying a central position, who are high in the social hierarchy— i.e. 
people w ith a higher level of education, higher-than-average incomes, and usually 
living in the capital. Such people are in a be tter “launching” position to compete 
for capital goods. The ideological tenets of this group are also rather peculiar. 
T he proponents of both re-privatisation and auction privatisation used to  belong 
to  the non-party  group, but while the former now tend to  declare themselves righ t­
wingers and (probably not independently of the dem and to restore church prop­
erty) religious, a similar, trad itional ideological profile is completely missing from 
the second. The proponents of the other two, more collectivist, solutions also show 
significant social differences. Those urging employee self-governance tend to  be­
long to  the better-educated  s tra ta  (of the white-collar and skilled workers). Their 
ideological/political orientation is characterised by a non-religious a ttitu d e , and a 
higher-than-average trade union membership ra tio .4 The upgrading of sta te  prop­
erty  as a possible privatisation variant was mentioned mainly by people w ith a 
lower level of education, many of them  former members of the HSW P (H ungarian 
Socialist W orkers’ Party). As for the distribution of choices by age, members of 
the oldest age groups (affected more by re-privatisation than  the rest and closer to 
the conservative pole of the liberal/conservative axis) rank this last solution low. 
Women, too, tend to give greater preference to the transm ittance of m odernised 
sta te  property than  active men who, for their part are more inclined to  follow the 
routes leading to  the classical forms of private property.
According to the Hungarian surveys, sex is a decisive factor with regard to 
a ttitu d es towards property. Several surveys have shown th a t males have a more 
m arked propensity for entrepreneurial activities than  females. (Cf. Lengyel and 
Tôth 1993) This is a finding which corresponds to the objective tendencies— namely, 
th a t males are definitely over-represented among the new entrepreneurs. As for the 
a ttitudes to  property (such as those presented above in Table 2), the sex param eter 
not only influences opinions, but is actually dem onstrated by our analyses to  be 
the strongest single determ inant. Experiences relating to  the expansion of private 
property  and to  the stra tum  of small entrepreneurs both suggest th a t men are 
more eager proponents of the spreading of private property than  women. The
4 T he variable in question m akes no d istinction betw een m em bers of the  old and  the  new trad e  
unions. As is well-known from  the  relevant sta tistics (and  the d istribu tions ind ica ted  by our 
own survey), the m em bers of the  trad itional trad e  unions are represented in m uch higher num bers 
th an  those of th e  new -type unions established afte r the  change of regime. E rzsébet Sza lay 's (1994) 
book on the  labour councils, on the  o ther hand, pain ts a  detailed  p ictu re  of th e— m ore or less 
vain— efforts of th is m ore lim ited  circle of employees to im plem ent employee ownership in  th e  first 
years after th e  change of regime.
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other correlations fit in to  the usual p a tte rn— namely, th a t the be tte r educated and 
the urban s tra ta  comprise the group which urges the expansion of the circles of 
private proprietors and small entrepreneurs the most.
As for the development trends in public opinion in recent years, we have been 
witnessing an atypical process which indicates the certain inner conflicts in pub­
lic thinking: despite the fact th a t groups playing a central part in shaping public 
opinion—e.g. professionals, people living in the capital, males— would accept to  a 
greater extent than  others, fauie de mieux, th a t private property expanded (yet 
one could hardly say this were a  rigorous support), the  predom inant trend  is ju s t 
the opposite. In 1995 a smaller num ber of people agreed th a t the num ber of small 
enterprises should be raised to  a to ta l higher than  four years earlier and, answer­
ing a question asked for the first tim e, more— actually the m ajority— doubted the 
assertion th a t more private proprietors would be needed in future.
A comparison of the 1995 d a ta  relating to these two questions (which pro­
duced averages of 3.21 and 2.95 for small entrepreneurs and private proprietors, 
respectively, on a five-point scale) also indicates th a t Hungarian public thinking 
finds it easier to  accept small than  large private property. Concerns relating to  the 
growth of the num ber of proprietors have probably also been m otivated by the fact 
th a t, in the course of the few years which have passed since the  change of regime, 
the  num ber of entrepreneurs has risen extrem ely fast— to 800 thousand accord­
ing to  some looser definitions and to  half a million according to  some stric ter ones. 
However, many of these small enterprises have since gone ou t of business (especially 
am ong the former unemployed who had been “forced” to  become entrepreneurs). 
According to  these considerations, the dem and of the narrow (and in certain areas 
still shrinking) domestic m arket is not sufficient to support the further expansion 
of the s tra tu m  of entrepreneurs.
Social spread of private property; involvement in and attitudes to privatisation
Several references were m ade above to the interrelationship— plausible and 
corroborated by everyday experience and research findings— between personal in­
volvement in the various forms of privatisation and a positive approach to  the 
process itself. In w hat follows, we shall discuss these instances of involvement and 
their a ttitu d in a l consequences. The findings below have special im plications for 
the social profile of H ungarian privatisation: the fact th a t property acquisition af­
fected a larger circle could, in itself, render personal a ttitudes to  privatisation  more 
positive; the sm aller the circle, the weaker the im pact. P roperty  acquisition ac­
com panied by a m arket polarisation of wealth and the deprivation of those having 
acquired no property, on the other hand, could intensify the negative a ttitudes. 
The sum  to ta l of the im pacts as reflected by the opinions expressed m ay indicate
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w hether the development of the middle-class or of the pro le taria t has been stronger 
in society.
In the program m e definition period of the change of regime, prior to  the 1990 
elections, H ungarian political forces/parties held more or less unanim ous views 
concerning the change-over to  m arket economy and the role of the private economy. 
However, opinions concerning im plem entation already showed differences a t th a t 
tim e. There were significant differences, for example, concerning the social base 
upon which privatisation was to rely and, a closely related issue, how exactly sta te  
property  was to  be transform ed into private property. C ertain options, which were 
to  play quite a significant role later on elsewhere (e.g. people’s shares, coupon 
privatisation), had only been supported by a limited circle of experts and econom ists 
in Hungary. The fact th a t the conceptions in question were taken off the agenda was 
due, to  a large extent, to  spontaneous privatisation: the transition  of ownership, 
the division of sta te  property into companies which were d istinct w ith regard to 
the m anagerial stra tum , and m anagem ent buy-outs paved another way to  growth 
in Hungary. Although the program m es of the future governing parties spoke of a 
“large middle class” in the form of a broad proprietary s tra tum , actual practice was 
very different. The original concept re-appeared as an episode of the 1994 election 
cam paign, w ith the announcem ent of such schemes as the “small p roprie to rs’ share 
ownership program m e” and the “employee share ownership program m e” . A nother 
critical issue, the divergence of opinions concerning re-privatisation, had already 
been referred to several times in connection with the questions discussed above. 
A lthough practically all the  m ajor political parties rejected the idea of restoring 
property  to  former owners, the Sm allholders’ Party  had, from the very beginning, 
pu t this on their banner and actually m anaged to realise this objective— to  some 
ex ten t a t least and through compromises—-during the first adm inistration cycle. 
C om pensation practice, not w ithout constraints owing, among other things, to 
the political compromises involved, has thus constituted a ra ther firm and hardly 
som ew hat im pregnable endowment confronting the socio-liberal adm inistra tion  as 
well.
T he resu ltan t of these politico-economic bouts has been a complex privati­
sation practice, including one segment giving access to  property  to  certain groups 
of the population as well. The m ajority acquired property  in the fram ework of 
the com pensation process, in the first place by exchanging com pensation vouchers 
for land. The share-ownership program m e for small proprietors was also early on 
targeted a t compensation-voucher owners (with the banks, real estate investors etc. 
buying the papers in question below nominal value, and thus constitu ting an ever 
larger segm ent of this group beside former owners).
An end-1993 survey by the Research Group for Com m unication Studies of 
the H ungarian Academy of Sciences and Loránd Eötvös University of Sciences in­
cluded a series of questions concerning personal involvement in privatisation and 
com pensation, and social responses to the same processes. As for com pensation,
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one question block queried dem ands relating to  former land property  and other 
real estate. Self-assessment results essentially corresponded to  the d a ta  published 
by the  com petent authorities after the processing and evaluation of the respective 
claims. O ur investigation findings are actually quite close to  the one million figure 
provided by these statistics. Accordingly, 11 percent of the adu lt population were 
com pensated for former land property  of their own or which had belonged to  their 
ancestors, and 2 percent for o ther property (e.g. plants, outlets, real esta te). An­
o ther question queried other family members who had benefited from com pensation 
under some title . This wider circle included, the proportion of those involved in 
privatisation  came to  a to ta l of 32 percent.
One of the declared objectives of the com pensation policy of the  conservative 
governm ent was to  provide some sort of moral com pensation, in accordance with 
the, in many ways explicit, aim  to  improve the social clim ate. Our survey findings 
indicate good agreem ent w ith other experiences which suggest th a t these goals have 
no t really been m et. A small segment of the survey subjects, some 20 percent were 
satisfied w ith com pensation policy, while 48 percent expressed definite dissatisfac­
tion. A lthough personal involvement has probably influenced opinions, there were 
also m arked differences in the degree of satisfaction/dissatisfaction am ong the ben­
eficiaries themselves. Land acquisition through bidding ja rred  the sense of justice 
of many former landowners. The m ajority  of the followers of the Sm allholders’ 
Party , the  champion of this cause, were also disappointed; probably the followers 
of the M DF— the H ungarian Dem ocratic Forum, the leading coalition party  of the 
tim e— were the only ones who seemed satisfied to some ex ten t w ith com pensation 
practice. The half-hearted support of the beneficiaries and the pro-governm ent 
group was definitely not enough to  counter-balance the strong aversion of those 
excluded from  com pensation.
A nother declared objective of com pensation policy was to  stim ulate privati­
sation by introducing com pensation vouchers. However, neither the circle of those 
entitled  to  com pensation (especially those in possession of a more significant vol­
ume of vouchers), nor the supply of sta te  property assets and production units was 
big enough for th a t. Many of the beneficiaries thought of no other type of invest­
m ent th an  land acquisition or, incidentally, some sort of a  pension-supplem enting 
annuity  or the purchase of a state-owned flat. P rivatisation has actually been given 
a certain im petus by this m ethod (e.g. through enterprises collecting the vouchers) 
b u t no t to  the desired extent and m ostly not for the benefit of the group directly 
involved, i.e. those having received com pensation.
In addition to  the above, an almost openly declared objective and a m ain 
m otive of governm ent com pensation policy was the establishm ent of the social base 
they aspired for: and old /new  middle class. The results of the  1994 election allow us 
to  draw certain  direct conclusions w ith regard to the degree of success in achieving 
th is objective, a t least in the short run. The significant loss of ground of the M DF 
and the coalition itself obviously indicates th a t the endeavours in question did
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not meet with success. Nevertheless, the achievement of certain partia l election 
results, such as the higher-than-average score of the conservative parties among 
the older generations whose members had been affected m ost by com pensation or 
in certain élite districts of the capital concentrating the progeny of the historical 
middle-classes, suggest th a t for certain s tra ta  a t least, the policy in question was 
not completely w ithout effect.
D ata  based on another representative sample of 1000 of the same end-1993 
survey allowed us to query the acquisition of private property, the forms of p artic­
ipation in privatisation, and the plans concerning these directly, through another 
question block. Questions covered referred to  four possible forms of property  ac­
quisition. Until end-1993, 6 percent of the adult population purchased land and 
another 4 percent said they intended to do so. More—i.e. some 10 percent—said 
they had “founded a private enterprise or participated in one in recent years” . In 
Hungary, it has been possible to found private enterprises—e.g. associations, coop­
eratives, civil-law partnerships—since the early eighties (not to m ention the fact 
th a t, w ithin certain narrow limits, property held by small producers, artisans and 
retailers also survived the decades of the socialist regime). These antecedents have 
probably contributed to the registration of relatively high levels of participation  
in these en trepreneurial/proprietary  forms already in 1993. The largest segment 
(nearly half) of the new entrepreneurs were active in commerce and in the services, 
while the production sphere generated no more than a mild interest.
D istribution by occupation, on the other hand, indicated the tendency th a t 
only a m inority (i.e. some 45 percent) of the new entrepreneurs were m ain-job 
holder artisans, intellectuals, agricultural producers or incidentally m anagers, while 
the m ajority  considered the enterprise as a source of supplem entary income (and 
kept their original jobs, which provided them  with a risk-reducing “shelter” ). No 
in terp re ta tion  of the above-indicated 10 datum  can disregard the fact th a t many 
gave up their entrepreneurial activity relatively soon after setting it up. (The 
num ber of active entrepreneurs is likely to  be somewhat less than  the 800 thousand 
corresponding to the 10 percent ratio. Despite some differences in accounting, 
Teréz Laky's 1992 d a ta  indicated th a t there were 466 thousand self-employed, a 
figure which could hardly have risen significantly above half a million in 1993.)
As for the future, 11 percent of the interviewees indicated th a t they mere 
planning to em bark on some entrepreneurial activity. Investigations based on time- 
series (Lengyel and T óth  1993) indicated a certain decline of entrepreneurial am bi­
tions (m easured by the question “Would you like to be an entrepreneur?” ) relative 
to  the tu rn  of the eighties and nineties. Our survey findings corresponded by and 
large to  these experiences: the first real opportunities and the first failures sifted 
those who were oriented towards such a career. According to our data, the m ajority  
of those hatching such plans are young people a t the beginning of their career.
W ith the establishm ent of the Stock Exchange, the speculation/investm ent 
branch was also included among the new alternatives of private enterprise. The
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purchase of stocks, a risky transaction, fit into the investm ent strategies of only 
4 percent of the population surveyed on the 1993 national sample, and another 5 
percent declared planning such purchases in the future.
Since the purchase of sta te  enterprises—the par excellence form  of privatisa­
tion— usually exceeded the capital strength of the H ungarian entrepreneurial s tra ­
tu m  (despite their having access to  sometimes quite significant credits) m ost of 
the applicants for the cash privatisation tenders for m ajor enterprises were for­
eign investors. The 1993 survey also took into account in this respect the fact th a t, 
when it came to  the privatisation of business organisations of a sm aller im portance, 
the governm ent in office organised various special credit funds to  assist domestic 
investors (such as the  “E credit” or “S ta rt” ). However, a mere 1 percent of the 
interviewees indicated th a t they had partaken in such schemes personally, and an­
other 5 percent showed interest in purchasing property  th is way. A t the  end of 
1993, at the tim e of the survey, the share program m e for small investors was no 
m ore than  a draft planned to  be published by the conservative coalition a t the tim e 
of the election cam paign. 4 percent of those questioned indicated th a t they were 
interested in being personally involved in the program m e.
Summing up the various forms of property acquisition, one m ight say th a t 
(based on self-assessment survey findings) some 17 percent of the adu lt population 
took p a rt, in some particu lar way, in launching one of the new forms of private 
enterprise in Hungary. Taking into account plans for the fu ture as well, a to ta l 
of 28 percent of the population was affected to a certain extent by the process of 
privatisation.
T he survey m entioned above queried opinions concerning the p roperty  dim en­
sion (s ta te /p riv a te ) as part of another question series on ideological and political 
m atters. One extrem e of the seven-point scale consisted of “governm ent should do 
its u tm ost to  urge the development of private property” , the other of “governm ent 
should exploit the advantages of sta te  property  as best it can” . Interviews were 
asked to  place their own opinion between these two poles.
T he average (on the seven-point scale) was 0.3 point closer to  the  private 
property  pole. T h a t is to say th a t, pu tting  this question in such a stra igh t way, more 
respondents tended to  accept the spread of private property  th an  the conservation 
of s ta te  property  (26 and 16 percent of the interviewees, respectively, identified 
their place in each of the two extrem e colum n-pairs of the scale). Neither did th is 
d istribu tion  of opinions change significantly in the next two phases of the  panel 
survey carried out w ithin a period of a few m onths. One m ust not forget, however, 
th a t significant efforts had been made in the course of the previous four years by 
the m edia, in party  policy and through the election campaigns, to  establish private 
property in Hungary. If the answers were driven by any “desirability effects” a t 
all, those m ust obviously have favoured private property. In relation to  th a t, the 
d istribution  of opinions deviated only slightly from the mean value. T his either 
reflected an indistinct indifference, or a com bination of radically opposed social
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standpo in ts—in this specific case, once again a general ambivalence regarding the 
entire issue a t hand.
Analyses of the d istribution of opinions confirmed our assum ption concerning 
personal involvement. M ulti-param eter analyses suggest th a t the privatisation ac­
tiv ity  param eter (i.e. the aggregate of the current activity  and future plans indices) 
was the one exerting the strongest influence.5 T h a t is to  say, those who expected 
m ost from the spreading of private property were people who had joined the process 
in some form or planned to do so. The im portance of this correlation is emphasised 
by the participation d a ta  (mostly low occurrences) mentioned earlier.
Conflicts of value: social security vs. market economy
As is well known, according to  the various theories of hierarchy of needs 
physiological and security dem ands override those for freedom. Unless the expan­
sion of m arket economy—along with its assumed economic liberty—is accompanied 
by confidence in the improvement of the basic conditions of living, the process will 
underm ine the social legitimacy of the economic change of regime and hence loyalty 
of the masses with respect to the changes involved.
If, in the course of a relatively prolonged transition period, s tru c tu ra l trans­
form ation is implemented by distributing a diminishing ra ther than growing “cake” , 
possible conflicts will multiply. The many losers of the process will only overcome 
their obvious deprivation if they can be sure their tu rn  will come soon (to  use 
H irschm an’s analogy, th a t “their car line, though still blocked, will soon be out of 
the traffic lam ” , ju s t like the neighbouring one).
In the former socialist countries, the above general considerations are tin ted  
by a special ideological heritage. These societies used to  proclaim  the basic ideo­
logical value of social equality, and actually allocated a relatively large segment of 
the resources available to  them  to the general satisfaction of certain basic needs. 
Insistence on the social protection net for both existential and ideological reasons 
may grow exceptionally strong in a period when the general economic conditions 
severely restrict individual endeavours to preserve one’s social status.
Surveys carried out since the change of regime have repeatedly dem onstrated 
a negative correlation between social security and personal a ttitudes registered in 
the m arket economy dimension. Thus those who considered the differences in in­
comes excessive gave less than did the rest to the support to economic development 
based on private companies, or the predominance of private property in large in­
dustry, or to the closing-down of loss-making plants. This negative correlation 
w arrants the  conclusion th a t growing sensitivity to  social security has serious im ­
5 For details of the  analysis see Angelusz and Tardos (1994).
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plications for a ttitu d es to m arket economy and privatisation  as well. Therefore, 
the development tendency of personal a ttitudes to  social issues in the period since 
the change of regime is certainly a significant issue. As for the perceived degree of 
income differences, some of the relevant d a ta  originate from 1988—i.e. from before 
the change of regime. In other areas (e.g. unem ploym ent, poverty), our findings 
are based on surveys repeated several times from 1990 to  1995. The following table 
will show the development of answers to  these questions (agreem ent ra ted  from  1 
to  5 corresponding to  the H ungarian school m arking system  in each case— i.e. 5 
responds to  the m ost, 1 to the least im portan t dem and).
Table 6
Development of opinions concerning social security and income differences, 1988 to 1995
(average score between 5 and 1)
Priority 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995
To decrease incom e differences 3.66 - - 3.96 4.07 -
To fight poverty - 4.03 4.21 4.20 4.26 4.14
To h a lt unem ploym ent - 3.98 4.08 4.24 4.26 4.13
In general term s, as witnessed by the average values around 4 in the highest 
band of the agreem ent scale, public opinion assigns very high priority to  social 
security issues, w hether this refers to  the income gap, unem ploym ent or poverty. 
As can be seen from the income gap d a ta  above, sensitivity intensified after the 
change of regime (either because of the structu ral changes or the worsening of 
conditions of living). Opinions emphasising the acute nature  of the social problem s 
a t hand had become more general in every one of the investigated areas up to  the
1994 change of governm ent. The slight drop shown by the figures for 1995 is no 
sm all p art due to the fact th a t those having voted for the H ungarian Socialist P arty  
(H SP), a party  which had shown a strong sense of social responsibility earlier, pu t 
less em phasis on the priority of social issues once the HSP came to  power.
W hile, as dem onstrated by our earlier analyses, the social base of privatisation  
correlated mainly w ith the more well-to-do stra ta , the inverse tendency observable 
in connection with the priority ranking of social security  was even more m arked. 
T he m ost eager members of the group insisting on social security considerations 
were those with a low level of education, a low level of income, village dwellers and 
the old. In other words, these were people who had had little  or no reserves a t the 
outset of the change of regime, and whose labour m arket position and com petition 
chances had deteriorated considerably owing to the s tru c tu ra l transition  to  m arket 
economy.6
6 Ferge (1996) reached conclusions th a t  are sim ilar in several respects, b u t on th e  basis of 
in te rn atio n al com parisons.
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The opinions in question are thus m otivated, in the final analysis, by exis­
tential interest. G roups with a lower social s ta tus are more vulnerable and more in 
need of the protection provided by the social distribution systems— however poor 
th a t may be— and, understandably, they have more reservations concerning the 
expansion of a m arket economy. As for the other pole, those in a superior social 
position and more capable of profiting from the opportunities presented by m arket 
economy are less concerned about the weakening of the social net.
W hile the above a ttitudes are governed by interest in the first place, more 
general views emphasising the responsibility of the government in trim m ing social 
differences originate from the value system, and ideological traditions. O ur survey 
carried ou t before the 1994 elections investigated the priority ranking of government 
activities in several areas. One possible choice, offered by a series of questions 
graded on a seven-point scale, was th a t “it is an essential task of the government 
to  trim  social inequalities” ; the direct opposite of this choice was represented by 
“governm ent should not concern itself a t all with diminishing social inequalities” . 
T he intensity of the social charge and the strength of the conditioning involved is 
indicated by the fact th a t, for once, the m ajority of the answers concentrated on 
one pole, th a t of social responsibility. (The average score on the 1-7 scale was— i.e. 
68 percent of those expressing an opinion on this issue urged a lessening of social 
inequalities and only 9 percent voted for the opposite.) The fact th a t the opinions 
in question show practically no correlation with the objective background factors is 
indicative of a strong ideological motive and the relative unim portance of interest 
in this case. On the other hand, lack of (either positive or negative) correlation may 
be a sign of the inconsistent nature of the opinions involved, or the co-existence of 
contrary views. Many of the most com m itted proponents of m arket economy agree 
th a t government should be held responsible for the reduction of social inequalities. 
A lthough this requirem ent cannot be considered a crucial organising element of the 
econom ic/social a ttitudes in question, it cannot be disregarded either. This is due 
to  the simple reason th a t it allows representatives of the social security cam p to 
refer to  this “common denom inator” as a generally accepted legitim ate premise.
An empirical typology of attitudes toward transition to market economy, 1995
The above analyses have focused on certain partia l moments of the various 
a ttitu d es to transition  to m arket economy (such as the property issue or the op­
tim um  scope of m arket relations). Mention has been made several tim es of their 
interconnections as well. A lthough, essentially, the empirical results are in good 
agreem ent with the theoretically posited “clear types” , they are too loose for the at- 
titud inal tra its  in question to fit into simple (e.g. pro-m arket/anti-m arket) patterns. 
As we have seen, the basic distributions themselves also suggest a quasi-perm anent
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co-existence of contradictory rather than  com plem entary views in public opinion. 
T hus, for instance, m any urge the closing down of loss-making plants and the  elim­
ination of unem ploym ent a t the same time. O thers feel th a t assistance to  m arket 
economy may as well be associated with preferences to  the domestic proprietary  
s tra tu m  as w ith the encouragem ent of capital im ports. Consequently, neither the 
possible configurations resulting from  combinations of personal a ttitudes and views, 
nor the size and com position of the social groups associated w ith each are easy to 
identify.
It was in order to  resolve these issues th a t we drew up an em pirical typology 
based on the d a ta  of the last, 1995, survey (to  be precise, on the eight item s of the 
already m entioned question series, including two on FDI inflow and any preferences 
to  be granted  to  domestic cap ita l).7 The 1995 database was selected for two reasons: 
topicality and the assum ption th a t, in principle, a ttitu d es would crystallise w ith 
the progress of privatisation and the enrichm ent of the relevant experiences.8
Five types were identified th a t could be assigned to  three m ajor categories 
by orientation . Two types— including approxim ately one-seventh of the sam ple 
of the adu lt population—belonged to  the liberal field, the kernel of the supporter 
base of m arket economy. Types 3 and 4— i.e. some two-fifth of the those surveyed 
altogether— share a certain anti-capitalistic stand  and thus a definite aversion to  the 
spreading of private property. The largest population segm ent, nearly 50 percent, 
is characterised by the am bivalent a ttitu d e  referred to  earlier: they accept and 
support the  introduction of private property in Hungary, bu t wish to  lim it m arket 
com petition and are especially sensitive to the problem s of unem ploym ent and 
poverty.
Let us now have a closer look at the profiles of the five types.9 Type 1, 
which gathers together the “pro-dom estic-capital” 11 percent of the H ungarian 
population, differs m arkedly from the nearest category i.e. “socio-liberal” T ype 2, 
which accounts for 3 percent. W hile members of both types consider the growth of 
the num ber of private proprietors and of small enterprises to be a highly desirable 
phenom enon, those in the “pro-dom estic-capital” group, however, urge preferences 
to  domestic buyers in company privatisation, and are not really enthusiastic about 
the  influx of foreign capital. A t the same tim e, they show a very liberal a ttitu d e  to 
the social consequences of the spreading of m arket economy. They do not consider 
it im perative to halt unem ploym ent, nor do they see poverty as a priority social 
problem.
7 T he last two item s are  as follows: a) The influx of foreign cap ita l should be p rom oted  by all 
possible m eans., b ) Dom estic buyers should be given preference in  th e  selling-off of com panies.
8 As for th e  technical im plem entation , a  five-cluster typology of non-hierarchical c lu s te r analyses 
was used  via th e  Q uick C luster app lication  of the  SPSS program m e package.
9For th e  specific c luste r com ponents see Angelusz and  T ardos (1996).
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Members of Type 2, on the other hand, show a m arkedly liberal a ttitu d e  
to  FDI inflow and, in accordance with tha t, definitely reject the idea of giving 
preference to  potential domestic buyers. They take a firm stand  on the issue of 
the closing down of loss-making plants, in spite of the fact th a t they are much 
m ore sensitive to  the social concom itants of m arket economy than  those in the 
previous group. They consider both unemployment and poverty very serious social 
problem s indeed. The “socio-liberal” tag of this type actually  refers to  this special 
com bination of attitudes ra ther than  to  a particular political orientation (although, 
as we shall see later on, it is not radically opposed to  th a t either).
The opposite pole consists of Type 3, the “social anti-capitalists” , who re­
jec t m ost definitely practically all m anifestations of m arket economy and insist on 
m aintaining a protective social umbrella. Members of this group pu t up the fiercest 
opposition to the spreading of private property, small property included, and they 
are the ones who p ro test most vociferously about the influx of foreign capital. They 
reject the closing down of loss-making plants— in th a t they are unique— and argue 
aggressively for lim iting the m arket. In view of this profile, it is not surprising th a t 
they should consider poverty a top priority problem.
Although in many respects Type 4 gathers together the “anti-capitalists” and 
is akin to the previous type, its profile is more particular. Members of the group 
share the aversion of those in Type 3 to  private property, bu t are less opposed to 
elim inating loss-making production. (A more detailed breakdown shows th a t there 
are less industria l/factory  workers among them, and their personal involvement 
is less marked, too.) Let us remark th a t “efficiency” is a slogan th a t has been 
inscribed on the flag of reform thinking for two or three decades, and has become 
som ething of a cliché in the meantime; this is one of the reasons why only the s tra ta  
most exposed to  unemployment are prepared to oppose it head-on. Paradoxically, 
em phasis on the winding up of loss-making enterprises co-exists peacefully w ith the 
aspiration of this type to  halt unemployment th a t is a direct or indirect th rea t to 
them  as well.
Finally, the characteristics of Type 5 include the “inconsistents” , who bear 
the tra its  of ideological movements of different roots associated w ith different eras, 
and dem onstrate the typical eclecticism of everyday thinking even more. Mem­
bers of this group, mostly belonging to  the older generations, have a trad itional 
respect for private property and insist on the social priorities of the K ádár era 
simultaneously. The predominance of one or another element of this m ixture of 
superim posed ideological views in this far-from-atypical m entality group always 
depends on the situation.
A description of the socio-demographic characteristics of each type will make 
it easier to  understand their respective profiles. The following table highlights the 
m ost typical representatives of each type.
The objective background of the two liberally-minded categories, Types 1 and
2, are clearly different from the block exhibiting ambivalent or negative a ttitudes to
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Table 7
Socio-demographic characteristics of the typology of attitudes 
to market economy transition
Sex, age and education
m ale fe­
male
-3 0 30 -
44
4 5-
59
6 0 - - 8
forms
8
forms
second­
ary
school
un iver­
sity
degree
100
p er­
cent
“dom estic cap ita l” 60 40 27 41 23 9 2 23 40 35 100
“soc-lib .” 51 49 22 40 26 12 0 44 30 26 100
“so c ./an ti-cap ." 47 53 18 35 33 24 10 46 29 15 100
“an ti-cap .” 45 55 24 36 23 17 7 49 35 10 100
“inconsisten t” 51 49 23 27 22 28 11 56 25 8 100
Settlem ent type, earning, p roperty  sta tus
capi­
tal
coun­
try
town
vil­
lage
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q i Q2 Q3 Q4 100
per­
cent
“dom estic cap ita l” 29 51 20 17 13 21 49 8 15 22 56 100
“soc-lib .” 27 53 19 18 16 28 38 8 18 41 33 100
“so c ./an ti-cap .” 20 51 29 23 25 24 28 26 29 26 18 100
“an ti-cap .” 17 48 36 20 28 24 27 24 27 25 24 100
“inconsisten t” 20 42 38 27 29 24 20 29 30 22 19 100
m arket economy, the main distinctive features being possession/lack of resources 
(cf. education, earning, property). The m ajority  of those belonging to  the  first 
types are urban people, w ith capital dwellers constitu ting a decisive segm ent.
There is also a certain difference in term s of resources between Types 1 and
2. From the point of view of property ownership especially, m embers of the “do­
mestic cap ita l” group are clearly quite well off, whereas those in the “socio-liberal” 
type are positioned lower than  th a t. A t the same time, on the basis of the relevant 
em ploym ent d a ta  (not quoted above) it could be said th a t the  “dom estic cap ita l” 
type includes much more active people, and a  much larger proportion of indepen­
dents am ong them ; the “socio-liberals” , on the other hand, have more pensioners 
and skilled workers. The term  “domestic capital” groups those segm ents of the 
population (youth and males especially) whose abilities/skills are m ost favourable 
for entrepreneurial activities and m arket participation.
From the point of view of resources, m embers of the “inconsistent” group 
are in the m ost disadvantageous position. The “anti-capitalists” tend to  have a 
som ew hat be tter education than  the “socio-anti-capitalists” , bu t are sim ilar to them
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in m any respects. The latter, however, are mostly urban people and, as indicated 
by the employment data , the inactive groups are more highly represented am ong 
them . The “anti-capitalist” group, endorsing a som ewhat more to leran t a ttitu d e  
to  m arket economy in certain respects, consists of relatively younger people, w ith 
a larger segment of (medium-level) intellectuals. The proportion of women is also 
higher in this la tte r segment.
Finally, there is a certain correlation with party  preferences. Two parlia­
m entary  parties, the SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Dem ocrats), and M DF are over­
represented in the “domestic capital” type. As for the “socio-liberals” , the  fol­
lowers of SZDSZ and of FIDESZ-M PP (Association of Free D em ocrats-H ungarian 
Civic Party ) score higher than  the average (the followers of the H ungarian Socialist 
P arty  are close to the average in both cases). The “anti-capitalist” a ttitu d e  is most 
characteristic of the electorate of the Smallholders, while the “inconsistents” are 
relatively evenly distributed among the parties.
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MANAGERPATHS 
Hungarian Enterprise and Bank Leaders at the Beginning of the 
Postcommunist Transformation1
A. BARTH A—J. P. MARTIN
Research into élite groups comprises one of the most im portan t topics related 
to  the present transform ation of Central and Eastern European countries. Beside 
the obvious em pirical relevance, the im portance of élite theories can be a ttrib u ted  
to  their peculiar theoretical sta tus: they make a bridge between the respective 
theories concerning power and institutions. The élite, by definition the m inority 
which disposes the key positions in the m ost im portan t decision-making processes 
of a society (Aron 1950), is no t passive, bu t represents an active force in the process 
of institu tional change; the social composition of élites, their social resources and 
behaviour strongly influence the path  and the speed of this institu tional transfor­
m ation.
Our theses are based on two pieces of survey-type research;2 we analysed the 
recruitm ent, the career patterns and the attitudes towards privatisation in two seg­
m ents of the economic élite: among large corporation’s m anagers and bank leaders, 
respectively. Beyond the description of these phenom ena, we also tried to test the 
validity of some theories concerning the interrelation between the restructuring  of 
ruling economic élites and the institu tional transform ation.
In this respect, we focus on four im portan t theories. The theory of structural 
compensation ( Nee 1989) emphasises the growing role of the m eritocratic  criteria, 
first of all w ith respect to education; in Nee’s view, during the period of the transi­
tion élite recruitm ent is characterised by the dom inant role of m arket mechanisms as 
opposed to  the formerly unique state-bureaucratic  type career pa ttern s. Szelényi’s 
theory (Szelényi 1990) about the interrupted embourgeoisement accentuates the 
im portance of family background: according to  this approach, the m em bers of the
1T h e  au thors express th e ir g ra titu d e  to György Lengyel  an d  P é te r  Vidor for th e ir  useful 
advices.
2T he recru itm en t, th e  iden tity  an d  th e  value-orientation of the  H ungarian  economic é lite  were 
exam ined in  the  first m onths of 1990 and in the  last m onths of 1993 un d er György Lengyel's 
research leadership. T he subsam ple of com pany leaders is representative for s ta te  enterprises w ith 
over 300 employees and  for private  enterprises w ith over 50 employees w ith respect to  counties 
and  industria l branches. In th e  case of the  bank  segm ent, the  d a ta  collection is com plete. In 
each ban k , and  in each industria l corporation  th e  chief executive officers or th e ir  deputies were 
interview ed. T he files contain ing  th e  collected d a ta  (HUMAN .SYS and  HECEL.SY S) are  a t  the 
D ep artm en t of Sociology of th e  B udapest University of Econom ics. For the  d a ta  in te rp re ta tio n  we 
used th e  following sta tis tica l m ethods: crosstab  analysis, loglinear analysis, analysis of variance, 
principle com ponent analysis an d  logistic regression.
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economic élite are often recruited among the people who have had “quasi-m arket” 
experiences in the “second economy” , where they got an opportunity  to  survive 
their parental or even more grandparental heritages: namely, their precom m unist 
m arket-com patible abilities and habits. In Szalay’s theory (Szalai 1990), which fo­
cuses on the phenomenon called technocratic continuity, the technocratic cadres of 
the 80’s, due to their professionalism, are able to m aintain their leading positions. 
Finally, we have to  mention Hankiss’s (1989) power conversion theory: according 
to  this approach, the political capital coming from the sta te  socialist period (e.g. 
s ta te  party  membership, especially leading political positions) is a resource which 
can be converted into economic capital in the postcom m unist period.
Recruitment types
In 1990 corporation leaders were recruited mainly from the middle or the 
older generation: their average age was around 48. Considering the focus of this 
research, the m ost surprising phenomenon was the high ratio  (nearly 2 /3) of en­
gineers, which strongly surpassed the ratio of economists (22 percent). The ratio  
of incongruent leaders—those people who held an élite position, although their 
educational qualification was only elementary or secondary— was low (5 percent).
A t the tim e of the change of the political system  the social origins of corpo­
ration  leaders provided evidence th a t there was in fact significant intergene rational 
mobility. More than half of their parents had, at most, a  qualification from a 
prim ary school; those who came from qualified families (i.e. with at least an MA 
degree) am ounted to  a proportion of under ten percent. The occupational position 
of m others indicates this mobility most vividly: 58 percent had gone into retire­
m ent after being a housewife, and nearly 20 percent were unskilled workers. Most 
of these corporation leaders were born in small villages, and a large m ajority  of 
them  were members of w hat was then the sta te  party  (i.e. the Hungarian Socialist 
W orkers’ Party).
There was no significant change in the age composition of m anagers until 
1993: then their average age was about 46. On the one hand, we can explain the 
lack of generational change by pointing to rejuvenation which occurred during the 
80’s (Lengyel 1992). On the other, we have to  accentuate th a t the development of 
the new m arket institu tions and the private sector did not affect the m anagers’ age 
com position to  any great extent.
In 1993, the intergenerational mobility shows a lower level than a t the begin­
ning of the system  transform ation. The ratio of people who came from qualified 
families had grown considerably (by more than 20 percent). Therefore, the m an­
agerial segm ents of the Hungarian economic élite had become more of a closed 
form ation than it had been in 1990. The ratio  of people coming from industrial
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and agrarian worker families had strongly decreased and the im portance of former 
com m unist party  m embership was lower (the change was 12 percent). Since the 
first free parliam entary  election in 1990, evidence suggests th a t m anagers prefer 
to  keep themselves away from politics: only 7 percent were m embers of a political 
party  in 1993.
Continuous or system  change careers
A round about the  period 1992-1993, the power conflict between the  m em bers 
of the “new technocracy” and the members of the “new clientele”— i.e. those people 
who came to power after 1990 thanks to  the new government— becam e more acute 
(Szalai 1994), and caused sensitive political problems. The m ain issue of debate was 
w hether the acquisition of an economic élite position was a ttached to  the political 
transition  or to  professionalism.
The career pa tterns show th a t nearly 2 /3  of the bank and corporation leaders 
of 1993 had  held the same or a similar position before 1990: thus their careers can be 
considered to  be continuous. On the other hand, we can define another significant 
m anagerial group: nearly 1/3 of the m anagers got their state-ow ned corporation 
leading position after 1990. We call these type of professional paths system change 
careers (Figure 1).
Continuous System change Other
Fig. 1 Division of corporation leaders in 1993 (percentages)
T he career pa tterns illustrate significant variance w ith respect to  age cohorts; 
the average age of those m anagers with continuous careers strongly surpasses the 
average age of the  m anagers w ith system  change careers: the difference is about ten 
years. More than  half of the m anagers with system  change careers were under 40, 
while 51 percent of m anagers w ith continuous careers belong to  the generation of
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the fifties ( Figure 2). The career types have a noticeable variance also according to 
qualification types: economists are strongly overrepresented am ong m anagers w ith 
continuous career patterns.
Continuous System change
■ 31-40 a  41-50 E3 51-60 D 6 0 - [
Fig. 2 Career patterns of managers in 1993 according to age cohorts (percentages)
There is a significant correlation between the career types and “m ultiposi­
tionality” : this refers to  managers w ith system  change careers who are more likely 
to  be m em bers of a board of directors or some other supervisory board. Partly, 
this phenom enon can be explained with the positional redistribution. However, we 
have to  emphasise th a t the system  change career pattern  correlates highly w ith the 
younger age cohorts and a qualification in economics or in engineering-economics. 
Meanwhile, the continuous careers correlate highly w ith the older age cohorts, the 
qualification in engineering, the smaller private-owned enterprises (from the per­
spective of the ownership type in which the élite position is fulfilled) and the absence 
of m em bership on boards of directors or supervisory boards. In this respect, we 
have to  underline th a t the big state-owned corporations were still proving to  be 
a ttrac tiv e  in 1993; the young m anagers with system change career pa tterns were 
able to  acquire their new élite positions mainly in state-owned companies.
Qualification: advance of the economists
A t the beginning of the systemic change the level of educational qualification 
was one of the m ost im portan t dividing lines within the economic élite. The career 
opportun ities of engineers continued to  deteriorate significantly in the 80’s; m ean­
while economists played a more and more im portan t role: they were able to  gain 
the new positions in the continuously growing banking sector and in the political
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sphere. In the m eantim e, the engineers were pushed into the background, even in 
the  sphere of corporations. This tendency has continued throughout the period of 
transition  ( Table 1). In the sphere of Parliam ent, and to  a lesser degree in pri­
vate enterprises too, besides economists, lawyers also form a considerable group. 
Lawyers have gained considerable ground in contrast to  the situation  of engineers. 
Finally, we have to  m ention the possible “transform ation” of some engineers: many 
of them  also have a diploma in economics, and thus they can m aintain their élite 
position in corporations; furtherm ore, they can also com pete for the banking élite 
positions.
Table 1
Qualification types according to segments in 1993 (percentages)
Segm ent
T ype of qualification
State-ow ned
companies
P rivate
companies
Banks M inistries P arliam en t
Engineers 45.2 34.3 1.6 10.9 28.2
Econom ists 2.8 40.3 77.4 71.7 28.2
Engineer-econom ists 17.5 1.5 6.5 2.2 2.6
O ther 13.5 23.9 14.5 15.2 41.0
From the H ungarian Household Panel analysis (Kolosi, Szívós and Bedekovics 
1993) we know th a t in the period 1989-1992 the rise in the higher and middle 
leaders’ respective nominal salaries was very significant: it strongly surpassed the 
rise of the Hungarian average. According to  our da ta , the average of the economic 
élites’ personal net income is twice th a t of the average of the higher and middle 
leaders in general. However, the qualification types show strong differences even 
inside the economic élite: for example, the average income of economists is 1.5 times 
greater than  th a t of engineers. This is partly  because of the sectoral division— the 
salary of the bank leaders is particularly  high, and in this sector the economists 
are overrepresented. However, the econom ists’ average income is higher even in the 
sector of corporations; moreover, the estim ation of future income p a tte rns showed 
a clear pessim ism  among the engineers of state-owned companies.
Network capital and multipositionality
The formal network capital of postcom m unist m anagers is based on positions 
in professional associations, on boards of directors and supervisory boards. On 
the other hand, we can draw im portan t conclusions from the respective advisory 
activities of the central government and local governments. The m anagerial élite
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rarely gives advice; this phenomenon is rather an element of the political élite. 
Nevertheless, the government advisors are recruited only from the economists, who 
are bank leaders in m ost cases.
Right from the beginning of the transition, the m ultipositionality— i.e. m em ­
bership of the boards of directors and supervisory boards of banks and corpora­
tions— has been the most im portant factor of the network capital. An alternative 
network resource—often continuous compared to the sta te  socialist period— has 
its roots in the professional associations (e.g. E ntrepreneurs’ National Association 
(VOSZ), Industrial Leaders’ National Association (GYOSZ)). 55 percent of the 
banking and m anagerial élite are members of a professional association, and 51 
percent are members of boards of directors or supervisory boards. Some of them  
have “accum ulated” the positions: there is a m anager who is mem ber of six pro­
fessional associations, and there is a bank leader who is member of eight different 
boards of directors or supervisory boards (Fig. 3).
m Engineers h Economists m Engineer-economists E3 Other
Fig. 3  Average membership in professional associations (PROFAS) and boards of direc­
tors or supervisory boards (DIRSUP)
M ultipositionality, as well as membership of professional associations, has a 
significant variance according to the type of qualification. M ultipositionality char­
acterizes economists; meanwhile, engineers, engineer-economists and the leaders 
w ith o ther qualifications are more likely to  have a position in professional associa­
tions. This phenomenon can again be explained mainly with the sectoral effect: 4 /5  
of bank leaders had a m ultiple position in board of directors or supervisory boards; 
furtherm ore, they generated connections between their own bank and other corpo­
rations. These connections provide— besides the significant formal power— bigger
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personal income to the bank leaders, and thus we can repeat our hypothesis about 
the privileged situation  of bankers (and economists).
Criteria of success
The network capital is an im portan t, but not exclusive criterion of the success 
of corporation leaders. According to  the self-evaluation of the m anagers we can 
differentiate three success-factors: qualifications, network capital and leadership 
skills.
Among the qualification factors the m anagers stressed the im portance of eco­
nomic knowledge. In their opinion, the usefulness of the engineering type of knowl­
edge is low, while legal knowledge is nearly as im portan t as economic knowledge. 
They consider the role of the networks to  be even more im portant; they emphasize 
especially the im portance of business relationships, although they also m ention the 
significance of power (i.e. political-adm inistrative) networks.
The leaders of state-ow ned companies place less im portance upon the above 
three factors than  the leaders of private enterprises. The bigger difference arises 
over question of leadership skills: the leaders of private companies have more ap­
preciation for comm unication with employees and loyalty to the company. The 
difference is even higher with regard to types of qualification. Engineers and 
engineer-economists have a low estim ation of the im portance of personal relation­
ships while, according to  economists and lawyers, this factor is the m ost im portan t. 
On the other hand, the economists—who have the best qualifications in the labour 
m arket— regard the qualifications as negligible, while they appreciate leadership 
skills very highly.
Nevertheless, opinion of the  m anageral élites is unanim ous: econom ists are 
more likely to  be successful company leaders than  any other élite-type individual. 
They have a  clear advantage due to  their qualifications; moreover, their in stitu ­
tional network capital is also better. Not surprisingly, they are more satisfied than  
engineers (who also have to  cope with their complex “lack of education” ).
Attitudes towards privatization
T he overwhelming m ajority of the economic élite were already in favour of 
the dominance of private ownership in 1990 ( Bartha and Martin 1997). A lthough 
during the three years up until 1993 the reality changed significantly, the opinion 
of m anagers hardly changed at all. According to  alm ost half of the m anagers, the 
dom inance of private ownership was desirable. One ten th  of the leaders voted for 
the dom inance of sta te  ownership, while 41 percent said th a t the sta te  should not
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own anything a t all. The opinion with respect to the desirable form of ownership 
was influenced by the variables of origin, age, qualifications, financial s ituation  and 
ex-communist party  membership. Our research work shows th a t m anagers with 
working class origins ceteris paribus prefer sta te  ownership significantly more than 
o ther groups. They do not have any sym pathy for a “watchdog” role for the state. 
T his can be explained by the way in which m anagers w ith working class origins 
were raised in the period of sta te  socialism.
Leaders above fifty also claimed to  be more in favour of sta te  ownership. Their 
opinions show th a t their accum ulated resources could be better converted if there 
is a certain level of sta te  ownership in the economy. The qualifications of managers 
also have an im pact on their attitudes. Not surprisingly, economists prefer private 
ownership as opposed to leaders with other qualifications. As has already been 
pointed out, the value of a dip lom áin economics has increased considerably with the 
growth of the private economy. It might seem surprising th a t former communists 
prefer a  dom inantly private economic system. However, their hope is th a t the 
conversion of their political capital and the further expansion of the private sector 
will ensure th a t they can keep their elite position.
There are two m ethods for the increasing of the extent of the private sector. 
T he first is to  encourage private entrepreneurships, the second is the transfer of 
sta te  assets to  private owners. According to our data, two-thirds of top managers 
though t th a t the transfer of sta te  assets to private owners should be speeded up. 
In the opinion of one ten th , privatization should be slowed down, and one fifth 
sta ted  th a t the current speed was satisfactory. Only two percent said th a t the 
privatization process should be stopped. This a ttitude  variable was influenced by 
origin and personal net m onthly income. The higher the social s ta tu s  and income 
of the m anager, the more m arket-oriented is his a ttitude.
It is not only the speed, but also the method of privatization which divides 
the opinions of enterprise leaders. From the second half of 1992 until the beginning 
of 1994, a specific situation was m aintained in the privatization process. On the 
one hand, self-privatization m eant the possibility of buy-outs by existing m anagers 
holding particularly  strong positions. In fact, self-privatization was like a type of 
decentralization. On the other hand, the process was dom inated by sta te  central­
ization w ith respect to the field appointm ent rights ( Voszka 1994). The notion of 
decentralized privatization has continued to  find favour in the minds of economic 
decision-makers, in spite of the fact th a t the process of privatization has been led 
by the government.
In 1993, half of the top m anagers were of the opinion th a t privatization re­
ally should take place under the auspices of the government, and according to  44 
percent the right to transfer sta te  assets could be delegated to the enterprises. A 
significant proportion of corporation leaders wanted greater autonom y in the pri­
vatization process. M anagers of working class origin and leaders with high incomes 
wanted the government to conduct the privatization process. For the former group
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sta te  intervention was very im portan t in their “la ten t b a ttle” against to ta l privati­
sation. The second group were more interested in stabilizing their own financial 
situations. The m ultipositional leaders preferred decentralized privatization  be­
cause they thought th a t in this way (i.e. w ithout sta te  interference) their privileges 
could be increased more easily.
T he a ttitu d e  of m anagers with regard to  ownership form and privatization 
were fragm ented first of all according to social origin, and to  a lesser ex ten t by mul­
tipositionality  and income variables. The leaders of working class origin preferred 
privatization w ith m oderate speed, and under the auspices of the government. How­
ever, leaders w ith m ultiple élite positions and also those with higher personal net 
incomes were in favour of rapid privatization. It is rem arkable th a t the ownership 
form did not influence this a ttitu d e  a t all. There were no significant differences in 
the opinions of sta te  and private managers.
*
The career types of the economic élite are structured  according to  three di­
mensions: their possibilities are influenced by social origin, qualifications and mul­
tipositionality. T he m anagers with intellectual origins, m embership of several su­
pervisory and directory boards, and a diplom a in economic sciences are the most 
successful.
Considering our theoretical s tarting  point, we can sta te  th a t on the one hand, 
the theory of technocratic continuity has a great explanatory force for our own 
findings; on the other hand, the descriptive element of the theory of in terrup ted  
embourgeoisem ent is also valid in the field of recruitm ent, with regard to  career 
possibilities, and with reference to  the attitudes of the managers. In contrast to  the 
s tru c tu ra l com pensation theory, in the first years of the transition  we cannot speak 
about the overwhelming im portance of the m eritocratic criteria, although the value 
of a diplom a in economic science has increased and th a t of technical qualifications 
decreased. The structu ra l com pensation of private entrepreneurs recruited from  the 
second economy was an illusion because evidence shows th a t their social capital has 
not been particularly  effective during the privatization process. Power conversion 
becam e possible only for a small proportion of m anagers, who had high personal 
net income, a diplom a in economic sciences and m ultiple élite positions. T his group 
wanted quick privatization with m inimum sta te  interference.
Relatively quick privatization led by the governm ent had reached its last 
phase by 1997. Also, in the next stage of the economic transform ation we expect 
th a t the value orientation of top managers will adap t not to  the laws of a latent 
economic order, bu t to the new challenges.
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